From Hitler's Germany to Saddam's Iraq: The Enduring False Promise of Preventive War

by Scott A. Silverstone

This book boldly challenges conventional wisdom about the value of preventive war. Beginning with the rise of German power and the French and British response to the Rhineland crisis leading to World War II, Scott Silverstone overturns the common impulse to point an accusing finger at British leadership for its alleged naïveté, willful blindness, or outright cowardice. Arguing against the belief that Britain could have contained Germany and avoided war if it had used force when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, the author uses this dramatic event to wrestle with a general strategic problem that has broad relevance for our current foreign policy dilemmas. Silverstone argues that the Rhineland crisis is a critical case for studying a central dynamic of world history—power shifts among states—and the preventive war temptation that power shifts frequently produce.

There has been surging interest in the idea of preventive war, an interest stimulated by the Bush administration’s articulation of the “preemption doctrine” in 2002 and the disastrous invasion of Iraq in 2003, and by frustration over the difficulty of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by such states as North Korea and Iran. Clarifying the way we think about preventive war, the author analyzes the enduring strategic flaws in preventive war that must inform how political leaders and the public think about this option as a means of dealing with shifting threats in the modern world. Offering a radically conservative argument for when to wage war, this persuasive book will be essential reading for policy makers and concerned citizens alike.

323 pages, Hardcover

First published December 3, 2018

Reviews

[Gabriel Conroy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Silverstone challenges us to avoid drawing hasty "lessons" from history. And one of the prime examples of the "lessons" history supposedly teaches us is, "don't appease Hitler in the 1930s, especially when he orders the remilitarization of the Rhineland." Silverstone offers a mostly compelling argument for why we shouldn't judge those, especially the British, who forbore challenging the Rhineland remilitarization.

The argument is compelling because British policymakers couldn't predict the future and because "preventive" war didn't have the greatest track record of success, historically speaking. Silverstone recounts the difficulties of preventive war and calls into question whether challenging the remilitarization would have actually had the effect of stopping Hitler for good.

Silverston's argument is less compelling on three fronts. First, while the policymakers couldn't predict the future, we now know what actually did happen. We shouldn't be too harsh in judging actors for choosing poorly (although we can be harsher in judging them for the quasi- and sometimes not so quasi Nazi sympathizing, Nazi gainsaying, and Nazi tolerating by some policymakers). But if we could rewind the clock and rerun the experiment, maybe it would be worth a try.

Second, Silverstone seems a bit too quick to call into question the prospects of short term victory if France (and the UK) had challenged Hitler in 1936. Silverstone is the expert, and I'm certainly no military historian, but a speedy short-term victory seems like it would have been likely. Whether the short-term victory would have had the longterm result of stopping Hitler is a different question, and one that Silverstone reminds us is more of a question than I assumed before reading this book.

Third, Silverstone seems a bit slippery about his definition of "preventive war." He is clear that he doesn't mean "preemptive war." But if we rule out "preemption," it's still not clear what the dividing line is between preventive war and regular war. It seems like any war that is not a response to an attack or clearly imminent attack counts as "preventive" in some fashion. It's also unclear whether a violation of a series of treaties and accords (such as the Versailles treaty and Locarno agreement that Silverstone discusses) that were designed to prevent war isn't a war provocation. If the implied threat behind these agreements is "if you don't agree we'll go to war," and the state that first agrees then rescinds their agreement, and rescinding the agreement results in war--the resulting war strikes me as something different from "preventive." It still might not be just, or right, but it doesn't strike me as preventive. And in my view, challenging the remilitarization of the Rhineland would have been more an effort to enforce the post-WWI peace (as modified by the Locarno agreement) than it would have been a "preventive" measure.

My reservations aside, Silverstone's book is definitely worth a read.

[Mathieu Gaudreault · Rating 1 out of 5]

The author just keep repeating the same thing over and over so that why I gave an one star review. So to resume even if the French army would march on the Rhineland Hitler would have stayed in power and try another time. Now you know what the book is about so you don't need to spend your dollards to buy or dowmload it.

[Antonino · Rating 5 out of 5]

The hindsight bias is probably the most common bias that historians, politicians and journalists have to take into account when writing about past events. This book proves how it worked for the Rhineland crisis in '36 and how the derived distortions make us prone to even more dangerous mistakes. One of the most brilliant historic account I've ever read.

[Chris · Rating 5 out of 5]

Prescient, readable, and important. Dr. S’s clear prose and thoughtful approach poses questions that are both timely and timeless. Whether you concur with all the conclusions or not the clarity and force of the arguments are indisputable.