Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy

by Samuel Wheeler, Samuel Wheeler

In this collection of essays Samuel Wheeler discusses Derrida and other “deconstructive” thinkers from the perspective of an analytic philosopher willing to treat deconstruction as philosophy, taking it seriously enough to look for and analyze its arguments. The essays focus on the theory of meaning, truth, interpretation, metaphor, and the relationship of language to the world. Wheeler links the thought of Derrida to that of Davidson and argues for close affinities among Derrida, Quine, de Man, and Wittgenstein. He also demonstrates the propinquity of Plato and Derrida and shows that New Criticism shares deconstruction’s conception of language. Of the twelve essays in the collection, four are published here for the first time. The fundamental resemblance between Derrida and such analytic thinkers as Quine, Wittgenstein, and Davidson, the author argues, is that they deny the possibility of meanings as self-interpreting media constituting thoughts and intentions. Derrida argues that some form of magic language has determined the very project of philosophy, and his arguments work out the consequences of denying that there are such self-interpreting mental contents. In addition, Derrida and Davidson agree in denying any “given.” Without a given, questions about realism and idealism cease to have a point. Derrida and Davidson are both committed to the textuality of all significant marks, whether in neurons or on paper. They argue that there is no mode of representation more direct than language.

Genres: Philosophy

308 pages, Paperback

First published May 1, 2000

Reviews

[Michael J.J. Tiffany · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent work, which I greatly respect, though the author and I have different ideas about the value of deconstruction. If you're like me, you think of deconstruction as a fine way to spend a Sunday, a lousy way to reason about reality, and a selfish, destructive way to go about ethical reasoning. Wheeler doesn't change my mind, but he does demonstrate that deconstruction can be performed with rigor in the style of analytic philosophy. Then he has fun showing how analytical philosophers like Donaldson could be characterized as engaging in deconstruction. It's all good analytical fun, though my sympathies go out to Quine at even the hint that anyone could group him with Derrida.

[Spoust1 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Samuel Wheeler has attempted to bring together the analytic philosophy of language of W. V. O. Quine and Donald Davidson with the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man. What connects them, Wheeler argues, is their rejection of a “magic language”—that is, the idea that language represents something that is not itself linguistic and that would not itself call for interpretation. This is fairly plausible. It seems to me that there are still major differences between these thinkers that I wish Wheeler spent more time on but which, in the interest of rapprochement between analytic and continental philosophy, he does not. For example, Derrida and de Man follow Ferdinand de Saussure in thinking of language primarily as a code; Quine and Davidson do not think of language this way, and Davidson is explicit in rejecting it in “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs.” Additionally, Quine and Davidson are focused on language acquisition, and especially on the role of ostension (or pointing out) therein; and this is something quite foreign to Derrida and de Man. In brief: Wheeler may be too eager to bring all these thinkers together. I wish he found a way to express more of their points of disagreement.

The best essay in the collection is probably the essay on Davidson, de Man, and metaphor. This essay contains some creative rethinking of ideas from both Davidson and de Man.