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The War against Japan #1
History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series: Official Campaign History: The War Against Japan Volume I: The Loss of Singapore
The first of five volumes of the 18-volume official British History of the Second World War dealing with the war against Japan; this book describes the fall of Britain's Far Eastern Hong Kong, Borneo, Malaya, and finally the fortress island of Singapore - perhaps the greatest single British disaster of the entire war. The authors pin the blame for the loss of Britain's Asian empire on the neglect of its defences between the wars, and on the Government's preoccupation with saving Britain itself in 1940. In the authors' opinion, 'the campaign in Malaya was lost before it begun', at least partly because of the ineptitude of the authorities on the spot. The book describes Japan's plans for imperial aggrandisement at the expense of vulnerable British and Dutch colonies in the region, and the rapid collapse of the European empires before the lightning Japanese advance. The loss of the British warships 'Prince of Wales' and 'Repulse', complementing the disasters onshore, and the disappearance of so many men - British, Australian and other Commonwealth nations - into the horrors of Japanese captivity, complete the sad story of one of Britain's lowest points in the Second World War. With 27 appendices illustrating the strength and structure of the forces engaged, the book is generously illustrated with 28 maps and sketches and 26 photographs.
- GenresHistory
688 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 1957
About the author
Stanley Woodburn Kirby
6 books1 followerMajor General Stanley Woodburn Kirby, CB, CMG, CIE, OBE, MC & Bar, was a British Army officer who served in both World Wars.
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July 12, 2025
Given its prominence in their nation’s mythos today, many Americans might be surprised to learn that Japan’s main target in the war they launched on December 7, 1941 was not the United States, but the British Empire. While the war began with their attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, this was done mainly to give Japanese forces a free hand in their conquest of the resource-rich British possessions in Southeast Asia. Along with their neighboring Dutch-controlled territories, they would give Japan the resources they needed to maintain their dominance in East Asia and continue their ongoing war in China.
Japan’s longstanding desire for these resources was far from a secret to the British, who had spent nearly two decades preparing for such a conflict. When it came, though, the outcome was a disaster, as landings went unopposed, defensive positions collapsed before inferior numbers of the enemy, and the great naval base in Singapore, the “Gibraltar of the East” surrendered little more than two months after the Japanese invaded the peninsula. For the first volume in the United Kingdom’s official history of their war in the Far East and the Pacific, Stanley Woodburn Kirby offers an anatomy of the campaign that describes in considerable detail how this collapse unfolded, which he combines with an assessment of the many factors that brought about such a devastating defeat to British imperial forces.
Kirby begins by addressing the development of British defense policy in the region in the years leading up to the war. As he explains, concerns about a possible conflict with Japan grew with the end of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1922, which until then had been an important element in British strategic policy in the region. Here he places more weight than is justified by the end of the treaty, as he overlooks how the growing incompatibility of the imperial interests of the two powers predated the alliance’s termination, making it more of a symptom rather than a cause of the growing hostility between the two sides. With its end, however, the British government was forced to take imperial defense in the region more seriously, and began preparations for a possible conflict against the Japanese Empire.
These efforts centered around the development of Singapore into a naval base capable of supporting fleet operations. From the start, however, this was hindered by budgetary constraints and poor coordination between the three services. As long as the Japanese threat remained mainly theoretical, economy-minded British governments were reluctant to spend the sums necessary to develop their defenses in the region. Without a coordinated effort at the cabinet level, each service undertook their own planning, without regard for the considerations of the other branches. This most notoriously took the form of airfields sited by the Royal Air Force (RAF) with greater concern for their location and suitability for air operations rather than their defensibility against ground assault. The protection of these fields particularly mattered as air power loomed ever larger as a factor in British plans. Guarding Singapore against air attack increasingly meant defending the entire Malayan peninsula, lest the Japanese establish airfields from which to bomb the base. Until the fleet could reach the area to take up the defense of the region – which was estimated could take up to seventy days from the outbreak of hostilities – air power was seen as vital to these efforts.
Preparations grew more urgent with the outbreak of the war in Europe, which proved a double-edged sword for those tasked with securing the region. Aware that Japan might try to take advantage of Britain’s preoccupation with Nazi Germany, the planning and organization of defenses in the area became a top priority. Yet the pressures of the fighting – which grew exponentially with the fall of France – meant that the resources for these efforts were frequently diverted elsewhere. Trained personnel were reassigned to expand army units in India. Obsolete aircraft were sent as reinforcements instead of the modern bombers and fighters committed to the defense of the British Isles or the ongoing campaigns in North Africa. While the officers on the scene acknowledged the reality driving this, it nonetheless meant that much of their hopes for their success should war come rested on assumptions of the inferiority of their foe, despite the evidence from China and elsewhere demonstrating otherwise.
This meant that when Japan went to war against the British Empire, they did so against an enemy that was fully expecting them yet still unprepared for their confrontation. Commanders throughout the region found themselves in an impossible situation, where they were expected to defend imperial possessions with only limited resources. The folly of this was demonstrated almost immediately by the destruction on December 10 of Force Z, the two British capital ships that were sent to the region in a vain attempt to deter Japan. It soon proved a harbinger of what was to follow, as Japanese troops landed in the north and began a rapid conquest of the Malayan peninsula. Kirby painstakingly recounts this inexorable advance, noting how the pace of Japan’s assault and their growing command of the air rapidly eroded the morale of the undertrained imperial forces resisting them.
Though the British belatedly poured reinforcements into Malaya, the Japanese occupation of Johore in late January convinced Archibald Wavell, the head of the joint American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) command in the region, that Singapore was no longer defensible. After that, the best that could be hoped for was a protracted delaying action that would occupy Japanese forces and buy time to shore up defenses elsewhere. Though the commander of the British forces in Malaya, Arthur Percival, believed that Singapore could hold out for up to three months, he surrendered just a week after Japanese forces crossed the Johore Strait, followed soon afterwards by the remaining British and Dutch forces in the East Indies.
Though temporary, Britain’s defeat in Southeast Asia proved fatal to their empire in the region, as once it was lost the position and prestige on which their empire rested could never be regained. Given his focus, Kirby addresses this only in passing, devoting his analysis instead to the immediate events and their causes. For the most part, he his circumspect in his judgment, placing the blame for the defeat primarily on politically-driven interwar parsimony, which deprived the commanders in the region of the materiel they needed to resist successfully the Japanese advance. Given that many of the named participants were still alive when he wrote his book – and had the opportunity to provide feedback on its chapters – his discretion in calling out individual commanders for their errors is understandable. Yet no amount of tact can disguise the humiliation so carefully laid out in its pages. Detailed in its coverage and supplemented with an abundance of finely colored maps, Kirby’s book is a superb resource for anyone seeking to understand how Britain’s defenses in the region collapsed. Though other accounts may provide a more pointed assessment, none can match the sheer amount of information provided in this indispensable autopsy.
Japan’s longstanding desire for these resources was far from a secret to the British, who had spent nearly two decades preparing for such a conflict. When it came, though, the outcome was a disaster, as landings went unopposed, defensive positions collapsed before inferior numbers of the enemy, and the great naval base in Singapore, the “Gibraltar of the East” surrendered little more than two months after the Japanese invaded the peninsula. For the first volume in the United Kingdom’s official history of their war in the Far East and the Pacific, Stanley Woodburn Kirby offers an anatomy of the campaign that describes in considerable detail how this collapse unfolded, which he combines with an assessment of the many factors that brought about such a devastating defeat to British imperial forces.
Kirby begins by addressing the development of British defense policy in the region in the years leading up to the war. As he explains, concerns about a possible conflict with Japan grew with the end of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1922, which until then had been an important element in British strategic policy in the region. Here he places more weight than is justified by the end of the treaty, as he overlooks how the growing incompatibility of the imperial interests of the two powers predated the alliance’s termination, making it more of a symptom rather than a cause of the growing hostility between the two sides. With its end, however, the British government was forced to take imperial defense in the region more seriously, and began preparations for a possible conflict against the Japanese Empire.
These efforts centered around the development of Singapore into a naval base capable of supporting fleet operations. From the start, however, this was hindered by budgetary constraints and poor coordination between the three services. As long as the Japanese threat remained mainly theoretical, economy-minded British governments were reluctant to spend the sums necessary to develop their defenses in the region. Without a coordinated effort at the cabinet level, each service undertook their own planning, without regard for the considerations of the other branches. This most notoriously took the form of airfields sited by the Royal Air Force (RAF) with greater concern for their location and suitability for air operations rather than their defensibility against ground assault. The protection of these fields particularly mattered as air power loomed ever larger as a factor in British plans. Guarding Singapore against air attack increasingly meant defending the entire Malayan peninsula, lest the Japanese establish airfields from which to bomb the base. Until the fleet could reach the area to take up the defense of the region – which was estimated could take up to seventy days from the outbreak of hostilities – air power was seen as vital to these efforts.
Preparations grew more urgent with the outbreak of the war in Europe, which proved a double-edged sword for those tasked with securing the region. Aware that Japan might try to take advantage of Britain’s preoccupation with Nazi Germany, the planning and organization of defenses in the area became a top priority. Yet the pressures of the fighting – which grew exponentially with the fall of France – meant that the resources for these efforts were frequently diverted elsewhere. Trained personnel were reassigned to expand army units in India. Obsolete aircraft were sent as reinforcements instead of the modern bombers and fighters committed to the defense of the British Isles or the ongoing campaigns in North Africa. While the officers on the scene acknowledged the reality driving this, it nonetheless meant that much of their hopes for their success should war come rested on assumptions of the inferiority of their foe, despite the evidence from China and elsewhere demonstrating otherwise.
This meant that when Japan went to war against the British Empire, they did so against an enemy that was fully expecting them yet still unprepared for their confrontation. Commanders throughout the region found themselves in an impossible situation, where they were expected to defend imperial possessions with only limited resources. The folly of this was demonstrated almost immediately by the destruction on December 10 of Force Z, the two British capital ships that were sent to the region in a vain attempt to deter Japan. It soon proved a harbinger of what was to follow, as Japanese troops landed in the north and began a rapid conquest of the Malayan peninsula. Kirby painstakingly recounts this inexorable advance, noting how the pace of Japan’s assault and their growing command of the air rapidly eroded the morale of the undertrained imperial forces resisting them.
Though the British belatedly poured reinforcements into Malaya, the Japanese occupation of Johore in late January convinced Archibald Wavell, the head of the joint American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) command in the region, that Singapore was no longer defensible. After that, the best that could be hoped for was a protracted delaying action that would occupy Japanese forces and buy time to shore up defenses elsewhere. Though the commander of the British forces in Malaya, Arthur Percival, believed that Singapore could hold out for up to three months, he surrendered just a week after Japanese forces crossed the Johore Strait, followed soon afterwards by the remaining British and Dutch forces in the East Indies.
Though temporary, Britain’s defeat in Southeast Asia proved fatal to their empire in the region, as once it was lost the position and prestige on which their empire rested could never be regained. Given his focus, Kirby addresses this only in passing, devoting his analysis instead to the immediate events and their causes. For the most part, he his circumspect in his judgment, placing the blame for the defeat primarily on politically-driven interwar parsimony, which deprived the commanders in the region of the materiel they needed to resist successfully the Japanese advance. Given that many of the named participants were still alive when he wrote his book – and had the opportunity to provide feedback on its chapters – his discretion in calling out individual commanders for their errors is understandable. Yet no amount of tact can disguise the humiliation so carefully laid out in its pages. Detailed in its coverage and supplemented with an abundance of finely colored maps, Kirby’s book is a superb resource for anyone seeking to understand how Britain’s defenses in the region collapsed. Though other accounts may provide a more pointed assessment, none can match the sheer amount of information provided in this indispensable autopsy.
October 1, 2021
It took some wading through! But I guess that goes with being the Official HMSO history.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews