Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read.

Start by marking “Blitzkrieg: From the Ground Up” as Want to Read:

Other editions

Enlarge cover

Rate this book

Clear rating

1 of 5 stars 2 of 5 stars 3 of 5 stars 4 of 5 stars 5 of 5 stars

Open Preview

Blitzkrieg: From the Ground Up

Niklas Zetterling

3.82 · Rating details · 91 ratings · 8 reviews

An examination of the German Blitzkrieg operations from Poland to Operation Barbarossa, as experienced by junior commanders and enlisted men, exploring why they were so successful.

The successes of the German Blitzkrieg in 1939-41 were as surprising as they were swift. Allied decision-makers wanted to discover the secret to German success quickly, even though only partial, ...more

Get A Copy

Hardcover, 288 pages

Published March 31st 2017 by Casemate

More Details... Edit Details

Friend Reviews

To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up.

Reader Q&A

To ask other readers questions about Blitzkrieg, please sign up.

Be the first to ask a question about Blitzkrieg

Lists with This Book

This book is not yet featured on Listopia. Add this book to your favorite list »

Community Reviews

Showing 1-30

Average rating 3.82 ·

Rating details

· 91 ratings · 8 reviews

More filters

Sort order

Start your review of Blitzkrieg: From the Ground Up

Nov 27, 2020 Chris Esposo rated it really liked it · review of another edition

While I appreciated the level of detail provided in this book in terms of maps, the correlation of forces (or the accounting of equipment, unit type, and number), I felt the underlying thesis of the book, that “Blitzkrieg” was not a doctrine consciously developed a-priori, and that much of success Germany experienced prior to 1942 has much to do with individual initiative taken at, or below, the division level, and less to do with explicit designs of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), or Germ While I appreciated the level of detail provided in this book in terms of maps, the correlation of forces (or the accounting of equipment, unit type, and number), I felt the underlying thesis of the book, that “Blitzkrieg” was not a doctrine consciously developed a-priori, and that much of success Germany experienced prior to 1942 has much to do with individual initiative taken at, or below, the division level, and less to do with explicit designs of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), or German high command, who were often surprised at the effectiveness of their own strategy in practice, was obvious and/or trivial. As far as I knew, I thought this was well-known in most amateur and professional military history circles, and this “bottom-up” force discipline was already put into practice for at least 3 - 4 decades, in at least two professional division/armies, the US Marine Corps (USMC), and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF).
The book covers 4 campaigns in decent detail:

1. Case White (Invasion of Poland)
2. Case Yellow (Invasion of Norway)
3. Invasion of France
4. Invasion of the USSR

Each campaign opens with a varying standard set of facts, some provide an accounting of the correlation of forces, the divisions, armies involved, all include battle maps, though not in consistent scale. The campaigns from Case White and Case Yellow have a few sub-10 km maps, with good detail of fine-grain unit menuevers, though icons are not often present. The invasion of France through the Ardennese is mostly within the 10 - 50 km scale, with at least 1 or 2 maps in the 200 km range to illustrate overall objectives in theater. For the USSR, we see mostly maps within the 50 - 100+ km range, which affords very little detail on maneuvers (though there are a small handful in the 10 km scale). This change in scale may be a result of the overall “tempo” of the campaign, with the first few campaigns against the Western powers having many instances of “defeat in detail”, or the timely exploitation of holes/weaknesses in the adversaries position to partition their forces, disrupt internal lines of movement, and otherwise weaken the cohesion of their corps to more easily disable or destroy their units, and these defeats in details were often inflicted in relatively smaller surface-areas vis-a-vis those actions taken in the Soviet Union. A good example of these actions and the associated map details are from the Battle at Lowicz against Poland in early September of 1939 that was part of the Battle of Bzura, which led to the fall of Warsaw. There is a lot of value to having 10 km or less maps to outline the synchronicity of actions and for the reader to understand how actions were sequenced both in space and in time, and the presence of points in space and relative dates allows one to understand the momenta of battle as well. Unfortunately, few of the maps have this very-fine grain in time-sequencing detail in the book.

Yet, as part of the author's narrative, despite these sorts of successes, the German army did not practice “Blitzkrieg” as we have come to associate it in the historical narrative in any of the first 3 campaigns against the Western Allies. These defeats-in-detail were wins for the individual units and their divisions, not the overall-command. As the author notes, the units often did not have an overall-picture of the objectives beyond some vague notion of theater-wide victory. Where the German units prevailed, they prevailed by navigating their local obstacle, whether that be subduing an adversary or negotiating a landmark feature, mostly independently, and not in tight cohesion with other elements of their force, with communication often limited because of interesting/surprising limitations like crowded radio bandwidth preventing a large number of tank commanders to intelligently talk to each other and their commands. The general notion of a German ‘combined arms’, that was a precursor to modern information-centric warfare is false (or at least there are a few things in between connecting those two notions). The main consistency between all of these campaigns that seemed to mark the German style of warfare could be boldness in the face of the ‘fog of war’, and this is exhibited in 2 primary ways 1. Local units taking initiative despite having incomplete information 2. Division and higher-level command willingness to orchestrate actions at night, especially with armored units, which could be especially vulnerable to close-fire of concealed anti-tank (AT) weaponry in low-visibility environments. Likewise, to hammer home that lack of cohesion within the purported "Blitzkrieg", the author makes many accounts of weaknesses and/or errors occurring within OKW’s orchestration of these campaigns, with many occasions, the German units had, at best, incomplete understanding where they fell relative to their allied units, were delayed, and experienced instances of fratricide because of this poor communication and coordination. However, again because delegation of command was distributed much lower in the Wehrmacht than other modern European armies at the time, German units were often able to adapt and quickly seize initiative where they presented themselves, even if these units didn’t always know what they were tasked to do beyond their immediate task. So again, the day was won, from "the ground up", not the "top down". My opinion is that this is a bit much, as the famous German strategist Von Moltke, the elder, has stated "No plan survives first contact with the enemy", and I wouldn't think that the Germans would be immune to this dictum. Even if "Blitzkrieg" were a purposely orchestrated cohesive doctrine, the results of the early campaigns against the Western Allies may not have been executed much differently because so much of the constriction was not only organizational, but more importantly technological.

In any event, I thought the above was mostly well-known, but perhaps the author is speaking to a more general audience when making this his primary point in the book. Especially since in modern times, especially in the United States, a vision of the superiority of wartime German technology has gone to an extreme, with such fiction like the “Wolfenstein” video game, the “Man in the High Castle” television series portraying a Germany that was decades ahead the rest of the world with “space-age” technology and ruthless machine-like efficiency. Of course, anyone who’s read even a introductory text on World War 2 will know that the German forces were far from this image (in fact their supply chain still used animal-drawn carriages in large numbers), and many of the “wonder” weapons that were leveraged against Britain at the end of war were devices developed prior to the ascension of the Nazi party, and in the case of aerial technology, most coming from one design firm, the Horton Brothers.

If there was one thing I regret most about this book it is that there are relatively few fine-grain details, in terms of maps, on the German campaign against the Soviet Union. The maps that do exist are often larger-scale, and paint sweeping movements, which is consistent with the history. I would like to have seen more detailed sequencing detail on the maps, showing how the units positions and maneuvered against each other. However, it may have been the nature of the campaign did not lend itself to those details, especially since my understanding is that the approach to Moscow from Europe is relatively flat, with relatively high visibility, and thus the German with superior ranged weaponry, against a disorganized and shocked defensive corps may have actually swept most of the resistance easily. The book ends right at the start of the campaign as fall and winter have slowed down and damaged their units, and with the Germans supply chains stretched thin, inhibiting movement on account of lack of resources and fuel.

Overall, the book is good. I will have to study these maps a bit more to get more out of them. I am satisfied with the information, and I think it complements other books on the early German campaigns in WW-2, and may be a good prelude into a book dedicated to the Battle of Kursk and the Soviet counter-campaign. Likewise, given that blitzkrieg as an idea was leveraged by famed US military theorist, John Boyd, to craft his theories, which itself serves as foundation to the USMC's maneuver warfare, this book would be interesting for those interested in learning more about the foundations of that thread of thought as well. Recommended. ...more

flag Like · see review

Jul 31, 2018 Christopher Allen rated it really liked it

Great analysis of the early stages of WW2 from the narrowed perspective of Panzer operations in key campaigns and the myth of the formation and understanding of the German blitzkrieg. The author demonstrates that the concept of “lightning war” developed as a natural evolution of existing German doctrine emphasizing mobility and training, taking in modern technologies to augment their strengths. He also suggests the concept was more of a propaganda effort (magnified by the Allies) than something Great analysis of the early stages of WW2 from the narrowed perspective of Panzer operations in key campaigns and the myth of the formation and understanding of the German blitzkrieg. The author demonstrates that the concept of “lightning war” developed as a natural evolution of existing German doctrine emphasizing mobility and training, taking in modern technologies to augment their strengths. He also suggests the concept was more of a propaganda effort (magnified by the Allies) than something in widespread use. This deception was particularly effective from a combined arms perspective, where infantry remained the key to success due to the unavailability of modern transportation and air units in vast quantities. The infantry served to not only hold onto the quickly seized territory by their motorized brethren but supplied the crucial materials and transportation network to keep the advanced units primed for the next attack.

Great discussion of the German reliance on independent command levels allowing for flexibility of tactics and the seizing of initiative whenever possible. The author explains that this was not a new concept for the German Army, but something honed over generations. Decisions made at the highest level allowed for changes down even to the unit level, allowing field commanders to adjust tactics, target priority, and the seizing of objectives as battlefield opportunities arose, often making such judgment calls without consulting the higher echelon of officers.

The German Air Force was not always useful in taking out opposing units, but its unmatched reconnaissance efforts were vitally important to ensuring ground-unit flexibility; the psychological impact of dive bombers and strafing runs on the defenders notwithstanding. As the author already showed, the German use of combined arms was not revolutionary but in combination with the training, willingness to fully engage technology, and independent command levels, made for stunning, quick battlefield victories. Keeping such fast-moving units properly supplied was another issue, also not new to the German experience, but one that undermines all offensive actions if not properly planned.

Enjoyed the use of small unit and individual soldier experiences spread over carefully chosen campaigns to highlight the larger battle, helping the reader experience the situation directly. ...more

flag 1 like · Like · see review

Jul 29, 2019 Ned Leffingwell rated it liked it · review of another edition

Shelves: history, non-fiction

This was an analysis of the German invasions of Poland, Norway, France, and Russia. The author is arguing that the Blitzkrieg was more a result of individual officers taking initiative and an emphasis on speedy attack rather than tons of tanks and dive bombers. The author uses officer's journals to paint a picture of what actually happened on the front. If you are interested in the history of the blitzkrieg then check it out. ...more

flag Like · see review

Mar 06, 2019 Tricia Bagley rated it really liked it · review of another edition

Consistent

A good short tight review of the "early years" of the Blitzkrieg, with enough detail to say how did they do what they with the equipment & manpower available. Good discussion of the structure of command.
Not boring, enjoy.
PW ...more

flag Like · see review

Oct 02, 2019 Jānis Meirāns rated it it was amazing

So good.

flag Like · see review

Dec 17, 2020 Zeb rated it liked it · review of another edition

Good analysis at times, marred by overly colorful descriptive sections

flag Like · see review

Mar 05, 2019 Robert M. Galbraith rated it really liked it · review of another edition

Interesting analysis and well documented. i learned a lot about the German army and how it worked during WW!!. Much better than a lot of other works on the subject.

flag Like · see review

Jul 03, 2020 Michael Murphy rated it it was amazing · review of another edition

An unbelievable account of how Hitler's Blitzkrieg was accomplished, which was the impetus of the Second World War. An intriguing account of what happened, how it occurred, and the various problems that ensued. This is an interesting book, if you are fond of the WWII time period and is well worth the time to read. ...more

flag Like · see review

Henry Percy rated it it was amazing
Mar 26, 2019

Richard Maclean rated it liked it
Mar 02, 2019

acc.verbeeck rated it it was ok
Feb 28, 2021

Lee rated it it was ok
Sep 07, 2017

Lourene rated it it was amazing
Apr 13, 2019

Neva rated it liked it
May 09, 2019

Norman rated it it was amazing
Mar 26, 2019

Marilyn Lee rated it liked it
Mar 05, 2019

John rated it really liked it
Dec 03, 2019

Bill Smithson rated it really liked it
Nov 18, 2020

Scott rated it liked it
Oct 20, 2020

Ted rated it really liked it
Mar 08, 2021

Charles rated it it was amazing
Jul 28, 2019

Jared McBee rated it liked it
Mar 26, 2020

Magnar rated it liked it
Aug 01, 2021

Dana Rudko rated it it was amazing
Oct 05, 2018

Richard Harral rated it it was amazing
Jan 28, 2022

Gerwyn rated it it was ok
Oct 01, 2021

Adam rated it really liked it
Dec 26, 2020

Merrily Clark rated it it was amazing
Apr 10, 2020

Magnus rated it really liked it
Aug 14, 2019

Justin rated it liked it
Sep 03, 2020

« previous 1 2 3 4 next »

new topic
Discuss This Book

There are no discussion topics on this book yet. Be the first to start one »

Recommend It | Stats | Recent Status Updates

Readers also enjoyed

See similar books…

Genres

History

8 users

Nonfiction

4 users

War > Military Fiction

4 users

War

3 users

War > World War II

3 users

Military > Military History

2 users

See top shelves…

About Niklas Zetterling

Niklas Zetterling

9 followers

Niklas Zetterling is a researcher at the Swedish Defense College. Along with Anders Frankson he has previously written Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis and The Korsun Pocket: The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in the East, 1944.