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Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises

Charles P. Kindleberger

3.96 · Rating details · 3,704 ratings · 161 reviews

The best known and most highly regarded book on financial crises

Financial crises and speculative excess can be traced back to the very beginning of trade and commerce. Since its introduction in 1978, this book has charted and followed this volatile world of financial markets. Charles Kindleberger's brilliant, panoramic history revealed how financial crises follow a nature ...more

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Paperback, 4th edition, 304 pages

Published December 4th 2000 by Wiley (first published 1978)

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Mar 02, 2009 Jake rated it liked it

Shelves: economics

If you're looking for a colorful, narrative history of financial bubbles, this book is not for you. Kindleberger is bone dry, and his goal is mainly to analyze common features of bubble cycles. Towards that end, he tends to pick a feature, then run through ten or twenty examples of how that feature worked during past bubbles. That leads to a lot of repetition, but by the end of the book, you definitely get a clear sense of how the Minsky model views bubbles. I think that's the reason the book ha ...more

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Apr 25, 2014 Daniel Clausen rated it really liked it

Shelves: books-of-2020, international-relations-classics

This was the second time reading this book. Honestly, the second time around I found this book to be rather boring. The theme of the book is as timely as ever, and I highly recommend reading something like it if you are interested in manias, panics, crashes (and financial fraud). As with the first time around, I appreciated the lack of bias and the common sense historical approach of the author. But this time around, I found elements of the book problematic.

The first problem is the academic ton This was the second time reading this book. Honestly, the second time around I found this book to be rather boring. The theme of the book is as timely as ever, and I highly recommend reading something like it if you are interested in manias, panics, crashes (and financial fraud). As with the first time around, I appreciated the lack of bias and the common sense historical approach of the author. But this time around, I found elements of the book problematic.

The first problem is the academic tone of the book. As a work of financial history, the book often found it necessary to deal with the theories and ideas of non-historians, particularly economists. Why? I found that historical analysis is often useful on its own merits and does not need to play too much with the theories of economists and their models. I also felt like the book would be better served dealing less with other academic works and more with establishing clearer historical narratives.

The second problem I found was the author's use of historical cases. As the book develops he uses a historical shorthand, reaching across cases to develop his themes. For someone like me not familiar with all the cases in-depth, this became a dizzying affair. The author has laid out a chart in the book of the book. This chart is useful, but it would have been better if the author had established a clear narrative without haphazard jumping between cases. It's a pain to have to jump to an appendix to figure out where and what is going on with a particular example.

And finally, the main thesis of the book: There should exist a lender of last resort, but the market should always be left wondering when and if it will come to the rescue.

When I first read the book, I found this argument to be reasonable and well-argued. But having read this argument, I was looking for more the second time around. Some ideas I missed. Some tidbit that would make me rethink the elements of this book. Unfortunately, I didn't find it.

I'm still interested in the subject matter and hope to find another book that can take me into the elements in way that is engaging and can challenge me a bit more. If possible, too, I would like this book to have a historical approach...but I would like the author to create clearer case studies and develop the patterns of human behavior in a more cogent way.

I'll keep my eyes open for just such a book. ...more

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Jan 16, 2020 Steve rated it it was ok

This work, I believe, takes first prize for the poorest editing of any recent read; it’s downright bad. While the message is important, the work is so choppy, disorganized and repetitive that it was mighty difficult to finish. I had this vision of someone updating this work at the corner bar, after first downing two or three pints of quality ale. Oh, for the poor student that finds this volume required reading. I’d be interested to see how the seventh edition compares to the first.

I feel a brief ...more

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Jan 06, 2015 James rated it it was ok

Shelves: finance

Was a bit disappointing,
most of the book is about events that happened more than 100 years ago,
short coverage of the last 80 years.

The book reads like 10 different people wrote parts of it
and didn't know what others were writing.

Some events are covered multiple times,
the south sea bubble has 16 entries, often saying the same thing.

Treasury sec Paulson was called Mr. Bailout in 2 separate parts that read the same.

I totally disagree that Lehmann bro should have been bailed out.
They piled on billio ...more

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Mar 08, 2016 Lewis Johnson rated it it was amazing · review of another edition

Shelves: classic, history-finance

Kindleberger's "Manias, Panics and Crashes" is a must read for anyone active in the markets. If you want to learn how to identify downcycles early, and to understand their progression and eventual end, look no further than Kindleberger's work.

While other worthy tomes, such as "History of Financial Disasters in 3 Volumes" cover much of the same material, the original organization of Kindleberger's work is what commends it. He disentangles the narrative of many financial disasters into their compo ...more

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Feb 21, 2016 Brad Pendleton rated it did not like it

Highly disappointing read. I read the book based on its reputation as the definitive work on extreme economic valuations.

I found a disconcertingly disjointed presentation. The book reads like a random sampling of the author's thoughts. There was not a linear/cohesive presentation of any of the historical bubbles. ...more

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Nov 14, 2013 Nick Klagge rated it liked it

Shelves: economics

This is a classic book in the financial world, but I was somewhat disappointed with it. Kindleberger uses Hyman Minsky's "anatomy" of financial crises to discuss commonalities between a number of different financial panics from different countries at different times in history. I had been hoping for more of a straightforward narrative description of each crisis, many of which, after all, occurred in unfamiliar settings. But in fact, Kindleberger uses the generic "crisis anatomy" as the structure ...more

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Oct 13, 2014 Martin rated it liked it · review of another edition

Shelves: history, economics

This book was referred to by another book I've been reading. This copy as gifted to me by my alma mater at an event where Professor Aliber, the co-author of this edition, spoke.

One of the most dense and therefore challenging books I've read. Every paragraph is jammed with facts. I think the book would be better if it had a few graphs and ignored corruption. There's plenty to digest here without getting into Ponzi, Madoff, or Enron. I also think some more perspective on why credit bubbles get in ...more

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Mar 05, 2015 Jennifer rated it it was ok

Shelves: library, psychology, history, social-issues, economics-and-finance

I think it would have been a lot more fun to sit down and talk with Kindleberger about his theories than to read this book. He clearly knew a lot on the subject, and I generally agreed with his ideas, but I found the way the book was organized hard to follow. A case of, "I'd have done it differently if I was writing it." ...more

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Aug 20, 2018 InvestingByTheBooks.com rated it really liked it

There are countless opinions about whether it's preferable to have a top-down or a bottom-up approach to investing. Typical value investors embrace the bottom-up approach where they mainly look at company fundamentals while others have a more open approach of considering factors as the business cycle and various macro factors. The top-down investor risks falling into the trap of predicting the unpredictable and the bottom-up approach got criticism after the financial crisis which hurt many value There are countless opinions about whether it's preferable to have a top-down or a bottom-up approach to investing. Typical value investors embrace the bottom-up approach where they mainly look at company fundamentals while others have a more open approach of considering factors as the business cycle and various macro factors. The top-down investor risks falling into the trap of predicting the unpredictable and the bottom-up approach got criticism after the financial crisis which hurt many value investors badly. Many have recovered well since then though. It is in my view useful for all investors to study financial history in order to learn from events of the past as it often repeats itself. In the words of George Santayana "Those who don't remember the past are condemned to repeat it".

Charles P. Kindleberger's Manias, Panics and Crashes is an oft-cited book in the realm of financial history and used in MBA programs across the world. Kindleberger was an economic historian and author of over thirty books and he originally published Manias, Panics and Crashes in 1978. During his career, he held senior roles within the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve and Bank for International Settlements. He finished his career as Professor of International Economics at MIT where he worked for more than thirty years. Robert Z. Aliber, who has updated the last three editions of the book, is a professor emeritus of International Economics and Finance at the University of Chicago.

The first couple of chapters presents a background of historical financial manias and typical patterns of how a mania evolves and how it turns to a panic and eventually a crash. Fraudulent behavior that is a typical theme towards the end of a mania is described with the examples of Charles Ponzi and Bernie Madoff as well as with instances of corporate frauds including Enron. The author summarizes some of the worst financial panics from the tulip mania in the 17th century, through the Great Depression in 1929 to the latest financial crisis in 2008 among others. The last couple of chapters of the book are primarily written for policy makers, advising on how to understand financial calamities in order to decide on the right policy from a fiscal and monetary perspective.

To sum up the main thesis of the book there are some typical factors that usually leads to a forthcoming mania and crash. The two most important factors have been increases of cross-border investment inflows as well as credit. The increases have typically led to rising stock- and real estate prices which have led to further increases in cross-border investment inflows and credit and in turn further increases in asset prices in a positive feedback cycle supported by behavioral phenomena. To cite from the book: "Asset bubbles - most asset bubbles - are a monetary phenomenon and result from the rapid growth of the supply of credit". The party has typically stopped when the creditors have got worried that debtors won't be able to pay back the loans and have in turn stopped issuing new loans. The debtors have relied on new loans to cover the interest payments and when the flow stops bankruptcies erupt.

As there are regularities in the financial crises the reading gets a bit monotonous at times. Also, I felt it was difficult to get a flow in the reading but that can probably be explained by it being a book written by academics for academics. It is not a must to read this book from cover to cover. The book is still a great source for investors who want to learn history in order to be able to be on alert for future occurrences. It's also a great start for those who want to dig into a specific event.

This is a book that is beneficial for both bottom-up and top-down investors. Just as individual companies, the stock market and currencies follow the investment market’s pendulum swings of euphoria to depression and overpricing to underpricing to use some of the terms often used by the legendary value investor Howard Marks. ...more

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Dec 23, 2017 Ari rated it really liked it · review of another edition

Written by an eminent economic historian, this book outlines what I believe is the standard view of bubbles, crashes and financial panics -- three closely related but not identical topics. The author's account goes something like this:

From time to time the price of some class of assets starts to rise and people get excited. Often there is some good reason for this -- railroads, canals, tech companies and so forth are real productive assets and people realize at some point that they have been pre Written by an eminent economic historian, this book outlines what I believe is the standard view of bubbles, crashes and financial panics -- three closely related but not identical topics. The author's account goes something like this:

From time to time the price of some class of assets starts to rise and people get excited. Often there is some good reason for this -- railroads, canals, tech companies and so forth are real productive assets and people realize at some point that they have been previously underestimating just how productive. Tulip bulbs with exciting pretty patterns also qualify -- a bulb that produces a new kind of flower is a capital asset, since you can produce many such flowers by cutting. The first third of the book documents this process.

As speculators pile in, the price of the asset grows higher than can be justified based on future cash flows. In addition to sincere promoters of the new asset, there are incompetents and frauds promising returns they can't reliably deliver, or have no intention to deliver. Insiders notice this and cash out. At some point the cycle goes into reverse -- often due to some prominent failure, sometimes due to simply a lack of new investors. Prices falter and fall. When people notice the decline, there's a feedback loop where everybody wants to sell "before the crowd" -- hence, the crash. The author traces this pattern with examples going back to the tulips, with special emphasis on English, French, and American panics from the South Sea bubble through 1929. Reading the book at the time I did, it was impossible not to think of Bitcoin. The second third of the book describes the crash and shows that it feels remarkably similar whether it's stock in the South Sea Company or a 2000-era Dotcom company.

Sometimes, a bubble can burst without drastic effect (e.g., the Dot-com bubble.) But sometimes the bubble is big enough, or has sensitive-enough investors, that it causes larger scale disruption. In particular, if people or banks had been borrowing against the now-worthless asset, the individual or bank will now be under water. At this point, creditors notice that they need to get their money out before the insolvent party goes bankrupt -- and there's a rush to call in loans and de-leverage. This cycle, if it grows big enough, is a panic. Anybody who was paying attention in the fall of 2008 knows what this looks like.

The last third of the book is devoted to discussing responses to panics. The author looks particularly at doing nothing, at declaring bank holidays, central bank cash infusions, and international rescues. The author notes that "bank holidays" [and their shorter-timescale equivalent, the trading circuit-breakers] rarely work -- those devices leave investors more anxious to get out quickly, while they still can, the next time. "Do nothing" is questionable: some problems do go away on their own as investors take their losses and move on; other times, the scale of financial deleveraging does a great deal of unnecessary damage. Rescues (domestic or foreign) do work, but have corresponding challenges -- they risk moral hazard,, and sometimes the rescuer doesn't have enough money to go through with it. The author at length concludes that we are little advanced over Walter Bagehot, the mid-19th-century economic journalist -- it's good to do rescues, when we can, but without being too consistent or predictable about it.

The book is written for both a professional-economist and lay readership. The author is at pains to draw contrasts between his view and either Marxists who assert that all investment and money is a sham or radical neoclassical types who assert that there are no bubbles, investors are always rational and things that look like bubbles and crashes are a misreading of the evidence. I found the book generally easy reading though was confused about technicalities at some points. ...more

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Aug 02, 2013 Dale Johnson rated it really liked it

I read the 1st edition written in 1977, published 1978. I understand that the book has been updated in later editions, the 6th written in 2006. It was written during the height of the California housing bubble which saw Bay-area studio apartment rent go as high as $1000 per month when 3-bedroom home mortgages elsewhere were running in the $400-$500 range. It is an eerie foreshadowing of the true mania that seized the country in 2004 when the government communicated its intent to effectively free ...more

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Mar 09, 2019 Henrik Haapala rated it it was amazing

Shelves: how-to-make-better-decisions-2020, science-2020, new-perspective-2020, wealth, classic, classics-2020, how-to, how-to-2020, making-money-2020

”The last 400 years have been replete with financial crises, which often followed increases in the supplies of credit, greater investor optimism, and more rapid economic growth.”

“There have been 4 waves of banking crises; a large number of lenders in 3,4, or more countries collapsed at about the same time as the prices of real estate and securities in these countries and the prices of their currencies fell sharply. Each country that experienced a banking crisis also had a recession as household ...more

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Nov 30, 2015 Anthony rated it it was amazing · review of another edition

There have been many attempts to explain the GFC – greed, irrational behaviours, bell curve, derivatives, excessive leverage, failures by rating agencies, regulatory failure, etc, which all can be groups as a demand side shock.
This book artfully presents (or had presented) another factor, excess capital floating around in the world built by the current account surpluses from the economic imbalance since 60’s. This is more of a supply side shock, which no one has control over after the collapse ...more

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Feb 13, 2014 Ernie Lavagetto rated it it was amazing

This is not the easiest book to read without some prior knowledge of economic history. That said it is probably the most complete book on the history and causes of economic upheavals from the 17th century to 2010 available to the non-economist.

In particular the authors have identified what they call the 4 waves of international financial disaster in the last 40 years. Perhaps the most striking conclusion one can draw from their study is how similar the causes of each wave has been. If you take t ...more

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Jan 30, 2015 Francisco rated it liked it · review of another edition

Shelves: economics

A good introductory book to the history of financial cycles, but only for people with some background in economics.
I didn't like the style. Many times it felt like an endless list of historical examples that illustrate an idea. The idea that financial crises across the world are connected is repeated ad nauseam. Lehman Brothers didn't deserve its own chapter.
It doesn't read as a treatise on the economics causes and consequences of financial cycles, panics, etc., and it doesn't read as an econom ...more

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May 23, 2015 Dylan rated it really liked it

The 2000 edition reads like a playbook for the collapse and bailout of of 2008. Both the descriptions and proscriptions of this book, especially its focus on the lender of last resort, seem to be amazingly prescient though it probably just that this iconic text was on the bookshelf of every major player in the fed at the time.
The book is not written for a general audience and some of the econ jargon gave me trouble as a non-specialist but it's not insurmountable. It is a historical and non-quan ...more

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Jul 02, 2014 Jim Angstadt rated it it was ok

Shelves: dnf

Bailed early; just could not get into the topic, and the sentence structure and phrasing felt odd.

keywords: bubble finance recession

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Nov 25, 2014 Adam McNamara rated it liked it

Shelves: history, economics

Important material delivered in a dry, difficult to follow narrative.

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May 20, 2017 B rated it really liked it

Interesting book, I would have been able to appreciate it more if I had a better grounding in economic and monetary theory

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May 06, 2020 Alexander Paul rated it it was ok · review of another edition

Reads like a textbook at times and also has a confusing timeline as it often jumps back and forth between economic catastrophes throughout global history.

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Aug 19, 2020 Franta rated it really liked it

The conclusion is: Lender of the last resort is indeed helpful in panics and crises.
This book tells you all the ways banks fall - surely useful for the coming years!

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May 09, 2020 Rob Price rated it liked it

Touted as a must read for anyone with an interest in global macro investing, I probably had too higher expectations. It’s filled with quality financial history, which should provide useful references against which to compare current events. Kindleberger, like his teacher Minsky, were students of credit cycles and the flow of global capital. I enjoyed the way in which he sketched the linkages between the financial crises of the last 50 years. From the inflationary 70s and the oil price shock of t ...more

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Jul 30, 2020 Tasos Manouras rated it liked it

OMG I am finally done.

Have never read a book that galvanizes its title to your soul as much as this has.

Neverending examples that seem to be repeating themselves over and over, transcending time, culture, political beliefs and geography.

More often than enough, the examples, well researched as they might be, seem to be portraying only parts of the problem. Conclusions are easy to be drawn when an event has passed and been thoroughly documented.

Was expecting more conclusions as to what awaits ...more

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Jun 16, 2020 Michael rated it liked it

The conclusion is very sharply summarized in the introduction and for me was 80% of what i will take away.
This book would have been easier to follow if i had more awareness of the economic history is goes over.
Overall this book is very dry.

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Nov 22, 2019 Alberto rated it liked it

very complete book about the topic but a bit heavy and at times obscure for the layman

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Oct 29, 2011 Void lon iXaarii rated it it was ok

The data in this book is very rich indeed, but the read was however rather confusing, in my opinion because of the way the author keeps jumping through history and countries without establishing contexts or a timeline for reasons which seemed to me to be meant to justify categories and groupings that to me seemed not very obvious or at least only useful with the perfect 20/20 hindsight vision of the past.

As to his conclusions I have read different views by other authors on some of the panics me The data in this book is very rich indeed, but the read was however rather confusing, in my opinion because of the way the author keeps jumping through history and countries without establishing contexts or a timeline for reasons which seemed to me to be meant to justify categories and groupings that to me seemed not very obvious or at least only useful with the perfect 20/20 hindsight vision of the past.

As to his conclusions I have read different views by other authors on some of the panics mentioned which made (to me, obviously) more sense. To disclose, my bias is that i found it quite unjust that in his desire to fix or at least do something, the author never seems to me to really ask about the costs born by the average citizen by the requested interventions. Indeed he seems to me to ascribe to the view which seems standard all through history: your government may promise you not to save those involved but eventually always seems to do, at least for those well connected enough. It's happened so many times through the centuries and it's such a recurring theme that (to my personal moral outrage) there's even a general formed strategy (to which the author seems to ascribe) of reassuring lying threats/promises until the last possible moment... followed by a shock and awe hyper reaction with cannons and bazookas.

As often is the case in government intervention advocacy situations, the focus is on those seen, and the things that can be measured by those in power, but not the (i believe) bigger hurt to those denied or hurt on the sidelines, be they businesses crowded out (i'm sure there are many industries who would like that amount of government help and support) or individuals who's savings are inflated away (because somebody has to pay for all those shock and awe interventions).

That being said however, the book does contain a lot of information and obviously the author knows and has done a lot of historical research. I would love to see more books like this... except with a better timeline maybe :D It's confusing to jump centuries back and forth, skipping countries without contexts. It often felt like the book is written for those who are already familiar with all the events told and is meant as just a synthesis (or rather an interpretation?) of those events. ...more

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Aug 10, 2017 Andrew rated it it was ok

Anyone who picks up this book hoping it may help make sense of what's going on in the world and the economy would be bitterly disappointed. Majority of the text reads as one long list of historic events that author doesn't even recount, but simply refers to. If you haven't read extensively on the history of the events in question it probably would make very little sense and a rather tedious reading. Moreover, any trace of analysis, opinion and conclusions postponed till the very last chapter and ...more

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Jun 01, 2015 Jenn M rated it liked it

I enjoyed this book first as an economics student in my undergraduate college course of study. It was read back then as a means to achieving a passing grade on a section test in the economics class. I recently had cause to re-read this book, and was surprised to be able to observe the connections between historical financial crises and economic events in our current economy. With all of the talk about stock market manipulation, derivative fraud, and the imminent collapse of the global economic s ...more

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Jun 13, 2011 May Ling rated it really liked it · review of another edition

Shelves: finance

This book gives a broad attempts to draw some lessons from the variety of manias, panics, and crashes that have occurred throughout history. I personally believe that one must read a bit more about each of these historical events first to really appreciate what the author is attempting to convey. However, if one is looking for a general overview, this is a good piece. I applaud the author for adding updates to the book post its first writing keeping his basic thesis current even in today's envir ...more

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About Charles P. Kindleberger

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Economic historian. More at Wikipedia ...more

Books by Charles P. Kindleberger

Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, Seventh Edition by Charles P. Kindleberger, Palgrave Macmillan

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“This book is an essay in what is derogatorily called "literary economics," as opposed to mathematical economics, econometrics, or (embracing them both) the "new economic history." A man does what he can, and in the more elegant - one is tempted to say "fancier" - techniques I am, as one who received his formation in the 1930s, untutored. A colleague has offered to provide a mathematical model to decorate the work. It might be useful to some readers, but not to me. Catastrophe mathematics, dealing with such events as falling off a height, is a new branch of the discipline, I am told, which has yet to demonstrate its rigor or usefulness. I had better wait. Econometricians among my friends tell me that rare events such as panics cannot be dealt with by the normal techniques of regression, but have to be introduced exogenously as "dummy variables." The real choice open to me was whether to follow relatively simple statistical procedures, with an abundance of charts and tables, or not. In the event, I decided against it. For those who yearn for numbers, standard series on bank reserves, foreign trade, commodity prices, money supply, security prices, rate of interest, and the like are fairly readily available in the historical statistics.” — 5 likes

“Money is a public good; as such, it lends itself to private exploitation.” — 3 likes

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