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From a Logical Point of View / Von einem logischen Standpunkt aus: Drei ausgewählte Aufsätze. Englisch/Deutsch
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Published October 1, 2011
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
May 16, 2026
It takes quite some time to get through these essays but if one is willing to put in the effort, they are highly recommended. Quine is not only intellectually but also stylistically very enjoyable writer. Furthermore, one should have probably taken an introductory course into logic and be familiar with other philosophical writers of that time namely Frege and Russell.
In the first essay Quine tries to define a criterion for ontological commitment addressing the problem of negative existence claims. He attacks the view that when we make singular negative existence claims such as “Pegasus does not exist” we are thereby committed to the existence of some object, the name allegedly refers to. Quine, firstly, outlines all the different kind of complications philosophers who take that stance must face. Then he goes on to that such existence claims can be analyzed in terms of Russell’s theory of descriptions. Proper names, moreover, can be analyzed as definite descriptions. Therefore, singular sentences must not necessary presuppose some entity. One only commits oneself to some entity within bound variables.
Sentences like “Pegasus does not exist” (F(a)) can be analyzed in the following way:
(x)(P(x) (y)(P(y) y x) “there is no such thing that uniquely satisfies the Pegasus-description”
In “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” Quine develops a critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction. The essay is basically structured in a way that he goes through the various possible candidates for criterions and thereby outlines that all those candidates seemingly don’t suffice in explaining analyticity without presupposing it.
In “Reference and Modality” Quine attacks modal logic for not being precise enough. He argues that similar to argument containing quotation or propositional attitudes such as “He believes, …” modality contains propositions which are referentially opaque. Their names are not interchangeable salva veritatae.
In the first essay Quine tries to define a criterion for ontological commitment addressing the problem of negative existence claims. He attacks the view that when we make singular negative existence claims such as “Pegasus does not exist” we are thereby committed to the existence of some object, the name allegedly refers to. Quine, firstly, outlines all the different kind of complications philosophers who take that stance must face. Then he goes on to that such existence claims can be analyzed in terms of Russell’s theory of descriptions. Proper names, moreover, can be analyzed as definite descriptions. Therefore, singular sentences must not necessary presuppose some entity. One only commits oneself to some entity within bound variables.
Sentences like “Pegasus does not exist” (F(a)) can be analyzed in the following way:
(x)(P(x) (y)(P(y) y x) “there is no such thing that uniquely satisfies the Pegasus-description”
In “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” Quine develops a critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction. The essay is basically structured in a way that he goes through the various possible candidates for criterions and thereby outlines that all those candidates seemingly don’t suffice in explaining analyticity without presupposing it.
In “Reference and Modality” Quine attacks modal logic for not being precise enough. He argues that similar to argument containing quotation or propositional attitudes such as “He believes, …” modality contains propositions which are referentially opaque. Their names are not interchangeable salva veritatae.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
April 20, 2026
This book slapped. I don’t want to spoil it though
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews