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Osprey Campaign #318
The Kuban 1943: The Wehrmacht's last stand in the Caucasus
In the summer of 1942, the Wehrmacht invaded the Caucasus in order to overrun critical oil production facilities at Maikop, Grozny, and Baku. However, the Red Army stopped the Germans short of their objectives and then launched a devastating winter counteroffensive that encircled them at Stalingrad. Consequently, Hitler grudgingly ordered an evacuation from the Caucasus, but ordered 17. Armee to fortify the Kuban bridgehead and hold it at all costs in order to leave open the possibility of future offensives. On the other side, the Soviet Stavka ordered the North Caucasus Front and the Black Sea Fleet to eliminate the Kuban bridgehead as soon as possible. The stage was set for a contest between an immovable object and an unstoppable force.
With the help of stunning specially commissioned artwork, this book tells the enthralling story of the impressive but strategically foolish German stand at Kuban, which tied down seven Soviet armies in a sideshow battle of attrition, which the Soviets dubbed "the Kuban meat grinder."
With the help of stunning specially commissioned artwork, this book tells the enthralling story of the impressive but strategically foolish German stand at Kuban, which tied down seven Soviet armies in a sideshow battle of attrition, which the Soviets dubbed "the Kuban meat grinder."
- GenresHistoryMilitary History
96 pages, Paperback
Published February 20, 2018
About the author
Robert Forczyk
65 books76 followersRobert Forczyk has a PhD in International Relations and National Security from the University of Maryland and a strong background in European and Asian military history.
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December 6, 2024
An excellent summary of this campaign
Any review of this book would have to start off by emphasizing that it is part of Osprey Publishing's "Campaign" series. For the uninitiated, these books are relatively short at only 96 pages, very roughly a third of which consists of illustration of one type or another (i.e., maps, contemporaneous photographs, etc.).
Hence for anyone looking for a comprehensive academic study this is not the book. The relevant question here is how does the book do considering the limitations of its format? The answer is excellent.
The book follows the typical "Campaign" series format and starts off with an "origins of the campaign" section that provides a strategic picture of the events leading to the campaign. Then the book goes into the next section "opposing commanders". This section covers, unfortunately, only the highest level commanders on both sides. There is nothing said regarding lower level leadership (i.e., NCOs, captains, etc.) which was overwhelmingly better on the German side and was a key factor in the campaign not becoming a total disaster for the Germans. It was this superior lower level leadership that enabled the Germans to withstand so many Soviet attacks and launch the many local counter-attacks that quickly sealed any gaps forming in the German lines. With respect to both sides, their high level commanders were mediocre albeit the German's were marginally better.
The book then provides an overview of each side's forces. The Germans (and Rumanians) had, roughly, half the number of troops that the Soviets had (about 225,000 vs 400,000) for most of the campaign. In addition, both sides considered this a low priority front hence equipment in the theatre was second rate on both sides and equipment was not exactly plentiful or even functional for that matter. For example, only 10-20% of German trucks were operational, 20-30% of German infantry weapons were non-functional, a larger share than usual of the German forces were equipped with mediocre captured equipment instead of more modern German made equipment, the only panzer division consisted of only a handful of tanks and the inadequate amount of German artillery suffered from lack of mobility due to the lack of towing vehicles. On the Soviet side, most equipment was of the type that the Soviets refused to use on other fronts (i.e., T-60 tanks, second rate aircraft types, etc.) and the troops consisted of only a small proportion of veterans.
The Soviets also, for most of the period of the campaign had more aircraft than the Germans (though at key points of the campaign this was not necessarily the case) and the Soviet Navy greatly outnumbered the German. The problem however, from the Soviet point of view, was that they just could not coordinate their air, land and sea forces and they did not make use of air and sea forces to try to interdict German-Rumanian supply runs from the Crimea to the Kuban. This was critical as the Germans and Rumanians were barely able to keep supplying the minimum amount of supplies the German army needed.
The book then goes into each side's strategy. In short, the Axis' strategy was to pin down as large a Soviet force as possible and to inflict as many casualties as possible. In this they succeeded as they tied down twice the number of Soviet troops and inflicted casualties at a 7-to-1 ratio (Soviet forces suffered about 472,000 casualties about 120,000 of which consisted of dead or missing compared to the Axis' about 65,000 casualties about 16,000 of which consisted of dead or missing). On the negative side, the roughly 225,000 Axis troops could have been better used elsewhere, especially considering the horrendous loses they were suffering on other fronts. The Soviet strategy, on the other hand, was simply to kick the Axis out of the Kuban. Considering the fact that they assumed that any pressure by them on the Axis would prompt an eager retreat this was not considered a difficult task. This is not what happened however.
The book then goes into how the battle played out. Geography played a very important role here as the extensive marshes and mountains, with little offensive-friendly topography, made it relatively easy for the Germans to defend. Plus, the Germans had built extensive defensive fieldworks with minefields and barbed wire. They did not build concrete and other heavy fortifications though. The defensive lines consisted basically of trenches and a small number of wooden pillboxes. Hence this front looked very much like the Western Front of WWI. And it played out that way too. The Soviets kept launching massive wave like attacks that lead to horrendous losses. Whenever gaps appeared the Germans launched local counter-attacks that sealed them. This is not to say that the Soviets did not try to bypass German and Rumanian defenses through extensive amphibious assaults but the overwhelming majority of these failed. The only notable amphibious success was a lodgment that grew to 20,000 troops near Novorossiysk. This was a persistent thorn in the Axis side but the Soviets were never able to make good use of it by breaking out and cutting of the lines of Axis supply and retreat.
In the long-term, eventually, the Axis started to retreat in steps to a number of defensive lines until they finally, via the sea, retreated to the Crimea. The amphibious evacuation (codenamed operation Brunhild) was an unqualified success with the axis completing the evacuation of approximately 225,000 men, all their equipment and in the thousands of tons of supplies. This retreat and evacuation very much reminds one of the Axis retreat through and evacuation of Sicily.
The author, Dr. Robert Forczyk, concludes that this campaign was a waste from the perspective of both sides. In his opinion this was because, from the German perspective, it tied down some 225,000 men that could have been "better used elsewhere" and from the Soviet as it tied down double that and lead them to having seven times the losses as the Germans. In this reviewer's opinion this assessment is not that clear cut. Could it really be said that, considering the ratio of Axis-to-Soviet troops tied down and the loss ratios that both sides unequivocally lost? To answer this question, one would have to argue that the German forces, if used elsewhere, could have had a benefit at least equal to this. Unfortunately the author does not do this. In this reviewer's opinion the only real weakness of the book. All and all an excellent overview of this campaign.
Any review of this book would have to start off by emphasizing that it is part of Osprey Publishing's "Campaign" series. For the uninitiated, these books are relatively short at only 96 pages, very roughly a third of which consists of illustration of one type or another (i.e., maps, contemporaneous photographs, etc.).
Hence for anyone looking for a comprehensive academic study this is not the book. The relevant question here is how does the book do considering the limitations of its format? The answer is excellent.
The book follows the typical "Campaign" series format and starts off with an "origins of the campaign" section that provides a strategic picture of the events leading to the campaign. Then the book goes into the next section "opposing commanders". This section covers, unfortunately, only the highest level commanders on both sides. There is nothing said regarding lower level leadership (i.e., NCOs, captains, etc.) which was overwhelmingly better on the German side and was a key factor in the campaign not becoming a total disaster for the Germans. It was this superior lower level leadership that enabled the Germans to withstand so many Soviet attacks and launch the many local counter-attacks that quickly sealed any gaps forming in the German lines. With respect to both sides, their high level commanders were mediocre albeit the German's were marginally better.
The book then provides an overview of each side's forces. The Germans (and Rumanians) had, roughly, half the number of troops that the Soviets had (about 225,000 vs 400,000) for most of the campaign. In addition, both sides considered this a low priority front hence equipment in the theatre was second rate on both sides and equipment was not exactly plentiful or even functional for that matter. For example, only 10-20% of German trucks were operational, 20-30% of German infantry weapons were non-functional, a larger share than usual of the German forces were equipped with mediocre captured equipment instead of more modern German made equipment, the only panzer division consisted of only a handful of tanks and the inadequate amount of German artillery suffered from lack of mobility due to the lack of towing vehicles. On the Soviet side, most equipment was of the type that the Soviets refused to use on other fronts (i.e., T-60 tanks, second rate aircraft types, etc.) and the troops consisted of only a small proportion of veterans.
The Soviets also, for most of the period of the campaign had more aircraft than the Germans (though at key points of the campaign this was not necessarily the case) and the Soviet Navy greatly outnumbered the German. The problem however, from the Soviet point of view, was that they just could not coordinate their air, land and sea forces and they did not make use of air and sea forces to try to interdict German-Rumanian supply runs from the Crimea to the Kuban. This was critical as the Germans and Rumanians were barely able to keep supplying the minimum amount of supplies the German army needed.
The book then goes into each side's strategy. In short, the Axis' strategy was to pin down as large a Soviet force as possible and to inflict as many casualties as possible. In this they succeeded as they tied down twice the number of Soviet troops and inflicted casualties at a 7-to-1 ratio (Soviet forces suffered about 472,000 casualties about 120,000 of which consisted of dead or missing compared to the Axis' about 65,000 casualties about 16,000 of which consisted of dead or missing). On the negative side, the roughly 225,000 Axis troops could have been better used elsewhere, especially considering the horrendous loses they were suffering on other fronts. The Soviet strategy, on the other hand, was simply to kick the Axis out of the Kuban. Considering the fact that they assumed that any pressure by them on the Axis would prompt an eager retreat this was not considered a difficult task. This is not what happened however.
The book then goes into how the battle played out. Geography played a very important role here as the extensive marshes and mountains, with little offensive-friendly topography, made it relatively easy for the Germans to defend. Plus, the Germans had built extensive defensive fieldworks with minefields and barbed wire. They did not build concrete and other heavy fortifications though. The defensive lines consisted basically of trenches and a small number of wooden pillboxes. Hence this front looked very much like the Western Front of WWI. And it played out that way too. The Soviets kept launching massive wave like attacks that lead to horrendous losses. Whenever gaps appeared the Germans launched local counter-attacks that sealed them. This is not to say that the Soviets did not try to bypass German and Rumanian defenses through extensive amphibious assaults but the overwhelming majority of these failed. The only notable amphibious success was a lodgment that grew to 20,000 troops near Novorossiysk. This was a persistent thorn in the Axis side but the Soviets were never able to make good use of it by breaking out and cutting of the lines of Axis supply and retreat.
In the long-term, eventually, the Axis started to retreat in steps to a number of defensive lines until they finally, via the sea, retreated to the Crimea. The amphibious evacuation (codenamed operation Brunhild) was an unqualified success with the axis completing the evacuation of approximately 225,000 men, all their equipment and in the thousands of tons of supplies. This retreat and evacuation very much reminds one of the Axis retreat through and evacuation of Sicily.
The author, Dr. Robert Forczyk, concludes that this campaign was a waste from the perspective of both sides. In his opinion this was because, from the German perspective, it tied down some 225,000 men that could have been "better used elsewhere" and from the Soviet as it tied down double that and lead them to having seven times the losses as the Germans. In this reviewer's opinion this assessment is not that clear cut. Could it really be said that, considering the ratio of Axis-to-Soviet troops tied down and the loss ratios that both sides unequivocally lost? To answer this question, one would have to argue that the German forces, if used elsewhere, could have had a benefit at least equal to this. Unfortunately the author does not do this. In this reviewer's opinion the only real weakness of the book. All and all an excellent overview of this campaign.
Displaying 1 of 1 review