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An Essay on the Modern State
This important book is the first serious philosophical examination of the modern state. It inquires into the justification of this particular form of political society. It asks whether all states are "nation-states," what are the alternative ways of organizing society, and which conditions make a state legitimate. The author concludes that, while states can be legitimate, they typically fail to have the powers (e.g. sovereignity) that they claim. Christopher Morris has written a book that will command the attention of political philosophers, political scientists, legal theorists, and specialists in international relations.
- GenresPhilosophyPolitics
316 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1998
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August 16, 2018
This is an excellent book, and a must-read for anyone interested in questions concerning the justification of the state. Morris takes us through a series of attempts to define, justify, or criticise the legitimate authority of the modern state and its alternatives. In doing so, his own novel and compelling position in the debate emerges.
The discussion centres on the modern state's claim to be the best solution to problems of the provision of collective goods (understood broadly). Morris ultimately concludes that many aspects of modern state's claims to legitimate authority simply fail; they fail for non-moral reasons as well as for reasons based on a minimal account of justice that is hard to dispute and which plays a fairly minor role in the argument. However, Morris points out that other aspects of state and certain forms of the modern state may be just, and indeed that there are many occasions where the state's powers are justified. But though states may be legitimate in this sense, the problem is that other agencies' using the same powers and providing the same services as the state would be legitimate in the same sense. Thus, because many state capacities and powers fail in their claim to legitimate authority, and because those that do could be equally as well provided by other agencies, we may have reason to look beyond the state's direct and territorial governance to an alternative form of political organisation.
There are ten chapters in the book. After the introduction, the second enters into discussion on the definition of the modern state. The second considers and rejects anarchist criticisms of the state. The fourth outlines why legitimacy is a requirement for justifying the state and what form it ought to take. The fifth considers the rational justification of the state, the role of moral and non-moral justification, and a series of arguments for the state's rational justification. The sixth considers the overall account of justification and what form it must take to justify the state (notably including efficacy), rejects a series of justice-based arguments in favour of a more minimal, common-sense account of justice and justification.
The seventh concerns sovereignty and the state's claim to political authority. The eighth asks whether the state's claim to territorial boundaries can be justified, the form the claim must take and considers and rejects a series of nationalist or populist arguments for its claim, settling simply on the view that the boundaries are justified for practical reasons and so are limited by this. The ninth considers what governments are justified in doing. The last summarises the argument, outlining Morris's (somewhat ambivalent) position.
The book is very accessible despite the complexity of the argument and would be a great introduction to the normative theory of the state for those considering such questions for the first time. Here, I'd like to outline some of the sections I thought were particularly useful that might be of interest to a wide range of scholars. I'll end by stating some of what I perceive to be the books major flaws and omissions.
Morris's discussion and definition of justification, legitimacy, political authority and his account of reasons will be useful and of interest to any moral or political philosopher or theorist. He outlines the concepts and explains their function particularly well. His criticisms of contractualist, consent-based, natural rights, and other accounts is also persuasive and rigorously argued. Morris is also especially good at embracing the complex nature of the state as well as controversy over its definition whilst (for the most part) managing not to to take a strong stance on much that is controversial. Morris also uses a employs a range of argumentative approaches: a nuanced and reasonable use of rational choice theory, historical political thought, and the usual analytic political philosophy (without going overboard).
Despite the many virtues of the book, it is limited in other ways. Morris's discussion of popular sovereignty and democracy is incredibly brief and accounts of popular sovereignty are dismissed without much strong argument. This is reflected in later problems in the book. In chapter seven, Rousseau's argument concerning sovereignty and Hobbes's are lumped together and dismissed together under the 'classical account of sovereignty', where an ultimate power is needed above all other powers in a top-down mode of governance (178. This may be true (though I have my doubts, but I've not read either in a long time), but it seems to me that that major differences between these thinkers in their accounts of the state of nature (one positive, the other negative) lead to different accounts and justifications of sovereignty, one as self-constraint, the other as absolutist restraint (though I may be wrong).
The greater problem comes in chapter nine, where Morris points out that different conceptions of justice lead to radically different understandings of the government's function. If this is the case, and people hold competing accounts of justice (and Morris tacitly lends strong support to this thesis), then it seems some form of state grounded in democracy might be needed to adjudicate on these different conceptions (or it at least lends support to the claims made by anarchists in chapter three). Either way, this seems to be an issue that Morris should have explored further, as it's unclear how another form of organisation could solve collective action problems without adjudicating between competing accounts of justice and without resorting to threats of force over some bounded population.
Another problem is with Morris's all-to-quick dismissal of Hegel with almost no discussion, due to Hegel's famously complex (at first) argument the development of human reason, culminating in the state. Yet it seems much of Hegel's view is in fact widely held, namely that the state is in some sense at one with and an expression of human community. Morris instead treats the state as having agency apart from our own and in a sense standing apart from ourselves, constraining our actions. But if the state really is an expression and extension of human community, it seems that there is an alternative account of sovereignty rooted in popular sovereignty that ought to be considered (and also a response to Morris's claim that the state alienates). Though I do not think this would necessarily undermine Morris's argument, my point is that greater discussion of Hegel, democracy, and popular sovereignty would have been welcomed.
To my mind, the most egregious omission is the complete absence of any discussion of Marxist (or better yet, Marx's) arguments concerning the state. Morris's arguments could easily have been linked to support (or perhaps he wishes to reject) Marxist arguments on the state, and may have provided additional resources for the question of 'what's next' regarding the state, support for the necessity of the state at a certain stage, and support for its eventual overcoming.
Anyway, that said this is a Very Good Book, and I particularly recommend it to those new to debates on the justification of the modern state and those looking for more nuanced arguments on the normative theory of the modern state.
The discussion centres on the modern state's claim to be the best solution to problems of the provision of collective goods (understood broadly). Morris ultimately concludes that many aspects of modern state's claims to legitimate authority simply fail; they fail for non-moral reasons as well as for reasons based on a minimal account of justice that is hard to dispute and which plays a fairly minor role in the argument. However, Morris points out that other aspects of state and certain forms of the modern state may be just, and indeed that there are many occasions where the state's powers are justified. But though states may be legitimate in this sense, the problem is that other agencies' using the same powers and providing the same services as the state would be legitimate in the same sense. Thus, because many state capacities and powers fail in their claim to legitimate authority, and because those that do could be equally as well provided by other agencies, we may have reason to look beyond the state's direct and territorial governance to an alternative form of political organisation.
There are ten chapters in the book. After the introduction, the second enters into discussion on the definition of the modern state. The second considers and rejects anarchist criticisms of the state. The fourth outlines why legitimacy is a requirement for justifying the state and what form it ought to take. The fifth considers the rational justification of the state, the role of moral and non-moral justification, and a series of arguments for the state's rational justification. The sixth considers the overall account of justification and what form it must take to justify the state (notably including efficacy), rejects a series of justice-based arguments in favour of a more minimal, common-sense account of justice and justification.
The seventh concerns sovereignty and the state's claim to political authority. The eighth asks whether the state's claim to territorial boundaries can be justified, the form the claim must take and considers and rejects a series of nationalist or populist arguments for its claim, settling simply on the view that the boundaries are justified for practical reasons and so are limited by this. The ninth considers what governments are justified in doing. The last summarises the argument, outlining Morris's (somewhat ambivalent) position.
The book is very accessible despite the complexity of the argument and would be a great introduction to the normative theory of the state for those considering such questions for the first time. Here, I'd like to outline some of the sections I thought were particularly useful that might be of interest to a wide range of scholars. I'll end by stating some of what I perceive to be the books major flaws and omissions.
Morris's discussion and definition of justification, legitimacy, political authority and his account of reasons will be useful and of interest to any moral or political philosopher or theorist. He outlines the concepts and explains their function particularly well. His criticisms of contractualist, consent-based, natural rights, and other accounts is also persuasive and rigorously argued. Morris is also especially good at embracing the complex nature of the state as well as controversy over its definition whilst (for the most part) managing not to to take a strong stance on much that is controversial. Morris also uses a employs a range of argumentative approaches: a nuanced and reasonable use of rational choice theory, historical political thought, and the usual analytic political philosophy (without going overboard).
Despite the many virtues of the book, it is limited in other ways. Morris's discussion of popular sovereignty and democracy is incredibly brief and accounts of popular sovereignty are dismissed without much strong argument. This is reflected in later problems in the book. In chapter seven, Rousseau's argument concerning sovereignty and Hobbes's are lumped together and dismissed together under the 'classical account of sovereignty', where an ultimate power is needed above all other powers in a top-down mode of governance (178. This may be true (though I have my doubts, but I've not read either in a long time), but it seems to me that that major differences between these thinkers in their accounts of the state of nature (one positive, the other negative) lead to different accounts and justifications of sovereignty, one as self-constraint, the other as absolutist restraint (though I may be wrong).
The greater problem comes in chapter nine, where Morris points out that different conceptions of justice lead to radically different understandings of the government's function. If this is the case, and people hold competing accounts of justice (and Morris tacitly lends strong support to this thesis), then it seems some form of state grounded in democracy might be needed to adjudicate on these different conceptions (or it at least lends support to the claims made by anarchists in chapter three). Either way, this seems to be an issue that Morris should have explored further, as it's unclear how another form of organisation could solve collective action problems without adjudicating between competing accounts of justice and without resorting to threats of force over some bounded population.
Another problem is with Morris's all-to-quick dismissal of Hegel with almost no discussion, due to Hegel's famously complex (at first) argument the development of human reason, culminating in the state. Yet it seems much of Hegel's view is in fact widely held, namely that the state is in some sense at one with and an expression of human community. Morris instead treats the state as having agency apart from our own and in a sense standing apart from ourselves, constraining our actions. But if the state really is an expression and extension of human community, it seems that there is an alternative account of sovereignty rooted in popular sovereignty that ought to be considered (and also a response to Morris's claim that the state alienates). Though I do not think this would necessarily undermine Morris's argument, my point is that greater discussion of Hegel, democracy, and popular sovereignty would have been welcomed.
To my mind, the most egregious omission is the complete absence of any discussion of Marxist (or better yet, Marx's) arguments concerning the state. Morris's arguments could easily have been linked to support (or perhaps he wishes to reject) Marxist arguments on the state, and may have provided additional resources for the question of 'what's next' regarding the state, support for the necessity of the state at a certain stage, and support for its eventual overcoming.
Anyway, that said this is a Very Good Book, and I particularly recommend it to those new to debates on the justification of the modern state and those looking for more nuanced arguments on the normative theory of the modern state.
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May 15, 2020This reviewer has a copy of the 1999 reprint which runs to 305 pages: the preface appears to be aphidful , and the difficulties presenting on page one would appear to be of the magnitude and type sufficient to burn the house down, so these matters need to be addressed at,in an appropriate time, setting.
At p17, we have 'Modern states claim to possess a remarkable set of powers and rights (as well as immunities).' To the extent that the unexpressed corollary is inverted commas How very dare they? and inferred correctly, what might a satisfactory rebuttal consist of?
At p19: 'Estrangement is also the reaction of people who do not easily identify with a state and who do not wish to consider state membership one of their defining or essential characteristics.' Really? How so? 'It may seem that this estrangement from the modern state is a condition primarily of itinerant intellectuals and perpetual tourists.' Oooh, I dunno about that.
On p35, to what extent may the reading of secular in inverted commas be interpreted as a dirty word? How might the resolution of the possessed argument be achieved satisfactorily?
Considering the paragraph at pp36-7 beginning 'In the modern world', should 'governance' read 'jurisdiction'? What else may be significant in this context? There appear to be gaps in the arguments on the remainder of p37. Considering the arguments on p39, what else appears to be significant in this context? (To what extent do the sources of international law provide satisfactory answers to the questions put in the first paragraph of p228?). Given that 'States are territorial.' at p261 and 'The problem is...that state's authority is not an ownership relation; it is jurisdictional.' at p261, to what extent are the arguments presenting rendered moot?
On p48, to what extent is it clear what Morris' assessment is of the merits of Rawls' A Theory of Justice? (presumably the institutional arrangements described in part two present modern states with the capacity to nurture the delivery of just outcomes per the original position described in chapter three?). How should we interpret the paragraph attached to footnotes 33-35 on pp150-1?
On p57: 'Most people appear to think that some form of centralized and coercive government is necessary for social order, especially in the conditions of the modern world.' appears to beg the question as to which ultimate goods are sought, even if the reader is looking in the same direction as the author, as well as the means by which such goods are secured (the basic security of person and possessions is obviously fair enough, however, considering the paragraphs on pp60-1 commencing with the same theme, what are the proper accountabilities and remedies for private protection agencies who execute an oopsie-daisy, and how should we deal with their principals?). On p58: 'Whatever the particular causes of the problematic nature of social order in the modern world, a particular and central feature of many accounts is of special relevance to my inquiry.' To what extent is it clear which one that would be?
Considering 'The argument would be circular.' at p65, which modifiers are readily available to qualify the argument properly?
Considering the characterisation of a private transaction in the sentence attached to footnote 33 on p71, to what extent is the description meaningful or otherwise nonsense? What else may be significant in this context?
Turning now to the paragraph beginning 'Relations between people' at p74, what else appears to be significant in this context?
Would it be sensible to skip chapter five, as the first sentence appears to float between the meaningless and the flatulent, except a reading of the paragraph beginning 'Some theorists adopt a purely instrumentalist account' at pp118-9? What else may be significant in this context?
Considering the paragraph attached to footnote 13 on p142, what else appears to be significant in this context?
Considering 'Bentham's view of natural rights is similar to Hobbes's, even if his moral theory is very different.' - do we have to run the counter-arguments right now?
To what extent is 'Comparative advantage over other forms of social organization should figure prominently in our evaluation of states.' at p163 meaningful? What else appears to be significant in this context?
How should we interpret 'Assuming that legitimacy requires both justice and minimal efficiency may be permitted me, as I shall argue for skeptical conclusions all the more likely to be true of states that are not particularly efficient or just.' on p164, or otherwise unpack, disaggregate, modify and resolve each component properly?
To what extent is 'Private enforcement of rights and interests leads to feuds.' on p168 meaningful? What else may be significant in this context?
Considering the paragraph beginning 'Sovereignty is the ultimate source of political authority and power within a realm.' on pp176-7, to what extent would the arguments be better prepared and presented were the Church in Rome to allow its priests and bishops to engage in private interpersonal relationships consistent with the law of the land? What else may be significant in this context?
Considering the paragraph beginning 'Part of the supposed problem with constitutional constraints on states has to do with the relation between law and its enforcement.' on p194, to what extent is Morris' argument resilient to the extent that it relies on claims based on his interpretation of the ninth amendment of the US constitution?
To what extent do the arguments in the paragraph beginning 'That states are limited only by constraints they recognize or acknowledge does not necessarily mean that these constraints are created by them' on p196 imply the courts of the state somehow lack the capacity to execute judgements handed down? What else may be significant in this context?
There seem to be some concerns that the institutions of the European Union can be a bit tin-eared at times. Considering at p227 'The interesting question for Westminster is thus not whether the agreements of Maastricht are compatible with the sovereignty of the "Queen in Parliament", but whether the independence of the British government is worth restricting in certain ways.' , what else appears to be significant in this context? (to take into account presumably of at p241: 'Until this century the norm for most people, European included, was rule by foreigners. Great Britain, for instance, was ruled until 1917 by the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, now the House of Windsor.')
Would it be helpful to formalise the claims referred to in the paragraph beginning ' On my characterization' on p237? Clearly, Morris should remain at liberty to state propositions that on an initial reading would be considered to be rather ridiculous. What else may be significant in this context?
On p250, we have: 'I wish to determine the rationale for the territorial nature of the state.' How can we help Professor Morris with this point? And on p258: "My main concern, however, is...to ascertain what can be said generally about the bases of membership in a particular sort of political community, namely, in a state.", to what extent are the rights to nationality and citizenship crystallised in articles 24 & 12 of the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights? To the extent that they are, to what extent are the remaining arguments in section 8.3 on membership moot? What else may be significant in this context?
On p269, to what extent does quote social contracts unquote refer to a person's deprived capacity to enter voluntarily into lawful contracts formed freely without third party interference? What else may be significant in this context?
At p17, we have 'Modern states claim to possess a remarkable set of powers and rights (as well as immunities).' To the extent that the unexpressed corollary is inverted commas How very dare they? and inferred correctly, what might a satisfactory rebuttal consist of?
At p19: 'Estrangement is also the reaction of people who do not easily identify with a state and who do not wish to consider state membership one of their defining or essential characteristics.' Really? How so? 'It may seem that this estrangement from the modern state is a condition primarily of itinerant intellectuals and perpetual tourists.' Oooh, I dunno about that.
On p35, to what extent may the reading of secular in inverted commas be interpreted as a dirty word? How might the resolution of the possessed argument be achieved satisfactorily?
Considering the paragraph at pp36-7 beginning 'In the modern world', should 'governance' read 'jurisdiction'? What else may be significant in this context? There appear to be gaps in the arguments on the remainder of p37. Considering the arguments on p39, what else appears to be significant in this context? (To what extent do the sources of international law provide satisfactory answers to the questions put in the first paragraph of p228?). Given that 'States are territorial.' at p261 and 'The problem is...that state's authority is not an ownership relation; it is jurisdictional.' at p261, to what extent are the arguments presenting rendered moot?
On p48, to what extent is it clear what Morris' assessment is of the merits of Rawls' A Theory of Justice? (presumably the institutional arrangements described in part two present modern states with the capacity to nurture the delivery of just outcomes per the original position described in chapter three?). How should we interpret the paragraph attached to footnotes 33-35 on pp150-1?
On p57: 'Most people appear to think that some form of centralized and coercive government is necessary for social order, especially in the conditions of the modern world.' appears to beg the question as to which ultimate goods are sought, even if the reader is looking in the same direction as the author, as well as the means by which such goods are secured (the basic security of person and possessions is obviously fair enough, however, considering the paragraphs on pp60-1 commencing with the same theme, what are the proper accountabilities and remedies for private protection agencies who execute an oopsie-daisy, and how should we deal with their principals?). On p58: 'Whatever the particular causes of the problematic nature of social order in the modern world, a particular and central feature of many accounts is of special relevance to my inquiry.' To what extent is it clear which one that would be?
Considering 'The argument would be circular.' at p65, which modifiers are readily available to qualify the argument properly?
Considering the characterisation of a private transaction in the sentence attached to footnote 33 on p71, to what extent is the description meaningful or otherwise nonsense? What else may be significant in this context?
Turning now to the paragraph beginning 'Relations between people' at p74, what else appears to be significant in this context?
Would it be sensible to skip chapter five, as the first sentence appears to float between the meaningless and the flatulent, except a reading of the paragraph beginning 'Some theorists adopt a purely instrumentalist account' at pp118-9? What else may be significant in this context?
Considering the paragraph attached to footnote 13 on p142, what else appears to be significant in this context?
Considering 'Bentham's view of natural rights is similar to Hobbes's, even if his moral theory is very different.' - do we have to run the counter-arguments right now?
To what extent is 'Comparative advantage over other forms of social organization should figure prominently in our evaluation of states.' at p163 meaningful? What else appears to be significant in this context?
How should we interpret 'Assuming that legitimacy requires both justice and minimal efficiency may be permitted me, as I shall argue for skeptical conclusions all the more likely to be true of states that are not particularly efficient or just.' on p164, or otherwise unpack, disaggregate, modify and resolve each component properly?
To what extent is 'Private enforcement of rights and interests leads to feuds.' on p168 meaningful? What else may be significant in this context?
Considering the paragraph beginning 'Sovereignty is the ultimate source of political authority and power within a realm.' on pp176-7, to what extent would the arguments be better prepared and presented were the Church in Rome to allow its priests and bishops to engage in private interpersonal relationships consistent with the law of the land? What else may be significant in this context?
Considering the paragraph beginning 'Part of the supposed problem with constitutional constraints on states has to do with the relation between law and its enforcement.' on p194, to what extent is Morris' argument resilient to the extent that it relies on claims based on his interpretation of the ninth amendment of the US constitution?
To what extent do the arguments in the paragraph beginning 'That states are limited only by constraints they recognize or acknowledge does not necessarily mean that these constraints are created by them' on p196 imply the courts of the state somehow lack the capacity to execute judgements handed down? What else may be significant in this context?
There seem to be some concerns that the institutions of the European Union can be a bit tin-eared at times. Considering at p227 'The interesting question for Westminster is thus not whether the agreements of Maastricht are compatible with the sovereignty of the "Queen in Parliament", but whether the independence of the British government is worth restricting in certain ways.' , what else appears to be significant in this context? (to take into account presumably of at p241: 'Until this century the norm for most people, European included, was rule by foreigners. Great Britain, for instance, was ruled until 1917 by the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, now the House of Windsor.')
Would it be helpful to formalise the claims referred to in the paragraph beginning ' On my characterization' on p237? Clearly, Morris should remain at liberty to state propositions that on an initial reading would be considered to be rather ridiculous. What else may be significant in this context?
On p250, we have: 'I wish to determine the rationale for the territorial nature of the state.' How can we help Professor Morris with this point? And on p258: "My main concern, however, is...to ascertain what can be said generally about the bases of membership in a particular sort of political community, namely, in a state.", to what extent are the rights to nationality and citizenship crystallised in articles 24 & 12 of the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights? To the extent that they are, to what extent are the remaining arguments in section 8.3 on membership moot? What else may be significant in this context?
On p269, to what extent does quote social contracts unquote refer to a person's deprived capacity to enter voluntarily into lawful contracts formed freely without third party interference? What else may be significant in this context?
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