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Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order
Too often, we are told that Russia plays a weak hand well. But, perhaps the nation's cards are better than we know. Russia ranks significantly behind the US and China by traditional measures of power: GDP, population size and health, and military might. Yet 25 years removed from its mid-1990s nadir following the collapse of the USSR, Russia has become a supremely disruptive force in world politics. Kathryn Stoner assesses the resurrection of Russia and argues that we should look beyond traditional means of power to assess its strength in global affairs. Taking into account how Russian domestic politics under Vladimir Putin influence its foreign policy, Stoner explains how Russia has battled its way back to international prominence.
From Russia's seizure of the Crimea from Ukraine to its military support for the Assad regime in Syria, the country has reasserted itself as a major global power. Stoner examines these developments and more in tackling the big questions about Russia's turnaround and global future. Stoner marshals data on Russia's political, economic, and social development and uncovers key insights from its domestic politics. Russian people are wealthier than the Chinese, debt is low, and fiscal policy is good despite sanctions and the volatile global economy. Vladimir Putin's autocratic regime faces virtually no organized domestic opposition. Yet, mindful of maintaining control at home, Russia under Putin also uses its varied power capacities to extend its influence abroad. While we often underestimate Russia's global influence, the consequences are evident in the disruption of politics in the US, Syria, and Venezuela, to name a few. Russia Resurrected is an eye-opening reassessment of the country, identifying the actual sources of its power in international politics and why it has been able to redefine the post-Cold War global order.
From Russia's seizure of the Crimea from Ukraine to its military support for the Assad regime in Syria, the country has reasserted itself as a major global power. Stoner examines these developments and more in tackling the big questions about Russia's turnaround and global future. Stoner marshals data on Russia's political, economic, and social development and uncovers key insights from its domestic politics. Russian people are wealthier than the Chinese, debt is low, and fiscal policy is good despite sanctions and the volatile global economy. Vladimir Putin's autocratic regime faces virtually no organized domestic opposition. Yet, mindful of maintaining control at home, Russia under Putin also uses its varied power capacities to extend its influence abroad. While we often underestimate Russia's global influence, the consequences are evident in the disruption of politics in the US, Syria, and Venezuela, to name a few. Russia Resurrected is an eye-opening reassessment of the country, identifying the actual sources of its power in international politics and why it has been able to redefine the post-Cold War global order.
272 pages, Hardcover
Published October 1, 2020
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March 18, 2021
Just recently finished reading the book “Russia Resurrected: Its Power in a New Global Order” (published in September 2020) by Kathryn E. Stoner, a Stanford University professor. The book is a solid reading which does not deliver to its full potential. Kathryn E. Stoner identifies what power resources Russia has and how they allow Putin to achieve domestic policy aims in international politics.
The book is a product of what I would call the Stanford University’s school of Russia studies, led by Professor and former ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul. The school focuses on Russian president Vladimir Putin and his interests as the main drivers behind Russian foreign and security policy. The school dismisses the realist balance of power approach when explaining Russian foreign and security policy. It rightly criticizes the approach of Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer, and others who argue that Russian foreign and security policies are resulted by provocations of the West. Book by Kathryn E. Stoner and the latest article by Michael McFaul “Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy,” published in International Security, follows a similar path and contradicts mentioned realist approach.
The author argues that a purely quantitative approach to power, as understood in neorealism, is outdated. There is no question on the necessity to agree with her. She rightly suggests that power capabilities result from the interaction of three dimensions: means, scope, and domain, providing a more in-depth understanding of the application of particular instruments of power to achieve foreign policy goals. Though Kathryn E. Stoner initially criticized other authors for focusing on the quantitative approach to power at the beginning of the book, she is later quite explicit on quantitative analysis of Russia’s power capabilities. So she follows a path she criticized.
From my perspective, the author overestimates Russia’s military capabilities, especially when writing about new weapon systems. Some of those systems are not even adequately tested or are in the initial phases of development. The overestimation of the capabilities of the tank Armata T-14 is a good example. Though the tank was widely advertised, Russia still focuses on the improvement and modernization of T-90 and other tanks, rather than replacing them with Armatas’. It seems that there are no large-scale orders of the new tank in Russian ground forces.
In the chapter on soft and sharp power resources author does not precisely indicate how one type of power undermines another type. Soft power is the power of attraction, while sharp power is the power of disruption. Does Russia have soft power over those countries and societies that identified Russia’s aims to disrupt their political systems and societies? I would argue that it does not. Simultaneously, the author stresses the importance of soft power in increasing its influence in the ex-soviet region. As a researcher living in the Baltic states, I would argue that Russia’s soft power is decreasing in the region for the last 30 years. Russia’s aggressive actions in Georgia and Ukraine undermine its soft power further. Russia is increasing its soft power in Italy, Spain, Cyprus, and elsewhere, in the states that are further from Russia and do not live with the daily threat. Russia’s soft power is possible for societies that avoided forced deportations and Soviet repressions. It remains unclear what Russia achieves through a combination of soft, hard, and sharp power and if such combination is effective.
As mentioned, the author has a false assumption that growing Russia’s power capabilities increase its influence in the Baltic states. Russia remains the core determinant of foreign and security policies of the Baltic states, but its influence constantly decreases because the Baltic states are orientated to the EU, NATO, and the U.S. I would argue against the assumption that Russia has hegemony in the ex-soviet region. Regional hegemony is not only a matter of power. It is also a matter of prestige and acceptance of such position of the country by other states.
The author faces the natural problem of shallow analysis/description when she briefly overviews Russian foreign policy with many countries. There are separate books on Russia’s relations with different regions and countries. It is difficult to significantly contribute to the existing literature, especially in such a short chapter.
The last chapter of the book is the best part of it. It is solid, and I wanted it to go deeper and broader into the questions it raises. I would not mind if the last chapter was developed into a separate book. I would definitely buy it. It is unnecessary to focus on different types of power, and such focus sometimes seems too encyclopedic. Incorporating information on various instruments of power into the narrative of why Putin and his “sistema” are adopting one or another tool would be much more appealing. Such an approach would allow demonstrating links between Putin’s interests, which become Russia’s interests, and their realization, thus allowing to assess the effectiveness of those instruments.
I was surprised by the repletion of the same information or similar sentences throughout the book. For example, on page 252, the author writes: “Most average Russians felt little sympathy for Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky, and Berezovsky, for example, who had made billions while most of the rest of society suffered the full financial brunt of the collapse of communism and Yeltsin’s uneven reforms.” On page 523, there is a sentence: “Most average Russians felt little sympathy for men who had made billions while most of society suffered the full financial brunt of the collapse of communism and Yeltsin’s uneven reforms.” It seems that the author or editor needed one last in-depth reading of the text before publishing.
To sum up, it is a book worth reading to get on board with the broader context on the evolution of Russia’s power capabilities and subordination of Russian foreign and security policy for Vladimir Putin’s interests.
The book is a product of what I would call the Stanford University’s school of Russia studies, led by Professor and former ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul. The school focuses on Russian president Vladimir Putin and his interests as the main drivers behind Russian foreign and security policy. The school dismisses the realist balance of power approach when explaining Russian foreign and security policy. It rightly criticizes the approach of Stephen Walt, John Mearsheimer, and others who argue that Russian foreign and security policies are resulted by provocations of the West. Book by Kathryn E. Stoner and the latest article by Michael McFaul “Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy,” published in International Security, follows a similar path and contradicts mentioned realist approach.
The author argues that a purely quantitative approach to power, as understood in neorealism, is outdated. There is no question on the necessity to agree with her. She rightly suggests that power capabilities result from the interaction of three dimensions: means, scope, and domain, providing a more in-depth understanding of the application of particular instruments of power to achieve foreign policy goals. Though Kathryn E. Stoner initially criticized other authors for focusing on the quantitative approach to power at the beginning of the book, she is later quite explicit on quantitative analysis of Russia’s power capabilities. So she follows a path she criticized.
From my perspective, the author overestimates Russia’s military capabilities, especially when writing about new weapon systems. Some of those systems are not even adequately tested or are in the initial phases of development. The overestimation of the capabilities of the tank Armata T-14 is a good example. Though the tank was widely advertised, Russia still focuses on the improvement and modernization of T-90 and other tanks, rather than replacing them with Armatas’. It seems that there are no large-scale orders of the new tank in Russian ground forces.
In the chapter on soft and sharp power resources author does not precisely indicate how one type of power undermines another type. Soft power is the power of attraction, while sharp power is the power of disruption. Does Russia have soft power over those countries and societies that identified Russia’s aims to disrupt their political systems and societies? I would argue that it does not. Simultaneously, the author stresses the importance of soft power in increasing its influence in the ex-soviet region. As a researcher living in the Baltic states, I would argue that Russia’s soft power is decreasing in the region for the last 30 years. Russia’s aggressive actions in Georgia and Ukraine undermine its soft power further. Russia is increasing its soft power in Italy, Spain, Cyprus, and elsewhere, in the states that are further from Russia and do not live with the daily threat. Russia’s soft power is possible for societies that avoided forced deportations and Soviet repressions. It remains unclear what Russia achieves through a combination of soft, hard, and sharp power and if such combination is effective.
As mentioned, the author has a false assumption that growing Russia’s power capabilities increase its influence in the Baltic states. Russia remains the core determinant of foreign and security policies of the Baltic states, but its influence constantly decreases because the Baltic states are orientated to the EU, NATO, and the U.S. I would argue against the assumption that Russia has hegemony in the ex-soviet region. Regional hegemony is not only a matter of power. It is also a matter of prestige and acceptance of such position of the country by other states.
The author faces the natural problem of shallow analysis/description when she briefly overviews Russian foreign policy with many countries. There are separate books on Russia’s relations with different regions and countries. It is difficult to significantly contribute to the existing literature, especially in such a short chapter.
The last chapter of the book is the best part of it. It is solid, and I wanted it to go deeper and broader into the questions it raises. I would not mind if the last chapter was developed into a separate book. I would definitely buy it. It is unnecessary to focus on different types of power, and such focus sometimes seems too encyclopedic. Incorporating information on various instruments of power into the narrative of why Putin and his “sistema” are adopting one or another tool would be much more appealing. Such an approach would allow demonstrating links between Putin’s interests, which become Russia’s interests, and their realization, thus allowing to assess the effectiveness of those instruments.
I was surprised by the repletion of the same information or similar sentences throughout the book. For example, on page 252, the author writes: “Most average Russians felt little sympathy for Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky, and Berezovsky, for example, who had made billions while most of the rest of society suffered the full financial brunt of the collapse of communism and Yeltsin’s uneven reforms.” On page 523, there is a sentence: “Most average Russians felt little sympathy for men who had made billions while most of society suffered the full financial brunt of the collapse of communism and Yeltsin’s uneven reforms.” It seems that the author or editor needed one last in-depth reading of the text before publishing.
To sum up, it is a book worth reading to get on board with the broader context on the evolution of Russia’s power capabilities and subordination of Russian foreign and security policy for Vladimir Putin’s interests.
January 19, 2021
TL;DR
Russia Resurrected documents just how far Russia has come since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kathryn E. Stoner created a clear analysis of Russia’s use of its power towards its foreign policy goals, and hopefully, copies of this book will be passed around in the new presidential administration. Highly recommended.
Disclaimer: I received an advance review copy of this book for free from the publisher in exchange for an honest review. All opinions are mine and mine alone.
For more reviews, please, visit my blog at Primmlife.com
Review: Russia Resurrected by Kathryn Stoner
The above quote best describes my history with Russia. I grew up in the Midwest to a conservative family. My childhood was filled with action movies, like Red Dawn. The Soviet Union loomed large in my mind as, to quote Ronald Reagan, the “evil empire.” The Soviets were our enemies until one day something truly unexpected happened, and the Berlin Wall fell. I don’t remember much about it other than the shock in the adults around me. Through high school, the world seemed headed toward peace. Russia and the former Soviet Union dropped off my radar. Apparently they dropped off more radars than just mine. The quote above shows how the world, in general, and the U.S., in particular, have reacted to Russia. In the Cold War, we (the U.S.) believed the first part of the sentence. Russia was the villain of our modern story. But once the Soviet Union collapsed, we switched immediately to the second part of the quote. Russia was considered a regional power, and by traditional measures, they were. However, when Putin returned to power in 2012, he unleashed Russia on international politics. The question becomes, did we underestimate Russia or did they have outsized success with what little they had? In Russia Resurrected, Kathryn E. Stoner argues that we underestimated Russia because Russian power didn’t fit into traditional paradigms. This book looks at Russia objectively – warts and all – to determine how and why Russia became an aggressor in international politics.
Russia Resurrected is a comprehensive look at Russia’s place in the world and how Russia uses its power. Stoner seeks to show that Russia has been underestimated in power. She recommends that the traditional measures of power be reevaluated because Russia’s aggressive actions in the world, like the 2014 invasion of Crimea, took a number of people by surprise. Stoner also argues that there is a misunderstanding of Russia’s motivations for the foreign policy decisions that Putin’s government have undertaken. Putin’s foreign policy is aimed to maintain domestic stability by providing a focus outside of the country. To support these arguments, Stoner lays out Russia’s capabilities in terms of policy scope, geographic domain, and means. I think of these capabilities as issues, regional politics, and the methods of how Russia exerts its power over other nations. Stoner then proceeds to go in-depth analyzing Russia in these three areas. But she also shows just how far Russia has come since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Truly the nation has come a long way and yet still has a long way to go.
Stoner presents an even account of the nation as it currently stands. The book reads as objective in its assessments. Granted, there is a person behind these assessments, but she neither demonizes nor lionizes Russia. She lays out her arguments in straight-forward, easy to understand manner. She tells us what she plans to do; then she lays the foundation; then she adds another layer and another layer until finally the capstone to her argument rounds out the book at the end. Along the way, we learn about Russia’s economy, international aid, a survey of its recent history with the U.S., its military capabilities, and the regional power plays being made.
Academic Writing Done Right
Russia Resurrected is a book that challenged but didn’t outpace me. I never felt left behind despite the fact that nothing in here was in my knowledge base. Each argument that Stoner built was done with care and craft that pulled me along. Though this book is in conversation with other academic books about the subject; it was self-contained. I didn’t feel that I had missed the point because I hadn’t read other books on the subject. Now, I probably did miss things because I’m not part of that academic conversation, but the material was presented such that a layperson like myself could understand.
Russia, Our Ally?
Early in the book, Stoner provides a survey of Russian relations with the U.S. since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin was the first foreign leader to call Bush after the 9/11 terrorist attack. I didn’t know that. Learning how the U.S. and Russia worked together until Putin’s return to power in 2012 fascinated me. I didn’t realize how close to allies our nations were becoming, and it feels like a real missed opportunity that both nations didn’t work harder to cement that relationship. Stoner lays out some convincing reasons why the relationship soured. For example, in contrast to the decadent West, Russia saw a chance to be a conservative nation and to provide a third option between the West and a growing China.
Stoner argues that Putin is undoubtedly the driving force behind Russia’s reassertion of power in international politics. She believes that it is unlikely any other leader would have responded to world events and problems facing the nation in the same way. This doesn’t seem like a big leap; after all, leaders influence the paths of their nations all the time. That’s why we elect them, but her claims are that Putin’s priority is maintaining stability in the autocracy he’s created. He’s pushing Russian foreign policy because it wins him approval with his citizens.
A New Cold War? Unlikely
Since 2016, I’ve been wondering if we’re in a new Cold War with Russia. After reading Russia Resurrected, I’d say no. Russia knows it weakened our country by helping Donald Trump get elected, and they’re loving the chaos he’s created over the past four years. But Russia is more concerned with internal matters (see Putin’s fear of Alexei Navalny), and Putin needs to maintain power in his patronal autocracy to keep the money flowing to his chosen supporters. I don’t think it benefits either nation to re-ignite the Cold War, but we may already be going down that path. Trump’s abdication of America’s role in the world and his subservience for all things Putin has dramatically changed the international landscape. In addition, Mitch McConnell and the Republican Party failed to take measures to protect our elections even after the senate released a report detailing Russia’s role in election interference. With the Republican party leaning ever more towards Russia – senators spent the Fourth of July there – it’s hard to see either side going so far as the Cold War. But we know and expect more ongoing cyber-attacks from Russia will be part of the foreign policy game from this point into the foreseeable future. I have the distinct fear, though, that future incidents will heat up real fast in the Putin era.
Russia has ambiguous criteria for whether it will use its military power, and the use of nuclear weapons has even more ambiguous criteria. Stoner’s writing on Russia’s nuclear capabilities scared me more than any horror novel I’ve ever read. Humans love to devise ways to destroy the entire species, and Russia – not alone by any means – is working on extinction capable warheads. But at this point, I’m not sure the concept of mutually assured destruction is as much of a deterrent to Putin as it was to the Soviet Union. All it takes is one person without the bravery and level-headedness of Stanislav Petrov (Thank you!!!) or Vasily Arkhipov (Thank you!!!) to make parts of the world unlivable. If you’ve been getting to sleep easily, feel free to read this section. It will definitely keep you up at night.
Soft, Hard, and Sharp Power
Stoner’s discussion of soft (economics, aid, culture), hard (military), and sharp (electronic warfare) was thorough, easy to understand, and an excellent read. The examples she gives are excellent support for her arguments. Whereas the Soviet Union wanted to use these powers to convert nations to the communist ideology, Russia is using these powers to be left alone. It fears the encroachment of NATO, and the official story that Navalny is a CIA asset shows that it suspects the West in attempting to overthrow Putin’s government. I particularly enjoyed Stoner documenting how Russia is using cultural power to maintain stability and pull Eurasian nations closer to itself. One particular section that caught my eye was how Russia provides a pension to Soviet World War II veterans who now live in Israel. This is such a strong political and economic move to pull the Jewish state closer to Russia. Stoner lists these and other examples that show Russia is seeking a greater international role.
Conclusion
Kathryn E. Stoner’s Russia Resurrected is a must read for anyone interested in international politics. I learned so much, and Stoner’s level headed approach to Russia helped me see its motivations more clearly. Hopefully people in the U.S. Department of State are reading this. I highly recommend Russia Resurrected to anyone who, like me, finds Russia’s recent history fascinating.
Russia Resurrected by Kathryn E. Stoner is available from Oxford University Press on February 1st, 2021.
8 out of 10!
Russia Resurrected documents just how far Russia has come since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Kathryn E. Stoner created a clear analysis of Russia’s use of its power towards its foreign policy goals, and hopefully, copies of this book will be passed around in the new presidential administration. Highly recommended.
Disclaimer: I received an advance review copy of this book for free from the publisher in exchange for an honest review. All opinions are mine and mine alone.
For more reviews, please, visit my blog at Primmlife.com
Review: Russia Resurrected by Kathryn Stoner
"Russia was never so strong as it wants to be, and never so weak as it is thought to be."
– Vladimir Putin, May 2002
The above quote best describes my history with Russia. I grew up in the Midwest to a conservative family. My childhood was filled with action movies, like Red Dawn. The Soviet Union loomed large in my mind as, to quote Ronald Reagan, the “evil empire.” The Soviets were our enemies until one day something truly unexpected happened, and the Berlin Wall fell. I don’t remember much about it other than the shock in the adults around me. Through high school, the world seemed headed toward peace. Russia and the former Soviet Union dropped off my radar. Apparently they dropped off more radars than just mine. The quote above shows how the world, in general, and the U.S., in particular, have reacted to Russia. In the Cold War, we (the U.S.) believed the first part of the sentence. Russia was the villain of our modern story. But once the Soviet Union collapsed, we switched immediately to the second part of the quote. Russia was considered a regional power, and by traditional measures, they were. However, when Putin returned to power in 2012, he unleashed Russia on international politics. The question becomes, did we underestimate Russia or did they have outsized success with what little they had? In Russia Resurrected, Kathryn E. Stoner argues that we underestimated Russia because Russian power didn’t fit into traditional paradigms. This book looks at Russia objectively – warts and all – to determine how and why Russia became an aggressor in international politics.
Russia Resurrected is a comprehensive look at Russia’s place in the world and how Russia uses its power. Stoner seeks to show that Russia has been underestimated in power. She recommends that the traditional measures of power be reevaluated because Russia’s aggressive actions in the world, like the 2014 invasion of Crimea, took a number of people by surprise. Stoner also argues that there is a misunderstanding of Russia’s motivations for the foreign policy decisions that Putin’s government have undertaken. Putin’s foreign policy is aimed to maintain domestic stability by providing a focus outside of the country. To support these arguments, Stoner lays out Russia’s capabilities in terms of policy scope, geographic domain, and means. I think of these capabilities as issues, regional politics, and the methods of how Russia exerts its power over other nations. Stoner then proceeds to go in-depth analyzing Russia in these three areas. But she also shows just how far Russia has come since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Truly the nation has come a long way and yet still has a long way to go.
Stoner presents an even account of the nation as it currently stands. The book reads as objective in its assessments. Granted, there is a person behind these assessments, but she neither demonizes nor lionizes Russia. She lays out her arguments in straight-forward, easy to understand manner. She tells us what she plans to do; then she lays the foundation; then she adds another layer and another layer until finally the capstone to her argument rounds out the book at the end. Along the way, we learn about Russia’s economy, international aid, a survey of its recent history with the U.S., its military capabilities, and the regional power plays being made.
Academic Writing Done Right
Russia Resurrected is a book that challenged but didn’t outpace me. I never felt left behind despite the fact that nothing in here was in my knowledge base. Each argument that Stoner built was done with care and craft that pulled me along. Though this book is in conversation with other academic books about the subject; it was self-contained. I didn’t feel that I had missed the point because I hadn’t read other books on the subject. Now, I probably did miss things because I’m not part of that academic conversation, but the material was presented such that a layperson like myself could understand.
Russia, Our Ally?
Early in the book, Stoner provides a survey of Russian relations with the U.S. since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin was the first foreign leader to call Bush after the 9/11 terrorist attack. I didn’t know that. Learning how the U.S. and Russia worked together until Putin’s return to power in 2012 fascinated me. I didn’t realize how close to allies our nations were becoming, and it feels like a real missed opportunity that both nations didn’t work harder to cement that relationship. Stoner lays out some convincing reasons why the relationship soured. For example, in contrast to the decadent West, Russia saw a chance to be a conservative nation and to provide a third option between the West and a growing China.
Stoner argues that Putin is undoubtedly the driving force behind Russia’s reassertion of power in international politics. She believes that it is unlikely any other leader would have responded to world events and problems facing the nation in the same way. This doesn’t seem like a big leap; after all, leaders influence the paths of their nations all the time. That’s why we elect them, but her claims are that Putin’s priority is maintaining stability in the autocracy he’s created. He’s pushing Russian foreign policy because it wins him approval with his citizens.
A New Cold War? Unlikely
Since 2016, I’ve been wondering if we’re in a new Cold War with Russia. After reading Russia Resurrected, I’d say no. Russia knows it weakened our country by helping Donald Trump get elected, and they’re loving the chaos he’s created over the past four years. But Russia is more concerned with internal matters (see Putin’s fear of Alexei Navalny), and Putin needs to maintain power in his patronal autocracy to keep the money flowing to his chosen supporters. I don’t think it benefits either nation to re-ignite the Cold War, but we may already be going down that path. Trump’s abdication of America’s role in the world and his subservience for all things Putin has dramatically changed the international landscape. In addition, Mitch McConnell and the Republican Party failed to take measures to protect our elections even after the senate released a report detailing Russia’s role in election interference. With the Republican party leaning ever more towards Russia – senators spent the Fourth of July there – it’s hard to see either side going so far as the Cold War. But we know and expect more ongoing cyber-attacks from Russia will be part of the foreign policy game from this point into the foreseeable future. I have the distinct fear, though, that future incidents will heat up real fast in the Putin era.
Russia has ambiguous criteria for whether it will use its military power, and the use of nuclear weapons has even more ambiguous criteria. Stoner’s writing on Russia’s nuclear capabilities scared me more than any horror novel I’ve ever read. Humans love to devise ways to destroy the entire species, and Russia – not alone by any means – is working on extinction capable warheads. But at this point, I’m not sure the concept of mutually assured destruction is as much of a deterrent to Putin as it was to the Soviet Union. All it takes is one person without the bravery and level-headedness of Stanislav Petrov (Thank you!!!) or Vasily Arkhipov (Thank you!!!) to make parts of the world unlivable. If you’ve been getting to sleep easily, feel free to read this section. It will definitely keep you up at night.
Soft, Hard, and Sharp Power
Stoner’s discussion of soft (economics, aid, culture), hard (military), and sharp (electronic warfare) was thorough, easy to understand, and an excellent read. The examples she gives are excellent support for her arguments. Whereas the Soviet Union wanted to use these powers to convert nations to the communist ideology, Russia is using these powers to be left alone. It fears the encroachment of NATO, and the official story that Navalny is a CIA asset shows that it suspects the West in attempting to overthrow Putin’s government. I particularly enjoyed Stoner documenting how Russia is using cultural power to maintain stability and pull Eurasian nations closer to itself. One particular section that caught my eye was how Russia provides a pension to Soviet World War II veterans who now live in Israel. This is such a strong political and economic move to pull the Jewish state closer to Russia. Stoner lists these and other examples that show Russia is seeking a greater international role.
Conclusion
Kathryn E. Stoner’s Russia Resurrected is a must read for anyone interested in international politics. I learned so much, and Stoner’s level headed approach to Russia helped me see its motivations more clearly. Hopefully people in the U.S. Department of State are reading this. I highly recommend Russia Resurrected to anyone who, like me, finds Russia’s recent history fascinating.
Russia Resurrected by Kathryn E. Stoner is available from Oxford University Press on February 1st, 2021.
8 out of 10!
Did Not Finish
June 10, 2024 (The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Книга читается как расширенная Википедия, т.е. как огромные статьи из Википедии, вот только зачем это было сделано, мне не совсем не понятно. Книга начинается с обзора международных отношений России со странами СНГ. Всю суть текст можно свести к тезису, что отношения между Россией и другими странами сложные, где каждая страна пытается выторговать более выгодные для себя позиции. Возможно, специалистам это и интересно читать, вот только обычным гражданам, даже из стран СНГ, такая подробность вряд ли что-то даст в плане понимания нынешней позиции РФ. Короче говоря, о международной политике РФ со странами-соседями написано и поверхностно и скучно (можно написать отдельную книгу об международных отношениях РФ и Белоруссии или РФ и Казахстана или РФ и Армении, так что в книге приведён беглый взгляд).
Далее идёт глава, в которой автор скучно и поверхностно рассматривает вопрос российской системы образования, здравоохранения, экономики и пр. Так как мой интерес к книге иссяк ещё на фазе международного обзора отношений между Россией странами СНГ, то мне уже трудно вспомнить, о чём далее автор писала. Книга походит на долгое и нудное описание внутренних вопросов РФ (здравоохранение, образование, экономика и пр.) в стиле Википедии. Что может дать понимание этих вопросов иностранцу, сказать сложно. С моей точки зрения ключевыми вопросами является наличие нефтегазового сектора как основы всей экономики России, т.е. её устойчивость и авторитарная модель правления, которая выстраивалась очень медленно и скрыто, начиная с 1993 года. Всё остальное – детали, которые имеют очень небольшое отношение к возможным путям построения новых политических отношений, как с путинской Россией, так и с постпутинской Россией. Я хочу сказать, что возможность российского правительства иметь неэффективную экономику связано с наличием огромного числа природных ресурсов, которые и поддерживают жизнеспособность неэффективной экономики, а также авторитарную модель правления или даже диктатуру, позволяет концентрировать всю власть в руках одного клана. Образование, медицина и пр., могут находиться в каком угодно плачевном положении, но эти факторы никак не могут повлиять ни на текущую власть, ни на будущую, только если будущая постпутинская власть не станет по-настоящему демократической. Вот поэтому я не нашёл особого смысла читать далее эту книгу.
The book reads like an expanded Wikipedia, i.e., as huge articles from Wikipedia, but why this was done is not quite clear to me. The book begins with an overview of Russia's international relations with the CIS countries. The whole essence of the text can be reduced to the thesis that relations between Russia and other countries are complex, where each country is trying to bargain for more favorable positions. It may be interesting for specialists to read this, but, for ordinary citizens, even from CIS countries, such details are unlikely to give anything in terms of understanding the current position of the Russian Federation. In short, it is superficially and boringly written about the international policy of the Russian Federation with neighboring countries (one can write a separate book about the international relations of the Russian Federation and Belarus or the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan or the Russian Federation and Armenia, so this book gives a cursory glance).
Then, there is a chapter in which the author boringly and superficially discusses the Russian system of education, health care, economy, and so on. Since my interest in the book dried up during the phase of the international review of relations between Russia and the CIS countries, it is hard for me to remember what the author wrote about next. The book looks like a long and tedious description of internal issues of the Russian Federation (health care, education, economy, etc.) in the style of Wikipedia. What understanding of these issues can give to a foreigner is hard to say. From my point of view, the key issues are the presence of the oil and gas sector as the basis of the entire Russian economy, i.e., its stability and the authoritarian model of government, which has been built very slowly and secretly since 1993. Everything else is details that have very little to do with possible ways of building new political relations with both Putin's Russia and post-Putin Russia. My point is that the ability of the Russian government to have an inefficient economy is due to the availability of a huge number of natural resources, which support the viability of an inefficient economy, as well as the authoritarian model of government or even dictatorship, which allows the concentration of all power in the hands of one clan. Education, medicine, etc., may be in any deplorable state, but these factors can have no effect on either the current government or the future one unless the future post-Putin government becomes truly democratic. That's why I didn't find much point in reading further into this book.
Книга читается как расширенная Википедия, т.е. как огромные статьи из Википедии, вот только зачем это было сделано, мне не совсем не понятно. Книга начинается с обзора международных отношений России со странами СНГ. Всю суть текст можно свести к тезису, что отношения между Россией и другими странами сложные, где каждая страна пытается выторговать более выгодные для себя позиции. Возможно, специалистам это и интересно читать, вот только обычным гражданам, даже из стран СНГ, такая подробность вряд ли что-то даст в плане понимания нынешней позиции РФ. Короче говоря, о международной политике РФ со странами-соседями написано и поверхностно и скучно (можно написать отдельную книгу об международных отношениях РФ и Белоруссии или РФ и Казахстана или РФ и Армении, так что в книге приведён беглый взгляд).
Далее идёт глава, в которой автор скучно и поверхностно рассматривает вопрос российской системы образования, здравоохранения, экономики и пр. Так как мой интерес к книге иссяк ещё на фазе международного обзора отношений между Россией странами СНГ, то мне уже трудно вспомнить, о чём далее автор писала. Книга походит на долгое и нудное описание внутренних вопросов РФ (здравоохранение, образование, экономика и пр.) в стиле Википедии. Что может дать понимание этих вопросов иностранцу, сказать сложно. С моей точки зрения ключевыми вопросами является наличие нефтегазового сектора как основы всей экономики России, т.е. её устойчивость и авторитарная модель правления, которая выстраивалась очень медленно и скрыто, начиная с 1993 года. Всё остальное – детали, которые имеют очень небольшое отношение к возможным путям построения новых политических отношений, как с путинской Россией, так и с постпутинской Россией. Я хочу сказать, что возможность российского правительства иметь неэффективную экономику связано с наличием огромного числа природных ресурсов, которые и поддерживают жизнеспособность неэффективной экономики, а также авторитарную модель правления или даже диктатуру, позволяет концентрировать всю власть в руках одного клана. Образование, медицина и пр., могут находиться в каком угодно плачевном положении, но эти факторы никак не могут повлиять ни на текущую власть, ни на будущую, только если будущая постпутинская власть не станет по-настоящему демократической. Вот поэтому я не нашёл особого смысла читать далее эту книгу.
The book reads like an expanded Wikipedia, i.e., as huge articles from Wikipedia, but why this was done is not quite clear to me. The book begins with an overview of Russia's international relations with the CIS countries. The whole essence of the text can be reduced to the thesis that relations between Russia and other countries are complex, where each country is trying to bargain for more favorable positions. It may be interesting for specialists to read this, but, for ordinary citizens, even from CIS countries, such details are unlikely to give anything in terms of understanding the current position of the Russian Federation. In short, it is superficially and boringly written about the international policy of the Russian Federation with neighboring countries (one can write a separate book about the international relations of the Russian Federation and Belarus or the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan or the Russian Federation and Armenia, so this book gives a cursory glance).
Then, there is a chapter in which the author boringly and superficially discusses the Russian system of education, health care, economy, and so on. Since my interest in the book dried up during the phase of the international review of relations between Russia and the CIS countries, it is hard for me to remember what the author wrote about next. The book looks like a long and tedious description of internal issues of the Russian Federation (health care, education, economy, etc.) in the style of Wikipedia. What understanding of these issues can give to a foreigner is hard to say. From my point of view, the key issues are the presence of the oil and gas sector as the basis of the entire Russian economy, i.e., its stability and the authoritarian model of government, which has been built very slowly and secretly since 1993. Everything else is details that have very little to do with possible ways of building new political relations with both Putin's Russia and post-Putin Russia. My point is that the ability of the Russian government to have an inefficient economy is due to the availability of a huge number of natural resources, which support the viability of an inefficient economy, as well as the authoritarian model of government or even dictatorship, which allows the concentration of all power in the hands of one clan. Education, medicine, etc., may be in any deplorable state, but these factors can have no effect on either the current government or the future one unless the future post-Putin government becomes truly democratic. That's why I didn't find much point in reading further into this book.
March 7, 2021
Excellent book examining the sources of Russian power and arguing persuasively that Russia is neither as weak as many believe nor as strong as they would like to be. More importantly the author argues that Russian foreign policy is driven more by domestic political considerations and fear of instability than realist theories of power politics.
The chapters addressing Russia’s resurrection, it's hard power (military) capabilities, and the foundational drivers of Russian foreign policy alone are worth the time to read this book. The reader can argue with the author's assessment of just how important domestic political drivers are in shaping Russian foreign policy but this is a well written and persuasive book. Anyone interested in Russia or great power competition should read this book.
Some key highlights include:
- Russia has reestablished itself on the global stage as a great disruptor rather than a traditional great power and possesses a much higher tolerance for risk then its competitors
- Russian revanchism comes from the interaction of private and national interests, Russia’s “power” resources, and the domestic political environment
- Key areas shaping Russia’s interaction with near-abroad include energy, trade, security of Russia’s borders, and political orientation of Russia’s neighbors
- Russia perceives itself as engaged in a defensive effort as it believes it is under attack by the West
- When considering purchasing power parity and military capabilities Russia is more capable/powerful then many believe and is more capable then any European state - even those appearing to spend equivalent sums on military power
- While the US is more powerful in nearly every element of power political polarization constrains its ability or will to act
The chapters addressing Russia’s resurrection, it's hard power (military) capabilities, and the foundational drivers of Russian foreign policy alone are worth the time to read this book. The reader can argue with the author's assessment of just how important domestic political drivers are in shaping Russian foreign policy but this is a well written and persuasive book. Anyone interested in Russia or great power competition should read this book.
Some key highlights include:
- Russia has reestablished itself on the global stage as a great disruptor rather than a traditional great power and possesses a much higher tolerance for risk then its competitors
- Russian revanchism comes from the interaction of private and national interests, Russia’s “power” resources, and the domestic political environment
- Key areas shaping Russia’s interaction with near-abroad include energy, trade, security of Russia’s borders, and political orientation of Russia’s neighbors
- Russia perceives itself as engaged in a defensive effort as it believes it is under attack by the West
- When considering purchasing power parity and military capabilities Russia is more capable/powerful then many believe and is more capable then any European state - even those appearing to spend equivalent sums on military power
- While the US is more powerful in nearly every element of power political polarization constrains its ability or will to act
February 16, 2025
Most of the book is a broad and high level overview of Russian history, relationships with its neighbours and other select countries, and internal matters such as healthcare, economy, demographics, etc. It is a good read for anyone who needs an introduction.
The main purpose of the book was arguing for an alternative to realist view of the reasons behind Russia’s power projections abroad. And to me, that main part fell flat. There was only one chapter dedicated to it and the arguments against full schools of thought were sometimes limited to one paragraph.
Maybe if the book were lighter on searchable stats and heavier on the core argument and proof points behind it, it would have scored higher for me.
The main purpose of the book was arguing for an alternative to realist view of the reasons behind Russia’s power projections abroad. And to me, that main part fell flat. There was only one chapter dedicated to it and the arguments against full schools of thought were sometimes limited to one paragraph.
Maybe if the book were lighter on searchable stats and heavier on the core argument and proof points behind it, it would have scored higher for me.
March 10, 2023
Well its always cringe when some writes,
that some chap with money from Russia somehow got the 45th president elected with the help of the internet.
also, its okay to focus on Russia about the military involvement in some parts of the world but not to mentions the never ending military involvement that the USA have embarked from like 17c.
some good points on other topics like finance, infrastructure and economy.
some bad point regarding Crimeia, since about every second person knows Russian history.
over all meh....
that some chap with money from Russia somehow got the 45th president elected with the help of the internet.
also, its okay to focus on Russia about the military involvement in some parts of the world but not to mentions the never ending military involvement that the USA have embarked from like 17c.
some good points on other topics like finance, infrastructure and economy.
some bad point regarding Crimeia, since about every second person knows Russian history.
over all meh....
March 14, 2022
This is an excellently written and researched work that could not be more timely. In it, Dr. Stoner examines all the various facets of Putin's government such as its use of hard, which we and witnessing now, and soft power. She examines the state of Russia's economy and army as well as societal elements such as healthcare, mortality, education among others,
July 26, 2025
A wonderful read to get closer to the Mind of the Kremlin, Stoner paints a picture of a Russia completely different in the minds of the average person. Far from a defeated power, Russia is rapidly regaining and forming new avenues of power.
March 8, 2021
Well-researched, academic look at current Russian power dynamics. Slower reading than I expected.
May 8, 2022
A very informative and valuable study, if a bit wonky at times.
March 29, 2023
Read for Russian Foreign Policy class - interesting way to re-examine Russia out of the traditional context and give credit where credit is due for progress.
May 17, 2025
Factological and boring
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews