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Modern War Studies
The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940
"A distinguished and provocative book that makes a major contribution to the fields of air power history and German military history."—Dennis Showalter, author of Tannenburg: Clash of Empires
"A first-rate, convincing, and impeccably researched account of the forging of the Luftwaffe's operational doctrine that carried it through the opening campaigns of the Second World War."—Richard R. Muller, author of The German Air War in Russia
"A great achievement that impresses by the author's comprehensive grasp of his subject.—Horst Boog, editor of The Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War
"Against the dogma that the Luftwaffe was merely a 'tactical air force,' Corum provides some powerful arguments. His work is a necessary correction to the historical record."—Klaus A. Maier, coauthor of the multivolume Germany and the Second World War
"The best account of the development of the Luftwaffe's operational doctrine and theory to appear in any language."—Edward L. Homze, author of Arming the Luftwaffe: The Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry
"This lucid and vigorously argued volume can be warmly recommended to everyone interested in the history of air power in the first half of the twentieth century."—Brian Bond, author of The Pursuit of Victory and War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970
Author Biography: James S. Corum is professor of comparative military studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base and the author of The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform.
392 pages, Paperback
First published July 1, 1997
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
May 29, 2020
An excellent history of the rise of the Luftwaffe, beginning with the remnants of World War I and concluding with the commencement of the Second World War, at which point Corum gives a rather brief overview of the campaigns against Poland, France and the Low Countries, and the Battle of Britain. His work is extensively researched and argued with great clarity. Truly a must-read for any Luftwaffe historian or enthusiast!
February 21, 2022
The Luftwaffe was established in 1933. Six years later it was the best operational air force in the world. How on earth did this happen? Read this book to find out.
First of all, it had the typical German advantages: World-class aeronautical engineering. Sound practical military thought. Thorough joint training and exercise. Well-organized logistics and support that allowed operations from airfields close to the front, allowing pilots to fly 3-4 sorties per day.
Then there was carefully evaluated operational experience in the Spanish Civil War.
And the German airmen were not mesmerized by the vision of strategic bombing quickly winning a war all by itself, as the USAAF and the RAF were. The Germans recognized the value of strategic bombing, and even viewed it at the primary mission of the Luftwaffe, but they also recognized the importance of cooperating with the army in a joint campaign. It's true that the Luftwaffe never deployed an effective heavy bomber, but it wasn't for lack of trying; they were just a few years behind the US and the UK in the high-power engines necessary, and their development took a wrong turn to focus on dive bombing after that proved so effective in Spain. Anyway, their primary possible adversaries (France, Poland, Czechoslovakia) were well within medium bomber range.
By the way, the horrifying terror bombing of Guernica, made infamous by Picasso, was no such thing. Guernica was a small town of 5000 not far behind the front lines. It was bombed because it was thought to be a center for reinforcing the front. All the rest was Spanish Republican propaganda.
First of all, it had the typical German advantages: World-class aeronautical engineering. Sound practical military thought. Thorough joint training and exercise. Well-organized logistics and support that allowed operations from airfields close to the front, allowing pilots to fly 3-4 sorties per day.
Then there was carefully evaluated operational experience in the Spanish Civil War.
And the German airmen were not mesmerized by the vision of strategic bombing quickly winning a war all by itself, as the USAAF and the RAF were. The Germans recognized the value of strategic bombing, and even viewed it at the primary mission of the Luftwaffe, but they also recognized the importance of cooperating with the army in a joint campaign. It's true that the Luftwaffe never deployed an effective heavy bomber, but it wasn't for lack of trying; they were just a few years behind the US and the UK in the high-power engines necessary, and their development took a wrong turn to focus on dive bombing after that proved so effective in Spain. Anyway, their primary possible adversaries (France, Poland, Czechoslovakia) were well within medium bomber range.
By the way, the horrifying terror bombing of Guernica, made infamous by Picasso, was no such thing. Guernica was a small town of 5000 not far behind the front lines. It was bombed because it was thought to be a center for reinforcing the front. All the rest was Spanish Republican propaganda.
January 24, 2022
Too much of an apologist for the men of the Luftwaffe for my taste. Feels like Corum is going out of his way to try to prove they weren't really bad Nazi's, would have been better if he'd just avoided that judgement altogether and focused on writing a history centered on the operational military lessons we can learn from them. Insofar as the book does focus on operational military lessons it is quite good.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews