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Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command
Although he took command of the Army of the Potomac only three days before the first shots were fired at Gettysburg, Union general George G. Meade guided his forces to victory in the Civil War's most pivotal battle. Commentators often dismiss Meade when discussing the great leaders of the Civil War. But in this long-anticipated book, Kent Masterson Brown draws on an expansive archive to reappraise Meade's leadership during the Battle of Gettysburg. Using Meade's published and unpublished papers alongside diaries, letters, and memoirs of fellow officers and enlisted men, Brown highlights how Meade's rapid advance of the army to Gettysburg on July 1, his tactical control and coordination of the army in the desperate fighting on July 2, and his determination to hold his positions on July 3 insured victory.
Brown argues that supply deficiencies, brought about by the army's unexpected need to advance to Gettysburg, were crippling. In spite of that, Meade pursued Lee's retreating army rapidly, and his decision not to blindly attack Lee's formidable defenses near Williamsport on July 13 was entirely correct in spite of subsequent harsh criticism. Combining compelling narrative with incisive analysis, this finely rendered work of military history deepens our understanding of the Army of the Potomac as well as the machinations of the Gettysburg Campaign, restoring Meade to his rightful place in the Gettysburg narrative.
Brown argues that supply deficiencies, brought about by the army's unexpected need to advance to Gettysburg, were crippling. In spite of that, Meade pursued Lee's retreating army rapidly, and his decision not to blindly attack Lee's formidable defenses near Williamsport on July 13 was entirely correct in spite of subsequent harsh criticism. Combining compelling narrative with incisive analysis, this finely rendered work of military history deepens our understanding of the Army of the Potomac as well as the machinations of the Gettysburg Campaign, restoring Meade to his rightful place in the Gettysburg narrative.
475 pages, Hardcover
First published June 7, 2021
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August 12, 2026
I finished Kent Masterson Brown’s Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command with something I did not necessarily expect when I started: a newfound respect for General George Gordon Meade.
Brown seems to be on something of a mission to rehabilitate Meade’s reputation—and, in this reader’s opinion, he succeeds.
Meade’s story at Gettysburg is remarkable. On June 28, 1863, he was suddenly ordered to replace Joseph Hooker as commander of the Army of the Potomac. He barely had time to understand his new command before being thrown into one of the most consequential moments of the Civil War. Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia were already invading the North.
Lee’s army needed supplies, and Pennsylvania offered food, livestock, forage, clothing, shoes, and other provisions that war-ravaged Virginia increasingly could not provide. But there was a much darker side to the invasion as well. Confederate forces seized free Black Americans during the campaign, carrying some south toward slavery. Whatever romantic mythology has been built around Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia, we cannot lose sight of what the Confederacy was fighting to preserve. This was an army invading free soil on behalf of a nation founded upon human bondage.
And Meade had been given only days to stop it.
One of the things Brown does particularly well is explain that Meade initially had no reason to assume Gettysburg would become the battlefield. His responsibility extended far beyond defeating Lee. He also had to protect Washington and Baltimore. He therefore considered a strong defensive position along the Pipe Creek line in Maryland while simultaneously moving the Army of the Potomac northward and keeping track of Lee.
Then events took over.
On July 1, Union cavalry under John Buford engaged the approaching Confederates at Gettysburg and helped buy precious time for Union infantry to arrive. The fighting was fierce, and Union forces were eventually driven through the town. But they fell back onto the high ground around Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge.
Meade arrived that night and inherited an enormous, chaotic battlefield.
This is where Brown’s book really shines.
Rather than simply providing another play-by-play account of Gettysburg, Brown focuses on command—how Meade organized, positioned, supplied, reinforced, and moved a massive army across a sprawling battlefield. From Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill in the north, down Cemetery Ridge, and ultimately toward Little Round Top in the south, Meade had to understand what was happening across miles of front while Lee repeatedly searched for a weakness.
With the help of Winfield Scott Hancock and a number of other Union commanders, Meade held that line.
Brown makes a convincing case that this was not simply a matter of Lee losing Gettysburg. Meade helped win it.
And the scale of what happened there is almost difficult to comprehend. Gettysburg was the largest land battle ever fought on American soil. Tens of thousands of men were killed, wounded, captured, or missing, and thousands of horses were killed or maimed as well. Meade’s victory was not inevitable. It came on a razor-thin margin, with decisions made under enormous pressure and with the fate of the Union hanging in the balance.
The final third of the book may be its most interesting—and controversial—section. Brown takes direct aim at the long-standing criticism that Meade failed to aggressively pursue and destroy Lee’s retreating army after Gettysburg.
Here Brown challenges interpretations offered by historians such as Allen Guelzo and Stephen Sears. His argument is that the Army of the Potomac was in far worse condition than hindsight sometimes allows us to appreciate. The army had suffered staggering casualties. Men were exhausted. Supplies and ammunition were depleted. Horses and pack animals were worn down and lacked forage. Large numbers of soldiers were marching with inadequate footwear. Then came torrential rain, turning roads into mud and swelling the Potomac River.
Brown’s evidence is persuasive. By the end, I found myself questioning the familiar criticism that Meade simply lacked the aggressiveness to finish Lee off. It is easy, more than 160 years later, to move armies around on a map. It was considerably harder to move tens of thousands of exhausted, wounded, hungry men through Pennsylvania and Maryland mud in July 1863.
Brown convinced me that Meade deserves considerably more credit than he has traditionally received.
There is, however, a downside to this book: bring maps!
I occasionally struggled to follow exactly where particular corps, divisions, and brigades were positioned and who commanded whom. This is not the easiest introduction to Gettysburg. Maps, notes, and perhaps even a Gettysburg order of battle nearby will make the experience considerably more rewarding.
In fact, I think this book works best when paired with two other Gettysburg histories I have recently read: Allen Guelzo’s Gettysburg: The Last Invasion and Stephen Sears’s Gettysburg.
For me, the three books complement one another beautifully.
Guelzo provides the analysis. Sears provides the extraordinary play-by-play. Brown provides the study of Union command and leadership.
Together they form something of a Gettysburg triumvirate.
I read this one through Kindle immersion with the audiobook, but I also picked up a signed hardcover at the Gettysburg National Military Park bookstore. After finishing the book—and after walking much of that battlefield myself—that signed copy now has a place of honor on my shelf.
And perhaps that is the best indication of what Brown accomplished for this reader. I began the book knowing George Meade mostly as the general who defeated Lee at Gettysburg and was later criticized for letting him escape.
I finished it seeing something more.
Meade was handed command of the Army of the Potomac in the middle of a national emergency, confronted Robert E. Lee only days later, managed an enormous army across a sprawling battlefield, and prevailed by the narrowest of margins in the largest battle ever fought on American soil.
Perhaps history has spent so much time asking why Meade did not destroy Lee after Gettysburg that we have not spent enough time appreciating what he accomplished at Gettysburg.
★★★★ — A challenging but rewarding study of command that gave me a new appreciation for George Gordon Meade.
https://substack.com/@lposse1
Brown seems to be on something of a mission to rehabilitate Meade’s reputation—and, in this reader’s opinion, he succeeds.
Meade’s story at Gettysburg is remarkable. On June 28, 1863, he was suddenly ordered to replace Joseph Hooker as commander of the Army of the Potomac. He barely had time to understand his new command before being thrown into one of the most consequential moments of the Civil War. Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia were already invading the North.
Lee’s army needed supplies, and Pennsylvania offered food, livestock, forage, clothing, shoes, and other provisions that war-ravaged Virginia increasingly could not provide. But there was a much darker side to the invasion as well. Confederate forces seized free Black Americans during the campaign, carrying some south toward slavery. Whatever romantic mythology has been built around Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia, we cannot lose sight of what the Confederacy was fighting to preserve. This was an army invading free soil on behalf of a nation founded upon human bondage.
And Meade had been given only days to stop it.
One of the things Brown does particularly well is explain that Meade initially had no reason to assume Gettysburg would become the battlefield. His responsibility extended far beyond defeating Lee. He also had to protect Washington and Baltimore. He therefore considered a strong defensive position along the Pipe Creek line in Maryland while simultaneously moving the Army of the Potomac northward and keeping track of Lee.
Then events took over.
On July 1, Union cavalry under John Buford engaged the approaching Confederates at Gettysburg and helped buy precious time for Union infantry to arrive. The fighting was fierce, and Union forces were eventually driven through the town. But they fell back onto the high ground around Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge.
Meade arrived that night and inherited an enormous, chaotic battlefield.
This is where Brown’s book really shines.
Rather than simply providing another play-by-play account of Gettysburg, Brown focuses on command—how Meade organized, positioned, supplied, reinforced, and moved a massive army across a sprawling battlefield. From Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill in the north, down Cemetery Ridge, and ultimately toward Little Round Top in the south, Meade had to understand what was happening across miles of front while Lee repeatedly searched for a weakness.
With the help of Winfield Scott Hancock and a number of other Union commanders, Meade held that line.
Brown makes a convincing case that this was not simply a matter of Lee losing Gettysburg. Meade helped win it.
And the scale of what happened there is almost difficult to comprehend. Gettysburg was the largest land battle ever fought on American soil. Tens of thousands of men were killed, wounded, captured, or missing, and thousands of horses were killed or maimed as well. Meade’s victory was not inevitable. It came on a razor-thin margin, with decisions made under enormous pressure and with the fate of the Union hanging in the balance.
The final third of the book may be its most interesting—and controversial—section. Brown takes direct aim at the long-standing criticism that Meade failed to aggressively pursue and destroy Lee’s retreating army after Gettysburg.
Here Brown challenges interpretations offered by historians such as Allen Guelzo and Stephen Sears. His argument is that the Army of the Potomac was in far worse condition than hindsight sometimes allows us to appreciate. The army had suffered staggering casualties. Men were exhausted. Supplies and ammunition were depleted. Horses and pack animals were worn down and lacked forage. Large numbers of soldiers were marching with inadequate footwear. Then came torrential rain, turning roads into mud and swelling the Potomac River.
Brown’s evidence is persuasive. By the end, I found myself questioning the familiar criticism that Meade simply lacked the aggressiveness to finish Lee off. It is easy, more than 160 years later, to move armies around on a map. It was considerably harder to move tens of thousands of exhausted, wounded, hungry men through Pennsylvania and Maryland mud in July 1863.
Brown convinced me that Meade deserves considerably more credit than he has traditionally received.
There is, however, a downside to this book: bring maps!
I occasionally struggled to follow exactly where particular corps, divisions, and brigades were positioned and who commanded whom. This is not the easiest introduction to Gettysburg. Maps, notes, and perhaps even a Gettysburg order of battle nearby will make the experience considerably more rewarding.
In fact, I think this book works best when paired with two other Gettysburg histories I have recently read: Allen Guelzo’s Gettysburg: The Last Invasion and Stephen Sears’s Gettysburg.
For me, the three books complement one another beautifully.
Guelzo provides the analysis. Sears provides the extraordinary play-by-play. Brown provides the study of Union command and leadership.
Together they form something of a Gettysburg triumvirate.
I read this one through Kindle immersion with the audiobook, but I also picked up a signed hardcover at the Gettysburg National Military Park bookstore. After finishing the book—and after walking much of that battlefield myself—that signed copy now has a place of honor on my shelf.
And perhaps that is the best indication of what Brown accomplished for this reader. I began the book knowing George Meade mostly as the general who defeated Lee at Gettysburg and was later criticized for letting him escape.
I finished it seeing something more.
Meade was handed command of the Army of the Potomac in the middle of a national emergency, confronted Robert E. Lee only days later, managed an enormous army across a sprawling battlefield, and prevailed by the narrowest of margins in the largest battle ever fought on American soil.
Perhaps history has spent so much time asking why Meade did not destroy Lee after Gettysburg that we have not spent enough time appreciating what he accomplished at Gettysburg.
★★★★ — A challenging but rewarding study of command that gave me a new appreciation for George Gordon Meade.
https://substack.com/@lposse1
July 18, 2023
A very well done assessment of George Meade's generalship during the Gettysburg campaign, I think the author should write a full biography on him. I would say that Meade deserves so much more credit than he is given.
August 21, 2021
Easily, the best single volume treatment of Meade's generalship at Gettysburg. The author debunks several myths that have cropped up in Civil War historiography over the years. We get a portrait of a different general, one who had a plan from the beginning and was prepared to follow it through. My only complaint about the book was that it didn't focus much on the Lost Cause tradition following the war and its impact on history. But, overall, a very good effort.
January 24, 2022
An excellent book on the performance of Gen George Meade during and after the battle at Gettysburg. Succinct details of the battle prove Meade’s competent and successful handling of an army he had only commanded for a few days. More interesting IMHO is the portrayal of Meade’s handling of the army during Lee’s retreat to the Potomac. The well documented actions in pursuit of Lee clearly show that Meade realized the Army of Northern Virginia was still a deadly foe. Despite harsh criticism by Lincoln and General Halleck, Meade stuck to his guns to prevent a potentially disastrous battle against the cornered Confederates.
August 13, 2021
Unlike monolithic battle accounts focused on bang and boom actions, Kent Masterson Brown presents an in-depth study of Meade’s generalship at Gettysburg. The gifted strategist, operational commander, and tactician that was the real George Gordon Meade finally surfaces above the considerable political and biases thrown against him after the battle and institutionalized as “history” since then. Supported by exhaustive research and gifted objectivity, Brown masterfully sets the record straight on a truly great American general.
January 23, 2026
Meade at Gettysburg is not just an evaluation of Major General George G. Meade's leadership from June 28 to July 15, 1863. It is also a Union counterpart to the author's previous book, Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign due to its emphasis on the Army of the Potomac's logistical issues before, during, and after the Battle of Gettysburg. I think the author also intended it as somewhat of rebuttal to Gettysburg: The Last Invasion. Allen Guelzo is infamously negative towards Meade while Brown is very positive. Unfortunately, Lee is Trapped, and Must be Taken: Eleven Fateful Days after Gettysburg: July 4 - 14, 1863 came out the same year as this book and is thus absent from the bibliography; I would expect Brown to have some strong opinions about it.
Besides the logistics, other standout aspects of this book are a more extensive analysis of Meade's Pipe Creek plan than I think any previous author has done and details on Meade attempting to deal with Lee's defensive line at Williamsport.
Several times Brown explicitly agrees or disagrees with authors of previous books about Gettysburg. Disagreements are kept professional, but it's clear to the reader on where Brown stands and why. This seems uncommon nowadays, or at least relegated to endnotes.
There are some simple but effective maps, photos of important officers and places throughout, a well-organized bibliography, and endnotes which include some commentary.
The writing is good, and better than than Retreat From Gettsyburg. I worked through this book steadily, a chapter each day. Although analytical, this doesn't feel like cliche university press book. I did feel like more detail was given about the fighting at Gettysburg than needed considering the main topic of the book; tighter editing probably could have shaved 10-20 pages.
As someone who already had a positive opinion of Meade, it's hard for me to say how persuasive the author's arguments are. I think the book does a good job showing the difficulties Meade operated under. One fault I do find regards Clausewitz. Although some of Meade's tactics may fit nicely with Clauzewitz's teachings, it's unlikely Meade was familiar with those teachings, though he may have been familiar with similar ideas from earlier sources taught when he was at West Point.
Recommended for those interested in the American Civil War.
Besides the logistics, other standout aspects of this book are a more extensive analysis of Meade's Pipe Creek plan than I think any previous author has done and details on Meade attempting to deal with Lee's defensive line at Williamsport.
Several times Brown explicitly agrees or disagrees with authors of previous books about Gettysburg. Disagreements are kept professional, but it's clear to the reader on where Brown stands and why. This seems uncommon nowadays, or at least relegated to endnotes.
There are some simple but effective maps, photos of important officers and places throughout, a well-organized bibliography, and endnotes which include some commentary.
The writing is good, and better than than Retreat From Gettsyburg. I worked through this book steadily, a chapter each day. Although analytical, this doesn't feel like cliche university press book. I did feel like more detail was given about the fighting at Gettysburg than needed considering the main topic of the book; tighter editing probably could have shaved 10-20 pages.
As someone who already had a positive opinion of Meade, it's hard for me to say how persuasive the author's arguments are. I think the book does a good job showing the difficulties Meade operated under. One fault I do find regards Clausewitz. Although some of Meade's tactics may fit nicely with Clauzewitz's teachings, it's unlikely Meade was familiar with those teachings, though he may have been familiar with similar ideas from earlier sources taught when he was at West Point.
Recommended for those interested in the American Civil War.
June 18, 2021
Brown knows his stuff, especially logistics. His Meade-centric fog of war approach is very effective: in the book Meade is properly judged only on what information he had available at the moment. Good insight into Meade's desire and preparation to fight at Pipe Creek rather than Gettysburg until Reynolds blundered into a general engagement against Meade's orders. Gettysburg needed this deep look into the logistics of the campaign; I had no idea that with limited supply routes to Gettysburg, the Union army (and horses and mules) basically starved for four days before and during the battle.
I do quibble some with Brown cutting Meade way too much slack in the pursuit. Almost impossible to pursue through mountain passes such as South Mountain? Even McCLELLAN did that, and forced those same passes, and against a Confederate Army that had not been devastated by three days of combat. And for every instance cited of the logistical difficulties Meade was facing, multiply that by three or four for Lee. And as late as July 7, Meade was afraid that Lee might sneak around him and go BACK to Gettysburg! The excuse that Meade was still under primary orders to protect Washington and Baltimore reeks of rationalization. I agree that Meade should not have attacked the defenses at Williamsport, but that begs the question: why did Meade give Lee the time to build such extensive fortifications in the first place?
I have Brown's earlier entire book on the retreat, have not read it yet but will, maybe he does a better job fleshing out the rationale for Meade not doing more. I think even the July 1863 version of Grant would have destroyed Lee before he ever made it back to the Potomac.
I do quibble some with Brown cutting Meade way too much slack in the pursuit. Almost impossible to pursue through mountain passes such as South Mountain? Even McCLELLAN did that, and forced those same passes, and against a Confederate Army that had not been devastated by three days of combat. And for every instance cited of the logistical difficulties Meade was facing, multiply that by three or four for Lee. And as late as July 7, Meade was afraid that Lee might sneak around him and go BACK to Gettysburg! The excuse that Meade was still under primary orders to protect Washington and Baltimore reeks of rationalization. I agree that Meade should not have attacked the defenses at Williamsport, but that begs the question: why did Meade give Lee the time to build such extensive fortifications in the first place?
I have Brown's earlier entire book on the retreat, have not read it yet but will, maybe he does a better job fleshing out the rationale for Meade not doing more. I think even the July 1863 version of Grant would have destroyed Lee before he ever made it back to the Potomac.
April 6, 2022
A phenomenal book, and one worth rereading. Through his analysis and examination of the sources, Brown has shifted my view on Meade and his generalship during the Gettysburg campaign towards a more positive and nuanced view. Especially valuable are his chapters on the events after 3 July, as well as his engagement with the work of other scholars such as Guelzo, Sears, and Coddington, who have published on the battle
Very much recommended.
Very much recommended.
September 29, 2022
Excellent book. Very underrated General. His leadership was invaluable for the union army at Gettysburg.
March 25, 2022
Kent Masterson Brown has written a fantastic treatise on General George G. Meade and the challenges he faced after having command of the Army of the Potomac thrust upon him in the middle of the morning. Meade had no choice in the matter, and he had to immediately assume the heavy responsibility and burden of command. Not only did Meade not know the position of other Union Army corps, he also did not know the location of General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. On top of all that, Meade was given the responsibility of telling General Hooker that he was no longer in command.
As a student of the Gettysburg Campaign, I have often read and heard much criticism pushed on Meade over two areas: the Pipe Creek Circular and the perceived lack of aggressiveness in pursuing Lee’s army after July 4, 1863. Brown does a fantastic job addressing this issue by highlighting the training Meade and his contemporaries received at West Point. Brown also points out the influences of Dennis Hart Mahan, Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, and Carl von Clausewitz on strategy and tactics during the Civil War. Training that the volunteer and politically appointed generals did not receive, and training that the politicians, including Abraham Lincoln, never had either.
Brown also details the hardships experienced by Union soldiers on their march to Gettysburg, during the fight, and the impact that had on their welfare and supply needs after the battle. Brown describes the challenges Meade faced with little intelligence on Lee’s location, logistic problems, communications problems, lack of maps for the area, etc.
This is a great read to learn more about the challenges Meade faced. There are many take-aways from this book, including fantastic leadership examples.
As a student of the Gettysburg Campaign, I have often read and heard much criticism pushed on Meade over two areas: the Pipe Creek Circular and the perceived lack of aggressiveness in pursuing Lee’s army after July 4, 1863. Brown does a fantastic job addressing this issue by highlighting the training Meade and his contemporaries received at West Point. Brown also points out the influences of Dennis Hart Mahan, Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, and Carl von Clausewitz on strategy and tactics during the Civil War. Training that the volunteer and politically appointed generals did not receive, and training that the politicians, including Abraham Lincoln, never had either.
Brown also details the hardships experienced by Union soldiers on their march to Gettysburg, during the fight, and the impact that had on their welfare and supply needs after the battle. Brown describes the challenges Meade faced with little intelligence on Lee’s location, logistic problems, communications problems, lack of maps for the area, etc.
This is a great read to learn more about the challenges Meade faced. There are many take-aways from this book, including fantastic leadership examples.
April 13, 2026
The best historical review of a commander's strategic and tactical actions from the American civil war I have ever read.
October 20, 2021
George Gordon Meade took over as commander of the Army of the Potomac on June 28. Given the task of resisting Lee's advance, and in particular defending the capital, he set up a line of defence that would achieve just this. In order to ascertain Lee's position and strength, he sent a reconnaissance in force under a general he trusted. As a result of this came about the famous Battle of Gettysburg, This is a fine account of Meade's Generalship during the Gettysburg campaign, which just to put things in perspective ran from the fourth to the sixth day of Meade's having taken charge of the army. The AOTP decisively defeated Lee's army, which subsequently pulled back, thereby ending the last major Confederate invasion of Union territory. However, Meade, the victor of the Battle of Gettysburg was criticised then and subsequently for having let Lee escape.
A warning to readers who might expect a complete account of the Battle of Gettysburg. That, this book is not and does not try to be. It shows in particular what Meade's plans were before Gettysburg was brought on accidentally by Reynolds' mistakes on Jul 1, how important Meade's generalship was to the victory on the left flank on July 2, and the correctness of Meade's actions following the battle given what he knew and the state of the Army of the Potomac. My one criticism of this book is that it could have had more detailed maps, but otherwise Brown does a good job of defending Meade's achievement, and concludes that Meade's decisions saved the Army of the Potomac and defeated Lee, and there was nothing more in the circumstances that he could have done. It is particularly impressive that Brown comments extensively from the kinds of books on strategy which Meade would have read, which shed light on what he was trying to do. Likewise, he has a firm grasp of geography and the role it played in the campaign, as well as the role of provisioning in what options were open to Meade at any given stage.
A warning to readers who might expect a complete account of the Battle of Gettysburg. That, this book is not and does not try to be. It shows in particular what Meade's plans were before Gettysburg was brought on accidentally by Reynolds' mistakes on Jul 1, how important Meade's generalship was to the victory on the left flank on July 2, and the correctness of Meade's actions following the battle given what he knew and the state of the Army of the Potomac. My one criticism of this book is that it could have had more detailed maps, but otherwise Brown does a good job of defending Meade's achievement, and concludes that Meade's decisions saved the Army of the Potomac and defeated Lee, and there was nothing more in the circumstances that he could have done. It is particularly impressive that Brown comments extensively from the kinds of books on strategy which Meade would have read, which shed light on what he was trying to do. Likewise, he has a firm grasp of geography and the role it played in the campaign, as well as the role of provisioning in what options were open to Meade at any given stage.
August 3, 2022
This was fantastic! General Meade has become a sort of obscure figure form the Civil War so it was very refreshing to read this glowing assessment of Meade's generalship during the Gettysburg campaign. I enjoy most things I read about Gettysburg, but I had never read an account of Meade's actions during the battle, and to see the battle through the eyes of the Union Army's commander was very refreshing and interesting.
This book does so much to clear up the inconsistencies and untruths about Meade during Gettysburg and proves that he was done dirty by his detractors during and after the war. His reputation is finally getting it's due and this book is a major step forward.
This book does so much to clear up the inconsistencies and untruths about Meade during Gettysburg and proves that he was done dirty by his detractors during and after the war. His reputation is finally getting it's due and this book is a major step forward.
August 21, 2026
The country and the Army of the Potomac find a match for Bobbie Lee
“The most difficult part of my work is acting without correct information on which to predicate action.” – from MEADE AT GETTYSBURG, General Meade in a letter to his wife
For historians of the Civil War, it’s been popular to criticize Major General George Gordon Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, for not vigorously pursuing General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and decisively defeating it and ending the war after the latter’s repulse at Gettysburg on July 1-3, 1863. The criticism apparently stems from President Lincoln’s unhappiness that Meade didn’t pull it off. MEADE AT GETTYSBURG is Kent Masterson Brown’s refutation of this criticism by close examination of Meade’s command decisions and actions before, during, and days after the battle.
The first two chapters set the stage by briefly summarizing the Army of the Potomac’s woes prior to Meade taking command in the early morning of June 28, 1863 and emphasizing the army’s defeats at Fredericksburg (under Burnside’s command) and Chancellorsville (under Hooker’s command). After Chancellorsville, the knives were unsheathed and the fate ordained for General Hooker.
It’s unnecessary in this review to encapsulate the Battle of Gettysburg itself rather than to say that MEADE AT GETTYSBURG is an incredibly detailed account of units’ actions on the battlefield down at regiment, brigade, division, corps, and artillery battery levels. The point of view is totally and appropriately that of the Union side overall and General Meade in particular; that of General Lee and the Confederates, including General Longstreet’s objections to the assaults on the Federal lines on Days 2 and 3, are completely ignored as irrelevant to the book’s topic and the author’s intent.
MEADE AT GETTYSBURG gives the reader marvelous insight on the energy and effort demanded of Meade to coordinate the movements of the widely separated seven corps of his army, comprising some 92,000+ men, and concentrate them at a point to oppose Lee’s advance through Pennsylvania to presumably attack Baltimore and/or Washington. Meade ultimately had to do this during the two days after assuming (his unwanted) command of his army. No pressure there!
The reader will perhaps be particularly struck by two of Meade’s pressing concerns during the events of June 28 – July 15, the period the book covers – concerns that casual students of the Civil War and its opposing armies may not appreciate enough, i.e., four-footed transport and the challenges of establishing proper and (relatively) quick lines of communication.
“Army regulations required each horse to be fed roughly fourteen pounds of hay and twelve pounds of oats every day. For mules, fourteen pounds of hay and nine pounds of oats, corn, or barley were required … With more than thirty-thousand mules and nearly thirty-thousand horses to feed every day, and regularly shoe, the task was almost insurmountable. “ – from MEADE AT GETTYSBURG
Nowadays, it’s technologically possible for the front-line trooper to call home on his cell phone. Thus, it’s almost inconceivable the difficulties endured by General Meade in communicating even by the swiftest routes.
“Overall, a message would take six hours to get from Baltimore to Gettysburg.” – from MEADE AT GETTYSBURG
MEADE AT GETTYSBURG was prodigiously researched – 51 pages of footnoted references and a 17-page Bibliography. Sprinkled throughout the volume are thirteen maps and a larger number of photos – mostly of various Federal general officers – and period drawings.
Now, a few words about the maps …
Back in 2006, I read and reviewed CHAMPION HILL by Timothy Smith, an historical narrative of that key battle that ultimately allowed General Grant and his Army of the Tennessee to approach and lay siege to Vicksburg. I said about the maps in that book:
“The evolution of the Champion Hill clash is traced by forty - count 'em, 40! - marvelously illustrative maps rendered in black, white, and gray that coincide at all times with the textual narrative. Smith even goes so far as to depict the field positioning of units during and after disintegration and, in some cases, their subsequent reformation and re-entry into the fray. At no time was I in the least confused about the tide of battle and the organizational identity of the combatants. These battlefield maps demonstrate how such should be constructed, but which so often are not in otherwise faultless works.”
Unfortunately, the maps in MEADE AT GETTYSBURG don’t meet the standard set by those in CHAMPION HILL. While certainly not in the small scale of country and global maps, they are also not of large enough scale, in my opinion, to fully illustrate the movements of the Army of the Potomac’s units on the battlefield. Indeed, they don’t. During much of the narrative, particularly that describing Day 2 of the Gettysburg battle, I had to rely solely on my mind’s eye to “see” the movements of such. Better map illustration would have been very much appreciated. For that reason, I’m deducting a star from what is otherwise one of the best Civil War battle narratives I’ve come across.
Brown brilliantly accomplished what he set out to do, i.e., vindicate General Meade. The reader is best left with the following quote from Private Robert Davis of the 74th New York in the Third Corps:
“We was [sic] satisfied with his generalship. It inspired us with renewed courage, believing our country had at last found more than a match for General Lee.”
“The most difficult part of my work is acting without correct information on which to predicate action.” – from MEADE AT GETTYSBURG, General Meade in a letter to his wife
For historians of the Civil War, it’s been popular to criticize Major General George Gordon Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, for not vigorously pursuing General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia and decisively defeating it and ending the war after the latter’s repulse at Gettysburg on July 1-3, 1863. The criticism apparently stems from President Lincoln’s unhappiness that Meade didn’t pull it off. MEADE AT GETTYSBURG is Kent Masterson Brown’s refutation of this criticism by close examination of Meade’s command decisions and actions before, during, and days after the battle.
The first two chapters set the stage by briefly summarizing the Army of the Potomac’s woes prior to Meade taking command in the early morning of June 28, 1863 and emphasizing the army’s defeats at Fredericksburg (under Burnside’s command) and Chancellorsville (under Hooker’s command). After Chancellorsville, the knives were unsheathed and the fate ordained for General Hooker.
It’s unnecessary in this review to encapsulate the Battle of Gettysburg itself rather than to say that MEADE AT GETTYSBURG is an incredibly detailed account of units’ actions on the battlefield down at regiment, brigade, division, corps, and artillery battery levels. The point of view is totally and appropriately that of the Union side overall and General Meade in particular; that of General Lee and the Confederates, including General Longstreet’s objections to the assaults on the Federal lines on Days 2 and 3, are completely ignored as irrelevant to the book’s topic and the author’s intent.
MEADE AT GETTYSBURG gives the reader marvelous insight on the energy and effort demanded of Meade to coordinate the movements of the widely separated seven corps of his army, comprising some 92,000+ men, and concentrate them at a point to oppose Lee’s advance through Pennsylvania to presumably attack Baltimore and/or Washington. Meade ultimately had to do this during the two days after assuming (his unwanted) command of his army. No pressure there!
The reader will perhaps be particularly struck by two of Meade’s pressing concerns during the events of June 28 – July 15, the period the book covers – concerns that casual students of the Civil War and its opposing armies may not appreciate enough, i.e., four-footed transport and the challenges of establishing proper and (relatively) quick lines of communication.
“Army regulations required each horse to be fed roughly fourteen pounds of hay and twelve pounds of oats every day. For mules, fourteen pounds of hay and nine pounds of oats, corn, or barley were required … With more than thirty-thousand mules and nearly thirty-thousand horses to feed every day, and regularly shoe, the task was almost insurmountable. “ – from MEADE AT GETTYSBURG
Nowadays, it’s technologically possible for the front-line trooper to call home on his cell phone. Thus, it’s almost inconceivable the difficulties endured by General Meade in communicating even by the swiftest routes.
“Overall, a message would take six hours to get from Baltimore to Gettysburg.” – from MEADE AT GETTYSBURG
MEADE AT GETTYSBURG was prodigiously researched – 51 pages of footnoted references and a 17-page Bibliography. Sprinkled throughout the volume are thirteen maps and a larger number of photos – mostly of various Federal general officers – and period drawings.
Now, a few words about the maps …
Back in 2006, I read and reviewed CHAMPION HILL by Timothy Smith, an historical narrative of that key battle that ultimately allowed General Grant and his Army of the Tennessee to approach and lay siege to Vicksburg. I said about the maps in that book:
“The evolution of the Champion Hill clash is traced by forty - count 'em, 40! - marvelously illustrative maps rendered in black, white, and gray that coincide at all times with the textual narrative. Smith even goes so far as to depict the field positioning of units during and after disintegration and, in some cases, their subsequent reformation and re-entry into the fray. At no time was I in the least confused about the tide of battle and the organizational identity of the combatants. These battlefield maps demonstrate how such should be constructed, but which so often are not in otherwise faultless works.”
Unfortunately, the maps in MEADE AT GETTYSBURG don’t meet the standard set by those in CHAMPION HILL. While certainly not in the small scale of country and global maps, they are also not of large enough scale, in my opinion, to fully illustrate the movements of the Army of the Potomac’s units on the battlefield. Indeed, they don’t. During much of the narrative, particularly that describing Day 2 of the Gettysburg battle, I had to rely solely on my mind’s eye to “see” the movements of such. Better map illustration would have been very much appreciated. For that reason, I’m deducting a star from what is otherwise one of the best Civil War battle narratives I’ve come across.
Brown brilliantly accomplished what he set out to do, i.e., vindicate General Meade. The reader is best left with the following quote from Private Robert Davis of the 74th New York in the Third Corps:
“We was [sic] satisfied with his generalship. It inspired us with renewed courage, believing our country had at last found more than a match for General Lee.”
November 14, 2023
I recently completed listening to Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command by Kent Masterson Brown
It should be noted that Brown is a lawyer by profession and a historian on the side. I think this explains a number of both positive and negative aspects of the book
On the negative side, he is sometimes repetitious – the book could use some light editing. Sometimes these are entire short paragraphs or half paragraphs. He’s also overly fond on long comma-delimited lists of items that could be said once and then a shorthand given in future nearby references.
He’s also very argumentative, and in general I think these are well done, but it is clear he has it out for some other authors, particularly Stephen Sears and Allen C Guelzo. Brown borders on being such a backer of Meade as to slide into fanboyism, though I think in general he makes a strong argument – but I haven’t read the Sears or Guelzo books (Guelzo’s The Last Invasion was a recent overdue library book)
Brown covers the Gettysburg campaign from just before Hooker was dumped and Meade took command through Lee’s escape across the Potomac
Brown goes into great detail on Meade’s logistics planning and challenges. The Army of the Potomac was handed to Meade in poor shape, with many troops lacking boots. Hooker had spread the army over a wide geographic area. And JEB Stuart had damaged two key railroads and cut a key telegraph line. Meade’s Pipe Creek Line would have been close to a railhead at Westminster Maryland, but one served by a poorly built single track railroad. When military railroad chief Herman Haupt wasn’t gossiping back-channel with General-in-Chief Henry Halleck, Haupt ran the railroad with amazing efficiency – using convoys of five trains to provide high freight depth. Haupt also arranged a Pony Express-style relay system to move messages from the end of the telegraph system to Gettysburg
Not only did Meade have around 90 thousand soldiers (plus unmentioned numbers of support personnel), there were about 30 thousand horses – about 1 for every three soldiers! – for officers, artillery, and logistics. And those logistics trains could be tens of miles long – which also complicated transport
I definitely enjoyed Brown’s focus on Meade’s logistical and communication challenges – I could really get into an entire book on these topics. For example, Meade’s troops were probably even more poorly shod than Lee’s (and the whole “going to Gettysburg due to a shoe ad is clearly bogus, as Confederate troops had been passing through Gettysburg for several days before the battle).
While some of the chapters might be a bit dry, and the narrator never injects much emotion the chapter describing the chaos of the fighting in the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield on July 2 is absolutely gripping – I simply couldn’t halt my walk before completing the chapter that night.
Brown richly uses quotes from participants – particularly Meade but also many soldiers. Though nearly entirely from Union sources – this is a book about Meade specifically and the Union side in general at Gettysburg.
Brown levels serious charges against General John Reynolds, who tends to get a light touch since he was killed on the first day. According to Brown, Reynolds was supposed to use I Corps for a reconnaissance-in-force and then drop both it and the advanced XI Corps (under O.O. Howard) to ascertain Lee’s intentions and perhaps draw him back to the well-prepared positions on the Pipe Creek Line – but NOT trigger a general battle. Fighting at Gettysburg put the Army of Potomac far from its supply and communication bases – and actually pretty far from the fighting – most of the army made amazing forced marches (often 20-30 miles through the night) to arrive on the battlefield.
Brown also has no patience for Daniel Sickles, plainly leveling a charge of subordination of orders in Sickles abandoning his position on Cemetery Ridge in favor of an unsupportable one in the Peach Orchard.
Brown makes a strong argument that Meade used his councils of war as ways to ensure consensus with the Corps commanders who would have to execute. So on July 2nd, he already has a dispatch ready for Halleck saying he would stand and fight, but didn’t send it until after the council came concurred. Conversely, he had a dispatch Ray that he would assault Lee’s strong lines on the Potomac, but lacking supper from the Corps commanders he never sent it. Many contemporaries & modern writes see this as weakness; Brown (and I) e see it as good leadership
Brown in general bats down most criticisms of Meade. He does take issue with Meade’s harsh criticism of artillery chief Henry Hunt - who asked to be relieved after it - which Meade then backed down from
Minor gripe: books like this are full of jargon that may put off non-specialists, so it helps to define some. I’ve done a small amount of reading in this field and had never come across “prolongue” before – and Brown didn’t explain it. I must not be alone! It’s a technique for using the recoil of an artillery piece to help move it, particularly in retreat
It should be noted that Brown is a lawyer by profession and a historian on the side. I think this explains a number of both positive and negative aspects of the book
On the negative side, he is sometimes repetitious – the book could use some light editing. Sometimes these are entire short paragraphs or half paragraphs. He’s also overly fond on long comma-delimited lists of items that could be said once and then a shorthand given in future nearby references.
He’s also very argumentative, and in general I think these are well done, but it is clear he has it out for some other authors, particularly Stephen Sears and Allen C Guelzo. Brown borders on being such a backer of Meade as to slide into fanboyism, though I think in general he makes a strong argument – but I haven’t read the Sears or Guelzo books (Guelzo’s The Last Invasion was a recent overdue library book)
Brown covers the Gettysburg campaign from just before Hooker was dumped and Meade took command through Lee’s escape across the Potomac
Brown goes into great detail on Meade’s logistics planning and challenges. The Army of the Potomac was handed to Meade in poor shape, with many troops lacking boots. Hooker had spread the army over a wide geographic area. And JEB Stuart had damaged two key railroads and cut a key telegraph line. Meade’s Pipe Creek Line would have been close to a railhead at Westminster Maryland, but one served by a poorly built single track railroad. When military railroad chief Herman Haupt wasn’t gossiping back-channel with General-in-Chief Henry Halleck, Haupt ran the railroad with amazing efficiency – using convoys of five trains to provide high freight depth. Haupt also arranged a Pony Express-style relay system to move messages from the end of the telegraph system to Gettysburg
Not only did Meade have around 90 thousand soldiers (plus unmentioned numbers of support personnel), there were about 30 thousand horses – about 1 for every three soldiers! – for officers, artillery, and logistics. And those logistics trains could be tens of miles long – which also complicated transport
I definitely enjoyed Brown’s focus on Meade’s logistical and communication challenges – I could really get into an entire book on these topics. For example, Meade’s troops were probably even more poorly shod than Lee’s (and the whole “going to Gettysburg due to a shoe ad is clearly bogus, as Confederate troops had been passing through Gettysburg for several days before the battle).
While some of the chapters might be a bit dry, and the narrator never injects much emotion the chapter describing the chaos of the fighting in the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield on July 2 is absolutely gripping – I simply couldn’t halt my walk before completing the chapter that night.
Brown richly uses quotes from participants – particularly Meade but also many soldiers. Though nearly entirely from Union sources – this is a book about Meade specifically and the Union side in general at Gettysburg.
Brown levels serious charges against General John Reynolds, who tends to get a light touch since he was killed on the first day. According to Brown, Reynolds was supposed to use I Corps for a reconnaissance-in-force and then drop both it and the advanced XI Corps (under O.O. Howard) to ascertain Lee’s intentions and perhaps draw him back to the well-prepared positions on the Pipe Creek Line – but NOT trigger a general battle. Fighting at Gettysburg put the Army of Potomac far from its supply and communication bases – and actually pretty far from the fighting – most of the army made amazing forced marches (often 20-30 miles through the night) to arrive on the battlefield.
Brown also has no patience for Daniel Sickles, plainly leveling a charge of subordination of orders in Sickles abandoning his position on Cemetery Ridge in favor of an unsupportable one in the Peach Orchard.
Brown makes a strong argument that Meade used his councils of war as ways to ensure consensus with the Corps commanders who would have to execute. So on July 2nd, he already has a dispatch ready for Halleck saying he would stand and fight, but didn’t send it until after the council came concurred. Conversely, he had a dispatch Ray that he would assault Lee’s strong lines on the Potomac, but lacking supper from the Corps commanders he never sent it. Many contemporaries & modern writes see this as weakness; Brown (and I) e see it as good leadership
Brown in general bats down most criticisms of Meade. He does take issue with Meade’s harsh criticism of artillery chief Henry Hunt - who asked to be relieved after it - which Meade then backed down from
Minor gripe: books like this are full of jargon that may put off non-specialists, so it helps to define some. I’ve done a small amount of reading in this field and had never come across “prolongue” before – and Brown didn’t explain it. I must not be alone! It’s a technique for using the recoil of an artillery piece to help move it, particularly in retreat
March 15, 2023
Meade at Gettysburg is one of those books that attracted my attention as soon as I saw it. I mean, the casual reader of history doesn't remember much about George Meade. Yes, he was the victorious Union general at Gettysburg. Didn't he fail afterwards by letting Lee escape back to Virginia? I read somewhere that he was described as "a damned old goggle-eyed snapping turtle". And then, he was replaced by Ulysses Grant and disappeared from history.
But Grant didn't replace Meade. In fact, Meade was the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac throughout the remainder of the war. Grant was the commanding general of all Union forces and it was unfortunate for Meade's memory that Grant decided to do his commanding in the field with the Army of the Potomac rather than from Washington the way that Grant's predecessor, Henry Halleck, did. But I digress…
The point is that some historians may have given Meade a bum rap. And Kent Masterson Brown has taken it upon himself to argue for a rehabilitation of Meade's record. And Mr. Brown makes a compelling argument.
For example, Mr. Brown points out that command of the army was thrust upon Meade just days before the Battle of Gettysburg. Meade did not want that command, but he felt that it was his duty to accept. And so, he took command of an army that was spread out over many miles and chasing after an enemy that had moved north into Pennsylvania and he had blessed little time to pull things together. His soldiers had been marching for many long hours and they had many more long days of marching ahead. We often hear about how Confederate troops marched without shoes or provisions, but it turns out that because of the need to move quickly and the uncertainty of the enemy's intentions, the Union army was no better provisioned and many of the Union soldiers were also without adequate footwear or food.
It also turns out that Meade made several sound military moves — creating plans to meet the enemy on a well-defended line at Pipe Creek — but those plans had to be altered when General John Reynolds was killed on July 1 in Gettysburg. Meade's plan called for reconnaissance in force, but the general who replaced Reynolds failed in that mission and was drawn into a battle on unfamiliar ground not of Meade's choosing. So, in fact, it was a major miracle that Meade and his army was able to get to Gettysburg and form a strong defensive line as quickly as they did.
What about Meade's failure to capture Lee's army after Gettysburg? Well, Mr. Brown points out that the Union army was a) pretty beaten up from the battle, b) was still suffering from a lack of supplies, and c) could not discern Lee's plans until Lee had already withdrawn into a very strong fortified position. Given that, Mr. Brown argues that Meade could well have completely undone the effect of his triumph at Gettysburg with a disastrous follow-up battle on the Potomac.
Okay… I might be biased. I've always liked Meade. But I do think that Mr. Brown makes a strong case and I welcome the idea that someone would defend Meade's legacy for a change.
About the book itself…
One of the book's strengths is that it never diverts its attention away from Meade. Mr. Brown does not spend time telling us about what was happening elsewhere. We never delve into the mind of Robert E. Lee. Everything is told from Meade's point of view. What dd he know and when did he know it? It is a very effective story-telling strategy.
My only complaints about the book are somewhat minor. There are times when Mr. Brown gets us too far in the weeds. I didn't really need to know who commanded at a brigade level unless it advances the story. I also think that the maps, while good, could have been better.
But, in the end, this is a book worth reading, if only to see a capable general in a new light.
But Grant didn't replace Meade. In fact, Meade was the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac throughout the remainder of the war. Grant was the commanding general of all Union forces and it was unfortunate for Meade's memory that Grant decided to do his commanding in the field with the Army of the Potomac rather than from Washington the way that Grant's predecessor, Henry Halleck, did. But I digress…
The point is that some historians may have given Meade a bum rap. And Kent Masterson Brown has taken it upon himself to argue for a rehabilitation of Meade's record. And Mr. Brown makes a compelling argument.
For example, Mr. Brown points out that command of the army was thrust upon Meade just days before the Battle of Gettysburg. Meade did not want that command, but he felt that it was his duty to accept. And so, he took command of an army that was spread out over many miles and chasing after an enemy that had moved north into Pennsylvania and he had blessed little time to pull things together. His soldiers had been marching for many long hours and they had many more long days of marching ahead. We often hear about how Confederate troops marched without shoes or provisions, but it turns out that because of the need to move quickly and the uncertainty of the enemy's intentions, the Union army was no better provisioned and many of the Union soldiers were also without adequate footwear or food.
It also turns out that Meade made several sound military moves — creating plans to meet the enemy on a well-defended line at Pipe Creek — but those plans had to be altered when General John Reynolds was killed on July 1 in Gettysburg. Meade's plan called for reconnaissance in force, but the general who replaced Reynolds failed in that mission and was drawn into a battle on unfamiliar ground not of Meade's choosing. So, in fact, it was a major miracle that Meade and his army was able to get to Gettysburg and form a strong defensive line as quickly as they did.
What about Meade's failure to capture Lee's army after Gettysburg? Well, Mr. Brown points out that the Union army was a) pretty beaten up from the battle, b) was still suffering from a lack of supplies, and c) could not discern Lee's plans until Lee had already withdrawn into a very strong fortified position. Given that, Mr. Brown argues that Meade could well have completely undone the effect of his triumph at Gettysburg with a disastrous follow-up battle on the Potomac.
Okay… I might be biased. I've always liked Meade. But I do think that Mr. Brown makes a strong case and I welcome the idea that someone would defend Meade's legacy for a change.
About the book itself…
One of the book's strengths is that it never diverts its attention away from Meade. Mr. Brown does not spend time telling us about what was happening elsewhere. We never delve into the mind of Robert E. Lee. Everything is told from Meade's point of view. What dd he know and when did he know it? It is a very effective story-telling strategy.
My only complaints about the book are somewhat minor. There are times when Mr. Brown gets us too far in the weeds. I didn't really need to know who commanded at a brigade level unless it advances the story. I also think that the maps, while good, could have been better.
But, in the end, this is a book worth reading, if only to see a capable general in a new light.
April 9, 2025
Overlook this book's faults (It includes too much tactical detail; it includes indigestible material in long narrative paragraphs that should be presented in tables or figures; most irritatingly, it frequently mentions places that are not included in the maps). It presents a wonderfully fresh look at the Battle of Gettysburg almost entirely from Meade's point of view: what he knew, what he wanted to accomplish, what he had to decide.
Meade was peremptorily appointed commander of the Army of the Potamic on 28 June 1863, when the Army was in Fredericksburg, MD, and Lee's army was rampaging through Pennsylvania 30 miles to the north. Three days later he commanded the Army in the largest battle ever fought in North America. He did not intend to fight at Gettysburg; he prepared a good defensive position about 10 miles to the south and hoped Lee would attack him there. Unsure of Lee's exact location and intentions, he sent two of his seven corps on a (doctrinally approved) reconnaissance in force towards the town. The lead corps was sharply attacked just north of it and perhaps got too closely involved, but when Meade saw the good defensive terrain there he decided to accept battle. The book covers not only his troop movements during the battle, but also the many other things an army commander has to think about: provisioning and fodder (most supplies were fairly distant, behind the originally intended line); signals (dispatch riders and a network of semaphores across the battlefield); field hospitals; usable maps of the area. After the defeated Confederates withdrew and he was sure of where they were going, he moved to intercept them when they crossed the Potomac. His exhausted Army got there just in time, but Meade wisely chose not to attack their well-entrenched position. If he had his army would have suffered just as badly as Lee's did at Gettysburg.
Meade has been criticized for not pursuing Lee with enough vigor after his victory, and for not destroying the Army of Northern Virginia and thus probably ending the Civil War. This started with Lincoln expressing his disappointment. Brown is plainly concerned to refute this criticism, and sometimes his vigorous defense of Meade seems to call his impartiality into question. However, I find the case he makes to be persuasive.
Meade was peremptorily appointed commander of the Army of the Potamic on 28 June 1863, when the Army was in Fredericksburg, MD, and Lee's army was rampaging through Pennsylvania 30 miles to the north. Three days later he commanded the Army in the largest battle ever fought in North America. He did not intend to fight at Gettysburg; he prepared a good defensive position about 10 miles to the south and hoped Lee would attack him there. Unsure of Lee's exact location and intentions, he sent two of his seven corps on a (doctrinally approved) reconnaissance in force towards the town. The lead corps was sharply attacked just north of it and perhaps got too closely involved, but when Meade saw the good defensive terrain there he decided to accept battle. The book covers not only his troop movements during the battle, but also the many other things an army commander has to think about: provisioning and fodder (most supplies were fairly distant, behind the originally intended line); signals (dispatch riders and a network of semaphores across the battlefield); field hospitals; usable maps of the area. After the defeated Confederates withdrew and he was sure of where they were going, he moved to intercept them when they crossed the Potomac. His exhausted Army got there just in time, but Meade wisely chose not to attack their well-entrenched position. If he had his army would have suffered just as badly as Lee's did at Gettysburg.
Meade has been criticized for not pursuing Lee with enough vigor after his victory, and for not destroying the Army of Northern Virginia and thus probably ending the Civil War. This started with Lincoln expressing his disappointment. Brown is plainly concerned to refute this criticism, and sometimes his vigorous defense of Meade seems to call his impartiality into question. However, I find the case he makes to be persuasive.
January 11, 2026
Union Major General George Meade has gotten a bum rap from history, but author Kent Masterson Brown has set the record straight.
Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac during the battle of Gettysburg in July 1863, has been faulted for not pursuing and destroying the Confederate army led by Gen. Robert E. Lee as it retreated back to Virginia. Meade took command of the Army of the Potomac from Gen. Joseph Hooker only days before the climactic battle. In his 2021 book "Meade at Gettysburg, A Study in Command," Brown writes that the new commander didn't know where all his units were located but was given the main mission of protecting Washington D.C. and Baltimore from Confederate attack.
With the help of his corps commanders and able staff officers, Meade set up the "Pipe Creek Line" defensive positions southeast of Gettysburg where he expected the Confederates to attack. When it became clear that Gettysburg would be the engagement site, Meade moved units into position, while maintaining his composure despite little food and sleep.
The Army of the Potomac held strong defensive positions and fended off numerous Confederate army assaults while suffering heavy casualties in men, equipment and horses.
"Apart from the horrific losses on the battlefield, the price Meade and his army paid for the victory at Gettysburg was a supply line that was too attenuated and too vulnerable to enemy attacks," Brown writes. "As a consequence, by the time the fighting ended at Gettysburg, Meade's sixty thousand officers and men had not been fed for days and neither had his more than thirty thousand horses. The army was desperate for food, forage, clothing, shoes, and even ammunition., and it would take days for enough of these basic supplies to reach the army even in the absence of enemy attacks along that supply line."
Meanwhile, back in Washington D.C., President Abraham Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry Halleck urged Meade to pursue Lee's army, destroy it and bring a quick end to the war. These men had little idea of Meade's situation, nor did they know of the strong defensive line Lee set up to protect his retreating army from probing Union units sent out by Meade.
Days after the battle, Halleck came to realize that criticism of Meade's performance was unwarranted and not truthful.
"Meade at Gettysburg" is a good read for serious scholars of the Civil War and of this particular battle.
Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac during the battle of Gettysburg in July 1863, has been faulted for not pursuing and destroying the Confederate army led by Gen. Robert E. Lee as it retreated back to Virginia. Meade took command of the Army of the Potomac from Gen. Joseph Hooker only days before the climactic battle. In his 2021 book "Meade at Gettysburg, A Study in Command," Brown writes that the new commander didn't know where all his units were located but was given the main mission of protecting Washington D.C. and Baltimore from Confederate attack.
With the help of his corps commanders and able staff officers, Meade set up the "Pipe Creek Line" defensive positions southeast of Gettysburg where he expected the Confederates to attack. When it became clear that Gettysburg would be the engagement site, Meade moved units into position, while maintaining his composure despite little food and sleep.
The Army of the Potomac held strong defensive positions and fended off numerous Confederate army assaults while suffering heavy casualties in men, equipment and horses.
"Apart from the horrific losses on the battlefield, the price Meade and his army paid for the victory at Gettysburg was a supply line that was too attenuated and too vulnerable to enemy attacks," Brown writes. "As a consequence, by the time the fighting ended at Gettysburg, Meade's sixty thousand officers and men had not been fed for days and neither had his more than thirty thousand horses. The army was desperate for food, forage, clothing, shoes, and even ammunition., and it would take days for enough of these basic supplies to reach the army even in the absence of enemy attacks along that supply line."
Meanwhile, back in Washington D.C., President Abraham Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry Halleck urged Meade to pursue Lee's army, destroy it and bring a quick end to the war. These men had little idea of Meade's situation, nor did they know of the strong defensive line Lee set up to protect his retreating army from probing Union units sent out by Meade.
Days after the battle, Halleck came to realize that criticism of Meade's performance was unwarranted and not truthful.
"Meade at Gettysburg" is a good read for serious scholars of the Civil War and of this particular battle.
May 10, 2025
Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command by Kent Masterson Brown is an in-depth examination of Union General George G. Meade’s leadership during the pivotal Battle of Gettysburg in July of 1863. Often perceived as cranky, cautious, timid, and merely lucky, Meade is re-evaluated by Brown as a competent, capable, and effective commander. The book highlights how Meade assumed command of the Army of the Potomac just days before the battle. This was an abrupt transition that left him with little time to prepare.
Brown demonstrates that Meade was under-equipped from the start, noting that Meade himself repeatedly mentioned his lack of topographical maps of Gettysburg and the surrounding region. Despite these disadvantages, the book outlines Meade’s leadership, strategic thinking, and organizational skills while also acknowledging the logistical and communication challenges he faced.
Drawing on official military reports, personal letters, and maps, Brown argues convincingly that Meade played a far more active and decisive role in the Union victory than he has traditionally been credited for.
One of the most common criticisms of Meade is his failure to aggressively pursue Lee’s army as it retreated from Pennsylvania. However, Brown offers a compelling defense in Carl von Clausewitz’s military theory: pursuing a retreating enemy across difficult terrain, especially with an exhausted and undersupplied force, would have risked everything Meade had achieved with the victory at Gettysburg. As Brown notes, “Pursuing Lee's defeated army into the mountains, like the South Mountain range, would inevitably lead to the loss of all that Meade's victory had gained” (p. 322).
Meade did, in fact, plan to pursue Lee once he confirmed the Confederate retreat, stating, “Should the enemy be retreating, I will pursue by way of Emmitsburg and Middletown, on the left flank” (p. 323).
I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the Civil War, the Battle of Gettysburg, or Union military leadership.
Brown demonstrates that Meade was under-equipped from the start, noting that Meade himself repeatedly mentioned his lack of topographical maps of Gettysburg and the surrounding region. Despite these disadvantages, the book outlines Meade’s leadership, strategic thinking, and organizational skills while also acknowledging the logistical and communication challenges he faced.
Drawing on official military reports, personal letters, and maps, Brown argues convincingly that Meade played a far more active and decisive role in the Union victory than he has traditionally been credited for.
One of the most common criticisms of Meade is his failure to aggressively pursue Lee’s army as it retreated from Pennsylvania. However, Brown offers a compelling defense in Carl von Clausewitz’s military theory: pursuing a retreating enemy across difficult terrain, especially with an exhausted and undersupplied force, would have risked everything Meade had achieved with the victory at Gettysburg. As Brown notes, “Pursuing Lee's defeated army into the mountains, like the South Mountain range, would inevitably lead to the loss of all that Meade's victory had gained” (p. 322).
Meade did, in fact, plan to pursue Lee once he confirmed the Confederate retreat, stating, “Should the enemy be retreating, I will pursue by way of Emmitsburg and Middletown, on the left flank” (p. 323).
I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the Civil War, the Battle of Gettysburg, or Union military leadership.
December 23, 2022
This book provides an excellent overview of Meade's tactical and operational victory at Gettysburg. In doing so, it attempts to restore Meade's image following later, prominent, and lingering claims that he let the Confederate Army escape destruction in 1863.
The book raises key points and questions that have been overlooked or misjudged at the time, and up to this day:
1. Meade's Army pursued Lee's and had some success destroying or capturing trailing elements, but this seems to have been overlooked for the lack of a general engagement.
2. Was Meade's Army in a state of readiness where it should have pressed a major engagement before 13JUL or was Meade correct in refitting and reorganizing to attack more methodically? [A large portion of his troops had not eaten a real meal or been able to resupply ammunition in days.]
3. Would an attack have succeeded or would the Army of the Potomac have lost such an engagement, thereby jeopardizing their previous victory?
Beyond these questions, which are raised towards the end of the book, this book details Meade's leadership and decisions throughout the Gettysburg campaign just days after assuming command of the Army of the Potomac. It details his decisions to prepare for the pending Confederate attack and actions during a couple key challenges: Reynolds' I Corps overly aggressive advance guard attack (Day 1) and Sickles' mispositioned III Corps in the wheat field (Day 2). He maneuvered forces to overcome both of these challenges, then predicted and prepared for Lee's main attack on Day 3 (Pickett's charge). In doing so, he became the first Union general to beat General Lee on the field. Unfortunately, Meade was unable to turn this tactical and operational victory into a strategic one when he was unable to destroy the Rebel Army before it retreated to Virginia, which is what Meade seems to be most remembered for.
The book raises key points and questions that have been overlooked or misjudged at the time, and up to this day:
1. Meade's Army pursued Lee's and had some success destroying or capturing trailing elements, but this seems to have been overlooked for the lack of a general engagement.
2. Was Meade's Army in a state of readiness where it should have pressed a major engagement before 13JUL or was Meade correct in refitting and reorganizing to attack more methodically? [A large portion of his troops had not eaten a real meal or been able to resupply ammunition in days.]
3. Would an attack have succeeded or would the Army of the Potomac have lost such an engagement, thereby jeopardizing their previous victory?
Beyond these questions, which are raised towards the end of the book, this book details Meade's leadership and decisions throughout the Gettysburg campaign just days after assuming command of the Army of the Potomac. It details his decisions to prepare for the pending Confederate attack and actions during a couple key challenges: Reynolds' I Corps overly aggressive advance guard attack (Day 1) and Sickles' mispositioned III Corps in the wheat field (Day 2). He maneuvered forces to overcome both of these challenges, then predicted and prepared for Lee's main attack on Day 3 (Pickett's charge). In doing so, he became the first Union general to beat General Lee on the field. Unfortunately, Meade was unable to turn this tactical and operational victory into a strategic one when he was unable to destroy the Rebel Army before it retreated to Virginia, which is what Meade seems to be most remembered for.
August 9, 2023
The Battle of Gettysburg has been studied by thousands of publications over the years from many perspectives. General Meade took over the Army of the Potomac only two days before the battle started. He studied the situation when he took over and gathered the resources available to possibly fight the Confederates. He set up a defensive line some miles below Gettysburg. Then he sent a strong force to recon what Lee was up to. However, due to General Reynolds’ gung-ho attitude and moving farther than ordered, Meade had to respond and send the whole army to defend Reynolds’ corps before it was wiped out. The battle was fought south of Gettysburg where Meade found the proper ground to defend the army from the Confederates’ many onslaughts. The battle was hard-fought and after winning, Meade tried to keep track of what Lee was doing to possibly wipe out the Confederate army or at least chase it out of the north. Meade’s army was exhausted after Gettysburg and supplies were very hard to obtain. In addition, Meade had orders to defend the Baltimore/Washington area. Lincoln and others disparaged Meade because he could not do that and eliminate the Confederate army. So, Meade had a negative reputation fostered by his superiors and some fellow officers. This book works to dispel that reputation.
It does this very well. The writing is clear and there is some repetition to remind the reader of important points. There is a lot of detail of who did what at the division and brigade level that seems a bit tedious. It is an excellent overview of the events leading up to the battle and how Meade attempted to chase down the Confederates after the battle despite a worn-out army and lack of supplies. He cites military theorists such as Clausewitz and Jomini to support Meade’s actions. A good book to supplements anyone’s knowledge of Gettysburg and Meade.
It does this very well. The writing is clear and there is some repetition to remind the reader of important points. There is a lot of detail of who did what at the division and brigade level that seems a bit tedious. It is an excellent overview of the events leading up to the battle and how Meade attempted to chase down the Confederates after the battle despite a worn-out army and lack of supplies. He cites military theorists such as Clausewitz and Jomini to support Meade’s actions. A good book to supplements anyone’s knowledge of Gettysburg and Meade.
September 6, 2021
It's tempting to look at all the books written on Gettysburg and wonder - what new can be written and/or learned about this battle? After you read Brown's excellent Meade at Gettysburg, you'll realize there is still much to learn and explore about this battle.
Brown is approaching this battle from Meade's perspective - what were his orders? What was his information? What factors shaped his planning decision making? What was his plan for the campaign and what factors shaped and changed it?
Brown takes a nice, clear analytical approach to Meade in the Gettysburg campaign. In the process he provides clarity to a number of Gettysburg debates such as Meade's intent in sending Reynolds to Gettysburg and his plan for the Pipe Creek Line.
Brown also clearly reviews Meade's intents and actions to deal with Sickle's decision to occupy the peach orchard. He lays out clear evidence of Sickle's willful disobedience in spite of multiple efforts to get him to comply with orders. Another important review is Brown's discussion of the Council of War held at Meade's headquarters on July 2 - Brown does a great job lining up the timeline and evidence to argue that Meade had reached his decision was using this meeting to assess his forces and build consensus among his subordinates.
A final, important discussion is Brown's review of Meade's decision making in the pursuit of Lee following the battle.
An important element of Brown's book is his review of key factors that shaped the campaign and Meade's decision making - the geography and topography of the area, supply status, condition of troops, efficiency of staff, intelligence, and the Army of the Potomac's command structure.
An all around excellent book that adds much to the understanding of the battle of Gettysburg.
Brown is approaching this battle from Meade's perspective - what were his orders? What was his information? What factors shaped his planning decision making? What was his plan for the campaign and what factors shaped and changed it?
Brown takes a nice, clear analytical approach to Meade in the Gettysburg campaign. In the process he provides clarity to a number of Gettysburg debates such as Meade's intent in sending Reynolds to Gettysburg and his plan for the Pipe Creek Line.
Brown also clearly reviews Meade's intents and actions to deal with Sickle's decision to occupy the peach orchard. He lays out clear evidence of Sickle's willful disobedience in spite of multiple efforts to get him to comply with orders. Another important review is Brown's discussion of the Council of War held at Meade's headquarters on July 2 - Brown does a great job lining up the timeline and evidence to argue that Meade had reached his decision was using this meeting to assess his forces and build consensus among his subordinates.
A final, important discussion is Brown's review of Meade's decision making in the pursuit of Lee following the battle.
An important element of Brown's book is his review of key factors that shaped the campaign and Meade's decision making - the geography and topography of the area, supply status, condition of troops, efficiency of staff, intelligence, and the Army of the Potomac's command structure.
An all around excellent book that adds much to the understanding of the battle of Gettysburg.
April 10, 2026
Ijust finished Meade at Gettysburg: A Study in Command by Kent Masterson Brown, and I wanted to post this review as it is still fresh in my head, as I thoroughly enjoyed it. Brown presents a compelling and well-supported reassessment of George Gordon Meade, emphasizing how methodical, cautious, and ultimately strategic he was in assuming command of the Army of the Potomac and, within days, leading it through the largest battle of the American Civil War.
One of the most effective aspects of the book is how Brown dismantles the long-standing narrative that Meade was overly timid or reactive. Instead, he demonstrates that Meade’s decisions were deliberate and correct at every critical juncture—before, during, and after the Battle of Gettysburg.
The epilogue is particularly powerful, where Brown cites Henry Jackson Hunt, Meade’s chief of artillery. Hunt’s assessment aptly encapsulates the book’s central thesis: Meade was right in ordering the Pipe Creek defensive line, right in advancing to Gettysburg once the battle began, right in holding his position, and right in conducting a defensive battle. He was right not to launch a counterattack, and right in his measured pursuit of Robert E. Lee.
Brown persuasively argues that Meade’s reputation suffered unfairly at the hands of Abraham Lincoln and others who, not having been on the battlefield, imposed unrealistic expectations in the aftermath of victory. As Hunt observed, the hopes and expectations following Gettysburg were as unreasonable as the fears that preceded it.
This is an excellent and thought-provoking read. Highly recommended for anyone interested in Civil War leadership and a more balanced understanding of Meade’s command.
One of the most effective aspects of the book is how Brown dismantles the long-standing narrative that Meade was overly timid or reactive. Instead, he demonstrates that Meade’s decisions were deliberate and correct at every critical juncture—before, during, and after the Battle of Gettysburg.
The epilogue is particularly powerful, where Brown cites Henry Jackson Hunt, Meade’s chief of artillery. Hunt’s assessment aptly encapsulates the book’s central thesis: Meade was right in ordering the Pipe Creek defensive line, right in advancing to Gettysburg once the battle began, right in holding his position, and right in conducting a defensive battle. He was right not to launch a counterattack, and right in his measured pursuit of Robert E. Lee.
Brown persuasively argues that Meade’s reputation suffered unfairly at the hands of Abraham Lincoln and others who, not having been on the battlefield, imposed unrealistic expectations in the aftermath of victory. As Hunt observed, the hopes and expectations following Gettysburg were as unreasonable as the fears that preceded it.
This is an excellent and thought-provoking read. Highly recommended for anyone interested in Civil War leadership and a more balanced understanding of Meade’s command.
October 12, 2021
Growing up I always heard Robert E. Lee´s Army of Northern Virginia stumbled into battle at Gettysburg, PA because they were barefoot and heard there was a shoe factory there. Or some such nonsense.
George Gordon Meade is a victim of politics and history. As the pages of this book witness, Meade was undoubtedly one of the most competent and imaginative commanding generals in the Union Army.
I always attributed the Union victory at Gettysburg to the grit and determination of the lower ranks, tired at getting whipped by Lee´s forces. Without Meade´s brilliant tactical handling of Union forces on July 2, 1863 the battle would have swung in Lee´s favor. Meade fashioned a victory, on the fly, from a debacle due to the insubordination of political general Daniel Sickles, of ¨temporary insanity¨ fame.
I was astonished by facts, read in this book by me for the first time, of the want of ammunition, food and clothing of the Union forces. I guess 60 years of Daughters of The Confederacy revisionism had me convinced the Army of Northern Virginia was starving and ragged through three days at Gettysburg. Not so.
Also Lincoln's reaction to Meade's decision, make after consultation with the highest ranking generals under his command, to not attack Lee's dug in forces at Williamsport, MD, July 13, 1863-- "He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with the our other late successes, have ended the war.*"--has colored his reputation ever since.
This is a very thoroughly researched book and should server future US Civil War historian well in righting a old, old wrong.
*unsent letter dated July 14, 1863
George Gordon Meade is a victim of politics and history. As the pages of this book witness, Meade was undoubtedly one of the most competent and imaginative commanding generals in the Union Army.
I always attributed the Union victory at Gettysburg to the grit and determination of the lower ranks, tired at getting whipped by Lee´s forces. Without Meade´s brilliant tactical handling of Union forces on July 2, 1863 the battle would have swung in Lee´s favor. Meade fashioned a victory, on the fly, from a debacle due to the insubordination of political general Daniel Sickles, of ¨temporary insanity¨ fame.
I was astonished by facts, read in this book by me for the first time, of the want of ammunition, food and clothing of the Union forces. I guess 60 years of Daughters of The Confederacy revisionism had me convinced the Army of Northern Virginia was starving and ragged through three days at Gettysburg. Not so.
Also Lincoln's reaction to Meade's decision, make after consultation with the highest ranking generals under his command, to not attack Lee's dug in forces at Williamsport, MD, July 13, 1863-- "He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with the our other late successes, have ended the war.*"--has colored his reputation ever since.
This is a very thoroughly researched book and should server future US Civil War historian well in righting a old, old wrong.
*unsent letter dated July 14, 1863
May 30, 2024
Finally some justice for General George Meade! Author Brown has excelled in revealing many of the things other authors have not emphasized. He gives a real, living portrait of the man and the general.
Brown alerts us to military standards in command taught at West Point (esp., Jomini and Clausewitz). I never understood the ins and outs of the “Reconnaissance in Force,” especially in relation to Meade’s operational thinking. Also, we learn of the difficulties in logistics, especially brought on by the weather and Stuart’s raids. How do fight a battle when you cannot feed your men and horses? How can you tend to the wounded when medical supplies are unavailable? Brown’s account reminds us that Army of Potomac was barely held together considering the losses, the short supplies, the beastly hot or violently raining weather, broken communications, broken railroads, and Lee.
It is fascinating to see the kind of commanding general General Meade actually was. He was everywhere, rarely eating or sleeping enough. He became the operational commander, personally ensuring the defense of all sectors of the battlefield. Previously I had perceived that Reynolds, Buford and Hancock and Chamberlain were the big heroes of Gettysburg. Brown properly show a bigger picture of the struggle of so many, especially Meade who seemed to be just where the greatest crises arose.
There is so much more to learn about Meade’s leadership before, during and after Gettysburg. I am glad to have the chance to read about unsung heroes of the largest land battle in the U.S. to that date.
Brown alerts us to military standards in command taught at West Point (esp., Jomini and Clausewitz). I never understood the ins and outs of the “Reconnaissance in Force,” especially in relation to Meade’s operational thinking. Also, we learn of the difficulties in logistics, especially brought on by the weather and Stuart’s raids. How do fight a battle when you cannot feed your men and horses? How can you tend to the wounded when medical supplies are unavailable? Brown’s account reminds us that Army of Potomac was barely held together considering the losses, the short supplies, the beastly hot or violently raining weather, broken communications, broken railroads, and Lee.
It is fascinating to see the kind of commanding general General Meade actually was. He was everywhere, rarely eating or sleeping enough. He became the operational commander, personally ensuring the defense of all sectors of the battlefield. Previously I had perceived that Reynolds, Buford and Hancock and Chamberlain were the big heroes of Gettysburg. Brown properly show a bigger picture of the struggle of so many, especially Meade who seemed to be just where the greatest crises arose.
There is so much more to learn about Meade’s leadership before, during and after Gettysburg. I am glad to have the chance to read about unsung heroes of the largest land battle in the U.S. to that date.
April 24, 2026
Meade at Gettysburg: A study in command by Kent Masterson Brown
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This book will gives the reader a true appreciation for the talents and abilities of Major General George Gordon Meade, former commander of the 5th corp in the AOP, who was unknowingly and unwillingly thrust into command of the entire Army of the Potomac, mere days before the largest and most impactful battle of the American civil war; Gettysburg. Working fast to get a gauge on the positions and readiness of his army (and the enemy’s) Meade performed admirably and did his soldierly duty in learning how to command an army of almost 100,000 men on the fly and doing an exceptional job. Kent Masterson Brown offers a bold defense of Meade’s meticulous decision making processes and tactical planning before, during and after the battle to show the reader the reasoning behind the decisions that were made. In my humble opinion, some of the reasons Meade is not in the great pantheon of Civil War generals and personalities are; he was not a self aggrandizing blowhard, he was a conservative democrat, he died shortly after the war, and he had the prickly personality of a snapping turtle. Altogether these things do not get you written kindly about in the annals of history, no matter how great of a job you did or how much you sacrificed to help your country win. That is why books such as this are so important to help enlighten the masses to the true talent of George Gordon Meade; a soldier who did his duty to the fullest and deserves the respect and appreciation of his countrymen, even 160+ years later.
September 2, 2026
I really didn't want to write this review.
I want to genuinely be fair about my opinions of this book, having read a LOT of Civil War history, visited dozens of battlefields, and having authored a couple of my own books.
Here's what the author gets right: Troop movements and military organization are very well researched and articulated.
Here's the problem: this book really shouldn't be called a "Study in Command" because it doesn't dive too deeply into an assessment of Meade's performance as a commander. Very little of the nearly 400 pages gets into Meade's head or helps the reader understand why Meade made the decisions he did. The reader often gets inundated with troop movements on a day-by-day basis.
Like the author, I've often believed Meade has been given a raw deal by most historians. Meade wasn't just asked to take command; he was ordered to take command over his own objections. And, he was made commander of the Army of the Potomac just days before one of the fiercest fights in American history. For him to manage under these circumstances, let alone to win the battle, was a function of some luck and a lot of diligence on Meade's part. Unfortunately, the author spends the vast majority of the reader's attention on the well-worn tale of what happened. Instead, the lesser-traveled path of why Meade made the decions he made under such daunting circumstances gets buried. Had this been more of a "Study in Command," it would have been an invaluable contribution to the story of Gettysburg.
I want to genuinely be fair about my opinions of this book, having read a LOT of Civil War history, visited dozens of battlefields, and having authored a couple of my own books.
Here's what the author gets right: Troop movements and military organization are very well researched and articulated.
Here's the problem: this book really shouldn't be called a "Study in Command" because it doesn't dive too deeply into an assessment of Meade's performance as a commander. Very little of the nearly 400 pages gets into Meade's head or helps the reader understand why Meade made the decisions he did. The reader often gets inundated with troop movements on a day-by-day basis.
Like the author, I've often believed Meade has been given a raw deal by most historians. Meade wasn't just asked to take command; he was ordered to take command over his own objections. And, he was made commander of the Army of the Potomac just days before one of the fiercest fights in American history. For him to manage under these circumstances, let alone to win the battle, was a function of some luck and a lot of diligence on Meade's part. Unfortunately, the author spends the vast majority of the reader's attention on the well-worn tale of what happened. Instead, the lesser-traveled path of why Meade made the decions he made under such daunting circumstances gets buried. Had this been more of a "Study in Command," it would have been an invaluable contribution to the story of Gettysburg.
October 22, 2022
A great book, providing a detailed study of General Meade through the Battle of Gettysburg and its immediate aftermath. The author, noted Civil War historian Kent Masterson Brown, gives a nearly hour by hour account of the U.S, Army’s senior leadership from 28 June, 1863 through to the Confederate’s final retreat on 14 July. This is one of the best Civil War histories I’ve read in some time. Masterson concentrates on General Meade and the leadership of the Army of the Potomac in the uncertain pre-battle maneuvers, the hectic battle itself, and the uncertain post-battle situation. The narrative follows the reports received by Meade, the steps he took on the battlefield, and the actions of his subordinates. There is minimal description of the Confederate actions, giving a truer understanding of what Meade knew and when. Masterson closely describes the logistics and administrative actions of the U.S. Army during the campaign. The book is generally favorable to Meade, arguing his decisions were much more central to the victory than is usually accepted. The author praised Meade for his Eisenhower-like ability to control the disparate personalities of the army. A great book for understanding the fighting methods of the Civil War. Highly recommended for any military professional keen on understanding the dynamics of operational leadership.
January 29, 2023
I grew up less than an hour from Gettysburg and attended numerous Boy Scout Jamborees on the Battlefield there in the 1960's. The theme of the story there highlighted the Battle as Meade vs Lee but Lincoln's impatience with Meade over his pursuit of Lee after the battle, eventually took hold, clouding Meade's roll in this critical battle and became a theme in many of the accounts of the battle that I have read over the years and soon it was like he actually had never been there (per Meade's letter to his wife regarding the criticisms of his generalship after the Battle). Brown's book clearly delineates Meade's roll in the success by describing Meade's adherence to the tactics and strategies that were taught at the time to US officers at West Point. He also does an excellent job of dispelling the long-held belief of Meade's failure to aggressively pursue Lee's army. The logistics of moving armies in the 19th century were confounded by poor roads ... etc etc.
I enjoyed this book a great deal and I believe Brown has done an excellent job of restoring credit to General Meade for the Union success at Gettysburg.
I enjoyed this book a great deal and I believe Brown has done an excellent job of restoring credit to General Meade for the Union success at Gettysburg.
May 6, 2022
Very detailed account of Meade's actions from his elevation to commanding general to Lee's retreat across the Potomac. The author makes his case that Meade did an outstanding job of managing all aspects of the victorious campaign - from establishing the Pipe Creek Line, to moving to Gettysburg when the situation changed, choosing to fight and superbly managing a defensive battle despite Sickle's gross insubordination and incompetence, and declining to attack a strongly entrenched and resupplied Lee at Williamsport with his fatigued and starving army. Lincoln, showed his ignorance of war and his frustration with its realities by unfairly attacking Meade, smearing his reputation for all time. Instead of celebrating a well deserved triumph in Washington, the hero of Gettysburg was instead pilloried and humiliated by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. As Hunt said years after both Lincoln and Meade were gone "the hopes and expectations of [Lincoln and others] excited by the victory at Gettysburg wear as unreasonable as the fears that had preceded it."
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