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命运攸关的抉择：1940-1941年间改变世界的十个决策
作者伊恩·克肖用十个章节的篇幅考察了1940年5月至1941年12月间第二次世界大战中，英国、美国、苏联、德国、意大利和日本等六个主要国家做出的十个互相关联、具有巨大军事影响的政治决策。从英国决定坚持抗击德国，到德国决定在珍珠港事件后向美国宣战，再到希特勒决定消灭欧洲大陆上的犹太人，这些决策把欧亚大陆上的两场互相分隔的战争，转变成一场真正全球化的冲突。尽管在1941年底，战争仍有三年多的进程，但第二次世界大战的结局在此时就已经注定了。
任何决策的制定都受到一系列条件的限制。政治体制、决策机制、意识形态、决策者所能掌握的情报信息、国内舆论、国际环境、决策者的理智与情感……这些无一不影响着“二战”中这些决策的形成过程。作者充分分析了这些因素在这十个决策中的作用与影响，试图为读者还原当时战场之外看不见的硝烟。但历史的发展并不具有必然性。作者还专门分析了被决策者们抛弃的其他替代方案，并合理推测了选择这些替代方案可能产生的结果。对这些替代方案被放弃过程的分析更是凸显了决策者做出这些命运攸关的抉择背后的逻辑。
任何决策的制定都受到一系列条件的限制。政治体制、决策机制、意识形态、决策者所能掌握的情报信息、国内舆论、国际环境、决策者的理智与情感……这些无一不影响着“二战”中这些决策的形成过程。作者充分分析了这些因素在这十个决策中的作用与影响，试图为读者还原当时战场之外看不见的硝烟。但历史的发展并不具有必然性。作者还专门分析了被决策者们抛弃的其他替代方案，并合理推测了选择这些替代方案可能产生的结果。对这些替代方案被放弃过程的分析更是凸显了决策者做出这些命运攸关的抉择背后的逻辑。
576 pages, Hardcover
First published May 31, 2007
About the author
Ian Kershaw
74 books908 followersProfessor Sir Ian Kershaw is a British historian, noted for his biographies of Adolf Hitler.
Ian Kershaw studied at Liverpool (BA) and Oxford (D. Phil). He was a lecturer first in medieval, then in modern, history at the University of Manchester. In 1983-4 he was Visiting Professor of Modern History at the Ruhr University in Bochum, West Germany. From 1987 to 1989 he was Professor of Modern History at the University of Nottingham, and since 1989 has been Professor of Modern History at Sheffield. He is a fellow of the British Academy, of the Royal Historical Society, of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, and of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung in Bonn. He retired from academic life in the autumn semester of 2008.
Ian Kershaw studied at Liverpool (BA) and Oxford (D. Phil). He was a lecturer first in medieval, then in modern, history at the University of Manchester. In 1983-4 he was Visiting Professor of Modern History at the Ruhr University in Bochum, West Germany. From 1987 to 1989 he was Professor of Modern History at the University of Nottingham, and since 1989 has been Professor of Modern History at Sheffield. He is a fellow of the British Academy, of the Royal Historical Society, of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, and of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung in Bonn. He retired from academic life in the autumn semester of 2008.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 104 reviews
October 3, 2017
Kershaw is a master historian and researcher of world war 2 topics. This book explores ten decisions made by world leaders from 1940-41 and their world wide implications, some reaching even to today and not only to WWII. Though there is nothing groundbreaking or new here, the layout is thoroughly documented and the process behind each decision is explained. Moreover, the though process is looked at through the eyes of the present day peoples not knowing the outcomes through current day knowledge of what actually happened. Though the book is a tad dry, the pace is good and holds interest.
I did learn more about what propelled Italy into the war and the details of the debacle of their invasion of Greece. What propelled Japan to seek the stance it did? I never for once thought there was any other option for Britain other than "fight back", but what if they didn't? The impact of all these decisions is weighed as through the battle are ongoing and have not yet happened. It's an interesting perspective on how things did happen or possibly could have happened. The real rationale of how things went and what drove the leaders there is expounded. This isn't some crack-pot alternative history, but real analysis of decisions and thought process derived from real scenarios, public pressure, the on-going war and changes in tactics and politics. A great compliment to any WWII library.
I did learn more about what propelled Italy into the war and the details of the debacle of their invasion of Greece. What propelled Japan to seek the stance it did? I never for once thought there was any other option for Britain other than "fight back", but what if they didn't? The impact of all these decisions is weighed as through the battle are ongoing and have not yet happened. It's an interesting perspective on how things did happen or possibly could have happened. The real rationale of how things went and what drove the leaders there is expounded. This isn't some crack-pot alternative history, but real analysis of decisions and thought process derived from real scenarios, public pressure, the on-going war and changes in tactics and politics. A great compliment to any WWII library.
April 1, 2008
Kershaw discusses 10 "fateful choices" made between May 1940 and December 1941 that "changed the world." To wit:
In spring 1940, (1) the "bulldog" Churchill convinced his cohorts in the War Cabinet (Halifax and Chamberlain) that fighting on against the Nazis was Britain's only choice. Better to go down fighting than negotiating. Either way, they'd end up at Hitler's mercy. At least if they went down fighting, they'd become a moral cause for Britain's friends to avenge.
Britain's choice to continue fighting imposed a new sense of urgency on Hitler. Instead of winning the war in the west and then turning east to release his full fury on Stalin (like he'd planned), he decided (2) to attack the Soviets immediately, win, and then turn back to the west to release his full fury on Britain (and, by then, probably the U.S. too).
In the meantime, the Japanese and Mussolini saw France and the Low Countries vanquished and Britain seemingly on her knees, and decided (3 & 4) to attack their interests in Southeast Asia and Greece, respectively. Roosevelt saw the same dire picture and decided (5) to lend/lease an unlimited supply of munitions and materials to Britain.
Meanwhile, Stalin, despite every scrap of intelligence coming his way, decided (6) that Hitler would never attack him without first defeating the British, or at least issuing an ultimatum. He was wrong.
Hitler's June 1941 invasion of Russia was a godsend in Roosevelt's eyes. The President decided (7) to wage undeclared war on Germany by way of unlimited military aid to both Britain and the Soviets. A month later, Japan joined the club of Roosevelt's undeclared enemies-- an American oil embargo of Japan began in late July-- and the Japanese (8) set their sites on Pearl Harbor.
No sooner was the Oahu harbor filled with battleship parts and charred US sailors than Hitler decided (9) that he too wanted a piece of an enemy with unlimited resources. On December 11, 1941 he declared war on the United States.
The 10th "fateful decision" Kershaw relates is Hitler's decision to "kill the Jews."
This is not a good book. The content can be had in more readable form elsewhere (Shirer's "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" for example) and Kershaw's analysis is boring-- "It had to happen the way it did" basically sums it up. Yes Mr. Kershaw, it did..... but you didn't have to write a book about it, did you? Kershaw also has an uncanny ability to present the same information 5 different times in each chapter, when once would have sufficed. And despite the epic nature of the book's content, Kershaw's mind-numbing prose turns the telling of it into a lullaby.
My evaluation: read something else.
In spring 1940, (1) the "bulldog" Churchill convinced his cohorts in the War Cabinet (Halifax and Chamberlain) that fighting on against the Nazis was Britain's only choice. Better to go down fighting than negotiating. Either way, they'd end up at Hitler's mercy. At least if they went down fighting, they'd become a moral cause for Britain's friends to avenge.
Britain's choice to continue fighting imposed a new sense of urgency on Hitler. Instead of winning the war in the west and then turning east to release his full fury on Stalin (like he'd planned), he decided (2) to attack the Soviets immediately, win, and then turn back to the west to release his full fury on Britain (and, by then, probably the U.S. too).
In the meantime, the Japanese and Mussolini saw France and the Low Countries vanquished and Britain seemingly on her knees, and decided (3 & 4) to attack their interests in Southeast Asia and Greece, respectively. Roosevelt saw the same dire picture and decided (5) to lend/lease an unlimited supply of munitions and materials to Britain.
Meanwhile, Stalin, despite every scrap of intelligence coming his way, decided (6) that Hitler would never attack him without first defeating the British, or at least issuing an ultimatum. He was wrong.
Hitler's June 1941 invasion of Russia was a godsend in Roosevelt's eyes. The President decided (7) to wage undeclared war on Germany by way of unlimited military aid to both Britain and the Soviets. A month later, Japan joined the club of Roosevelt's undeclared enemies-- an American oil embargo of Japan began in late July-- and the Japanese (8) set their sites on Pearl Harbor.
No sooner was the Oahu harbor filled with battleship parts and charred US sailors than Hitler decided (9) that he too wanted a piece of an enemy with unlimited resources. On December 11, 1941 he declared war on the United States.
The 10th "fateful decision" Kershaw relates is Hitler's decision to "kill the Jews."
This is not a good book. The content can be had in more readable form elsewhere (Shirer's "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" for example) and Kershaw's analysis is boring-- "It had to happen the way it did" basically sums it up. Yes Mr. Kershaw, it did..... but you didn't have to write a book about it, did you? Kershaw also has an uncanny ability to present the same information 5 different times in each chapter, when once would have sufficed. And despite the epic nature of the book's content, Kershaw's mind-numbing prose turns the telling of it into a lullaby.
My evaluation: read something else.
November 2, 2020
As I read this book, I was struck not simply by how many fateful decisions altered the trajectory of the war but rather how many of them occurred in 1940-1941 alone. As Kershaw notes repeatedly, we of course have no way of knowing exactly how the course of history may have turned had these choices gone slightly differently (he has little time for counterfactual history which he considers nothing more than a parlor game not worth the thought expended on it). What Kershaw does here is examine the “why?” rather than the “what if?”.
Why for example would Benito Mussolini, when the Axis was at the height of their powers (the fall of France to the Nazis was imminent at the time) and Germany was making inroads into North Africa that had the potential to knock the British out of the war, invade Greece?
It was a decision that would doom any further North African adventure as well as forcing the Germans to bail out Mussolini at the expense of using troops desperately needed for the invasion of Russia. It was in short, a catastrophic mistake.
So why? The answer lies in the most human of emotions, pride. Italy was always going to play second fiddle to Hitler so Mussolini thought this was his chance to spread his wings as it were and prove he didn’t need Hitler. It didn’t by itself doom the Reich, but they were never quite the same afterward.
While Mussolini is a special case in idiocy, Stalin’s decision to ignore every intelligence report he received that a German invasion in the spring of 1941 was imminent is right up there. Of course it didn’t help that two years earlier he had either purged or executed large swaths of the army leadership leaving them by 1941 wholly unprepared for what was coming. Some decisions like this one were essentially made years before and only manifested themselves in 1940-41.
Kershaw sums up the book by reminding the reader that any decision made then or now, is a reflection of that leader’s personality. Be it Mussolini’s inferiority complex, Stalin’s paranoia, the collective imperial army of Japan’s quasi-religious fanaticism, even Churchill’s indomitable will that forced Britain to fight on.
While it is possible that different men may have arrived at similar decisions, (it is for example hard to imagine a Himmler or a Goring doing anything different) it was the force of these men’s personalities that drove these decisions.
It is in many ways a sobering if not cautionary conclusion to arrive at in that with all of the best intelligence, manpower, and experience nations have at their disposal, most decisions come down to the decisions of one, perhaps fatally flawed human being. For every Roosevelt and Churchill who while experiencing some missteps alone the way, ultimately guided their nations to victory, there is a Stalin or Mussolini. One really never knows until a moment of crisis arrives however, which one you have making the decisions for you.
January 7, 2022
Book: Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World, 1940-1941
Author: Ian Kershaw
Publisher: Penguin Press HC, The (31 May 2007)
Language: English
Hardcover: 656 pages
Reading age: 18 years and up
Item Weight: 1 kg 20 g
Dimensions: 16.1 x 4.9 x 23.52 cm
Country of Origin: USA
Price: 1150/-
The greater part of historians concur that that it is the sturdy forces of economics and social change which are the true forces that shape our past. However, there are decisive moments where a powerful leader or thinker or a singular event can change the course of history.
History is shaped by great currents such as economic and social changes but historians continue to disagree over whether individuals, whether leaders or thinkers, also make a difference. Individuals do not make history on their own but sometimes an individual and the times meet to produce change. It can be argued that the Reformation would have taken a dissimilar route without Martin Luther or that the Russian Revolution might not have led to Soviet communism without Lenin and Stalin.
This book scrutinizes more than a few interlinked political decisions with enormous and theatrical military outcomes, between May 1940 and December 1941, which transformed the two separate wars in different continents into one truly global inferno, a gigantic conflict with genocide and unparalleled barbarism at its core.
Certainly, by December 1941 the war still had far to run. A lot of vagaries were still to occur over the itinerary of the war.
Obviously, other crucial decisions, though mainly strategic and tactical, were yet to be taken. And towards the war’s end, with Allied supremacy now assured, the geopolitical framework of the postwar settlement–the basis of the Cold War soon to emerge–was laid down in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.
But the remaining three and a half years of the war would, nevertheless, essentially play out the consequences of the decisions taken between May 1940 and December 1941.
These were indeed momentous pronouncements–verdicts that changed the world.
Ten decisions are explored in this book. Three, with debatably the most far-reaching effects of all, were those of Hitler’s regime:
A) To attack the Soviet Union,
B) To declare war on the United States and
C) to murder the Jews.
The extensive consideration of these decisions reflects the predominant role of Germany as the chief driving force in the crucial course of events that we are following.
As a vibrant power triggering phenomenon, Japan was second only to Germany, something which the two chapters devoted to Japanese decisions seek to emphasize.
The fundamentally imprudent decisions of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and, in an unusual way (with self-destructive upshots), Italy are taken up in single chapters, though the ever more imperative role played by the United States warrants two chapters.
Other decisions than those under consideration here, for example those of Franco’s Spain or of Vichy France to refuse to join the war on the Axis side–were, compared with the momentous decisions examined below, of a distinctly lesser order of importance.
The following chapters constitute the book:
1) London, Spring 1940 - Great Britain Decides to Fight On
2) Berlin, Summer and Autumn 1940 - Hitler Decides to Attack the Soviet Union
3) Tokyo, Summer and Autumn 1940 - Japan Decides to Seize the ‘Golden Opportunity’
4) Rome, Summer and Autumn 1940 - Mussolini Decides to Grab His Share
5) Washington, DC, Summer 1940 – Spring 1941 - Roosevelt Decides to Lend a Hand
6) Moscow, Spring–Summer 1941 - Stalin Decides He Knows Best
7) Washington, DC, Summer–Autumn 1941 - Roosevelt Decides to Wage Undeclared War
8) Tokyo, Autumn 1941 - Japan Decides to Go to War
9) Berlin, Autumn 1941 - Hitler Decides to Declare War on the United States
10) Berlin/East Prussia, Summer–Autumn 1941 - Hitler Decides to Kill the Jews
Each decision in the ten chapters had consequences which informed the next and subsequent decisions.
So, as the story moves from one country to another, there is a logical sequence of ‘knock-on’ events and implications as well as an unfolding chronological pattern.
The book opens with Great Britain’s decision in May 1940 to stay in the war. Far from being the obvious, even inevitable, decision subsequent events (and some persuasive historical writing) have made it seem, the War Cabinet seriously deliberated the choices for three days, with a new Prime Minister still tentatively feeling his way, the British army seemingly lost at Dunkirk, no immediate prospect of help from the United States and a German invasion in the near future presumed to be very likely.
The decision eventually taken, not to seek a negotiated settlement, had direct and far-reaching consequences not just for Britain, but also for Germany. That single decision, in fact, placed in jeopardy Hitler’s entire war strategy.
Hitler felt compelled already in July 1940 to begin preparations to risk a war on two fronts through an invasion of the Soviet Union the following year. But it was only six months later that the contingency plans were turned into a concrete war directive. In the interim, there was no straight path to the Russian war.
Even Hitler seemed irresolute and tentative. The intervening period saw a range of strategic possibilities explored, but eventually discarded. These options in the summer and autumn of 1940, viewed from behind Hitler’s desk and evaluated in the eyes of his advisers, form the subject of Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3, the scene switches, therefore, to the Far East, and to the decision for the southern advance that would inevitably risk conflict with the United States and presaged, therefore, the road to Pearl Harbor directly embarked upon the following year.
Chapter 4 speaks of the choices facing the Italian leadership as Mussolini exploited the destruction of France to take his country into the war, and then plunged the Balkans into turmoil with the disastrous decision to attack Greece.
The decisive position of the United States is explored in Chapter 5; how Roosevelt walked a tightrope between isolationist opinion and interventionist pressure.
Chapter 6 deals with one of the most mystifying episodes of the war, with near terminal consequences for the Soviet Union: Stalin’s resolution to disobey all warnings and the unambiguous findings of his own secret intelligence of the imminent German invasion.
Chapter 7 examines the decision of the American administration to wage in provocative fashion an ‘undeclared war’ in the Atlantic, taking advantage of Hitler’s unwillingness to retaliate while embroiled in Russia.
Chapter 8 is an examination of Japan’s strange decision to attack the United States, despite full identification of the extent of the peril, aware that the long-term chances of concluding victory were low if an instant and total knock-out blow were not attained.
Chapter 9 delves into Hitler’s choice to declare war on the United States, taken in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor and long regarded as one of the strangest of the Second World War.
Chapter 10 takes the readers into the killing fields of Eastern Europe, unfolding in the early months of 1942 into the full-scale ‘final solution’.
For nearly four years after the events explored here, the global war raged on. The stupendous losses from military combat, and from genocide, mounted drastically. For over two years, between the summer of 1940 and the autumn of 1942, the outcome was far from certain.
Both Hitler and the Japanese leadership knew that the odds would tell against them in a long war. So it proved. But it was a close-run thing–closer than is often presumed. Ultimately, but only from 1943 onwards, the rout of the Axis was in sight, at first mutedly, then more dazzlingly, and in the end excruciatingly.
The implausible merger of an unconquerable Soviet fighting machine and boundless American resources and steadfastness finally ensured conquest in both Europe and the Far East.
This book is much suggested for all students of modern European history.
Author: Ian Kershaw
Publisher: Penguin Press HC, The (31 May 2007)
Language: English
Hardcover: 656 pages
Reading age: 18 years and up
Item Weight: 1 kg 20 g
Dimensions: 16.1 x 4.9 x 23.52 cm
Country of Origin: USA
Price: 1150/-
The greater part of historians concur that that it is the sturdy forces of economics and social change which are the true forces that shape our past. However, there are decisive moments where a powerful leader or thinker or a singular event can change the course of history.
History is shaped by great currents such as economic and social changes but historians continue to disagree over whether individuals, whether leaders or thinkers, also make a difference. Individuals do not make history on their own but sometimes an individual and the times meet to produce change. It can be argued that the Reformation would have taken a dissimilar route without Martin Luther or that the Russian Revolution might not have led to Soviet communism without Lenin and Stalin.
This book scrutinizes more than a few interlinked political decisions with enormous and theatrical military outcomes, between May 1940 and December 1941, which transformed the two separate wars in different continents into one truly global inferno, a gigantic conflict with genocide and unparalleled barbarism at its core.
Certainly, by December 1941 the war still had far to run. A lot of vagaries were still to occur over the itinerary of the war.
Obviously, other crucial decisions, though mainly strategic and tactical, were yet to be taken. And towards the war’s end, with Allied supremacy now assured, the geopolitical framework of the postwar settlement–the basis of the Cold War soon to emerge–was laid down in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.
But the remaining three and a half years of the war would, nevertheless, essentially play out the consequences of the decisions taken between May 1940 and December 1941.
These were indeed momentous pronouncements–verdicts that changed the world.
Ten decisions are explored in this book. Three, with debatably the most far-reaching effects of all, were those of Hitler’s regime:
A) To attack the Soviet Union,
B) To declare war on the United States and
C) to murder the Jews.
The extensive consideration of these decisions reflects the predominant role of Germany as the chief driving force in the crucial course of events that we are following.
As a vibrant power triggering phenomenon, Japan was second only to Germany, something which the two chapters devoted to Japanese decisions seek to emphasize.
The fundamentally imprudent decisions of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and, in an unusual way (with self-destructive upshots), Italy are taken up in single chapters, though the ever more imperative role played by the United States warrants two chapters.
Other decisions than those under consideration here, for example those of Franco’s Spain or of Vichy France to refuse to join the war on the Axis side–were, compared with the momentous decisions examined below, of a distinctly lesser order of importance.
The following chapters constitute the book:
1) London, Spring 1940 - Great Britain Decides to Fight On
2) Berlin, Summer and Autumn 1940 - Hitler Decides to Attack the Soviet Union
3) Tokyo, Summer and Autumn 1940 - Japan Decides to Seize the ‘Golden Opportunity’
4) Rome, Summer and Autumn 1940 - Mussolini Decides to Grab His Share
5) Washington, DC, Summer 1940 – Spring 1941 - Roosevelt Decides to Lend a Hand
6) Moscow, Spring–Summer 1941 - Stalin Decides He Knows Best
7) Washington, DC, Summer–Autumn 1941 - Roosevelt Decides to Wage Undeclared War
8) Tokyo, Autumn 1941 - Japan Decides to Go to War
9) Berlin, Autumn 1941 - Hitler Decides to Declare War on the United States
10) Berlin/East Prussia, Summer–Autumn 1941 - Hitler Decides to Kill the Jews
Each decision in the ten chapters had consequences which informed the next and subsequent decisions.
So, as the story moves from one country to another, there is a logical sequence of ‘knock-on’ events and implications as well as an unfolding chronological pattern.
The book opens with Great Britain’s decision in May 1940 to stay in the war. Far from being the obvious, even inevitable, decision subsequent events (and some persuasive historical writing) have made it seem, the War Cabinet seriously deliberated the choices for three days, with a new Prime Minister still tentatively feeling his way, the British army seemingly lost at Dunkirk, no immediate prospect of help from the United States and a German invasion in the near future presumed to be very likely.
The decision eventually taken, not to seek a negotiated settlement, had direct and far-reaching consequences not just for Britain, but also for Germany. That single decision, in fact, placed in jeopardy Hitler’s entire war strategy.
Hitler felt compelled already in July 1940 to begin preparations to risk a war on two fronts through an invasion of the Soviet Union the following year. But it was only six months later that the contingency plans were turned into a concrete war directive. In the interim, there was no straight path to the Russian war.
Even Hitler seemed irresolute and tentative. The intervening period saw a range of strategic possibilities explored, but eventually discarded. These options in the summer and autumn of 1940, viewed from behind Hitler’s desk and evaluated in the eyes of his advisers, form the subject of Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3, the scene switches, therefore, to the Far East, and to the decision for the southern advance that would inevitably risk conflict with the United States and presaged, therefore, the road to Pearl Harbor directly embarked upon the following year.
Chapter 4 speaks of the choices facing the Italian leadership as Mussolini exploited the destruction of France to take his country into the war, and then plunged the Balkans into turmoil with the disastrous decision to attack Greece.
The decisive position of the United States is explored in Chapter 5; how Roosevelt walked a tightrope between isolationist opinion and interventionist pressure.
Chapter 6 deals with one of the most mystifying episodes of the war, with near terminal consequences for the Soviet Union: Stalin’s resolution to disobey all warnings and the unambiguous findings of his own secret intelligence of the imminent German invasion.
Chapter 7 examines the decision of the American administration to wage in provocative fashion an ‘undeclared war’ in the Atlantic, taking advantage of Hitler’s unwillingness to retaliate while embroiled in Russia.
Chapter 8 is an examination of Japan’s strange decision to attack the United States, despite full identification of the extent of the peril, aware that the long-term chances of concluding victory were low if an instant and total knock-out blow were not attained.
Chapter 9 delves into Hitler’s choice to declare war on the United States, taken in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor and long regarded as one of the strangest of the Second World War.
Chapter 10 takes the readers into the killing fields of Eastern Europe, unfolding in the early months of 1942 into the full-scale ‘final solution’.
For nearly four years after the events explored here, the global war raged on. The stupendous losses from military combat, and from genocide, mounted drastically. For over two years, between the summer of 1940 and the autumn of 1942, the outcome was far from certain.
Both Hitler and the Japanese leadership knew that the odds would tell against them in a long war. So it proved. But it was a close-run thing–closer than is often presumed. Ultimately, but only from 1943 onwards, the rout of the Axis was in sight, at first mutedly, then more dazzlingly, and in the end excruciatingly.
The implausible merger of an unconquerable Soviet fighting machine and boundless American resources and steadfastness finally ensured conquest in both Europe and the Far East.
This book is much suggested for all students of modern European history.
March 14, 2014
Although it gets a bit dense at times, Kershaw clarifies a number of the most confusing questions of the early phases of WWII. He has a knack for showing how objectively irrational decisions were rational within a certain distorted worldview with a set of dubious assumptions. Basically the book explains how 10 major decisions by the great powers transformed WWII from two distinct regional conflicts to a coherent global conflict. It's fascinating to see how much decisions in each theater depended on what was going on in the other theater. For instance, Hitler's decision to declare war on the US right after 9/11 was based on the assumption that war with the US was inevitable, but that the Japanese attack would draw America's attention away from Europe in time for Hitler to win in Europe. He felt he had to show the Japanese his unwavering commitment, lest they sign a separate peace with the US, allowing the US to shift its entire weight against Hitler. The fall of France also had a major impact on the Japanese decision to invade Southeastern Europe and the Italian decision to invade Greece. Moreover, Kershaw presents a clear account in his final chapter of the decision to kill the Jews, which wasn't really a single decision but a series of choices, memos, and takings of the initiative.
My favorite part of the book was the brain food it provided for decision theory. The dictatorial states of WWII made remarkably bad decisions, and they did so for very similar reasons. Here are the main similarities I noticed in their planning and decision-making: 1. The relied on a sense of momentum from past successes, which often blinded them to current conditions. 2. They had a strong sense of a closing window of opportunity as rival states became too powerful to be confronted (especially true for Japan). 3. They are all paragons of the triumph of hope over experience, or the planning bias (thanks, Daniel Kahneman) 4. They believed that war was inevitable, which caused them to close off many options that might have avoided the deaths of millions and the destruction of their regimes. This belief was an extension of totalitarian ideologies. 5. They planned for lighting victory and believed that a long, drawn out war would benefit their enemies 6. They all had personalized systems of rule and decision making with little room for debate, loyal opposition, and the rational bureaucratic examination of evidence and construction of plans. Kershaw rightly emphasizes that it's not enough to understand the decision makers of WWII; you have to understand their systems of government as well. Democracies and dictatorships made decisions in very different ways. 7. They shared a sense of having been wronged, or being have-not nations. Quite revengeful. 8. They had a focus on not losing national prestige by never backing down against terrible odds or from bad decisions. Certainly, this was a product of honor cultures across the board. Instead of losing national and personal prestige, they lost millions of the lives of their own people, and sometimes their own heads. In summation, a great book for understanding a complex time period. 483 pages.
My favorite part of the book was the brain food it provided for decision theory. The dictatorial states of WWII made remarkably bad decisions, and they did so for very similar reasons. Here are the main similarities I noticed in their planning and decision-making: 1. The relied on a sense of momentum from past successes, which often blinded them to current conditions. 2. They had a strong sense of a closing window of opportunity as rival states became too powerful to be confronted (especially true for Japan). 3. They are all paragons of the triumph of hope over experience, or the planning bias (thanks, Daniel Kahneman) 4. They believed that war was inevitable, which caused them to close off many options that might have avoided the deaths of millions and the destruction of their regimes. This belief was an extension of totalitarian ideologies. 5. They planned for lighting victory and believed that a long, drawn out war would benefit their enemies 6. They all had personalized systems of rule and decision making with little room for debate, loyal opposition, and the rational bureaucratic examination of evidence and construction of plans. Kershaw rightly emphasizes that it's not enough to understand the decision makers of WWII; you have to understand their systems of government as well. Democracies and dictatorships made decisions in very different ways. 7. They shared a sense of having been wronged, or being have-not nations. Quite revengeful. 8. They had a focus on not losing national prestige by never backing down against terrible odds or from bad decisions. Certainly, this was a product of honor cultures across the board. Instead of losing national and personal prestige, they lost millions of the lives of their own people, and sometimes their own heads. In summation, a great book for understanding a complex time period. 483 pages.
May 30, 2016
Tačno to što kaže u naslovu - detaljan pregled najbitnijih odluka koje su državnici doneli u prve dve godine rata. Ako si kao ja, interesovaće te i pozadina pre donošenja neke odluke, stanje u kom su se nalazili oni koji su odlučivali, pod kakvim uticajima i pritiscima su bili. Šta je uticalo na odluku u tom pravcu, kako je tekao proces i kakve su bile posledice takve odluke. Na kraju, autor pokušava sagledati istorijsku situaciju i iz špekulativne tačke gledišta i, iako i sam smatra da je to više fikcija nego eventualna istorijska realnost, priča o tome šta-bi-bilo-kad-bi-bilo.
Neke odluke su mi, kao ljubitelju istorije i pre svega 2. svetskog rata, bile poznate i otprilike i logične. Međutim, nikad se nisam dovoljno duboko udubio u to zašto je Hitler samo par dana nakon napada na Pearl Harbor objavio rat SAD. Viđena kao jedna od najčudnijih odluka Drugog svetskog rata, malo je jasnija nakon svih argumenata koje postavlja Kershaw.
Interesantan je i način na koji su odluke donošene. Dok je u nekima učestvovala ekipa ljudi, druge su donešene potpuno samostalno. Kolika je bila moć odlučivanja Hitlera ili Mussolinija, toliko manja je bila moć japanskih vođi vlada, uprkos autoritativnom režimu.
Ovo su odluke koje suj obrađene u knjzi.
1. Velika Britanija ostaje u ratu 1940.
2. Hitler se odlučio da napadne Sovjetski savez
3. Japan preokreće osvajanje na jug Pacifika
4. Musolini ulazi u rat - i napada Grčku (!)
5. Ruzvelt pokreće pomoć Velikoj Britaniji
6. Staljin ignoriše desetine pokazatelja o skorašnjem napadu Wehrmachta
7. Ruzvelt ulazi u "neobjavljen rat"
8. Japan kreće u rat sa SAD
9. Hitler objavljuje rat SAD
10. Odluka o holokaustu
Neke odluke su mi, kao ljubitelju istorije i pre svega 2. svetskog rata, bile poznate i otprilike i logične. Međutim, nikad se nisam dovoljno duboko udubio u to zašto je Hitler samo par dana nakon napada na Pearl Harbor objavio rat SAD. Viđena kao jedna od najčudnijih odluka Drugog svetskog rata, malo je jasnija nakon svih argumenata koje postavlja Kershaw.
Interesantan je i način na koji su odluke donošene. Dok je u nekima učestvovala ekipa ljudi, druge su donešene potpuno samostalno. Kolika je bila moć odlučivanja Hitlera ili Mussolinija, toliko manja je bila moć japanskih vođi vlada, uprkos autoritativnom režimu.
Ovo su odluke koje suj obrađene u knjzi.
1. Velika Britanija ostaje u ratu 1940.
2. Hitler se odlučio da napadne Sovjetski savez
3. Japan preokreće osvajanje na jug Pacifika
4. Musolini ulazi u rat - i napada Grčku (!)
5. Ruzvelt pokreće pomoć Velikoj Britaniji
6. Staljin ignoriše desetine pokazatelja o skorašnjem napadu Wehrmachta
7. Ruzvelt ulazi u "neobjavljen rat"
8. Japan kreće u rat sa SAD
9. Hitler objavljuje rat SAD
10. Odluka o holokaustu
April 7, 2022
In “Fateful Choices”, the renowned historian Ian Kershaw sets out to explain the course and eventual outcomes of the Second World War by analysing 10 decisions taken by the leaders of the protagonist powers. A small few of these 10 decisions were prescient (Britain’s resolve to fight on after the fall of France in 1940; Roosevelt’s far-sighted military aid programme to the British during the early years of the conflict). Many more of these key decisions were calamitous blunders (Mussolini’s invasion of Greece, Stalin’s refusal to take seriously his advisors’ warnings about a Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union). Other decisions were borne out of wild hubris and overconfidence after earlier military victories (Hitler’s declaration of war against the U.S. in the wake of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour). While one decision in particular will live on in unfathomable infamy for the rest of human history (German’s attempt to exterminate the entire Jewish population of Europe).
While many of these events will be familiar to readers as being the pivotal actions of the Second World War, where Kershaw really comes into his own in “Fateful Choices” is in his analysis of the actions of the ‘lesser powers’. Kershaw is particularly adroit in his scrutiny of the decisions taken by Italy and Japan, both of whom radically reshaped their expansionist ambitions in the wake of Germany’s astonishing defeat of France in the spring of 1940, leading to catastrophically blundering invasions which eventually brought the Italian and Japanese regimes crashing down. Throughout “Fateful Choices” we see repeated examples where miscalculations in intelligence - exacerbated by groupthink at the centres of decision-making - and then supercharged by ultra-nationalist belligerence led to military actions which would lead to the complete and utter implosion of those powers (claiming the lives of tens of millions of people in the process). Thankfully, Kershaw is too astute a historian – and adept a writer – to go too far down the cul-de-sac of counterfactual history, and “Fateful Choices” avoids presenting a series of alternative outcomes for the conflict had certain decisions not been made. Instead, “Fateful Choices” provides a salutary lesson on how trying to rectify an earlier strategic blunder can cause political and military leaders to make even more catastrophic errors – a lesson with uncomfortable resonances for our own era.
While many of these events will be familiar to readers as being the pivotal actions of the Second World War, where Kershaw really comes into his own in “Fateful Choices” is in his analysis of the actions of the ‘lesser powers’. Kershaw is particularly adroit in his scrutiny of the decisions taken by Italy and Japan, both of whom radically reshaped their expansionist ambitions in the wake of Germany’s astonishing defeat of France in the spring of 1940, leading to catastrophically blundering invasions which eventually brought the Italian and Japanese regimes crashing down. Throughout “Fateful Choices” we see repeated examples where miscalculations in intelligence - exacerbated by groupthink at the centres of decision-making - and then supercharged by ultra-nationalist belligerence led to military actions which would lead to the complete and utter implosion of those powers (claiming the lives of tens of millions of people in the process). Thankfully, Kershaw is too astute a historian – and adept a writer – to go too far down the cul-de-sac of counterfactual history, and “Fateful Choices” avoids presenting a series of alternative outcomes for the conflict had certain decisions not been made. Instead, “Fateful Choices” provides a salutary lesson on how trying to rectify an earlier strategic blunder can cause political and military leaders to make even more catastrophic errors – a lesson with uncomfortable resonances for our own era.
November 29, 2022
Further reflection takes this down to 3 stars.
The strongest chapter in many ways might be the second-last, where Kershaw explains why Hitler's decision to declare war on the US first wasn't so cuckoo from a rationalist point, and how Hitler held it up a day to get details of the Tripartate Pact with Japan nailed down, even though that did not commit Germany to declare war. Chapter also explains why FDR on Dec. 8 only asked for a declaration against Japan — first, he wasn't sure if Congress would declare war against Germany and second, per Magic, he knew the basics of the above discussions and knew he could wait.
The weakest would either be Chapter 2, Berlin Summer 1940 or Kershaw not writing a separate chapter on this issue. The semi-consensus of ETO WWII historians is that Germany did NOT engage in "total war" economically until the run-up to Stalingrad. At the same time, Kershaw's not always followed this consensus and that seems to be reflected here. (I think he's wrong on not following the consensus, whether or not that's the reason he doesn't discuss the issue. If he is, here, in consensus land, then I don't know why he omits this issue.)
Second-weakest would be Chapter 3, Tokyo 1940. Kershaw doesn't go into depth on why Japan determined on using the Marco Polo Bridge incident for full war against "China proper."
Yes, that was pre-1940, but he discusses other pre-1940 issue.
That said, arguably, that leads to a debate as to whether or not there weren't bigger pre-1940 issues that outweighed one or more of these 10. Or, whether there were decisions by nonbelligerents that weren't weightier. (Having just read David Kertzer's latest, I think of Pius XII's repeated refusal to condemn Germany in general, and in light of Kershaw's last chapter being about the Holocaust, Pius' refusal to speak out about that, even in 1940, when he first had a chance.)
A very insightful book in many ways, with chapters not mentioned above certainly solid, but ...
3 stars here, though 3.5 to be precise, which it gets at the Graph, where I explain more weaknesses.
The strongest chapter in many ways might be the second-last, where Kershaw explains why Hitler's decision to declare war on the US first wasn't so cuckoo from a rationalist point, and how Hitler held it up a day to get details of the Tripartate Pact with Japan nailed down, even though that did not commit Germany to declare war. Chapter also explains why FDR on Dec. 8 only asked for a declaration against Japan — first, he wasn't sure if Congress would declare war against Germany and second, per Magic, he knew the basics of the above discussions and knew he could wait.
The weakest would either be Chapter 2, Berlin Summer 1940 or Kershaw not writing a separate chapter on this issue. The semi-consensus of ETO WWII historians is that Germany did NOT engage in "total war" economically until the run-up to Stalingrad. At the same time, Kershaw's not always followed this consensus and that seems to be reflected here. (I think he's wrong on not following the consensus, whether or not that's the reason he doesn't discuss the issue. If he is, here, in consensus land, then I don't know why he omits this issue.)
Second-weakest would be Chapter 3, Tokyo 1940. Kershaw doesn't go into depth on why Japan determined on using the Marco Polo Bridge incident for full war against "China proper."
Yes, that was pre-1940, but he discusses other pre-1940 issue.
That said, arguably, that leads to a debate as to whether or not there weren't bigger pre-1940 issues that outweighed one or more of these 10. Or, whether there were decisions by nonbelligerents that weren't weightier. (Having just read David Kertzer's latest, I think of Pius XII's repeated refusal to condemn Germany in general, and in light of Kershaw's last chapter being about the Holocaust, Pius' refusal to speak out about that, even in 1940, when he first had a chance.)
A very insightful book in many ways, with chapters not mentioned above certainly solid, but ...
3 stars here, though 3.5 to be precise, which it gets at the Graph, where I explain more weaknesses.
October 18, 2010
In "Fateful Choices" Kershaw provides a fascinating account of the rationale and the process of 10 seminal decisions that structured the events of the Second World War. One of the most interesting facets of the book is how the different political structures of the major antgagonists in the war affected their decision making process and the decisions themselves. Though this isn't Kershaw's main aim in his descriptions, we compare Britain's coalition cabinet with Roosevelt's dependency on public opinion; then there's Japan's struggle for consensus within an oligarchy, while Stalin suffers from his total concentration the the decision making process in his own hands. Hitler similarly has sole decision making power, but doesn't stifle input to the extent of Stalin. However, the most interesting to me was the constraints that Mussolini operated under in his decsions making processes. I had thought that he had the same dictatorial power as Hitler, but it turns out the King and the army's oath of loyalty to the king did constrain him. I'll have to read more on this matter.
On the whole, an excellent book, though a bit long or redundant at times.
On the whole, an excellent book, though a bit long or redundant at times.
Read
February 5, 2009In Fateful Choices, Ian Kershaw, professor of history at England's University of Sheffield and author of multiple volumes on Hitler, including the acclaimed two-volume biography Hubris (1999) and Nemesis (2000), has done his research, and his arguments here possess the same reasoned analysis that he brought to the Hitler books. Not all key decisions were made in the opening months of the war, of course, and critics wonder whether the author might have chosen other events to examine, including the offensive attacks by Japan and Germany that were catalysts for the war in the first place. Nonetheless, Kershaw offers a solid primer on the war's early history and a fresh perspective on the events that avoids the "terrible bog of counterfactual history" (Guardian) so popular these days in history books. Fateful Choices is engaging, and its insights into the decision-making process valuable.
This is an excerpt from a review published in Bookmarks magazine.
Read
February 18, 2015An odd book.
By definition, an examination of the decisive decisions of 1940-41 is going to flirt with counterfactual, yet Kershaw is having none of it, proceeding to outline how in every junctured covered the course of action was largely predetermined by decisions and events of several years before (1937-38 looms large in most cases). Readers familiar with this period won't find much new in most of the sections but the depth of Kershaw's reinvestigation may prove too rigorous for the casual reader.
By definition, an examination of the decisive decisions of 1940-41 is going to flirt with counterfactual, yet Kershaw is having none of it, proceeding to outline how in every junctured covered the course of action was largely predetermined by decisions and events of several years before (1937-38 looms large in most cases). Readers familiar with this period won't find much new in most of the sections but the depth of Kershaw's reinvestigation may prove too rigorous for the casual reader.
January 30, 2009
So I read maybe six or seven of the ten choices, for my World War II pro-seminar. I can say that for each decision/chapter, it takes about two pages to cover one month in the decision-making process. SUPER-DETAILED. Read only if you are patient. But the ideas are good, and I came away knowing every single freaking cabinet member in Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain during World War II. Informative, I guess I'm saying.
December 29, 2017
The book is much in line with Ian Kershaw’s other work. It’s well written and the product of deep analytical thought as well as a thorough understanding of the times. He is thought provoking but his conclusions are unchallengeable.
February 1, 2023
В периода 1940 - 1941 г, когато Вермахтът жъне победа след победа, полагайки основите на хитлеровия "Нов ред" в Европа, няколко мъже (да не се обиждат дамите), стоящи начело на различни държави в различни краища на света, вземат съдбоносни решения, които ще обърнат хода на войната и в крайна сметка ще доведат до унищожаването на Третия райх и до разгрома на неговите съюзници. Как се стига до тези решения и какво влияние имат върху вземането им личностите, на които биват приписвани, е въпросът, който Кършоу разнищва в книгата.
Привикнали да съдим за миналите събития от гледището на днешния ден, а и следвайки мъдростта на учените-историци, че "в историята няма условно наклонение", твърде често подминаваме истината, че настоящето някога е било просто една от много възможности. И колкото "непрофесионално" да ни се струва вглъбяването в същите тези възможности, то това е абсолютно необходимо за добиването на цялостно историческо познание (NB! естествено, тук не става дума за използването на исторически спекулации за идеологически/политически цели, а за действително желание за познание). Тръгвайки от това разбиране, Кършоу изследва как 10 решения обръщат предполагаемия (за съвременниците им) към 1940/1 г. ход на световната история. Хитлер напада СССР, а не избира по-стратегическия (за днешните стратези) южен вектор (Африка, Балканите, Близкия изток) и обявява война на САЩ (без това да изглежда на нас съвременниците разумно), Рузвелт решава да окаже помощ на Великобритания, замесвайки страната си във ВСВ (когато това е било изключително непопулярен ход сред сънародниците му), японските управници решават да атакуват САЩ, докато е можело да ударят в гръб СССР и т. н., и т. н.....
За тези решения повечето от нас, интересуващи се от история, са чували и чели, но движещите сили, довеждащи до тях са видими само за най-опитните познавачи на Втората световна война и историята на 20-те/30-те години на ХХ в., какъвто, несъмнено, е Иън Кършоу. Тази не чак толкова обемна книга ни позволява да проследим никак нелесния път към разбирането на банализираните с годините 10 съдбоносни решения, набелязани в нея. Ако и по-запознатите може би няма да открият сензационно "нови" факти, то книгата е полезна двойно повече с това как трябва да се работи с наличния фактологически материал и как трябва да правим обосновани заключения.
Привикнали да съдим за миналите събития от гледището на днешния ден, а и следвайки мъдростта на учените-историци, че "в историята няма условно наклонение", твърде често подминаваме истината, че настоящето някога е било просто една от много възможности. И колкото "непрофесионално" да ни се струва вглъбяването в същите тези възможности, то това е абсолютно необходимо за добиването на цялостно историческо познание (NB! естествено, тук не става дума за използването на исторически спекулации за идеологически/политически цели, а за действително желание за познание). Тръгвайки от това разбиране, Кършоу изследва как 10 решения обръщат предполагаемия (за съвременниците им) към 1940/1 г. ход на световната история. Хитлер напада СССР, а не избира по-стратегическия (за днешните стратези) южен вектор (Африка, Балканите, Близкия изток) и обявява война на САЩ (без това да изглежда на нас съвременниците разумно), Рузвелт решава да окаже помощ на Великобритания, замесвайки страната си във ВСВ (когато това е било изключително непопулярен ход сред сънародниците му), японските управници решават да атакуват САЩ, докато е можело да ударят в гръб СССР и т. н., и т. н.....
За тези решения повечето от нас, интересуващи се от история, са чували и чели, но движещите сили, довеждащи до тях са видими само за най-опитните познавачи на Втората световна война и историята на 20-те/30-те години на ХХ в., какъвто, несъмнено, е Иън Кършоу. Тази не чак толкова обемна книга ни позволява да проследим никак нелесния път към разбирането на банализираните с годините 10 съдбоносни решения, набелязани в нея. Ако и по-запознатите може би няма да открият сензационно "нови" факти, то книгата е полезна двойно повече с това как трябва да се работи с наличния фактологически материал и как трябва да правим обосновани заключения.
June 12, 2021
I’ve read several books of Kershaw’s and all of them were interesting & I enjoyed them.
This one, however, I found unsatisfying as it lacked several qualities that might have supported the premises suggested in the title:
1) Cohesiveness- his choices seem arbitrary, or at least, the explanations for them are not given solid foundation.
2) The reasoning leading up to his 10 “fateful choices” are not inescapable, we are unconvinced by Kershaw’s explanations. The author states that multiple options might have been chosen, but the reader’s curiosity remains unsatisfied with why they were not.
Ok, so things happen often by luck and without the historical inexorability that hindsight seduces us into accepting as inescapable. I get it. But, if you are going to use “fateful choices” in the title of a book-then do your damnedness to ensure that readers believe they were.
This one, however, I found unsatisfying as it lacked several qualities that might have supported the premises suggested in the title:
1) Cohesiveness- his choices seem arbitrary, or at least, the explanations for them are not given solid foundation.
2) The reasoning leading up to his 10 “fateful choices” are not inescapable, we are unconvinced by Kershaw’s explanations. The author states that multiple options might have been chosen, but the reader’s curiosity remains unsatisfied with why they were not.
Ok, so things happen often by luck and without the historical inexorability that hindsight seduces us into accepting as inescapable. I get it. But, if you are going to use “fateful choices” in the title of a book-then do your damnedness to ensure that readers believe they were.
December 16, 2019
An excellent work on the WWII decisions that changed the world forever. While I was already familiar with the subject matter, I was able to glean new insights into the decision-making process of the various leaders involved in WWII. It was interesting to see the choices being made as a product of political pressure, foreign relations, culture, nationalism/isolationism, and hubris rather than an inexorable turn of events. I particularly enjoyed how the author presented possible alternative decisions that might have had immediate impacts on the future of the global conflict - without engaging to much in speculative virtual history.
May 16, 2020
Great discussion of the manner in which terrible decisions unfolded. A case study on the cost of rejecting, even subconsciously, information contrary to one's extant perspective.
August 27, 2012
Sir Ian Kershaw is a leading scholar on Hitler and Germany during the Nazi era, which makes this an interesting and detailed book. But the 10 decisions are NOT the most important of 1940-41. He skips the decision by American Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt on October 9, 1941 (not the day before the attack on Pearl Harbor, as Kershaw writes) to proceed with construction of the atomic bomb. Even Kershaw notes, "Without the decision then, the bomb would not have been available to Pres. Harry S. Truman to use in the final days of the war, in August 1945." Despite the fact that nuclear weapons shaped the Cold War and future human history, Kershaw argues weakly that "its ultimate use was scarcely even a distant vision" and so he fails to include it.
And decisions by Winston Churchill to share sensitive scientific technology -- including both Enigma decryption and radar technology -- had dramatic impact exceeding Mussolini's impetuous leadership, one of Kershaw's list of ten. Though considered a national secret by the British, the transfer of technology enable faster production of cavitron tubes and added to the number of scientists working on miniaturizing radar sets. By the end of the war it would overcome German advantages in night air fighting and enable the U.S. navy to overcome the early night fighting advantage of the Japanese navy. Of course the commercial use of radar in the post-war years makes the technology one of those items that changed the world.
The second arena of open scientific cooperation involved the sharing Bletchley Park's technical information on the Enigma decryption technology set up decades of leading signal intelligence and the creation of the National Security Agency in the U.S. It also created a lasting intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. During World War II it enabled the winning of the Battle of the Atlantic against German submarines; contributed to the major victories at Midway that disabled the Japanese fleet of aircraft carriers; and even led to the killing of Admiral Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Japanese combined fleet, in an air ambush.
Kershaw's 10th chapter in this book, "Hitler Decides to Kill the Jews," is an excellent summary of what's known about the decisions behind the start of the Holocaust that would kill 6 million Jews and as many non-Jews. It is a great introduction to what's known about where and when decisions were made, including early plans to purge Europe by shipping Jewish citizens to Madagascar or Siberia.
And decisions by Winston Churchill to share sensitive scientific technology -- including both Enigma decryption and radar technology -- had dramatic impact exceeding Mussolini's impetuous leadership, one of Kershaw's list of ten. Though considered a national secret by the British, the transfer of technology enable faster production of cavitron tubes and added to the number of scientists working on miniaturizing radar sets. By the end of the war it would overcome German advantages in night air fighting and enable the U.S. navy to overcome the early night fighting advantage of the Japanese navy. Of course the commercial use of radar in the post-war years makes the technology one of those items that changed the world.
The second arena of open scientific cooperation involved the sharing Bletchley Park's technical information on the Enigma decryption technology set up decades of leading signal intelligence and the creation of the National Security Agency in the U.S. It also created a lasting intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. During World War II it enabled the winning of the Battle of the Atlantic against German submarines; contributed to the major victories at Midway that disabled the Japanese fleet of aircraft carriers; and even led to the killing of Admiral Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Japanese combined fleet, in an air ambush.
Kershaw's 10th chapter in this book, "Hitler Decides to Kill the Jews," is an excellent summary of what's known about the decisions behind the start of the Holocaust that would kill 6 million Jews and as many non-Jews. It is a great introduction to what's known about where and when decisions were made, including early plans to purge Europe by shipping Jewish citizens to Madagascar or Siberia.
November 19, 2008
"Fateful Choices" by Ian Kershaw surveys 10 choices made by the leaders of Germany, Japan, Italy, UK, USA and USSR from May, 1940 to December, 1941 that shaped WWII as it lurched from its limited beginnings to its global span. Kershaw will look at every branch in the decision tree that was presented to the actual leaders, but will not venture far beyond threshold of the path not taken. But he does strive to show why a decision was made in the face of the alternatives, which had shortcomings of their own worth noting.
This book is more suited for the student of grand strategy and statecraft, as every chapter stands as a good case study in how leaders view information, however imperfect, and arrive at a course of action worth pursuing. It's additional gloss and chrome for the WWII-obsessed.
Kershaw also tries to illuminate the thinking of people we have a hard time understanding. It's too easy to dismiss the enemy leader as mad when cultural and political differences add up to a different sum in the alternate logic of the foe. Here Kershaw notes that the quality of decisionmaking among the dictators went from audacious to disastrous, while democratic leaders at least had the leavening of the collaborative process (committees, cabinets) and political accountability (confidence motion, election). They were more likely to look before they leaped into a strategy.
Kershaw's effort at explaining the inexplicable suffers its harshest challenge when looking at the decisions that led up to the Holocaust. Yes, there was a crooked path to evil, but the documents that chart the course are not there, leaving us to infer what happened after judging the results. Evil is easy to see, but hard to explain.
This book is more suited for the student of grand strategy and statecraft, as every chapter stands as a good case study in how leaders view information, however imperfect, and arrive at a course of action worth pursuing. It's additional gloss and chrome for the WWII-obsessed.
Kershaw also tries to illuminate the thinking of people we have a hard time understanding. It's too easy to dismiss the enemy leader as mad when cultural and political differences add up to a different sum in the alternate logic of the foe. Here Kershaw notes that the quality of decisionmaking among the dictators went from audacious to disastrous, while democratic leaders at least had the leavening of the collaborative process (committees, cabinets) and political accountability (confidence motion, election). They were more likely to look before they leaped into a strategy.
Kershaw's effort at explaining the inexplicable suffers its harshest challenge when looking at the decisions that led up to the Holocaust. Yes, there was a crooked path to evil, but the documents that chart the course are not there, leaving us to infer what happened after judging the results. Evil is easy to see, but hard to explain.
April 7, 2016
I went into this book with high hopes due to the older books by Kershaw I have read. The first part, however, got slow and sticky very fast. Dealing with the UK's decision(s) to wage war/not wage war, resits/not resist etc, it's a series of "X said..." "then Y said..." "and X replied..." in meeting after meeting. Way too much detail, I felt, not really contributing to the essence and becoming quite hard to read and boring after a few pages.
However, after the first part things got much, much better and exciting to read. The part about the Japanese decisions was a bit hard to keep track due to the names, but that's not Kershaw's fault, naturally.
All in all I enjoyed the book. Not the easiest to read unless you're really into the subject matter - it's really not superficial history analysis we're talking about here; but the progression and analysis are spot on.
The one thing I disagree is a pretty big one but it doesn't have any bearing on most of the book: in his epilogue Kershaw argues that all the decisions taken were deterministic - there could've been no other way. So, every little thing and every big result were historical necessities. I can't, on a philosophical level, agree with that - deconstructing that immesurable amount of madness that WWII was into unavoidable sequences. But that big -for me- "whoa!" doesn't come until the very end of the book and, as I said, doesn't really detract.
However, after the first part things got much, much better and exciting to read. The part about the Japanese decisions was a bit hard to keep track due to the names, but that's not Kershaw's fault, naturally.
All in all I enjoyed the book. Not the easiest to read unless you're really into the subject matter - it's really not superficial history analysis we're talking about here; but the progression and analysis are spot on.
The one thing I disagree is a pretty big one but it doesn't have any bearing on most of the book: in his epilogue Kershaw argues that all the decisions taken were deterministic - there could've been no other way. So, every little thing and every big result were historical necessities. I can't, on a philosophical level, agree with that - deconstructing that immesurable amount of madness that WWII was into unavoidable sequences. But that big -for me- "whoa!" doesn't come until the very end of the book and, as I said, doesn't really detract.
November 7, 2018
This reads well and offers interesting insights into the manner in which alternatives are whittled away decision by decision analogous to the way possibilities are excluded as one writes a sentence.
The first nine chapters deal with the historical development of choices among the English, German, Japanese, Italian, Russian, and US leaderships (ch. 1-6), moving to the focus on US, Japanese, and German developments arising from the earlier decisions (ch. 7-9). I found this material both interesting and informative, sometimes truly surprising. That the war found its raison d'etre in the Anglo-American control of vast resources badly needed by the Axis to establish a level playing field.
However, ch. 10, on the German decision to eliminate Jewry from Europe including the Bolshevecki does not really fit the pattern or structure of the book. It is interesting and, like the rest of the text, well researched, but, to my mind, only belongs as the murdering machine affected the German war effort. Of this, there is no examination that I saw.
The first nine chapters deal with the historical development of choices among the English, German, Japanese, Italian, Russian, and US leaderships (ch. 1-6), moving to the focus on US, Japanese, and German developments arising from the earlier decisions (ch. 7-9). I found this material both interesting and informative, sometimes truly surprising. That the war found its raison d'etre in the Anglo-American control of vast resources badly needed by the Axis to establish a level playing field.
However, ch. 10, on the German decision to eliminate Jewry from Europe including the Bolshevecki does not really fit the pattern or structure of the book. It is interesting and, like the rest of the text, well researched, but, to my mind, only belongs as the murdering machine affected the German war effort. Of this, there is no examination that I saw.
July 21, 2016
Detailed and insightful, this book is a must-read for World War II buffs. Unlike some researchers, Kershaw attempts to answer the "why" behind the sometimes-inscrutable policies of the movers and shakers of the time. Why did Adolf Hitler decide to invade the Soviet Union when Napolean had so utterly failed? Why did the Japanese war council order an attack on Pearl Harbor when the officer in charge of planning advised against going to war with the United States? Kershaw provides reasonable, well supported answers to these questions and more. It's difficult to know anyone's mind, particularly the mind of a politician, but Kershaw makes some pretty good guesses.
It's a bit dense, I admit, so casual readers should think twice before spending money. However, if you're interested in expanding your knowledge of WWII, this is the book to buy.
It's a bit dense, I admit, so casual readers should think twice before spending money. However, if you're interested in expanding your knowledge of WWII, this is the book to buy.
July 16, 2016
WW II reads like a story waiting to happen. Every piece looks like it was planned in advance. But in practice, political leaders had to make difficult decisions. Sometimes they look odd (Hitler's decision to declare war on USA) or stupid (Mussolini's order to attack France and Greece).
Personally, I do not agree that USA had no option to stay out of the war. Kershaw even defends Roosevelt's actions to get involved via Lend-and-Lease while no Axis power harmed any American interest at that time. The US president acted against the isolationist public opinion and even dared to lie on Joe Sixpack regarding USS Greer. Any moral rationale for the US entering the war, sounds very poor taking into account Roosevelt did not bother allying with "Uncle Joe" Stalin.
Personally, I do not agree that USA had no option to stay out of the war. Kershaw even defends Roosevelt's actions to get involved via Lend-and-Lease while no Axis power harmed any American interest at that time. The US president acted against the isolationist public opinion and even dared to lie on Joe Sixpack regarding USS Greer. Any moral rationale for the US entering the war, sounds very poor taking into account Roosevelt did not bother allying with "Uncle Joe" Stalin.
February 21, 2008
History should be taught, written about, and studied, not as a narrative of events which lead from one to the next but as a series of events which could easily have had different outcomes. This way of exploring history allows for a genuine understanding of history rather than simply knowledge of it. In this respect, the book fulfilled my expectations. My only criticism of it was that it was a little long and a little dense. This would be a great book to read a chapter out of for a class in college but wasn’t appropriate for casual reading. There was simply too much detail and too much of the blow-by-blow of Japanese/British/Italian politics.
July 21, 2011
While Kershaw doesn't uncover any new information, he provides an excellent recapitulation of the fateful decisions that continue to shape our world. While avoiding nuanced "what if" scenarios, he deftly explores the reasons why nearly all of these decisions were unavoidable and the direct consequence of the sycophantic despotism that drove them. Kershaw is a first-rate historian, and this ranks as an excellent, all-encompassing look at the both the monumental decisions and monumental leaders that drove them.
November 9, 2015
Naja Schulbuch halt. Der Inhalt war zwischendurch wirklich spannend und erklärt einige Entscheidungen die man normalerweise nicht kennt somit hilft es wirklich beim Verständnis des 2. WK. Trotzdem war es echt mühsam das wir das ganze Buch lesen sollten obwohl später Vorträge über die einzelnen Kapitel gehalten werden und man alles zusammen gefasst bekommt.
Für Leute die sich wirklich für den 2 WK und die politischen Verhältnisse interessiert sicher spannend ich hätte es jetzt nicht selber gekauft
Für Leute die sich wirklich für den 2 WK und die politischen Verhältnisse interessiert sicher spannend ich hätte es jetzt nicht selber gekauft
July 23, 2011
Masterly take on Counterfactual History--Kershaw isolates ten crucial decisions from 1940-1941 and examines what alternatives were available and their probable outcomes. Would Hitler have been better off if Il Duce had left Greece alone? Why did Stalin ignore every possible warning sign of the coming of Barbarossa? What were the Japanese alternatives to Pearl Harbor?
December 28, 2007
Excellent counter-factual history about ten decision which shaped the outcome of the Second World war
Currently reading
July 26, 2009Great to WWII history buffs and generalists alike. Helps better understand not only the decisions of the period, but the context around which similar decisions are being made today.
March 29, 2021
more of a snapshot/collection of short essays on these decision...either acts as a refresher, etc. of what you know or a nice introduction to major topics and decisions...
‘At last I had the authority to give directions over the whole scene. I felt as if I were walking with destiny, and that all my past life had been but a preparation for this hour and for this trial.’
In the real world of Hitler, rather than the counter-factual world of fantasy and imagination, it seems clear that no chance was missed in 1940. Given the leadership which Germany had, and the very reason she was facing a strategic dilemma in the summer and autumn of 1940 in the first place, the attack on the Soviet Union was indeed the only practicable way open.
It was madness, but there was method in it.
In an instant, Japan saw her only powerful would-be friend in Europe in alliance with her arch-enemy to the north. Marquis Kido Koichi, a leading courtier and soon to become the Emperor’s closest counsellor as Lord Privy Seal, recorded in his diary that he was ‘astonished at this extremely treacherous act’
Reflecting the domestic turbulence, governments were unstable and of short duration, with fifteen changes of Prime Minister between November 1921 and June 1937
In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt had used American pressure to broker an end to the war between Japan and Russia.
It looked as though Mussolini was making a "smart move” to realise his revindications upon France with a minimum spilling of blood. They thought France was already beaten and England left in a hopeless position. It was money for jam.’
The American regular army comprised 245,000 men at this time, twentieth in world rankings, one place behind the Dutch. It had only five fully equipped divisions (the Germans deployed 141 divisions in the western campaign alone), equipped with weapons often still of First World War vintage.
Even were Britain to be subjugated, the Empire and the British Fleet would fight on from beyond the seas ‘until in God’s good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old’.
They amounted to a declaration of American aims for a postwar world: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear.
In essence, the military-industrial complex of postwar America had its foundations in lend-lease
‘We can manage somehow in 1942 and 1943,’ Tojo himself remarked in relation to army allocations. ‘We do not know what will happen after 1944.’
‘At last I had the authority to give directions over the whole scene. I felt as if I were walking with destiny, and that all my past life had been but a preparation for this hour and for this trial.’
In the real world of Hitler, rather than the counter-factual world of fantasy and imagination, it seems clear that no chance was missed in 1940. Given the leadership which Germany had, and the very reason she was facing a strategic dilemma in the summer and autumn of 1940 in the first place, the attack on the Soviet Union was indeed the only practicable way open.
It was madness, but there was method in it.
In an instant, Japan saw her only powerful would-be friend in Europe in alliance with her arch-enemy to the north. Marquis Kido Koichi, a leading courtier and soon to become the Emperor’s closest counsellor as Lord Privy Seal, recorded in his diary that he was ‘astonished at this extremely treacherous act’
Reflecting the domestic turbulence, governments were unstable and of short duration, with fifteen changes of Prime Minister between November 1921 and June 1937
In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt had used American pressure to broker an end to the war between Japan and Russia.
It looked as though Mussolini was making a "smart move” to realise his revindications upon France with a minimum spilling of blood. They thought France was already beaten and England left in a hopeless position. It was money for jam.’
The American regular army comprised 245,000 men at this time, twentieth in world rankings, one place behind the Dutch. It had only five fully equipped divisions (the Germans deployed 141 divisions in the western campaign alone), equipped with weapons often still of First World War vintage.
Even were Britain to be subjugated, the Empire and the British Fleet would fight on from beyond the seas ‘until in God’s good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old’.
They amounted to a declaration of American aims for a postwar world: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear.
In essence, the military-industrial complex of postwar America had its foundations in lend-lease
‘We can manage somehow in 1942 and 1943,’ Tojo himself remarked in relation to army allocations. ‘We do not know what will happen after 1944.’
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