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The Army and Vietnam

Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.

3.86 · Rating details · 140 ratings · 11 reviews

Many senior army officials still claim that if they had been given enough soldiers and weapons, the United States could have won the war in Vietnam. In this probing analysis of U.S. military policy in Vietnam, career army officer and strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., argues that precisely because of this mindset the war was lost before it was fought.

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Paperback, 344 pages

Published March 1st 1988 by Johns Hopkins University Press (first published April 1986)

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Mar 16, 2008 Art rated it it was amazing

Krepinevich has a cult following among professors and students at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. After reading his work I understand why. It is rare that ones comes across a book that radically changes the way one looks at military history. Thousands of books have been written on Vietnam and the movies "Platoon" and "Apocalypse Now" brought the war to millions of Americans. Until I read this book, I thought I understood the causes and conduct of the war. Krepinevich brilliantly ...more

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Feb 14, 2014 Levie Galapon rated it liked it

Although repetitive in nature, Krepinevich manages to cite a breadth of knowledge that points out why the Army failed in Vietnam. According to Krepinevich, the Army in particular was unprepared due to doctrine called the Army Concept. The US Army Concept revolves around the use of firepower to quickly overcome enemy forces. Furthermore, the value of US lives is important which makes the use of technology and firepower more important. Because of this, the Army in Vietnam utilized tactics and Although repetitive in nature, Krepinevich manages to cite a breadth of knowledge that points out why the Army failed in Vietnam. According to Krepinevich, the Army in particular was unprepared due to doctrine called the Army Concept. The US Army Concept revolves around the use of firepower to quickly overcome enemy forces. Furthermore, the value of US lives is important which makes the use of technology and firepower more important. Because of this, the Army in Vietnam utilized tactics and strategies not conducive to counterinsurgency. Krepinevich, points out the basic tenets of counterinsurgency. Among these include winning the "hearts and minds of the population" and the systematic destruction of insurgent forces. In Vietnam, the Army would neither win the support of the population or sufficiently deal with insurgent forces. In terms of winning the support of the population, the Army would lose it in different ways, such as, defoliation methods, indiscriminate killings, and failed relocation programs. In terms of defoliation, the Army would use chemicals to destroy foliage as to deny the Vietcong of access to supplies and cover. However, the defoliation would mostly affect the population. As for the insurgents, they would be able to find supplies from alternative sources. When it came to indiscriminate killings, the main goal of the Army was to simply kill as much Vietcong as possible to force them into submission. Furthermore, artillery and aviation officers would be promoted on the basis of Viet Cong killed and ammunition expended. Because of this, suspected Vietcong insurgents would be killed as to fulfill the quota needed by officers. When it came to relocations, the Army would force villages to relocate to safe areas as to create more "fire-free" zones. Programs such as these would displace villagers and result in refugees. All of these efforts that led to the loss of support were all aimed to simply destroy as many Viet Cong forces as possible. This is in accordance to the Army Concept of quickly winning the war and the utilization of superior firepower on the part of the US. Krepinevich, while showcasing the flaws of the Army, also offered explanations as to why the Army failed to adopt classical counterinsurgency in any meaningful form. According to Krepinevich, the Army's Concept of the use of superior firepower came from the Army's experiences in World War II and Korea. In both of these wars, the utilization of firepower served as a benefit to the US. Because of this, lessons drawn from both of these wars were used as a basis during the Vietnam War. Another reason why the Army wasn't prepared for counterinsurgency was because, during this time period the Army was focused on conducting conventional warfare In Europe against the USSR. Because of this, there was little incentive in the Army Hierarchy to adopt counterinsurgency tactics. The Army believed that their conventional warfare tactics would be good enough to combat insurgents in Vietnam. However, prior to the large US commitment to Vietnam, President Kennedy tried to push for more studies in counterinsurgency within the military. However, the military would barely comply since it didn't see the importance to studying counterinsurgency at the time. From Krepinevich's writing, we can learn that we should be careful in drawing lessons from the past. It could be seen that experiences in WWII and Korea greatly shaped the way the Army conducted warfare in Vietnam. If the Army approached Vietnam with a fresh look, they possibly could have altered the way they conducted warfare initially. Furthermore, when it comes to counterinsurgency, the Army experience in Vietnam is a classical case on how to not fight an insurgency. ...more

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Dec 26, 2013 Christopher rated it did not like it

Just re-read in full for the first time in probably eight years. Now that I'm more familiar with the documentary record concerning Vietnam (and not just the "Vietnam literature" or the COIN-as-military reform oeuvre, which in many cases are the same thing), Krepinevich's tendentious book holds up very poorly indeed. Greg Daddis's new work (detailed review to come!) – along with recent stuff by Birtle, Andrade, Cosmas, Carland, and others – should put the final nail in this one; I don't think ...more

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Mar 24, 2018 Christopher rated it liked it

Fantastic and deep analysis of the Vietnam war. We underestimated many aspects, most important, the conventional threat. While we effectively countered the communist conventional forces, they drew US troops away from what was most important - the human geography.

An argument for population centric counter-insurgency, this books presents that and many other thoughts. Well worth the read.

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Feb 05, 2014 Roger Burk rated it really liked it

If like me you have some affection for the American army and for its soldiers, this is a depressing read. It relates how the Army went into Vietnam organized, trained, and equipped for major combat in Europe, and tried to apply the same concept to a counterinsurgency. The result was massive search-and-destroy operations that missed an elusive enemy and further alienated the population. There was no recognition that counterinsurgency was a different kind of war requiring different methods. The If like me you have some affection for the American army and for its soldiers, this is a depressing read. It relates how the Army went into Vietnam organized, trained, and equipped for major combat in Europe, and tried to apply the same concept to a counterinsurgency. The result was massive search-and-destroy operations that missed an elusive enemy and further alienated the population. There was no recognition that counterinsurgency was a different kind of war requiring different methods. The one part of the Army that was trained for irregular warfare, the Special Forces, were actually intended to help organize offensive partisan warfare behind Soviet lines. They did some good work organizing local defense units early in the war, but the US military command regarded this as a low-priority nuisance that diverted resources from the "real" war.

The top priority in a counterinsurgency is to protect the population and separate it from the insurgents. This is a defensive effort that went against the training and ethos of the US Army. So while the Army searched vainly in the jungles, the VC continued to infiltrate the populated regions. They staged a major uprising in early 1968, the Tet offensive, expecting a popular uprising would join them. No such thing happened, and the VC were almost wiped out, though after some heavy fighting. After that the Army started some efforts at protecting the population, but too little, too late, and half-heartedly. Their main interest was still the big-unit war. Ironically, when the North Vietnamese did attack with tanks and regular units in 1972 and 1975, and the Army's favored skills could have been really useful, political support for the war had so far eroded that that was impossible.

Most depressingly, Krepinevich writes (in the mid-1980s) that the Army had not taken the lesson to heart. Instead, the favored explanation of the failure in Vietnam was that the big-unit war had not been big enough. It should have been expanded with invasions of the North, or of Laos, to cut the supply line of the southern insurgents. However, up until Tet, the VC were supported mostly from sources within the South (at least according to Krepinevich). One wonders if the lesson has been learned now, after two more insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The book is professional and dispassionate. The author is believable and shows no obvious animus against the US or the US Army. My only critique is that the blow-by-blow accounts in some places become tedious and detract from the overall narrative. ...more

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Apr 01, 2013 Al rated it really liked it

Shelves: military-history, strategy

This was a fantastic analysis of the Army's failure to successfully prosecute the war in Vietnam. It was easy to stay interested as the narrative moves at a good pace and the events themselves are fascinating. This book outlines the failure of the JCS to appy the correct strategy to the ground war, in spite of lessons available from the French failure in Indochina and their experience in Algieria. While the Johnson administration micromanaged the airwar, they gave Westmoreland carte blanche to ...more

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Oct 04, 2014 Andy rated it it was ok

This book is now very dated. As someone deeply familiar with the historical record on the Vietnam War through archival research, I can say that while this book captures one part of the American experience in Vietnam, it fails to be comprehensive. Yes, the points and themes highlighted here were relevant to some units at some times, but the tendency to view Krepinevich's argument as being universally valid has led to an overly simplistic view of the Vietnam War. This has had consequences for ...more

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Dec 03, 2009 Diana rated it liked it

interesting perspective on what should have happened for a successful intervention in Vietnam, but I felt the author kept placing the blame on the Army time and time again. yes, I realize that's the point of the book, but how many times can you drive the point home? endless, i guess! still, a very interesting and enlightening story about the experience.

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Jan 22, 2016 Brett Matzenbacher rated it liked it

Population centric COIN is a panacea! At least according to Krepinevich....

Certainly some useful insights and critiques of the US approach in Vietnam, but also somewhat one dimensional

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Jan 22, 2013 Matt Danner rated it it was amazing

Accurate, thorough, and wholly depressing. After reading this, one would presume that the United States could never make such critical and wasteful errors again. Wrong.

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