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Modern War Studies
The Roots Of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt And German Military Reform
Following Germany's defeat in World War I, the Germans signed the Versailles Treaty, superficially agreeing to limit their war powers. The Allies envisioned the future German army as a lightly armed border guard and international security force. The Germans had other plans.
As early as 1919, James Corum contends, the tactical foundations were being laid for the Nazi Blitzkrieg. Between 1919 and 1933, German military leaders created and nurtured the Reichswehr, a new military organization built on the wreckage of the old Imperial Army. It was not being groomed for policing purposes.
Focusing on Hans von Seeckt, General Staff Chief and Army Commander, Corum traces the crucial transformations in German military tactical doctrine, organization, and training that laid the foundations for fighting Germany's future wars. In doing so, he restores balance to prior assessment of von Seeckt's influence and demonstrates how the general, along with a few other "visionary" officers--including armor tactician Ernst Volckheim and air tactician Helmut Wilberg--collaborated to develop the core doctrine for what became the Blitzkrieg.
The concepts of mobile war so essential to Germany's strength in World War II, Corum shows, were in place well before the tools became available. As an unforeseen consequence of the Versailles Treaty, the Germans were not saddled with a stockpile of outdated equipment as the Allies were. This, ironically, resulted in an advantage for the Germans, who were able to create doctrine first and design equipment to match it.
As early as 1919, James Corum contends, the tactical foundations were being laid for the Nazi Blitzkrieg. Between 1919 and 1933, German military leaders created and nurtured the Reichswehr, a new military organization built on the wreckage of the old Imperial Army. It was not being groomed for policing purposes.
Focusing on Hans von Seeckt, General Staff Chief and Army Commander, Corum traces the crucial transformations in German military tactical doctrine, organization, and training that laid the foundations for fighting Germany's future wars. In doing so, he restores balance to prior assessment of von Seeckt's influence and demonstrates how the general, along with a few other "visionary" officers--including armor tactician Ernst Volckheim and air tactician Helmut Wilberg--collaborated to develop the core doctrine for what became the Blitzkrieg.
The concepts of mobile war so essential to Germany's strength in World War II, Corum shows, were in place well before the tools became available. As an unforeseen consequence of the Versailles Treaty, the Germans were not saddled with a stockpile of outdated equipment as the Allies were. This, ironically, resulted in an advantage for the Germans, who were able to create doctrine first and design equipment to match it.
294 pages, Paperback
First published October 1, 1992
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
August 3, 2019
A good book, providing a detailed analysis of the German Army’s actions and development in the years immediately following WWI. The emphasis of the book is on General Hans Von Seekt, Commander of the German Army in the early 1920s and the major figure behind the maneuver warfare concepts which became Blitzkrieg. Following the end of The Great War the German Army, led by its well educated General Staff, undertook a wide-ranging series of studies on how the war had been fought. This massive After Action Review provided the impetus for the slowly developed concept of maneuver warfare based on smaller but higher quality armed forces. The concept eventually materialized, despite the usual gamut of philosophical, financial, and political roadblocks, as the Blitzkrieg of the late 1930s. The book makes clear that the background and experience of the German combatants in WWI had a major effect on this idea of maneuver warfare. Whilst the British and French armies had predominantly known the Western Front’s static conflict, many of the post-War German commanders had fought on the Eastern front. They, like their Russian counterparts, were much more understanding of a mobile warfare concept. The use by Germany of Russian land and resources to develop concepts away from the victorious Allies observations is well explained. The development of the Luftwaffe’s emphasis on a tactical air campaign (as opposed to the strategic concepts popular in other air forces) is also explored. All in all, an enlightening book which goes a long way in showing how a military can effectively utilize Lessons Learned to re-shape its baseline doctrine. Highly recommended for those wanting to know more about inter-War military developments.
August 27, 2012
This book is for those who are interested in military history. Others will find it boring. I learned a lot from it, e.g., that by 1926 the German army, small though it was, was the best trained army in the world, and that the ideas behind the blitzkrieg tactics that they used in WW2 had pretty much been developed by the mid-1920's. They were only refined after that.
July 30, 2013
Well researched if somewhat less well argued. Corum's quest to lionize Seeckt leads to some questionable analysis but he's dead on the money in his criticism of Guderian and retrospective "blitzkrieg" proponents.
June 2, 2025
In this very interesting book, we are given example of what happens when (a) war does not end in a proper way - conditions will come up, that will just enable resumption of war under other means - and (b) when you get right people in right time on the right place.
Related to (a), as much Versailles' treaty was basically just a trigger for new war, nothing was learned after WW2. Same as at the end of WW1, Germany was just used as a bulwark against USSR (this time instead of Freikorps' Iron Division fighting in Baltics, Allies basically reactivated Wehrmacht under the most weird white propaganda ever). Everything was silenced (btw denazification as a term popular today, for which everybody is saying, oh what does this mean - check the Nueremberg Trials, this was a thing then but because of Red Menace, they went silent about it and never pursued it to the end, giving rise to scandal later when history of people running West Germany became known) and even more deadly ideology (when compared to Kaiser in WW1) was allowed to thrive and live. Because, hey, enemy of my enemy ..... you get the gist, right?
That being said, this book is more about the post-WW1 German Army goal to make sure that Reichswehr (Weimar era German Army) does not end up forgotten and basically erased from the history.
Although some political elements do come up, overall Reichswehr's political aims are not central point (although they are mentioned as king-makers in the background, basically parallel power structure) and I understand that would muddle the water considerably, and make the book stray into potentially troublesome waters.
This book is about organizational nature of Germans, especially in military affairs. It is about how far-thinking and patriotic officer corps, led by van Seeckt, laid the way, doctrinal but also organizational and in the end physical (including industrial aspect and international relations) to make sure that Germany, when Allies control mechanisms are brought down, can again take its place on the international stage and have powerful army to back any political decision German government makes.
It is fascinating to read about people learning on their mistakes, collating all of the data and feedback from infantry, artillery to motorized forces and air service, and preparing the ground for advancement. If Germans had to have small army they decided it would be very professional army, highly trained, technologically knowledgeable, adaptable and able to expand very quickly as needed. At the tip of the spear was Truppenamt, renamed German General Staff - professional officer corps that worked tirelessly to make sure troops get proper training, equipment and mindset for the conflicts to come. it is exquisite to read about the way air force was built and organized, or how mock-up tanks were used to make sure that troops get accustomed to work with the armor even before the armor forces were actually fully operational.
Even on international stage, Reichswehr managed to make deals with Soviets and use Soviet territory to conduct trainings and technical development they could not do on their own land. Military industry spread across the world where it developed many vehicle and weapon prototypes (Sweden for example being crucial for development of tanks and weapons such as famous German 88mm gun). This was not something to be done immediately, but over the years. Imagine having politicians or leaders of any nation in Europe's west thinking this much ahead - a decade? No way, political managers cannot even think 4 years ahead.
I mean when one looks at all of this, full militarization of Germany way ahead of Nazi party takeover, it is obvious that powder keg would be put on fire no matter what by the end of 1930's. It is very interesting how Germans viewed Poles and Czechs as very aggressive neighbors - they were expecting conflict with them at any time. At the same time French were tolerated, not the least because territory they were trying to occupy did not interest Germany that much at the time - definitely not as much as territory of old Prussia.
By finely manipulating the Army, Nazi party managed to overtake it completely, instilling the political and ideological vigor and make Army part of the Nazi machine. Everything that was started to enable Germany to stand on its own after humiliation is over, just made sure that this entire fine tuned mechanism ended up completely under Nazi control. And this is greatest defeat of Reichswehr and van Seeckt's goals. Instead of being force to unite Germany, Reichswehr became the ideologically-fueled Nazi tool with major role to play in overtaking the whole of Europe and Asia. Truly sad, but then what is army for than for fighting wars, if it is not keen on finding targets on its own, ambitious politicians will always find ways to utilize it.
Fantastic book on how to approach very complex task of rebuilding of army. Highly recommended to anyone interested in the turbulent interwar period, magnificent technological advances and their military applications.
Highly, highly recommended.
Related to (a), as much Versailles' treaty was basically just a trigger for new war, nothing was learned after WW2. Same as at the end of WW1, Germany was just used as a bulwark against USSR (this time instead of Freikorps' Iron Division fighting in Baltics, Allies basically reactivated Wehrmacht under the most weird white propaganda ever). Everything was silenced (btw denazification as a term popular today, for which everybody is saying, oh what does this mean - check the Nueremberg Trials, this was a thing then but because of Red Menace, they went silent about it and never pursued it to the end, giving rise to scandal later when history of people running West Germany became known) and even more deadly ideology (when compared to Kaiser in WW1) was allowed to thrive and live. Because, hey, enemy of my enemy ..... you get the gist, right?
That being said, this book is more about the post-WW1 German Army goal to make sure that Reichswehr (Weimar era German Army) does not end up forgotten and basically erased from the history.
Although some political elements do come up, overall Reichswehr's political aims are not central point (although they are mentioned as king-makers in the background, basically parallel power structure) and I understand that would muddle the water considerably, and make the book stray into potentially troublesome waters.
This book is about organizational nature of Germans, especially in military affairs. It is about how far-thinking and patriotic officer corps, led by van Seeckt, laid the way, doctrinal but also organizational and in the end physical (including industrial aspect and international relations) to make sure that Germany, when Allies control mechanisms are brought down, can again take its place on the international stage and have powerful army to back any political decision German government makes.
It is fascinating to read about people learning on their mistakes, collating all of the data and feedback from infantry, artillery to motorized forces and air service, and preparing the ground for advancement. If Germans had to have small army they decided it would be very professional army, highly trained, technologically knowledgeable, adaptable and able to expand very quickly as needed. At the tip of the spear was Truppenamt, renamed German General Staff - professional officer corps that worked tirelessly to make sure troops get proper training, equipment and mindset for the conflicts to come. it is exquisite to read about the way air force was built and organized, or how mock-up tanks were used to make sure that troops get accustomed to work with the armor even before the armor forces were actually fully operational.
Even on international stage, Reichswehr managed to make deals with Soviets and use Soviet territory to conduct trainings and technical development they could not do on their own land. Military industry spread across the world where it developed many vehicle and weapon prototypes (Sweden for example being crucial for development of tanks and weapons such as famous German 88mm gun). This was not something to be done immediately, but over the years. Imagine having politicians or leaders of any nation in Europe's west thinking this much ahead - a decade? No way, political managers cannot even think 4 years ahead.
I mean when one looks at all of this, full militarization of Germany way ahead of Nazi party takeover, it is obvious that powder keg would be put on fire no matter what by the end of 1930's. It is very interesting how Germans viewed Poles and Czechs as very aggressive neighbors - they were expecting conflict with them at any time. At the same time French were tolerated, not the least because territory they were trying to occupy did not interest Germany that much at the time - definitely not as much as territory of old Prussia.
By finely manipulating the Army, Nazi party managed to overtake it completely, instilling the political and ideological vigor and make Army part of the Nazi machine. Everything that was started to enable Germany to stand on its own after humiliation is over, just made sure that this entire fine tuned mechanism ended up completely under Nazi control. And this is greatest defeat of Reichswehr and van Seeckt's goals. Instead of being force to unite Germany, Reichswehr became the ideologically-fueled Nazi tool with major role to play in overtaking the whole of Europe and Asia. Truly sad, but then what is army for than for fighting wars, if it is not keen on finding targets on its own, ambitious politicians will always find ways to utilize it.
Fantastic book on how to approach very complex task of rebuilding of army. Highly recommended to anyone interested in the turbulent interwar period, magnificent technological advances and their military applications.
Highly, highly recommended.
October 8, 2023
Niall Ferguson, the Scottish historian, once declared that “ the law of unintended consequences is the only real law of history.” James S. Corum’s “The Roots of Blitzkrieg” thoroughly confirms Ferguson’s aphorism. Corum’s excellent study of the German army’s rearmament following World War I, demonstrates how the onerous restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, led to the development of a lean, intellectually sound, flexible, organization which had capabilities beyond the ken of the Allied authorities.
The Reichswehr established nearly 60 committees following the Great War to ponder the lessons of 1914-18. The Germans, contrary to conventional wisdom, did not wallow in denial with respect to their failures; instead, they studied every aspect of their defeat assiduously. Corum depicts a military culture in which NCOs-whose numbers went unregulated by the Versailles framework- functioned like junior officers, and lieutenants and captains could oppose, in print, the tenants of senior staff officers. While the U.S. military was threatening to sanction Dwight Eisenhower for his heretical views about armor, and court marshaling Billy Mitchell, their German counterparts were engaged in robust debate.
In short, this is an invaluable study. Ostensibly about how a peacetime military avoided insignificance and morbidity during a tumultuous period of political and technological flux, Corum’s narrative is a cautionary tale that ought to inform thinking about any number of large, bureaucratically driven organizations.
The Reichswehr established nearly 60 committees following the Great War to ponder the lessons of 1914-18. The Germans, contrary to conventional wisdom, did not wallow in denial with respect to their failures; instead, they studied every aspect of their defeat assiduously. Corum depicts a military culture in which NCOs-whose numbers went unregulated by the Versailles framework- functioned like junior officers, and lieutenants and captains could oppose, in print, the tenants of senior staff officers. While the U.S. military was threatening to sanction Dwight Eisenhower for his heretical views about armor, and court marshaling Billy Mitchell, their German counterparts were engaged in robust debate.
In short, this is an invaluable study. Ostensibly about how a peacetime military avoided insignificance and morbidity during a tumultuous period of political and technological flux, Corum’s narrative is a cautionary tale that ought to inform thinking about any number of large, bureaucratically driven organizations.
January 25, 2026
More accurate rating: 3.7/5
Overall, it is a good book on the state and changes that occurred in the Reichswehr wehr in the 1920s. It calls out previous historians which I believe is good for dialogue and to see the change of ideas
However, the author seems to be a bit too much of a fanboy for Germany. He does point out some faults, such as procuring 36 different models of wheeled vehicles. But he either ignores the effects of some of the reforms and overly praised things that all other historical sources say is bad. An example of the former is that he mentions that the Air Organization did not favor strategic bombing and then doesn’t mentioned that this left the Luftwaffe ill prepared for the Battle of Britain. The latter is the author praise of the A7V tank, a rapid attempt by German late in WWI to make a tank, that ended up having a 18 man crew and poor performance.
Don’t let my longer negative section dissuade you from reading the book, I would just recommend going in with an open mind and a bit of skepticism on some of the authors claims.
Overall, it is a good book on the state and changes that occurred in the Reichswehr wehr in the 1920s. It calls out previous historians which I believe is good for dialogue and to see the change of ideas
However, the author seems to be a bit too much of a fanboy for Germany. He does point out some faults, such as procuring 36 different models of wheeled vehicles. But he either ignores the effects of some of the reforms and overly praised things that all other historical sources say is bad. An example of the former is that he mentions that the Air Organization did not favor strategic bombing and then doesn’t mentioned that this left the Luftwaffe ill prepared for the Battle of Britain. The latter is the author praise of the A7V tank, a rapid attempt by German late in WWI to make a tank, that ended up having a 18 man crew and poor performance.
Don’t let my longer negative section dissuade you from reading the book, I would just recommend going in with an open mind and a bit of skepticism on some of the authors claims.
June 9, 2025
Best book ever about interwars period.
Analyze in depth of the German Army military reform from a defecare d army to the strongest force in the field of poland an france.
Tactics
Training
Weaponary
Training
Of the reichswehr and its leaders!
Strongly suggested for military students and historians.
Analyze in depth of the German Army military reform from a defecare d army to the strongest force in the field of poland an france.
Tactics
Training
Weaponary
Training
Of the reichswehr and its leaders!
Strongly suggested for military students and historians.
August 7, 2018
A good history of the between wars German Army and Air Force. A bit dry in places, but does a good job of covering the various areas in good detail.
January 24, 2016
One of the first, and still very few, works to really explore the doctrine and practice of the Reichswehr prior to Hitler's rise to power. Corum essentially argues that most of the practices and doctrines later associated with Blitzkrieg had been developed prior to 1933, especially by Hans von Seeckt. Corum is particularly interesting in his use of the materials left by the German analysis of the lessons of the First World War, which I have not seen used elsewhere. The main deficiency of the work is that it tends to look forward, seeing developments in terms of their results after 1939, rather than considering the Reichswehr in its contemporary context.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews