Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945

by Thomas G. Mahnken

No nation in recent history has placed greater emphasis on the role of technology in planning and waging war than the United States. In World War II the wholesale mobilization of American science and technology culminated in the detonation of the atomic bomb. Competition with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, combined with the U.S. Navy's culture of distributed command and the rapid growth of information technology, spawned the concept of network-centric warfare. And America's post-Cold War conflicts in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan have highlighted America's edge.

From the atom bomb to the spy satellites of the Cold War, the strategic limitations of the Vietnam War, and the technological triumphs of the Gulf war, Thomas G. Mahnken follows the development and integration of new technologies into the military and emphasizes their influence on the organization, mission, and culture of the armed services. In some cases, advancements in technology have forced different branches of the military to develop competing or superior weaponry, but more often than not the armed services have molded technology to suit their own purposes, remaining resilient in the face of technological challenges.

Mahnken concludes with an examination of the reemergence of the traditional American way of war, which uses massive force to engage the enemy. Tying together six decades of debate concerning U.S. military affairs, he discusses how the armed forces might exploit the unique opportunities of the information revolution in the future.

Genres: Military History

256 pages, Hardcover

First published June 1, 2008

Reviews

[Casey · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good book, providing an overview of the interaction between technological development and the flow of American military strategy since WWII. The author, Thomas G. Mahnken, gives a detailed history of American military advancements over the last 80 years and how these advances interacted with military strategy. Mahnken divides the period up into a series of phases, each of which had its own unique military strategic theme correlating to the state of military technology of the time. From the early Cold War’s development of atomic weapons and nuclear strategies through to the Global War on Terror’s techno-military policies, Mahnken gives a detailed summary of the systems at the forefront of the U.S. military’s arsenal and the strategic goals they enabled. The author shows how technology and strategy were correlated, but how neither really had a dominant causal position; strategy is not always shaped by technology but never is it completely immune from its influence. I liked how Mahnken separated out the various services in his analysis, showing how each military culture adapts technology in its own way. Highly recommended for anyone interested in the development of military capability since WWII and its effect on the flow of strategy.