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The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics
The Diffusion of Military Power examines how the financial and organizational challenges of adopting new methods of fighting wars can influence the international balance of power. Michael Horowitz argues that a state or actor wishing to adopt a military innovation must possess both the financial resources to buy or build the technology and the internal organizational capacity to accommodate any necessary changes in recruiting, training, or operations. How countries react to new innovations--and to other actors that do or don't adopt them--has profound implications for the global order and the likelihood of war.
Horowitz looks at some of the most important military innovations throughout history, including the advent of the all-big-gun steel battleship, the development of aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons, and the use of suicide terror by nonstate actors. He shows how expensive innovations can favor wealthier, more powerful countries, but also how those same states often stumble when facing organizationally complicated innovations. Innovations requiring major upheavals in doctrine and organization can disadvantage the wealthiest states due to their bureaucratic inflexibility and weight the balance of power toward smaller and more nimble actors, making conflict more likely. This book provides vital insights into military innovations and their impact on U.S. foreign policy, warfare, and the distribution of power in the international system.
Horowitz looks at some of the most important military innovations throughout history, including the advent of the all-big-gun steel battleship, the development of aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons, and the use of suicide terror by nonstate actors. He shows how expensive innovations can favor wealthier, more powerful countries, but also how those same states often stumble when facing organizationally complicated innovations. Innovations requiring major upheavals in doctrine and organization can disadvantage the wealthiest states due to their bureaucratic inflexibility and weight the balance of power toward smaller and more nimble actors, making conflict more likely. This book provides vital insights into military innovations and their impact on U.S. foreign policy, warfare, and the distribution of power in the international system.
264 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2010
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
June 29, 2025
As an institutionalist, I very much enjoyed Horowitz’s contribution to how militaries adopt technology innovation as dictated by organizational capacity and financial intensity. Rationalist IR theories assume technology adoption is seamless and based on state level competition, rather than technologies being contextual and complex, and disruption as something contingent on organization and capital as much as competition.
Formatting wise, this is an academic published book. The introduction contains the key theory + 4 chapters of case studies (battleship, suicide warfare, aircraft carrier, nuclear weapons) demonstrating how organizational+financial intensity dictate how militaries adopt innovation. As someone still learning more about military history, I enjoyed each case study in its own right though others may find the introduction sufficient.
Formatting wise, this is an academic published book. The introduction contains the key theory + 4 chapters of case studies (battleship, suicide warfare, aircraft carrier, nuclear weapons) demonstrating how organizational+financial intensity dictate how militaries adopt innovation. As someone still learning more about military history, I enjoyed each case study in its own right though others may find the introduction sufficient.
November 15, 2022
very good though if horowitz didn't need to get tenure I think this could've been a truly excellent book that let the case studies breathe a little without so much of the polysci baggage constraining the writing and narrative
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July 20, 2015Meh.
March 26, 2024
tl;dr: innovation/R&D means jack if you can't produce it at scale and diffuse it across your org, which is a function of how much financial intensity and organizational capacity you have to adopt and scale said technology
great historical tidbits and deep case studies on the production and diffusion of a few key military innovations in the past century, including carrier warfare, suicide terrorism, and nuclear power
great historical tidbits and deep case studies on the production and diffusion of a few key military innovations in the past century, including carrier warfare, suicide terrorism, and nuclear power
May 15, 2019
This is a book I’ve been meaning to read for quite some time, and I think it covers a topic of particular relevance. Fundamentally, the book seeks to determine the factors that enable state and non-state actors to adopt new military innovations, concluding that institutional flexibility and resource constraints are most salient.
Horowitz, through his “adoption-capacity theory,” argues that different innovations pose different challenges to adoption. For example, nuclear weapons, though resource-intensive, do not require serious doctrinal shifts or reorganizations. Aircraft carriers, however, are both costly and novel in the demands they place on naval war planners because they fundamentally change the tactics of naval warfare. This distinction is important because, Horowitz argues, it has implications for the distribution of military power. Resource intensive but non-revolutionary technology works to entrench existing powers, as it benefits strong, established states that can invest the requisite capital to reap the rewards. Novel technologies, by contrast, benefit rising powers with more flexible and nascent military structures. While entrenched great powers might be slow to adapt, younger powers can leap ahead by reorganizing to capitalize on new innovations.
I found the theory to be both intuitive and well-supported by the qualitative analysis in the book. However, I felt that more could be done. In particular, I wish that Horowitz offered an explicit definition of revolutionary military innovations. It would also have been helpful if he were clearer about what he means by “institutional flexibility.” He uses a very crude quantitative measure based on the time since a military defeat or regime change, which I believe fails to capture the nuances of bureaucratic change. Moreover, it is also a standard he fails to consistently apply to his qualitative work, which is full of caveats and exceptions. My final criticism is that the book reads too much like a dissertation – stylistic polish and more refined case studies would have been nice. Nevertheless, the substance of the book is engaging and convincing, and it covers a topic of imminent importance. So, while this is not the best book I’ve read this year, it is both readable and worth reading.
Horowitz, through his “adoption-capacity theory,” argues that different innovations pose different challenges to adoption. For example, nuclear weapons, though resource-intensive, do not require serious doctrinal shifts or reorganizations. Aircraft carriers, however, are both costly and novel in the demands they place on naval war planners because they fundamentally change the tactics of naval warfare. This distinction is important because, Horowitz argues, it has implications for the distribution of military power. Resource intensive but non-revolutionary technology works to entrench existing powers, as it benefits strong, established states that can invest the requisite capital to reap the rewards. Novel technologies, by contrast, benefit rising powers with more flexible and nascent military structures. While entrenched great powers might be slow to adapt, younger powers can leap ahead by reorganizing to capitalize on new innovations.
I found the theory to be both intuitive and well-supported by the qualitative analysis in the book. However, I felt that more could be done. In particular, I wish that Horowitz offered an explicit definition of revolutionary military innovations. It would also have been helpful if he were clearer about what he means by “institutional flexibility.” He uses a very crude quantitative measure based on the time since a military defeat or regime change, which I believe fails to capture the nuances of bureaucratic change. Moreover, it is also a standard he fails to consistently apply to his qualitative work, which is full of caveats and exceptions. My final criticism is that the book reads too much like a dissertation – stylistic polish and more refined case studies would have been nice. Nevertheless, the substance of the book is engaging and convincing, and it covers a topic of imminent importance. So, while this is not the best book I’ve read this year, it is both readable and worth reading.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews