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The End of Grand Strategy: US Maritime Operations in the Twenty-First Century
In The End of Grand Strateg y, Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski challenge the common view of grand strategy as unitary. They eschew prescription of any one specific approach, chosen from a spectrum that stretches from global primacy to restraint and isolationism, in favor of describing what America’s military actually does, day to day. They argue that a series of fundamental recent changes in the global system, the inevitable jostling of bureaucratic politics, and the practical limitations of field operations combine to ensure that each presidential administration inevitably resorts to a variety of strategies. Proponents of different American grand strategies have historically focused on the pivotal role of the Navy. In response, Reich and Dombrowski examine six major maritime operations, each of which reflects one major strategy. One size does not fit all, say the authors―the attempt to impose a single overarching blueprint is no longer feasible. Reich and Dombrowski declare that grand strategy, as we know it, is dead. The End of Grand Strategy is essential reading for policymakers, military strategists, and analysts and critics at advocacy groups and think tanks.
- GenresMilitary FictionPolitics
252 pages, Hardcover
Published January 15, 2018
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
November 24, 2019
There's an aesthetic appeal to grand strategy. Designing a single over-arching, elegant scheme that can organise 'all' elements of national power. This goal has led to a boom industry of academic papers, think tank reports and commentary. And most of it is completely useless.
In 'The End of Grand Strategy', Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski show that such formulations typically ignore the complexity and limits of American power and the operational realities of achieving American interests. Wisely limiting their analysis to the US Navy, they show that across the world the US follows very different guiding policies and principles, driven as much by military practices as by any direct guiding strategic influence from Washington.
Along with their general critique of the concept of Grand Strategy, the book is also a useful analysis of the strengths and limits of the different types of Grand Strategy found in the literature today. In particular, the clarification of the 'Sponsorship' method (think US supporting regional actors) which has a long and important history but is often overlooked in favour of the 'do it all' notions of primacy or the 'ignore it all' logic of isolationism.
As much as I wanted to like this book, I did have some reservations. There was a presumption that current practice was necessarily superior to theoretical alternatives. While the stress on operational realities is a very useful reminder, military needs and habits of tradition should not be the driving forces in why the US acts as it does around the world. Indeed, some grand strategies such as Restraint have emerged precisely as a critique to this view, worrying that too often the US approach has become about the needs of the implementers, rather than those on behalf it is being implemented.
What's needed therefore is an approach that can both avoid the vanity and conceit of grand strategy, is focused on the feasible instead of the desirable, and yet still provides clear principles to ensure the instrument of national military power continues to play a tune set to the needs of the government and people. How to find these right notes, avoiding both absurd notions of control, while still pursuing harmony of interests and actions is one of the key challenges of our times. In this, Reich and Dombrowski have made a very useful contribution.
In 'The End of Grand Strategy', Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski show that such formulations typically ignore the complexity and limits of American power and the operational realities of achieving American interests. Wisely limiting their analysis to the US Navy, they show that across the world the US follows very different guiding policies and principles, driven as much by military practices as by any direct guiding strategic influence from Washington.
Along with their general critique of the concept of Grand Strategy, the book is also a useful analysis of the strengths and limits of the different types of Grand Strategy found in the literature today. In particular, the clarification of the 'Sponsorship' method (think US supporting regional actors) which has a long and important history but is often overlooked in favour of the 'do it all' notions of primacy or the 'ignore it all' logic of isolationism.
As much as I wanted to like this book, I did have some reservations. There was a presumption that current practice was necessarily superior to theoretical alternatives. While the stress on operational realities is a very useful reminder, military needs and habits of tradition should not be the driving forces in why the US acts as it does around the world. Indeed, some grand strategies such as Restraint have emerged precisely as a critique to this view, worrying that too often the US approach has become about the needs of the implementers, rather than those on behalf it is being implemented.
What's needed therefore is an approach that can both avoid the vanity and conceit of grand strategy, is focused on the feasible instead of the desirable, and yet still provides clear principles to ensure the instrument of national military power continues to play a tune set to the needs of the government and people. How to find these right notes, avoiding both absurd notions of control, while still pursuing harmony of interests and actions is one of the key challenges of our times. In this, Reich and Dombrowski have made a very useful contribution.
July 18, 2023
Overview of theories of Grand Strategy, the advantages and disadvantages, followed by the current state of affairs, and trouble spots.
Why I started this book: I'm working my way through the Professional Reading list and this one was at my library.
Why I finished it: Dense, detailed and hardcover, it's been a while since I read a serious book like this and it took me a while to get my groove back. Interesting perspective on what the Navy brings to national defense, what it wants to bring, what it's asked to bring, and what it's budgeted for, are three completely different things. The process only gets murkier with the desire to do it all alone or to work closely with allies.
Why I started this book: I'm working my way through the Professional Reading list and this one was at my library.
Why I finished it: Dense, detailed and hardcover, it's been a while since I read a serious book like this and it took me a while to get my groove back. Interesting perspective on what the Navy brings to national defense, what it wants to bring, what it's asked to bring, and what it's budgeted for, are three completely different things. The process only gets murkier with the desire to do it all alone or to work closely with allies.
July 16, 2021
This book is a tough but worthwhile read based more on speculation than theory. The biggest takeaway I uncovered was the further highlighting of the widening gap between our military and the civilian leaders appointed to serve as their heads and the broader political establishment as a whole. Worth the read but it may take two or three passes to glean the major points of the authors thesis.
January 31, 2022
What is sunlight, brilliant & laser-like in its intensity & monochromatic quality, but when diffused is shown to be nothing more than the a beautiful blending of seven colors across a broad spectrum that mimics the rainbow?
The above paragraph, is my summary of the authors' position on a possible U.S. strategy, if given that U.S. retains it preeminent position into the foreseeable future, in safeguarding the global commons. The authors, recognizing U.S. predominance & status as a global maritime power, lays out three overarching strategies based on present-day American maritime operations, with each being divided into two sub-strategies; giving a total of six methods of engagements, from absolute unilateralism to cooperative multilateralism with shades in-between, employed by U.S. in overseeing the global maritime pathways.
Whether these underlying & diverse strategies arose out of instinctual understanding of American limitations or out of operational necessities, the authors suggest that the U.S. should embrace the idea that not one single path may lead to the ultimate end of ensuring the stability & security of the global commons. The authors suggest a term "selective engagement", but I propose that "spectrum engagement" perhaps best fit the conceit advocated by this book.
In essence, the authors are implicitly arguing that strategy can be either a broad, narrow, or selected band in a wide spectrum that may preoccupy a nation for a particular period of time, depending upon the circumstances. But it should not lose sight of the fact that while it may not be engaged in the other bands, it does not mean those areas do not feature or remain irrelevant.
On another note, this book has shed for me quite a bit of light, in terms of unspoken aims aimed at or narratives about near-peers or rival nations, on certain maritime operations currently being carried out by U.S. naval forces throughout the world.
The above paragraph, is my summary of the authors' position on a possible U.S. strategy, if given that U.S. retains it preeminent position into the foreseeable future, in safeguarding the global commons. The authors, recognizing U.S. predominance & status as a global maritime power, lays out three overarching strategies based on present-day American maritime operations, with each being divided into two sub-strategies; giving a total of six methods of engagements, from absolute unilateralism to cooperative multilateralism with shades in-between, employed by U.S. in overseeing the global maritime pathways.
Whether these underlying & diverse strategies arose out of instinctual understanding of American limitations or out of operational necessities, the authors suggest that the U.S. should embrace the idea that not one single path may lead to the ultimate end of ensuring the stability & security of the global commons. The authors suggest a term "selective engagement", but I propose that "spectrum engagement" perhaps best fit the conceit advocated by this book.
In essence, the authors are implicitly arguing that strategy can be either a broad, narrow, or selected band in a wide spectrum that may preoccupy a nation for a particular period of time, depending upon the circumstances. But it should not lose sight of the fact that while it may not be engaged in the other bands, it does not mean those areas do not feature or remain irrelevant.
On another note, this book has shed for me quite a bit of light, in terms of unspoken aims aimed at or narratives about near-peers or rival nations, on certain maritime operations currently being carried out by U.S. naval forces throughout the world.
March 20, 2021
More than just boats
This concise well researched and written study in grand strategy is a must read for strategists and military planners. A quick and easy read, the book outlines grand strategy, quoting a personal favorite Liddell Hart, and then focuses the reader on maritime operations in support of US goals and end states (or lack there of). I really liked it and was enthralled.
This concise well researched and written study in grand strategy is a must read for strategists and military planners. A quick and easy read, the book outlines grand strategy, quoting a personal favorite Liddell Hart, and then focuses the reader on maritime operations in support of US goals and end states (or lack there of). I really liked it and was enthralled.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews