This book was converted from its physical edition to the digital format by a community of volunteers. You may find it for free on the web. Purchase of the Kindle edition includes wireless delivery.
Sir Walter Alexander Raleigh was an English scholar, poet, and author. Raleigh was also a Cambridge Apostle. He was Professor of English Literature at Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh in India (1885–87), Professor of Modern Literature at University College Liverpool (1890–1900), Regius Professor of English Language and Literature at Glasgow University (1900–1904), and in 1904 became the first holder of the Chair of English Literature at Oxford University. He was a fellow of Merton College, Oxford (1914–22). He was knighted in 1911.[
Very good, but definitely not excellent. Excellent writing, many excellent turns of phrase. Excellent historical account of the development of Britain’s air power, if taken at face value. But in some places the reader might wonder if the author is not presenting chance, and sometimes chaos that preceded victory, as being the product of wise foresight and careful planning rather than something far inferior.
SOME KEY POINTS IN THE BOOK
1. The culture of the Army and RN were different and the culture of an air force needed to be different from both. But the author fails to give details of what these differences of culture are; it would have been very interesting to know.
2. The opportunities that so many involved in air power in the Great War seized that made their reputations, albeit most of them were probably not trying to do such a thing, arose because it was a time of great opportunity: a vast new bureaucracy was needed, and there was none, so those who had talent and were in the right place at the right time became grandees in the air service. The author does not say this, but it is a clear implication from what he does say.
3. The air service is a technical service and moreover, one where planning matters. Key factors are long lead times, complex dependencies, and a reliance on new technologies that are not yet proved and dependable becoming so within the timeframe called for in the plans.
4. For equipment, the first criterion of effectiveness is “does the pilot like it?” This criterion is all the more acute because the pilot trusts his life to his equipment. He faces many risks and of those he must take many, but he has only one life.
5. Air-ground cooperation is vital to modern warfare, especially in artillery and reconnaissance matters. This depends largely on the air force offering their services and the ground force asking for them. If pilots do not think that their work is appreciated by the ground forces, they will be less likely to risk their lives to do good work.
6. Power within an organization matters. Power stems from lawful authority and money, and also strength of character and culture. Power and these sources of it are key themes in the book. They are rarely explored directly, but almost ever present.
7. The UK depended on the French for aero-engines for most of the war. It took a long time to develop a native manufacturing capacity to meet demand.
8. There was no system to divert skilled mechanics from the teeth arms into the RFC, where they would have been much more valuable. However, the problem was solved by the brute force approach of paying suitably experienced mechanics more.
9. For all the supposed riches of the British Raj, the Indian Army had no budget to create an air arm when it wanted to.
10. A major difference between the RNAS and the RFC was that the RFC was much more a part of the Army, in culture and discipline, that was the RNAS part of the RN.
A great little book on the beginnings of the RAF and Fleet Air Arm. Gives a brief introduction to the early days of flight, then how aviation developed. Covers a lot of the big names but also records some of the earliest flyers, navigators and mechanics. Most of the book is about the process of how and why the Army and Navy set up separate services, the roles of these services, their establishment, training, aircraft, early technical advances and the early days of WWI. The last chapter does a quick cover of the rest of WWI.
A bit old in its wording and a lot of pride in being English. Nonetheless it was interesting how the author (and others) saw the establishment of Squadrons as the key for making a flying unit work, to enable it to establish its culture and focus in a small enough group of people and aircraft.