This volume contains a review of evidence to assess whether sanctions work, to assess what determines their success and to assess why their effectiveness has declined. It looks at the uses of economic sanctions since 1914 and evaluates the effectiveness of sanctions as a policy tool. It contains 11 case studies of different countries which each include a chronology; the sanctioning country's objectives; the target country's response; the roles played by important third countries; relevant economic data and a calculation of costs; and an assessment of the outcome.
Gary Hufbauer: All the economic sanctions in the last four decades or five decades have had less than a two percent impact on the GDP of the target country. Two percent is not a very big figure.
Now there are exceptions: the sanctions against Iraq prior to the Gulf Wars had a much bigger impact, probably 15 percent.
The sanctions against Iran probably have an impact prior to the JCPOA/nuclear deal [at] about five percent. So that’s the range of impact.
If the target country is a large country which has a very strong leader, and has no internal political dissent or conflict, then, in those circumstances, the sanctions are unlikely to produce regime change.