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Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance
This myth shattering book reveals the methods Nouriel Roubini used to foretell the current crisis before other economists saw it coming and shows how those methods can help us make sense of the present and prepare for the future.
Renowned economist Nouriel Roubini electrified his profession and the larger financial community by predicting the current crisis well in advance of anyone else. Unlike most in his profession who treat economic disasters as freakish once-in-a-lifetime events without clear cause, Roubini, after decades of careful research around the world, realized that they were both probable and predictable. Armed with an unconventional blend of historical analysis and global economics, Roubini has forced politicians, policy makers, investors, and market watchers to face a long-neglected financial systems are inherently fragile and prone to collapse.
Drawing on the parallels from many countries and centuries, Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm, a professor of economic history and a New York Times Magazine writer, show that financial cataclysms are as old and as ubiquitous as capitalism itself. The last two decades alone have witnessed comparable crises in countries as diverse as Mexico, Thailand, Brazil, Pakistan, and Argentina. All of these crises-not to mention the more sweeping cataclysms such as the Great Depression-have much in common with the current downturn. Bringing lessons of earlier episodes to bear on our present predicament, Roubini and Mihm show how we can recognize and grapple with the inherent instability of the global financial system, understand its pressure points, learn from previous episodes of "irrational exuberance," pinpoint the course of global contagion, and plan for our immediate future. Perhaps most important, the authors-considering theories, statistics, and mathematical models with the skepticism that recent history warrants—explain how the world's economy can get out of the mess we're in, and stay out.
In Roubini's shadow, economists and investors are increasingly realizing that they can no longer afford to consider crises the black swans of financial history. A vital and timeless book, Crisis Economics proves calamities to be not only predictable but also preventable and, with the right medicine, curable.
Renowned economist Nouriel Roubini electrified his profession and the larger financial community by predicting the current crisis well in advance of anyone else. Unlike most in his profession who treat economic disasters as freakish once-in-a-lifetime events without clear cause, Roubini, after decades of careful research around the world, realized that they were both probable and predictable. Armed with an unconventional blend of historical analysis and global economics, Roubini has forced politicians, policy makers, investors, and market watchers to face a long-neglected financial systems are inherently fragile and prone to collapse.
Drawing on the parallels from many countries and centuries, Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm, a professor of economic history and a New York Times Magazine writer, show that financial cataclysms are as old and as ubiquitous as capitalism itself. The last two decades alone have witnessed comparable crises in countries as diverse as Mexico, Thailand, Brazil, Pakistan, and Argentina. All of these crises-not to mention the more sweeping cataclysms such as the Great Depression-have much in common with the current downturn. Bringing lessons of earlier episodes to bear on our present predicament, Roubini and Mihm show how we can recognize and grapple with the inherent instability of the global financial system, understand its pressure points, learn from previous episodes of "irrational exuberance," pinpoint the course of global contagion, and plan for our immediate future. Perhaps most important, the authors-considering theories, statistics, and mathematical models with the skepticism that recent history warrants—explain how the world's economy can get out of the mess we're in, and stay out.
In Roubini's shadow, economists and investors are increasingly realizing that they can no longer afford to consider crises the black swans of financial history. A vital and timeless book, Crisis Economics proves calamities to be not only predictable but also preventable and, with the right medicine, curable.
368 pages, Hardcover
First published May 1, 2010
248 people are currently reading
4323 people want to read
About the author
Nouriel Roubini
14 books167 followersNouriel Roubini is a Persian American professor of economics at New York University's Stern School of Business and chairman of Roubini Global Economics, an economic consultancy firm.
Roubini's critical economic views have earned him the nicknames "Dr. Doom" and "permabear" in the media. In 2008, Fortune magazine wrote, "In 2005 Roubini said home prices were riding a speculative wave that would soon sink the economy. Back then the professor was called a Cassandra. Now he's a sage". The New York Times notes that he foresaw "homeowners defaulting on mortgages, trillions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities unraveling worldwide and the global financial system shuddering to a halt". In September 2006, he warned a skeptical IMF that "the United States was likely to face a once-in-a-lifetime housing bust, an oil shock, sharply declining consumer confidence, and, ultimately, a deep recession". Nobel laureate Paul Krugman adds that his once "seemingly outlandish" predictions have been matched "or even exceeded by reality."
As Roubini's descriptions of the current economic crisis have proven to be accurate, he is today a major figure in the U.S. and international debate about the economy, and spends much of his time shuttling between meetings with central bank governors and finance ministers in Europe and Asia. He has appeared before the US Congress, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the World Economic Forum at Davos.
Roubini's critical economic views have earned him the nicknames "Dr. Doom" and "permabear" in the media. In 2008, Fortune magazine wrote, "In 2005 Roubini said home prices were riding a speculative wave that would soon sink the economy. Back then the professor was called a Cassandra. Now he's a sage". The New York Times notes that he foresaw "homeowners defaulting on mortgages, trillions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities unraveling worldwide and the global financial system shuddering to a halt". In September 2006, he warned a skeptical IMF that "the United States was likely to face a once-in-a-lifetime housing bust, an oil shock, sharply declining consumer confidence, and, ultimately, a deep recession". Nobel laureate Paul Krugman adds that his once "seemingly outlandish" predictions have been matched "or even exceeded by reality."
As Roubini's descriptions of the current economic crisis have proven to be accurate, he is today a major figure in the U.S. and international debate about the economy, and spends much of his time shuttling between meetings with central bank governors and finance ministers in Europe and Asia. He has appeared before the US Congress, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the World Economic Forum at Davos.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 148 reviews
December 30, 2020
Roubini was the one of not many who predicted the crisis 2007-09. Being Iranian Jew, he is sort of outsider in the US academic world of economics. Or at least he comes across this way. Since then he was labelled mr Doom as his forecasts tend to be on a bearish side. He calls himself Mr Realist though. The book was published in 2010. So it is fresh reflection on that crisis. Now, when we are in the middle of another, it was interesting reading. He explains his views on the reasons of instability in the financial system in particular. Now his views are closer to the mainstream - inherent instability in the market economy and bubble’s tendency. He proposed measures of restructuring financial system to fight “too big to fail” paradigm. Also he was the first who manage to clearly explain what “quantitative easing” is. It was interesting to see which one of his forecasts made in the 2009 have crystallised and which - not. He was urging for example to resolve international trade imbalances through more cooperation. The opposite is actuallly taken place which I find rather unfortunate.
Before pandemics he predicted that the future crisis would be the crisis of supply as opposed to the crisis of demand in 2007. Here is the article about it: https://www.google.co.uk/amp/s/amp.th...
It is tricky to see clearly which way the pandemic moved the balance. But Some elements of his logic of excessive demand and potential inflation due to the limited supply and new barriers to trade hold pretty firmly. Hopefully, the current events though would be a wake up call for taking global issues more seriously by the national governments. But I am afraid it might have had an opposite effect.
Before pandemics he predicted that the future crisis would be the crisis of supply as opposed to the crisis of demand in 2007. Here is the article about it: https://www.google.co.uk/amp/s/amp.th...
It is tricky to see clearly which way the pandemic moved the balance. But Some elements of his logic of excessive demand and potential inflation due to the limited supply and new barriers to trade hold pretty firmly. Hopefully, the current events though would be a wake up call for taking global issues more seriously by the national governments. But I am afraid it might have had an opposite effect.
May 30, 2019
I have a terrible affliction. Its like a python coiled around my neck; its trying to squeeze my throat but I can pull on the snake just hard enough to keep from suffocating. Recently, I stopped resisting my reptilian oppressor and that's when I started watching cable news again.
I know cable news will crush my wind pipe and deprive my brain of oxygen, but I get tired from the struggle and give in. And when I give in, I hear the most absurd and illogical assertions from the talking skulls on the screen. Its like watching a 2-D representation of my most intense fever dream.
Thankfully, I have a safe word: "unprecedented". This wonderful word is used incorrectly 99% of the time by cable news journalists. The word means "without precedent" and should be applied to situations where a dragon swallows a skyscraper or the moon splits in half, or, you know, things that have no precedent. It is not a synonym for "unusual". And it is a weirdly popular word on cable news, so it didn't take long to snap out of cable news hypnosis.
Now after an unnecessarily long introduction; my opinion of this book. It was a welcome antidote for the overly simplistic and uncritical analysis presented on cable news networks. I read this book at a time when I wanted to learn more about the systemic nature of the American and global economy. I feel the authors took the time to validate their conclusions with the support and authority of historical fact. I frequently forgot that I was reading a book about economics because I enjoyed the presentation of the author's analysis so much. While I did not agree with all of the author's conclusions, I felt like my oxygen-starved brain received a concentrated dose of the precious gas. The next time I feel that twisted urge to watch cable news, I will reach for another economics book. Maybe that metaphorical python will die from boredom and I'll never again watch cable news. We'll just have to see about that.
I know cable news will crush my wind pipe and deprive my brain of oxygen, but I get tired from the struggle and give in. And when I give in, I hear the most absurd and illogical assertions from the talking skulls on the screen. Its like watching a 2-D representation of my most intense fever dream.
Thankfully, I have a safe word: "unprecedented". This wonderful word is used incorrectly 99% of the time by cable news journalists. The word means "without precedent" and should be applied to situations where a dragon swallows a skyscraper or the moon splits in half, or, you know, things that have no precedent. It is not a synonym for "unusual". And it is a weirdly popular word on cable news, so it didn't take long to snap out of cable news hypnosis.
Now after an unnecessarily long introduction; my opinion of this book. It was a welcome antidote for the overly simplistic and uncritical analysis presented on cable news networks. I read this book at a time when I wanted to learn more about the systemic nature of the American and global economy. I feel the authors took the time to validate their conclusions with the support and authority of historical fact. I frequently forgot that I was reading a book about economics because I enjoyed the presentation of the author's analysis so much. While I did not agree with all of the author's conclusions, I felt like my oxygen-starved brain received a concentrated dose of the precious gas. The next time I feel that twisted urge to watch cable news, I will reach for another economics book. Maybe that metaphorical python will die from boredom and I'll never again watch cable news. We'll just have to see about that.
December 13, 2010
Roubini is a smart dude who manages to tell an interesting and informative story without resorting to hyperbole. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the book's editors, who presumably wrote the following shamelessly self-indulgent and misleading description: "This myth shattering book reveals the methods Nouriel Roubini used to foretell the current crisis before other economists saw it coming and shows how those methods can help us make sense of the present and prepare for the future."
Were the book to truly provide readers with all the details of its author's forecasting models, there'd be no reason to seek the no-doubt pricey advisory services of the vindicated Roubini Global Economics, LLC. Ah, well. Nothing is truly free except on the Internet, where content is only free until it costs you a lawsuit.
That said, Crisis Economics does an honorable job of broaching a subject that is still touchy despite being, by now, a familiar one. A confluence of forces related to financial markets nearly collapsed the economy as we knew it. MORAL HAZARD! RENT-SEEKING! SYSTEMIC RISK! Ho-hum.
What's impressive is how diplomatically the author dives into the juicy details, refusing to succumb to the sweet intoxication of finger-pointing and dogmatism. He's harshly critical of Alan Greenspan, and he mocks Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein repeatedly, but it's always in the context of a complex system with numerous actors and changing circumstances. In weighing interpretations from economists influenced primarily by Keynes versus those who prefer "Austrians" like Hayek, he points out that we can learn from both. OMG, cupcakes and rainbows!
Roubini also offers a number of policy suggestions that he himself admits are likely to be ignored--mind you, that's a tier lower than being dismissed. He doesn't reckon that anything material will be altered in the interest of avoiding another near catastrophe until history repeats itself at least one or two more times. If you have a baby in your life, you owe it to posterity to tell them this heartwarming truth.
In short, Crisis Economics won't give you the ability to impress people at cocktail parties with bold, accurate predictions about impending doom, but you will be able to explain the difference between a CDO, CDO^2, CDO^3 to my grandmother. She won't understand you, but if you try to pass off a bunch of hot dog meat by insisting it's steak, she will slap you.
Were the book to truly provide readers with all the details of its author's forecasting models, there'd be no reason to seek the no-doubt pricey advisory services of the vindicated Roubini Global Economics, LLC. Ah, well. Nothing is truly free except on the Internet, where content is only free until it costs you a lawsuit.
That said, Crisis Economics does an honorable job of broaching a subject that is still touchy despite being, by now, a familiar one. A confluence of forces related to financial markets nearly collapsed the economy as we knew it. MORAL HAZARD! RENT-SEEKING! SYSTEMIC RISK! Ho-hum.
What's impressive is how diplomatically the author dives into the juicy details, refusing to succumb to the sweet intoxication of finger-pointing and dogmatism. He's harshly critical of Alan Greenspan, and he mocks Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein repeatedly, but it's always in the context of a complex system with numerous actors and changing circumstances. In weighing interpretations from economists influenced primarily by Keynes versus those who prefer "Austrians" like Hayek, he points out that we can learn from both. OMG, cupcakes and rainbows!
Roubini also offers a number of policy suggestions that he himself admits are likely to be ignored--mind you, that's a tier lower than being dismissed. He doesn't reckon that anything material will be altered in the interest of avoiding another near catastrophe until history repeats itself at least one or two more times. If you have a baby in your life, you owe it to posterity to tell them this heartwarming truth.
In short, Crisis Economics won't give you the ability to impress people at cocktail parties with bold, accurate predictions about impending doom, but you will be able to explain the difference between a CDO, CDO^2, CDO^3 to my grandmother. She won't understand you, but if you try to pass off a bunch of hot dog meat by insisting it's steak, she will slap you.
December 14, 2012
I just finished a book of this name by Nouriel Roubini (famous for predicting the 2008 crash) and Stephen Mihn. It’s hardly a work of art, and in places quite dreadfully written (how about this for a string of cliches: “[shareholders] don’t actually have much skin in the game. They’ve put up some of the bank’s capital, but not a whole lot of it, and while they don’t want to lose their shirts, they’re fine turning a blind eye when traders roll the dice”; or this: “When things go south, traders and shareholders don’t necessarily retreat from risk. Instead, they may share a willingness to double down and bet the farm in the hopes of righting the sinking ship.”)
But the writing style is not the point. What the book does offer is a cogent analysis of the runup to the banking crisis, placed in a long historical context, and the sensible point of view that horror stories like this are always going to happen unless you regulate the banking system properly. The prescription they offer is entitled “Glass-Steagall on steroids”, and (put simply) consists of regulation (including the proper structuring of incentives), enforcement of that regulation, and breaking up the badly run and economically dangerous monster institutions that now seem to exist just for the enrichment of those who run them, with no regard to the social cost. That sounds about right to me, though I’ll add one of my own: tax the rich, so that society is seen to be fair.
It’s dismaying that the political will to do this seems to be nowhere in sight.
But the writing style is not the point. What the book does offer is a cogent analysis of the runup to the banking crisis, placed in a long historical context, and the sensible point of view that horror stories like this are always going to happen unless you regulate the banking system properly. The prescription they offer is entitled “Glass-Steagall on steroids”, and (put simply) consists of regulation (including the proper structuring of incentives), enforcement of that regulation, and breaking up the badly run and economically dangerous monster institutions that now seem to exist just for the enrichment of those who run them, with no regard to the social cost. That sounds about right to me, though I’ll add one of my own: tax the rich, so that society is seen to be fair.
It’s dismaying that the political will to do this seems to be nowhere in sight.
November 26, 2024
The main point is that crises are not rare (which is true) nor even hard to predict (which is doubtful). They preceded capitalism though Marx famously tied crises to capitalism. The post mortem of the great recession is: loose regulation esp. on exotic financial instruments, shadow banking, cheap loans from high earnings countries combined together to cause trouble. But the proposed solutions are unconvincing. They belong to the categories of impracticable (e.g., telling greedy financiers how to correctly set compensation), tautological (e.g., have better regulations), or restating goal as a solution (e.g., balance trade between US and China).
The valid lesson for an average person is that crises will happen again. Deal with it.
The valid lesson for an average person is that crises will happen again. Deal with it.
October 31, 2025
Genel Değerlendirme
Roubini’nin kitabı, 2008 küresel finans krizini yalnızca bir “kaza” olarak değil, kapitalizmin yapısal bir özelliği olarak okur. Yani kriz, sistemin dışından gelen bir şok değil; bizzat sistemin içinden, onun teşvik ve kör noktalarından doğar. Bu yönüyle Roubini, klasik Keynesyen kriz analizlerinden bir adım ileri gider — hem neoliberal finans mimarisini hem de politik ekonominin ideolojik körlüğünü eleştirir.
⸻
💣 1. Krizlerin Normalleşmesi: “İstisna değil, norm”
Roubini’ye göre finansal krizler artık döngüsel değil, sürekli tekrar eden yapısal olaylardır.
• 1997 Asya krizi, 2000 dot-com balonu ve 2008 krizi arasında benzerlikler kurar.
• Spekülasyon, düşük faiz ve yüksek borçluluk üçgenini sistemik bir “kriz üretim mekanizması” olarak tanımlar.
• Bu anlamda “kriz ekonomisi”, aslında kapitalizmin doğal çalışma biçimidir.
⸻
💰 2. Borç, Balon ve Finansal Mühendislik
Roubini özellikle borçla şişen finansal ürünlerin (CDO, MBS, türevler) nasıl toplu yanılgılar yarattığını analiz eder.
• “Finansal inovasyon” adı altında riskin yeniden paketlenip gizlenmesi, piyasalarda kolektif bir bilinçsizlik yaratır.
• Bu süreçte finansal elitlerin çıkarı ile kamu refahı arasında uçurum büyür.
• Roubini’ye göre bu, Marx’ın “fiktif sermaye” kavramının çağdaş biçimidir: gerçek değeri olmayan ama kazanç yaratıyormuş gibi davranan para sistemi.
⸻
⚙️ 3. Devletin Rolü: Kurtarıcı mı, Suç Ortağı mı?
Krizin patladığı anda devletler bankaları kurtarırken, halkı borç yüküne mahkûm eder.
• Roubini bu durumu “özelleştirilmiş kâr, kamulaştırılmış zarar” olarak tanımlar.
• Keynesyen politikaların yüzeysel uygulandığını, gerçek anlamda kamusal yatırım ve üretim politikalarının devreye sokulmadığını vurgular.
• “Bailout” (kurtarma) politikalarını, ahlaki tehlike (moral hazard) yaratan yapılar olarak eleştirir.
⸻
🏦 4. Düzenleme (Regülasyon) Sorunu
Roubini kitabında düzenleyici kurumların piyasa mitine teslim oluşunu sert biçimde eleştirir.
• “Piyasalar kendi kendini denetler” dogmasının çöktüğünü belirtir.
• Finansal denetimin ulusal değil, küresel ölçekte yeniden tasarlanması gerektiğini söyler.
• Yani IMF, BIS, Dünya Bankası gibi kurumlar “kriz sonrası mimarinin” yeniden kurgulanması için merkezî önemdedir.
⸻
🌍 5. Küresel Eşitsizlik ve Jeopolitik Boyut
Kitap yalnızca finansı değil, küresel güç dağılımını da tartışır:
• ABD dolarının rezerv para olma avantajı, dünya ekonomisini Washington’ın borç politikalarına bağımlı kılar.
• Çin’in tasarruf fazlası – ABD’nin tüketim fazlası dengesizliği “küresel ikili bağımlılık” yaratır.
• Bu durum, Roubini’ye göre bir sonraki krizin jeopolitik tetikleyicisi olabilir.
⸻
🔮 6. Roubini’nin “Yeni Paradigma” Çağrısı
Roubini “kriz ekonomisi”ni bir kehanet değil, bir uyarı sistemi olarak sunar:
• Piyasalar kendi doğaları gereği istikrarsızdır, bu yüzden kamusal düzenleme kaçınılmazdır.
• Teknoloji, borç ve finansın birleştiği çağda yeni bir “sürdürülebilir büyüme modeli” zorunludur.
• Önerdiği model, daha sıkı finansal denetim, şeffaflık, kamu yatırımı ve gelir eşitliği temellerine dayanır.
⸻
📈 7. Günümüz Bağlamında (2020’ler)
Bugünün dünyasında kitap yeniden anlam kazanıyor:
• Yüksek enflasyon, jeopolitik gerilimler, borç tavanı krizleri, yapay zekâ kaynaklı işsizlik gibi yeni tehditler, Roubini’nin “kriz ekonomisi” teziyle birebir örtüşüyor.
• Özellikle Roubini’nin son yıllarda “megathreats” (çoklu tehditler) kavramına evrilttiği analiz, bu kitabın temel fikrinin genişletilmiş versiyonudur.
⸻
🔍 Sonuç
“Kriz Ekonomisi”, finansal sistemin doğasını teşhir eden bir manifesto gibidir:
Kriz, kapitalizmin arızası değil; işleyiş biçimidir.
Roubini, bu işleyişi anlamadan hiçbir reformun kalıcı olamayacağını söyler.
Roubini’nin kitabı, 2008 küresel finans krizini yalnızca bir “kaza” olarak değil, kapitalizmin yapısal bir özelliği olarak okur. Yani kriz, sistemin dışından gelen bir şok değil; bizzat sistemin içinden, onun teşvik ve kör noktalarından doğar. Bu yönüyle Roubini, klasik Keynesyen kriz analizlerinden bir adım ileri gider — hem neoliberal finans mimarisini hem de politik ekonominin ideolojik körlüğünü eleştirir.
⸻
💣 1. Krizlerin Normalleşmesi: “İstisna değil, norm”
Roubini’ye göre finansal krizler artık döngüsel değil, sürekli tekrar eden yapısal olaylardır.
• 1997 Asya krizi, 2000 dot-com balonu ve 2008 krizi arasında benzerlikler kurar.
• Spekülasyon, düşük faiz ve yüksek borçluluk üçgenini sistemik bir “kriz üretim mekanizması” olarak tanımlar.
• Bu anlamda “kriz ekonomisi”, aslında kapitalizmin doğal çalışma biçimidir.
⸻
💰 2. Borç, Balon ve Finansal Mühendislik
Roubini özellikle borçla şişen finansal ürünlerin (CDO, MBS, türevler) nasıl toplu yanılgılar yarattığını analiz eder.
• “Finansal inovasyon” adı altında riskin yeniden paketlenip gizlenmesi, piyasalarda kolektif bir bilinçsizlik yaratır.
• Bu süreçte finansal elitlerin çıkarı ile kamu refahı arasında uçurum büyür.
• Roubini’ye göre bu, Marx’ın “fiktif sermaye” kavramının çağdaş biçimidir: gerçek değeri olmayan ama kazanç yaratıyormuş gibi davranan para sistemi.
⸻
⚙️ 3. Devletin Rolü: Kurtarıcı mı, Suç Ortağı mı?
Krizin patladığı anda devletler bankaları kurtarırken, halkı borç yüküne mahkûm eder.
• Roubini bu durumu “özelleştirilmiş kâr, kamulaştırılmış zarar” olarak tanımlar.
• Keynesyen politikaların yüzeysel uygulandığını, gerçek anlamda kamusal yatırım ve üretim politikalarının devreye sokulmadığını vurgular.
• “Bailout” (kurtarma) politikalarını, ahlaki tehlike (moral hazard) yaratan yapılar olarak eleştirir.
⸻
🏦 4. Düzenleme (Regülasyon) Sorunu
Roubini kitabında düzenleyici kurumların piyasa mitine teslim oluşunu sert biçimde eleştirir.
• “Piyasalar kendi kendini denetler” dogmasının çöktüğünü belirtir.
• Finansal denetimin ulusal değil, küresel ölçekte yeniden tasarlanması gerektiğini söyler.
• Yani IMF, BIS, Dünya Bankası gibi kurumlar “kriz sonrası mimarinin” yeniden kurgulanması için merkezî önemdedir.
⸻
🌍 5. Küresel Eşitsizlik ve Jeopolitik Boyut
Kitap yalnızca finansı değil, küresel güç dağılımını da tartışır:
• ABD dolarının rezerv para olma avantajı, dünya ekonomisini Washington’ın borç politikalarına bağımlı kılar.
• Çin’in tasarruf fazlası – ABD’nin tüketim fazlası dengesizliği “küresel ikili bağımlılık” yaratır.
• Bu durum, Roubini’ye göre bir sonraki krizin jeopolitik tetikleyicisi olabilir.
⸻
🔮 6. Roubini’nin “Yeni Paradigma” Çağrısı
Roubini “kriz ekonomisi”ni bir kehanet değil, bir uyarı sistemi olarak sunar:
• Piyasalar kendi doğaları gereği istikrarsızdır, bu yüzden kamusal düzenleme kaçınılmazdır.
• Teknoloji, borç ve finansın birleştiği çağda yeni bir “sürdürülebilir büyüme modeli” zorunludur.
• Önerdiği model, daha sıkı finansal denetim, şeffaflık, kamu yatırımı ve gelir eşitliği temellerine dayanır.
⸻
📈 7. Günümüz Bağlamında (2020’ler)
Bugünün dünyasında kitap yeniden anlam kazanıyor:
• Yüksek enflasyon, jeopolitik gerilimler, borç tavanı krizleri, yapay zekâ kaynaklı işsizlik gibi yeni tehditler, Roubini’nin “kriz ekonomisi” teziyle birebir örtüşüyor.
• Özellikle Roubini’nin son yıllarda “megathreats” (çoklu tehditler) kavramına evrilttiği analiz, bu kitabın temel fikrinin genişletilmiş versiyonudur.
⸻
🔍 Sonuç
“Kriz Ekonomisi”, finansal sistemin doğasını teşhir eden bir manifesto gibidir:
Kriz, kapitalizmin arızası değil; işleyiş biçimidir.
Roubini, bu işleyişi anlamadan hiçbir reformun kalıcı olamayacağını söyler.
June 13, 2024
Honestly, really enjoyed it! It’s readable and interesting, and I learned the whole way through.
March 18, 2016
Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance by Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm is a non-fiction financial book.
I thought Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance by Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm was a very interesting book, offering solutions to a stabilize the financial system. Even though the book might no longer be as relevant as it was when it was written, it is still fascinating.
The book gives a good overview of capitalism from the point of view of the crisis that happens every once in a while, before and after reforms. The authors give a clear look about the crisis of 2008 and what got us into it, as well as what long-term improvements should be done.
The authors go on to give some good, solid advice which is likely never to be implemented. Much of the proposals are politically poisonous (letting the Bush tax cuts expire in 2010), or will not gain support in government and especially with the financial industry.
The book ends with a gloomy look into the future – some of it seems to be coming true these days (China starting to fall, Europe is on financial brink). A very interesting book for those who want to an overview of the financial crisis without going into too much detail or more complex reading.
For more reviews and bookish posts please visit: http://www.ManOfLaBook.com
I thought Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance by Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm was a very interesting book, offering solutions to a stabilize the financial system. Even though the book might no longer be as relevant as it was when it was written, it is still fascinating.
The book gives a good overview of capitalism from the point of view of the crisis that happens every once in a while, before and after reforms. The authors give a clear look about the crisis of 2008 and what got us into it, as well as what long-term improvements should be done.
The authors go on to give some good, solid advice which is likely never to be implemented. Much of the proposals are politically poisonous (letting the Bush tax cuts expire in 2010), or will not gain support in government and especially with the financial industry.
The book ends with a gloomy look into the future – some of it seems to be coming true these days (China starting to fall, Europe is on financial brink). A very interesting book for those who want to an overview of the financial crisis without going into too much detail or more complex reading.
For more reviews and bookish posts please visit: http://www.ManOfLaBook.com
July 5, 2011
If you predict that mortgage crash, predict which companies will be allowed to go bust and what order it will happen in 2 years out, then you get a book deal. The first half of the book seemd almost like the fulfillment of a contract. There was a lot of repetitive history. Informative, yes, but not terribly interesting to start. The second half (or so) of the book gets much more useful. Roubini outlines the pros and cons of dozens of regulatory strategies and paths for the future. I began to feel less hopeless, at least, by the end of it. Worth the read for serious students of the crisis.
February 16, 2015
Despite the book cover description, can't say I learned much about how Roubini foretold the GFC, other than (ex-post) comparisons with prior crises. Policy suggestions are unsurprising, but that's probably because the book was written in 2010?
February 3, 2016
A great book that lucidly explains economic concepts in its most practical form. Any keen student of economics should read this book to get a connect between theory and practice. One of my best books, for sure!
August 2, 2015
The book is rather technical for a non-economics background reader . Having said that, the authors make a great effort to be lucid and not loose rigour at the same time.
Deserves a second read .
Deserves a second read .
March 14, 2022
This book is decent, good enough, but not so good, informative, or wise, that I'd recommend or reread it.
Years ago I read (and saved) about three dozen of Roubini's blog posts, so before reading this book I was familiar with his thinking. I was hoping this book would proffer something knew about his thinking that I did not already know. That didn't happen. But he's a smart guy. And so is Steven Mihm, who wrote this fine 3100-word profile of Roubini in 2008, worthy praise from a collaborator, available here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/mag...
The writing in these pages is good enough; it reads quickly; there's not much to give one pause.
My favorite parts, not numerous, are when Roubini recollects his prior work experience at the IMF & World Bank bailing out countries — a kind of firsthand ethnographic reporting of what he saw, how events transpired and/or devolved, and what remedies needed implementing.
I generally prefer firsthand, on-the-hoof reporting to big-picture, timeless, view-from-nowhere theorizing. Crisis Economics would have been better imho if it had more straight-up reporting of what happened, who said what, etc. The book, however, is mostly an account of how particular events fit into or evidence one or another view-from-nowhere, grand theory — which has warrant.
I agreed with most of Roubini's riffs in this 130,000-word book. His views strike me as orthodox, certainly familiar to persons who've read a handful of Dr. Doom's blog posts. To read today in 2020 this book, which at several points decries the Fed's suppression of interest rates, lax lending standards, large trade/budget deficits, etc., made me curious to know what Roubini thinks today.
In other words, in this book Roubini decries so many financial market excesses, and essentially concludes that It all must stop. But of course it did not stop. The various metrics he cites have gotten arguably worse over the ten years since this book was published. What's he think now—not only about the present economic state of the nation but, perhaps more importantly, the vociferousness with which he had prophesied worse-to-come outcomes ten years ago?
My sense is that Roubini advertises himself, or his "brand" of thinking, which garnered him the sobriquet Dr. Doom, as outré, unorthodox, or heterodox. But I don't see it.
Side note:
Many financial market observers (save James Grant & David Stockman) often say of the 2008 crisis that if policy X, Y or Z were not implemented, then disaster would have ensued, the financial system would have "collapsed," "melted down." Roubini says something like that, too. I often wonder: What would life look like if a "meltdown" occurred? If everything were overturned, would a barter economy return?
Jonathan Lear described the aftermath of societal collapse in his short thought-provoking book Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation (2006).
When people—like Bernanke, Geithner, Paulson, Roubini, and too many others to list—say the 2008-09 crisis almost resulted in a total meltdown that would have ended the way we live now, are they saying the United States narrowly avoided the kind of devastation that wiped out North American Indian cultures?
=========================
Here are some lines I highlighted from the Introduction and Chapter 1, which will give one a sense of the book's valence. I'm a huge fan of Jim Grant, so I cheered Roubini's characterization of him as a "Wall Street legend":
———————————————————
Other well-respected figures raised a similar warning: Wall Street legend James Grant warned in 2005 that the Federal Reserve had helped create one of 'the greatest of all credit bubbles' in the history of finance....
Crises, we argue, are neither the freak events that modern economics has made them seem nor the rare “black swans” that other commentators have made them out to be. Rather, they are commonplace and relatively easy to foresee and to comprehend.
[Chapter 3] challenges [the] absurd perspective [that subprime mortgages infected an otherwise healthy global financial system], showing how decades-old trends and policies created a global financial system that was subprime from top to bottom.
. . . we do not subscribe to the usual contradictory explanations that the crisis was caused by too much government or too little.
History confirms that crises are much like pandemics: they begin with the outbreak of a disease that then spreads, radiating outward. ... We break with the conventional wisdom that the rest of the world merely caught a disease that originated in the United States. Far from it: the vulnerabilities that plagued the U.S. financial system were widespread—and in some cases, worse—elsewhere in the world. The pandemic, then, was not indiscriminate in its effects; only countries whose financial systems suffered from similar frailties fell victim to it.
The level of intervention necessary to stabilize the system challenges the sustainability of traditional laissez-faire capitalism itself;
In 1933 John Maynard Keynes declared, “The decadent international but individualistic capitalism, in the hands of which we found ourselves after the [First World] war, is not a success. It is not intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not virtuous—and it doesn’t deliver the goods. In short we dislike it, and we are beginning to despise it. But when we wonder what to put in its place, we are extremely perplexed.” That perplexity was eventually resolved, and it will be once again. This book contributes to that resolution, giving some sense of how to reform a capitalism that has delivered serial crises instead of delivering the goods on a consistent and stable basis.
[Roubini's assertion that his own proposals solve Keynes's "perplexity" struck me as wildly overoptimistic, completely unwarranted. The intellectual milieu of Bloomsbury gets no mention in these pages and Keynes's thinking is largely reduced to the kind of bite-sized message one finds inside fortune cookies.]
In the history of modern capitalism, crises are the norm, not the exception. ... Sometimes ... even governments are to blame.
. . . for two quarters [2008-09] the global economy experienced a free fall comparable to that of the Great Depression.
[Hmm.]
But the recent disaster was no freak event. It was probable. It was even predictable, because financial crises generally follow the same script over and over again.
[Grrrr.]
. . . asset bubbles are often associated with an excessive growth in the supply of credit.
. . . real estate was said to be a “safe investment” that “never lost value” because “home prices never fall.” ... From such beginnings, financial disasters proceed along a predictable path. As credit becomes increasingly cheap and abundant, the coveted asset becomes easier to buy. Demand rises and outstrips supply; prices consequently rise.
American homeowners, for example, enthusiastically embraced the fiction that home prices could increase 20 percent every year forever,
The falling value of the asset at the root of the bubble eventually triggers panicked “margin calls,”
. . . firms could no longer “roll over,” or refinance, their existing debt....
Contrary to conventional wisdom, crises are not black swans but white swans: the elements of boom and bust are remarkably predictable.
It took a new Federal Reserve chairman, Paul Volcker, to set things right.
[There was a problem—high inflation—but the Great Man Theory of History (Paul Volcker) set things right. Hooray!]
Every silver lining has its cloud: Volcker’s policies [in 1979-83] also helped trigger the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s.
[Boo!]
By the mid-1980s Volcker had defeated inflation....
[Hooray!]
Markets know best and never fail: this was the conventional wisdom in Washington, London, and elsewhere in the English-speaking world.
These markets disintegrated when the imperiled investment banks pulled the plug on these instruments....
As credit dried up in the United States, it evaporated overseas too, and as economies contracted, manufacturing giants like China and commodity exporters like Russia caught the virus. Toward the end of 2008 the pandemic worsened, and the history of long-forgotten crises became increasingly relevant for explaining what was happening.
=========================
Crisis Economics is a decent book I'll never recommend or reread.
Years ago I read (and saved) about three dozen of Roubini's blog posts, so before reading this book I was familiar with his thinking. I was hoping this book would proffer something knew about his thinking that I did not already know. That didn't happen. But he's a smart guy. And so is Steven Mihm, who wrote this fine 3100-word profile of Roubini in 2008, worthy praise from a collaborator, available here:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/mag...
The writing in these pages is good enough; it reads quickly; there's not much to give one pause.
My favorite parts, not numerous, are when Roubini recollects his prior work experience at the IMF & World Bank bailing out countries — a kind of firsthand ethnographic reporting of what he saw, how events transpired and/or devolved, and what remedies needed implementing.
I generally prefer firsthand, on-the-hoof reporting to big-picture, timeless, view-from-nowhere theorizing. Crisis Economics would have been better imho if it had more straight-up reporting of what happened, who said what, etc. The book, however, is mostly an account of how particular events fit into or evidence one or another view-from-nowhere, grand theory — which has warrant.
I agreed with most of Roubini's riffs in this 130,000-word book. His views strike me as orthodox, certainly familiar to persons who've read a handful of Dr. Doom's blog posts. To read today in 2020 this book, which at several points decries the Fed's suppression of interest rates, lax lending standards, large trade/budget deficits, etc., made me curious to know what Roubini thinks today.
In other words, in this book Roubini decries so many financial market excesses, and essentially concludes that It all must stop. But of course it did not stop. The various metrics he cites have gotten arguably worse over the ten years since this book was published. What's he think now—not only about the present economic state of the nation but, perhaps more importantly, the vociferousness with which he had prophesied worse-to-come outcomes ten years ago?
My sense is that Roubini advertises himself, or his "brand" of thinking, which garnered him the sobriquet Dr. Doom, as outré, unorthodox, or heterodox. But I don't see it.
Side note:
Many financial market observers (save James Grant & David Stockman) often say of the 2008 crisis that if policy X, Y or Z were not implemented, then disaster would have ensued, the financial system would have "collapsed," "melted down." Roubini says something like that, too. I often wonder: What would life look like if a "meltdown" occurred? If everything were overturned, would a barter economy return?
Jonathan Lear described the aftermath of societal collapse in his short thought-provoking book Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation (2006).
When people—like Bernanke, Geithner, Paulson, Roubini, and too many others to list—say the 2008-09 crisis almost resulted in a total meltdown that would have ended the way we live now, are they saying the United States narrowly avoided the kind of devastation that wiped out North American Indian cultures?
=========================
Here are some lines I highlighted from the Introduction and Chapter 1, which will give one a sense of the book's valence. I'm a huge fan of Jim Grant, so I cheered Roubini's characterization of him as a "Wall Street legend":
———————————————————
Other well-respected figures raised a similar warning: Wall Street legend James Grant warned in 2005 that the Federal Reserve had helped create one of 'the greatest of all credit bubbles' in the history of finance....
Crises, we argue, are neither the freak events that modern economics has made them seem nor the rare “black swans” that other commentators have made them out to be. Rather, they are commonplace and relatively easy to foresee and to comprehend.
[Chapter 3] challenges [the] absurd perspective [that subprime mortgages infected an otherwise healthy global financial system], showing how decades-old trends and policies created a global financial system that was subprime from top to bottom.
. . . we do not subscribe to the usual contradictory explanations that the crisis was caused by too much government or too little.
History confirms that crises are much like pandemics: they begin with the outbreak of a disease that then spreads, radiating outward. ... We break with the conventional wisdom that the rest of the world merely caught a disease that originated in the United States. Far from it: the vulnerabilities that plagued the U.S. financial system were widespread—and in some cases, worse—elsewhere in the world. The pandemic, then, was not indiscriminate in its effects; only countries whose financial systems suffered from similar frailties fell victim to it.
The level of intervention necessary to stabilize the system challenges the sustainability of traditional laissez-faire capitalism itself;
In 1933 John Maynard Keynes declared, “The decadent international but individualistic capitalism, in the hands of which we found ourselves after the [First World] war, is not a success. It is not intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not virtuous—and it doesn’t deliver the goods. In short we dislike it, and we are beginning to despise it. But when we wonder what to put in its place, we are extremely perplexed.” That perplexity was eventually resolved, and it will be once again. This book contributes to that resolution, giving some sense of how to reform a capitalism that has delivered serial crises instead of delivering the goods on a consistent and stable basis.
[Roubini's assertion that his own proposals solve Keynes's "perplexity" struck me as wildly overoptimistic, completely unwarranted. The intellectual milieu of Bloomsbury gets no mention in these pages and Keynes's thinking is largely reduced to the kind of bite-sized message one finds inside fortune cookies.]
In the history of modern capitalism, crises are the norm, not the exception. ... Sometimes ... even governments are to blame.
. . . for two quarters [2008-09] the global economy experienced a free fall comparable to that of the Great Depression.
[Hmm.]
But the recent disaster was no freak event. It was probable. It was even predictable, because financial crises generally follow the same script over and over again.
[Grrrr.]
. . . asset bubbles are often associated with an excessive growth in the supply of credit.
. . . real estate was said to be a “safe investment” that “never lost value” because “home prices never fall.” ... From such beginnings, financial disasters proceed along a predictable path. As credit becomes increasingly cheap and abundant, the coveted asset becomes easier to buy. Demand rises and outstrips supply; prices consequently rise.
American homeowners, for example, enthusiastically embraced the fiction that home prices could increase 20 percent every year forever,
The falling value of the asset at the root of the bubble eventually triggers panicked “margin calls,”
. . . firms could no longer “roll over,” or refinance, their existing debt....
Contrary to conventional wisdom, crises are not black swans but white swans: the elements of boom and bust are remarkably predictable.
It took a new Federal Reserve chairman, Paul Volcker, to set things right.
[There was a problem—high inflation—but the Great Man Theory of History (Paul Volcker) set things right. Hooray!]
Every silver lining has its cloud: Volcker’s policies [in 1979-83] also helped trigger the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s.
[Boo!]
By the mid-1980s Volcker had defeated inflation....
[Hooray!]
Markets know best and never fail: this was the conventional wisdom in Washington, London, and elsewhere in the English-speaking world.
These markets disintegrated when the imperiled investment banks pulled the plug on these instruments....
As credit dried up in the United States, it evaporated overseas too, and as economies contracted, manufacturing giants like China and commodity exporters like Russia caught the virus. Toward the end of 2008 the pandemic worsened, and the history of long-forgotten crises became increasingly relevant for explaining what was happening.
=========================
Crisis Economics is a decent book I'll never recommend or reread.
April 18, 2020
A very cool book in mainly three parts: 1 - what economists thought about crisis historically 2 - how 2009 happened and what are some general patterns across crises of the past 3 - what should necessarily be done to avoid another crisis on the short-term. Roubini and Mihm are of a balanced view, they firmly believe the government should intervene, but not too much as to avoid sending perverse signals that banks can take risks because anyway they will be bailed out. The authors recommend preventive policies and regulating bubbles as they arise rather than saving all illiquid and insolvent institutions indiscriminately once a crisis occurs.
And we are now in another crisis and recession, so this book helps think about the one we are currently in and how far the world has moved in the last 10 years.
And we are now in another crisis and recession, so this book helps think about the one we are currently in and how far the world has moved in the last 10 years.
April 15, 2022
Excellent non-technical discussion of some important concepts in the realm of both economics and decision making.
The global system as it currently stands is extremely fragile and has been undergoing multiple stress tests due to “unforeseeable” events (i.e. pandemic, military conflict). The more this continues, the likelier we hit a breaking point where another crisis may unfold.
The aim of this book is to help the reader build awareness regarding the elements that dominate todays system.
The global system as it currently stands is extremely fragile and has been undergoing multiple stress tests due to “unforeseeable” events (i.e. pandemic, military conflict). The more this continues, the likelier we hit a breaking point where another crisis may unfold.
The aim of this book is to help the reader build awareness regarding the elements that dominate todays system.
June 21, 2010
Crisis Economics is more of a history book than a casual read about the recent crisis. The book provides a history of economic crisis since the 1600's with a brief description of each. This history lesson ends with the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The history lesson supports the book's central themes (1) economic crisis are not the exception, but rather a part of the normal economic cycle (2) A building economic crisis can be recognized. These themes dispute claims of mainstream economists and central bankers that “no one could have seen this coming” or that this was a “once in thousand year event”.
Modern economists have a tendency to believe that past crisis were due to an intellectual failing of past generations ie.... “how could the Fed have been so stupid in 1930, we would have simply eased monetary policy and avoided The Great Depression”. As studied historians know, this type of reasoning is often overly simplistic and ignores complexities of a situation at the time. Roubini criticizes modern economists for clinging to the latest economic theory as gospel ( in this case the efficient Market Hypothesis and free market dogma). Roubini suggests that economics is more complex than any one theory allows. He feels that economists should have a solid understanding of historical crisis alongside their theoretical education.
The final quarter of the book includes suggested financial reform and a forecast for the next decade. In short Roubini, continues to see trouble ahead with a Sovereign default likely. The monetary system remains very fragile and vulnerable to additional shocks, inflation or deflation. Finally, he ponders how China might use it's huge position in US treasuries for political purposes. A good primer if you are wondering what is going on in the economy and have that sinking feeling that this time its different.....
Modern economists have a tendency to believe that past crisis were due to an intellectual failing of past generations ie.... “how could the Fed have been so stupid in 1930, we would have simply eased monetary policy and avoided The Great Depression”. As studied historians know, this type of reasoning is often overly simplistic and ignores complexities of a situation at the time. Roubini criticizes modern economists for clinging to the latest economic theory as gospel ( in this case the efficient Market Hypothesis and free market dogma). Roubini suggests that economics is more complex than any one theory allows. He feels that economists should have a solid understanding of historical crisis alongside their theoretical education.
The final quarter of the book includes suggested financial reform and a forecast for the next decade. In short Roubini, continues to see trouble ahead with a Sovereign default likely. The monetary system remains very fragile and vulnerable to additional shocks, inflation or deflation. Finally, he ponders how China might use it's huge position in US treasuries for political purposes. A good primer if you are wondering what is going on in the economy and have that sinking feeling that this time its different.....
May 9, 2015
As an ex bank currency and money market traders, our defence for speculative trading was that economics was an art and not science. Having read this book, the author have proven that economic is rigorous science. In my reality in the past ,market players in the financial system ridden mainly on the animal spirit behaviours rather than the rationality of the science of economic. The author hit the nail that it was short term interest incentives that rewarded the market . Infact the system of remuneration for traders contributed to manifest greed inherent in human nature. The author highlighted that Central banks in the past had not exercised power to enforce regulations to prevent speculative manias to fed the bubble and spinning out of control. I recalled most of our top traders who were rewarded handsomely had the 'reckless' traits in them to be speculative manias to succeed.
Thanks to the transparency and accountability of the American financial system, the author could provide such a profound and insightful detailed analysis of the complex causes and effects of the crisis. The system can regulate accountability and transparency but not responsibility. The author suggested enforcement of more responsible regulation by central bank; the 2008 crisis had proven it was the central bank ( which are taxpayers money) that bear the responsibility of bailing out the culprits.
Thanks to the transparency and accountability of the American financial system, the author could provide such a profound and insightful detailed analysis of the complex causes and effects of the crisis. The system can regulate accountability and transparency but not responsibility. The author suggested enforcement of more responsible regulation by central bank; the 2008 crisis had proven it was the central bank ( which are taxpayers money) that bear the responsibility of bailing out the culprits.
May 16, 2013
There were things I liked about this book and things I did not like. I thought it had some good technical explanations with market theory and hypothesized links in currency and markets and deficits and so on. I thought this was interesting.
What I didn't like was a lot of unsupported statements where the author would state something about someone's criticism of why markets shouldn't be regulated for example and he would then say "That is a ridiculous statement" and then go on to cite reasons he thought it was ridiculous but didn't always provide any external evidence besides what he thought. I don't mind the opinions, but I thought a little more technical support was needed when criticizing. I read the book over a month ago so I can't remember specific examples of this, but he did it like 5 or 6 times and it was annoying. He would plant the idea of something being "ridiculous" or "preposterous" before explaining why it was. Sometimes I thought he was right and sometimes wrong, but a lot of the time when he said something like this, he didn't have a lot of evidence.
Overall though, I thought the book was insightful and tied together the similarities between past financial crises and the latest crisis and had some interesting discussions on U.S. and China monetary policies (right or wrong).
What I didn't like was a lot of unsupported statements where the author would state something about someone's criticism of why markets shouldn't be regulated for example and he would then say "That is a ridiculous statement" and then go on to cite reasons he thought it was ridiculous but didn't always provide any external evidence besides what he thought. I don't mind the opinions, but I thought a little more technical support was needed when criticizing. I read the book over a month ago so I can't remember specific examples of this, but he did it like 5 or 6 times and it was annoying. He would plant the idea of something being "ridiculous" or "preposterous" before explaining why it was. Sometimes I thought he was right and sometimes wrong, but a lot of the time when he said something like this, he didn't have a lot of evidence.
Overall though, I thought the book was insightful and tied together the similarities between past financial crises and the latest crisis and had some interesting discussions on U.S. and China monetary policies (right or wrong).
June 29, 2012
All in all, a comprehensive, albeit understandable for the economic novice, account of the most recent global financial crisis, what "caused" it, the historic precedence, and how to move forward. That being said, the reader must use caution as he continues through he chapters, as it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate fact from the authors' (highly academic/informed, and political central) own opinions. This is not to say that all sides are not presented, quite the contrary. However, economic theories differing from those of the authors are too often dismissed with a simple analogy. It is not always clear where the authors get their data, either (the bibliography is quite extensive, but it is not annotated or cited in the text itself). Like most economics paperbacks, there is plenty of hole-poking and name-calling, without much in the way of new, substantive propositions or solutions (at least not in any great detail).
That being said, this is a must-read for all, and is worded in a way to accommodate both the novice and the connoisseur.
That being said, this is a must-read for all, and is worded in a way to accommodate both the novice and the connoisseur.
February 18, 2013
I gave this book five stars because I found it to be the best one stop shop on the topic. I’ve read a lot of different books on the recent crash and each of them tends to focus on a specific influence such as the slicing and dicing of mortgages or currency devaluation.
This book has it all from the history of previous crashes, the full story line of the recent crash, and a complete set of recommendations on what needs to be fixed to avoid a similar or worse crash happening in the future. Above all else, it’s written in such a way that anyone can understand it, you won’t find financial jargon getting in the way of the real story.
The really scary part of reading books like this is the realization that to date almost nothing has been learned by those in positions to act as clearly little to nothing has been done.
This book has it all from the history of previous crashes, the full story line of the recent crash, and a complete set of recommendations on what needs to be fixed to avoid a similar or worse crash happening in the future. Above all else, it’s written in such a way that anyone can understand it, you won’t find financial jargon getting in the way of the real story.
The really scary part of reading books like this is the realization that to date almost nothing has been learned by those in positions to act as clearly little to nothing has been done.
March 6, 2018
A self-proclaimed centrist take on the recent economic crash of 2006-09. He makes the point that most crises have common inputs, contrary to the popular narrative that most are unique.
He paints a bleak picture.
The first 2/3 I found very interesting when I could understand. It gets a bit technical at times but he is a skilled story teller for most of it.
The tail end spoke to some possible reforms that could be made to avoid a more damaging crisis in the future. These solutions ranged from the large, massive reforms to the very technical. I got confused a few times. Not his fault. But it did feel like it got in the weeds a bit at times.
He paints a bleak picture.
The first 2/3 I found very interesting when I could understand. It gets a bit technical at times but he is a skilled story teller for most of it.
The tail end spoke to some possible reforms that could be made to avoid a more damaging crisis in the future. These solutions ranged from the large, massive reforms to the very technical. I got confused a few times. Not his fault. But it did feel like it got in the weeds a bit at times.
September 18, 2010
A bit too polemical for me, perhaps due to the audiobook narrator--I've heard him before, and he often lets a hint of a righteous sneer sneak into his tone when the authors are responding to some opposition view.
Besides that, I am suspicious of Roubini's conviction that crises are essentially predictable. We look at history with the benefit of hindsight; causes and effects seem crystal clear, and we wonder how we could be such fools. But life has to be lived forward, and the crystal ball is always murky.
Besides that, I am suspicious of Roubini's conviction that crises are essentially predictable. We look at history with the benefit of hindsight; causes and effects seem crystal clear, and we wonder how we could be such fools. But life has to be lived forward, and the crystal ball is always murky.
October 23, 2010
Extremely readable book about economics. Read more like a thriller and often kept me on the edge of my seat. News stories about economics are much more understandable. While the authors have a particular perspective, I felt like they provided a wealth of information and attended fairly to diverging viewpoints. Very impressed with their ability to take such a complex and dry topic (at least to readers such as myself) and produce such an engaging and informative overview, not only of the current crisis, but within an historical context. I hope they write some kind of sequel.
February 21, 2011
An exceptional work that provides a superb analysis of the sources and causes of the financial crisis. The authors also provide sage recommendations for the necessary reforms that must be enacted.
This is a book that will appeal to both financial laymen (such as myself) and practitioners steeped in financial necromancy. A great starting point for those who work all their lives for money, but are clueless about how money works. If you have to read one book on the financial crisis, this is it.
This is a book that will appeal to both financial laymen (such as myself) and practitioners steeped in financial necromancy. A great starting point for those who work all their lives for money, but are clueless about how money works. If you have to read one book on the financial crisis, this is it.
January 24, 2015
It is a very good book as my journey in 2015 has started in an overview of both economics and finance. The findings from various sources of both finance and economics had brought to a level of broad assessment that come to this piece of book. From a world complexities from macro and micro economics, to banking, investment, insurances and to the more on how practical it is that makes more sense in current world. Details gathered by Roubini and Stephen deliberately that makes interest to another assessment from Paul Krugman, Robert J. Shiller, Martin Wolf and many others.
Currently reading
August 3, 2016Summer 2011 with the dollar in the jaws of Republican utopians, the euro at the cross rounds of a poker all-in or fold, the afternath of the CDS debackle and the massive government bailouts risk to make all our daily worries trivial. This book makes the origins of the cuurent crisis more tangible and carries hope and warning in it's historical perspective, at least it does so far, crossing my fingers that all will end well..
December 24, 2015
Would highly recommend to anyone wishing to understand both the foundations and the implications of the 2007 economic crisis. Having read a number of books on the events of the last five years, I found the Roubini and Mihm text cogent, powerful and the implications particularly interesting.
Given Roubini's previous foresight I would advise others to read and take on board his prognosis.
Given Roubini's previous foresight I would advise others to read and take on board his prognosis.
November 4, 2019
The original prophet of economic doom, Nouriel Roubini lays bare the spiraling greed that inspired, irrigated and ignited the calamitous financial crisis of 2008. Governments will learn from this, the layman will both fume and fret, while investment bankers would collectively wish to put bullets through the heads of the authors!
March 18, 2015
Insightful analysis.
I'm afraid, though, that the 'good crisis' HAS gone to waste...
I'm afraid, though, that the 'good crisis' HAS gone to waste...
June 20, 2015
a great explanation of some of the key economic concepts. Author gets a bit carried away with the solutions approach and I don't think any of them are feasible without heavy regulation.
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