The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783

by Alfred Thayer Mahan

Inspiring the imagination of politicians, the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan laid the foundation for the emergence of the global superpower the United States is today. When it was first published in 1890, it was intended as a detailed history of the critical and positive impact of naval power in the growth of states. At the time, this was clearly indicated by the British Royal Navy, but The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, soon served as the catalyst for the transformation of the United States small force of outmoded ships into a mighty modern fleet.

About the Author:

Alfred Thayer Mahan was born in West Point, New York, in 1840 and died in 1914, just before the fleets he had helped to create clashed in the First World War. He was educated at the U.S. Naval Academy, graduating second in his class in 1859, just in time to serve as an officer in the Union Navy during the Civil War that broke out two years later. In 1884, he became first a lecturer and then president of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

Genres: History, Military Fiction, Nonfiction, Military History, War, Politics, Naval History

584 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1890

About the author

Alfred Thayer Mahan was a United States Navy flag officer, geostrategist, and historian, who has been called "the most important American strategist of the nineteenth century." His concept of "sea power" was based on the idea that countries with greater naval power will have greater worldwide impact; it was most famously presented in his 1890 book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783. The concept had an enormous influence in shaping the strategic thought of navies across the world, especially in the United States, Germany, Japan and Britain, ultimately causing the World War I naval arms race. His ideas still permeate the U.S. Navy Doctrine.

Reviews

[Michael O'Brien · Rating 4 out of 5]

For decades, I've been wanting to read this book. Mahan seems to me to be, in naval circles at least, one of those authors and thinkers oft referenced but seldom read, not unlike many Greek philosophers. I'd see him often referred to in naval professional journals like "Proceedings" and in site like realcleardefense.com. Also, I'd heard his ideas referred to later in my Coast Guard career when taking classes from Naval War College. So influential his writings, I wondered why his book was not required reading at my alma mater, Coast Guard Academy or in the senior service schools.

Well, there's a reason for that. In his own time as the 19th Century faded and the 20th about to dawn, the world found itself in the curious situation of the sun never setting upon the British Empire. How did this happen? How did an island nation, Great Britain, of modest population with a small professional army become one of, perhaps even the greatest empire the world had ever known --- its language ubiquitous, its currency a standard of international commerce, its merchant fleets vast. Mahan delves into the genesis of this which, as he attempts to demonstrate, was largely due to the British Empire's sea power.

A common misconception of Mahan's ideas is that he was saying this meant justification for nations having large navies, but a reading of this book reveals Mahan's concept of sea power to be far more complex than just that. With respect to modern readers and naval strategists, Chapter 1, where Mahan develops this is probably actually the most useful part of the book. Mahan argues that the elements necessary for a nation to become a great sea power are:
1. Geographical position
2. Physical conformation
3. Territorial extent
4. Size of population
5. National character
6. Character of the Government

Each one of these, Mahan discusses in depth. As part of it, Mahan shows that nations that developed economic strength and a strong merchant marine naturally tend to grow into naval powers. He also illustrates how the sea is uniquely different from land --- a great, unimpeded superhighway, devoid of anyone nation's complete territorial control from which power over it can force competitors and adversaries into untenable situations in which they will ultimately lose over time.

The remainder of the narrative is Mahan going into great detail the various naval campaigns and battles between the British, French, Spanish, and Dutch fleets.

As I related, Mahan's work had a profound effect upon the decision makers of of the great powers of his time --- especially upon the thinking of British, American, German, and Japanese naval leaders of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. So why a 4-star instead of 5-star rating?

For one reason, the bulk of the book assumes that the reader is well familiar with nautical terminology from the Age of Sail. In Mahan's time, there still would have been many familiar with such terms; however, to modern readers, terms like "the weather gage", "tack", "leeward", etc, may not be. I had to reach back 3 decades to my time as a Coast Guard cadet aboard the sailing ship, USCGC Eagle, to recall what Mahan means in the text. I think a glossary would have been helpful --- either that or footnotes to help modern readers better understand the terminology.

Another reason --- for this edition, at least --- the maps showing the dispositions of the various fleets movements that Mahan uses are too small to be of use. Good grief, I felt like I was being given an eye exam --- even with a magnifying glass, the charts are too faded to be of much use in understanding the points Mahan is making as he analyzes the various naval battles. Better maps are needed than in this edition. However, Mahan's analysis still proved useful --- in general, one may conclude, notwithstanding the poor maps, that the British strategy of destroying the enemy's fleet proved, in the long term, a better strategy than the French and Spanish ones of risk aversion and choosing to preserve their own fleet numbers so as to better support land forces and land-based objectives.

I found Mahan's analysis of naval power during the American Revolution to be very interesting. Unbeknownst probably to most American readers, the French involvement in this war, ultimately turned it into a global one, extending from the Americas to the Mediterranean to India.

Because the bulk of this book is in-depth analysis of sailing vessel tactics, this is probably the reason why this book is not required reading for naval officers today in the U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, or Marine Corps, despite its profound influence upon naval thinking. It's not a book in quite the same class as Clausewitz or Sun Tzu whose works describe general strategy and practices that have proven timeless.

I do recommend this book for those desiring to read up on naval strategy, those with an interest in the age of sail, and for those interested in seeing how sea power in the 17th and 18th Centuries ultimately led to British predominance in the world by the end of the 19th. Having said that, I do recommend prospective readers find editions with better maps and charts than in this edition.

[Rindis · Rating 3 out of 5]

You could easily write a recursive book about the influence of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History upon history. Mahan wanted to show that navies decided wars, even between land powers, and many powerful and influential people listened. In the list of influential works on strategy it is probably number four, behind The Art of War, The Prince, and On War.

There's actually a few interrelated theses here. The primary one is the assertion that naval power is a deciding factor for everyone but the most land-locked of countries. The secondary one is not so clearly stated, but quite evident in the later parts of the book, that the proper goal of military operations is the reduction of organized enemy forces in the field. The later parts of the book particularly talk about this, showing that the French government and navy held to theory that saw the taking of objectives while preserving force, and that it time and again failed to gain results, while the British habit of forcing battles inevitably put their opponents into a worse position over time. Lastly, he considers the pursuit of interrupting merchant shipping to be a mistaken strategy, as British trade increased even during wars where the French captured large numbers of British merchants. (The Battle of the Atlantic might be seen as a condemnation of this rule, but I imagine Mahan might argue that the failure to actually hamper the British—and American—navies gave them the ability to find a way to destroy U-Boats and end "The Happy Time".)

Mahan covers the most of height of the Age of Sail in his book, from the Restoration of Charles II to the end of the Revolutionary War, after an extended chapter that looks at naval power throughout history. This is definitely a preferred era for him, but he considers that while tactics must change over time, with new technology, it is still possible to find strategic truths that always apply, and I think he did so very well. His narrative gets steadily more detailed as it goes on, with the last couple chapters looking at actions in India and the Caribbean from 1781-1783 in great detail. As his descriptions get more detailed, so too do the conclusions that he draws from them. This is decidedly Nineteenth Century writing, and technical in nature to boot, with overly long-winded sentences and paragraphs by today's standards (thankfully, the page-long paragraph is a thing of the past), but it still retains a high degree of readability.

My copy of the book is an OCR Pyrrhus Press ebook, which is in decent shape. I started noticing errors about a third of the way through, and they slowly become more common as the book went on, but never got to the levels I've seen in other books. On the other hand, the tactical description of battles is reliant on a number of maps that are directly referenced in the text, but are not included in this copy. I could generally follow along, but it takes a fair amount of effort it shouldn't, and the details are lost.

[Clay Davis · Rating 5 out of 5]

A good work of scholarship on the age of sail

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

Despite being over a hundred years old, Mahan's classic text on the importance of sea power in wartime is both accessible to the modern reader and applicable to modern naval thinking. In fact, I've been finding that many of these "ancient" historical texts are far more enjoyable than some of their contemporary counterparts (see my review of Henry Adams' History of the United States, Vols. I & II). Mahan takes the reader on a whirlwind tour of the wars between the years 1660 and 1783, focusing on the role that sea power played in all of them. Although some of these wars were mostly confined to the continent of Europe, Mahan makes a potent case that in all of them the control of the seas played a critical role in the outcome of those wars. Mahan deftly shows through example how Louis XIV's designs for continental Europe were completely frustrated by England's control of the seas, which brought to England sources of revenue far in excess of her island-bound resources. He spends the last 200 pages going over the whole naval operations surrounding the American Revolution, looking at and extending beyond North America. As great as this book is, there are a two things that hold it back from a five-star rating. The first is his descriptions of actual naval battles. It was difficult to piece together what was going on because of Mahan's extensive use of nautical terms such as "starboard tack," "leeward," "windward," etc. He did go over these in his introductory chapter, but briefly and not in a way that they would stick out in an average reader's mind. Thus, the naval battles are good for people with a knowledge of nautical terms and naval tactics, but not the average reader. The other is his use of racial theories in his introductory chapter pointing out why certain countries fared better than others in terms of sea power. While this was the prevalent theory of historiography during Mahan's era, it is still disgusting and disconcerting to the modern reader's ears. Just plug your nose and try to get through it quickly. All in all, this is a fine read on how naval superiority is critical to the success of nearly any country at war.

[Preetam Chatterjee · Rating 3 out of 5]

Mission 2026: Binge reviewing (and rereading on occasion) all previous Reads, I was too slothful to review, back when I read them.

Very few works in military and strategic history have exercised an influence as profound and long-lasting as this one. First published in the late 19th century, this book quickly became a foundational text in the study of naval strategy, reshaping how historians, statesmen, and naval officers understood the relationship between maritime dominance and the rise of global power.
Mahan’s central argument is deceptively simple yet historically sweeping: nations that command the seas tend to command the course of history itself. Through an expansive survey of European conflicts between the 17th and 18th centuries, he demonstrates how naval power shaped the political and economic fortunes of empires.

The narrative of this book unfolds across the turbulent centuries that witnessed the transformation of Europe into a network of expanding maritime empires. Countries such as England, France, and Spain competed fiercely for overseas trade routes, colonial territories, and naval supremacy.

In this struggle, control of the sea proved decisive not merely for military victories but for economic prosperity and imperial expansion. Mahan argues that naval strength allowed a nation to protect its commerce, disrupt the trade of its rivals, and project power across distant regions of the globe.

The introduction to ‘The Influence of Sea Power Upon History’ by Alfred Thayer Mahan argues that the history of sea power is fundamentally a story of rivalry among nations competing for the wealth and advantages derived from maritime commerce.

Long before economists and strategists fully understood the principles governing trade and maritime strength, states already recognised that control of sea commerce brought immense prosperity and political power.

Accordingly, countries tried to secure a dominant share of these benefits by excluding competitors. Sometimes this exclusion took peaceful forms, such as monopolies, trade regulations, and restrictive laws designed to protect national commerce.

When such measures failed, however, nations frequently resorted to violence. Conflicts over trade routes, overseas markets, and newly discovered regions often escalated into wars.

At the same time, wars that began for unrelated political reasons were frequently shaped by the degree to which one side controlled the seas. Because maritime dominance could determine the outcome of conflicts and the prosperity of nations, the history of sea power inevitably becomes closely linked to military history, particularly naval warfare.

Mahan emphasises that studying the military history of the past is essential for understanding and conducting wars in the future. Great commanders such as Napoleon Bonaparte recommended the careful study of earlier campaigns, even those fought long before modern weapons existed.

Despite changes in technology, certain principles of warfare remain constant across time.

By examining historical conflicts, strategists can identify these enduring principles and apply them to modern situations. Mahan argues that the same logic applies to naval warfare. Although advances in technology—such as steam power and modern naval weapons—have transformed ships and fleets, the historical record of maritime conflict still offers valuable lessons about strategy, tactics, and the use of sea power.

This historical study is particularly important because modern steam navies had, at the time of Mahan’s writing, very little combat experience from which reliable conclusions could be drawn.

Theories about the future of naval warfare therefore remained largely speculative. Some observers attempted to understand modern naval tactics by comparing steam-powered fleets with ancient fleets of galleys, which were propelled by oars and could move independently of the wind.

While this comparison has some validity—both types of vessels share the ability to manoeuvre freely regardless of wind direction—Mahan warns against relying too heavily on such analogies. Important differences exist between the two systems.

For example, galley fleets depended on human muscle for propulsion, which limited the duration of their manoeuvres. Their weapons were also short-ranged, forcing combatants into close encounters and chaotic hand-to-hand battles.

Modern naval warfare, however, involves long-range weapons and more sustained manoeuvring capabilities. Therefore, historical comparisons must be used carefully, taking both similarities and differences into account. Mahan cautions that excessive enthusiasm for analogies can lead to mistaken conclusions, especially when strategists overlook important distinctions between historical and modern technologies.

He also contrasts sailing ships with both galleys and steamships. Although sailing vessels depended on the wind and were therefore less flexible in movement, they possessed important advantages, including long-range artillery and the ability to fight for extended periods without exhausting their crews.

These characteristics make the tactical lessons of the sailing era relevant even in the age of steam-powered fleets.

Finally, Mahan discusses the concept of the “weather gauge", a crucial tactical advantage in the age of sailing ships. The fleet positioned upwind held the initiative, since it could choose when to attack or withdraw from battle. This advantage allowed a commander to adopt an offensive posture and control the terms of engagement.

Although steam power removed the direct influence of wind, Mahan argues that similar strategic principles still apply. In modern naval warfare, the decisive factor is not wind position but speed.

Fleets with greater speed and better coordination gain the same advantage once provided by the weather gage—the power to attack, manoeuvre, or refuse battle according to their own strategic judgement.

One of the book’s most compelling insights is the connection it draws between maritime commerce and military capability. Mahan emphasises that sea power is not limited to fleets of warships; it also includes merchant shipping, naval bases, shipbuilding industries, and the strategic geography of coastlines and ports.

In his view, a strong commercial maritime network creates the economic foundation upon which naval power can flourish. The prosperity generated by trade provides the resources needed to maintain powerful fleets, while naval protection ensures that trade routes remain secure.

Much of the book focuses on the rivalry between England and France during the seventeenth and 18th centuries. Mahan portrays England’s eventual dominance as the result of a deliberate and sustained commitment to naval strength. By investing heavily in its fleet and developing a coherent maritime strategy,

England was able to protect its commerce and challenge the ambitions of its continental rivals. Naval victories and blockades gradually eroded French influence, allowing Britain to emerge as the leading maritime power of the age.

The chronological endpoint of Mahan’s study, the year 1783, coincides with the conclusion of the American Revolutionary War and the Treaty of Paris (1783).

Although Britain ultimately lost its American colonies, Mahan argues that its long-term maritime dominance remained intact. The British navy continued to control crucial sea lanes, enabling the expansion of British trade and imperial influence during the 19th century. For Mahan, this enduring maritime supremacy illustrates the lasting strategic advantages conferred by sea power.

What distinguishes Mahan’s work from many earlier military histories is its analytical ambition. He does not merely recount battles or describe fleets; he seeks to identify the underlying principles that determine naval success.

Geography, economic resources, national character, and political leadership all play roles in shaping a nation’s maritime strength. By examining these factors together, Mahan constructs a broader theory of how sea power influences the trajectory of global politics.

The impact of the book extended far beyond academic circles. Naval strategists around the world studied Mahan’s ideas with intense interest. Governments in countries such as Germany, Japan, and the United States used his arguments to justify the expansion of their own naval forces.

In this sense, Mahan’s work did not merely interpret history; it actively shaped the strategic thinking of the modern world.

When you are through with this tome, you’ll notice its brilliance and its limitations. Mahan wrote in an era when great-power competition was defined largely by imperial rivalries and naval armaments. His emphasis on maritime dominance reflects the geopolitical realities of that time. Yet his broader insight—that control of key strategic networks determines global influence—remains relevant even in an age dominated by air power, digital infrastructure, and economic interdependence.

Ultimately, this classic stands as a true example of historical analysis that transcends its immediate subject. By examining centuries of naval conflict,

Mahan illuminates the deeper relationship between geography, commerce, and political power.

His study demonstrates that the oceans, far from being empty expanses separating continents, have long served as the great highways of global history, shaping the rise and fall of nations.

A must-read for history buffs.

[Phrodrick slowed his growing backlog · Rating 4 out of 5]

It can be argued that Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s (At the time of original publication Mahan was a Captain) the Influence of Sea Power upon History was and perhaps remains, the single most influential book ever written by an American. It was written for the purpose of changing American attitudes towards modernizing its Navy. Via President Theodore Roosevelt it did just that. But it also influenced German Kaiser William II who began building a modern Imperial Navy for the purpose of upsetting England’s long standing as the preeminent sea power. This in turn launched both a navel construction war with Germany and fed British and European suspicions about German intentions. This along with Germany’s arrogant diplomacy fed a more general arms buildup and shifts in regional alliances that would be a major cause of World War I. One book equals one world war is a lot to put on one author but this is an actual speculation by historian Barbara Tuchman.

I had been delaying the day when I would make a point of reading this seminal book. Having done so, I wonder if this is the right one. In the usually recap of Mahan famous book the major points in The Influence are that:
1. Mahan argues a point I think originally made by Napoleon; that control of the sea gives to possessor the advantage in their the ability to strike at times and places where an opponent is least able to defend from such an attack.
2. A single major victory can determine who wins control of the sea and there by significantly increases their ability to win a larger war. So important is this aspect of the theory that well into World War II the Japanese Imperial Navy was still seeking to draw the US Navy into what it hoped would be a single, large naval battle, the outcome would decide WWII and be fought along the theoretical lines of Mahan.

In The Influence, Point I is far more nuanced. Sea Control can be expressed in terms of control of what I was taught to call sea lines of communication. That is a mid ocean line of ships that can intercept the enemy’s fleet and defeat it before it can achieve its mission.
Or control can be close in shore in the forms
Or Commercial blockade
Or Commerce warfare
Or Direct engagement with critical enemy land based holdings (Islands, harbors, land lines of communications) via embarked invasion troops.
And further limited to no more than local or seasonal controls of waterways that may or may not be critical to the larger strategic considerations.

Mahan has much more to say on this point ranging from the fact that a land power or continental power may have little need for open sea lines of communications and a prospective sea power may be limited by the number and types of harbors that grant it access to the sea or an enemies ability to exploit sea to shore power projections. Mahan would also remind his contemporary readers of logistical issues such as coal fired ships also depend on their own supply chain in the form or more or less vulnerable coaling stations.

Given that much of this book speaks of the problems nations can have with access to the sea, he notices that at one point the French Fleet was split between two harbors across the Bay of Biscay. The fleet was split between these harbors, but they parts could not provide mutual support. The winds that might allow one squadron to sortie, would keep the other unable to get out of the harbor.

What struck me as the most important lesson from the examples Mahan uses is that Naval strategy is an extension of National strategy and though doctrine, tactics follow. Students of the 17th and 18th century actions between the French and English tend to conclude that the French were generally bad at naval warfare. Mahan makes it clear that their leadership was often as brave and competent as their English counterparts. So often were the French ships better in design that captured French ship were highly desirable additions to the English Fleet.

Beyond the issue of individual fighting spirit, Mahan documents that:
As a continental power France had less need to be a major Naval Power.
French Colonies varied in their strategic importance
The national doctrine emphasized preservation of a fleet to maintain a threat against the British (The Fleet in being strategy) rather than risking the loss of expensive military assets in the chance of gaining what was most likely to be an indifferent result.

As for point 2. No where do I see Mahan speaking of a single engagement achieving more than a temporary or local advantage. Nations large enough to compete for command at sea were and are likely to have multiple squadrons such that a single fleet action by itself is unlikely tobe a war wining event.

Indeed the two cases most often cites as Mahan type victories are the American victory over the Spanish Navy , in fact two separate victories, one off Santiago, Cuba and the other in Manila Bay The Philippines. And the Japanese Victory over the Russians. Actually at least two major battles (Battle of Tsushima Strait and Battle of the Sea of Japan) and a series of skirmishes mostly in and about Port Author. Rarely mentioned was the battle of Lissa between Austria and Italy in 1866.

While all resulted in one sided victories all the losers had in common related to failures in technical parity, for example the US navy was modern, the Spanish was not, and tactical incompetence. Russia, a massive land power, could have traded soldiers for time until Japan won itself into bankruptcy. Battle involves chance and there are also outcomes that are not one-sided. Meantime, Cuba had to be taken by land action, The Philippines would become a stain on America’s honor and Lissa had zero direct effect on the war between its contenders.

Maybe this was not the particular book by Mahan that the usual historical sources are quoting. Mahan’s influence is not as hard to read as was common in formal texts of his period. He has numerous other titles, some write for the purpose or reaching a more general audience. Maybe the one title is meant to stand for the sum of his work.

My recommendation is that The Influence of Sea Power Upon History is worth consideration as a piece of history. It is not especially hard to read but likely to be impossible for someone looking for history as entertainment. I may turn to other Mahan titles, but for the moment I think I have read another one of those must reads. Minor point the maps on my Kindle were largely useless.

[Sasha Ambroz · Rating 4 out of 5]

A monster of a book.
Huge profound research of the development of a fleet. How naval battles shaped the history and the decisions of a government on how to use or not use the fleet left marks on the countries' future. Sometimes it felt patchy, I felt I needed more economic predispositions behind many decisions. But I believe they would have made the book twice as big.
My only advice - if possible read it in paper with all the maps included.

[Al · Rating 3 out of 5]

I can't add anything significantly different to some of the reviews already posted. This edition of the work is very good and is a very interesting read. Strategically, many of Mahan's conclusions still apply today, even though he was writing with an eye to advocating for a larger navy and these conclusions are much more difficult to execute in the 21st century's shrinking U.S. Navy. Also, fleet on fleet engagements are a thing of the past. Mahan's emphasis on the navy leaves out the fact that we live on land, and the navy is at best a strategic adjunct. I couldn't help but think of the controversy surrounding the LCS, both from a naval construction and architectural standpoint and from a utilization perspective. This weapons platform seems to be going in the opposite direction envisioned by Mahan. His strategic overview of the American revolution is insightful and still relevant for those who are interested in how naval warfare influenced the strategic outcome of the war. It is possible to read only those chapters of the work and still come away with a solid feel for Mahan's strategic vision.

[Truls Ljungström · Rating 3 out of 5]

Mahan är en av de där tänkarna som man som samhällsvetare har hört talas om ofta, men undvikt, av fruktan att inte förstå allt. Som samhällsvetare kan jag konstatera att denna fruktan är befogad. De flottslagsbeskrivningar som utgör väl en tiondel av boken är implikationstyngda, och de implikationerna kunde åtminstone inte jag utläsa helt och hållet. Trots det, är Mahans huvudbudskap tydliga: transport och information är båda nödvändiga för framgångsrikt imperiebyggande, och haven är de vektorer där båda rör sig obehindrat. Det gör att Mahan förordar decentralisering av dessa funktioner, samt en stark statsflotta för att skydda dem efter bästa förmåga. Handel och en stark medelklass blir alltså strategiska frågor, i ett slags global-kameralism, där förmågan att agera på egen hand måste skyddas, genom att skydda de grupper som kontrollerar teknologin som möjliggör förmågan. Som policyrekommendation kan detta leda till allt från fransk dirigisme till hayekiansk nyliberalism, men den blir viktig, för den överbygger avgrunden mellan försvarsvetenskaperna och statsvetenskaperna.

Boken är långt ifrån enkel, men den är värd att ta sig igenom.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is not often that one can credibly claim to read a book that started a world war. Granted, Germany would have sought her "place in the sun" if Admiral Mahan had never been born; however, the race to match the British in capital ships ignited in Germany by "Influence" strained Anglo-German relations and gave the Entente Cordiale between France and Britain (and eventually the Triple Entente) space to grow.

This book is truly aimed at the naval historian. For the rest of us, Admiral Mahan's argument is clear even if one skips the desciptions of illustrative naval engagements from history that Mahan supplies.

[Marks54 · Rating 3 out of 5]

If you are interested in military strategy, and especially naval strategy and history, this is an important book to know about. I can see why it was so important historically, especially given the timing of its appearance. The actual argument, however, is not as clear as you might think and there is an aspect of overselling to this. That is OK - it is good to read one of the classics anyway.

[J.R. · Rating 2 out of 5]

I'm not questioning the intellect of Mahan, nor the importance of this work on naval strategy, especially American naval strategy.

However, much of my critique of this book is probably rooted in the fact that I already agreed with his premise. Great Britain, and the Dutch before them, rose to power because of their navies. The ocean was, and remains, the most efficient way to move commerce around the world, and therefore a country which wishes to engage in trade needs a navy to protect its merchant ships and sea lanes. The more efficient they can do this, the richer they will become, and the more resources a nation can dedicate to other pursuits.

I agreed with this going into the book, and therefore didn't really need 400 plus pages of blow-by-blow historical accounts of UK naval engagements to drive the point home. The style of writing is really tough as well. Not only is it written in an academic tone, its written in a late nineteenth century academic tone. Top it off with lots of naval jargon from the times of sail, it took me a lot of effort to get through. In fact, the first chapter discussing the various geographic, sociological, and political conditions necessary to have a great sea power was really the only chapter in the book I found enjoyable.

If you're interested in naval history for history's sake, go ahead and pick this up. You'll probably find the historical retelling of the battles fun, plus there are sketched graphics about which lines the ships took during the fighting (made no sense to me, but if you already have a naval background it probably does). For the casual reader interested in strategy writ large, maybe read the first chapter and look at a modern synopsis.

[Maria · Rating 3 out of 5]

In 1890 Mahan, published this book while President of the US Naval War College, about the importance of navies on historical land campaigns and wars. His theory of the necessity of capital ships convinced both President Roosevelts, the German navy and the Japanese navy, changing the build up and disposition of fleets in WWI and WWII.

Why I started this book: I was thrilled to find this book on Audible and downloaded it immediately. I was eager to see why a book written in 1890 was just added back on the Navy's Recommended Reading List.

Why I finished it: It was fascinating to learn about 1660-1783 battles and how they shaped the colonization of the Americas, Africa and India. I had no idea that while America was fighting for it's independence, British and French fleets were fighting in the Indian Ocean, not to mention the West Indies as well. So much context is lost when you narrow the focus to just United States history. Plus, I was interested in all the explanations of wind, ports and seasonal typhoons that get weeded out of the school textbooks but which are a huge part of the story. Side note: The audio from audible was horrible. It had been converted from tape and the scratches and whines were very annoying.

[Don LeClair · Rating 3 out of 5]

Last year I read a non-fiction book called Six Frigates by Ian Toll. In that book he mentioned that this book, The Influence of Sea Power up History, was a huge influence on navies across the world. The original book was published in 1890.
On the positive side, the amount of highly detailed information regarding naval battles dating back to 1660 is amazing. You can read about the order or ships, the wind conditions, how the fleets battled, and learn about the losses of people and ships. It was also fascinating to learn about the rapidly changing alliances of European powers during the period and large number wars that came of it. In many ways the book provides extensive information on the big picture political alignments, the strengths and weaknesses of the combatants enconomies and navies, and detailed well diagramed dissertations on the how the battle proceeded.
Having said all of that, this is definitively not a fast-paced book. There is a lot of detail that is thoroughly covered and that kind of sucks the fun out it.

[Steven · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very insightful, and with lots of great analysis. Captain Mahan knows an unbelievable amount about history.

Unfortunately, the book is really hard to read, mostly because the book is written in the 19th century (although it reads as if it was written in the 16th), but also because Mahan tends to skip around a lot and make convoluted arguments. For example, the chapter dedicated to the Anglo-Dutch conflict in the 17th century devotes a lot of time to the French-Indian war of the late 18th century and the state of the Spanish navy in the 16th century.

[Vasil Kolev · Rating 3 out of 5]

I found out about this book from "The proud tower". It was described as having a serious effect on governmental thinking, so I wanted to see what was it about.

It wasn't easy, as the book is from the 1800s and the language is different in subtle and not-so-subtle ways. Also, there are a lot of descriptions of sea-battles, which don't really match the title.

Otherwise, it's a good point/theory of exercising international power and some parts of it can be seen to be followed even today (although his ideas about commerce-stopping warfare were debunked by submarine warfare).

[Alex · Rating 5 out of 5]

An incredibly influential book. A must read for those interested in sea power.

[Alex Hope · Rating 3 out of 5]

I will not write a lot in my review, I’ll try to stay short.
It is a dry read unless you know the correct terminology and as for me, it was insanely difficult to read it: I often found myself bothered and uninterested, however, in the end, I understand what Mahan is implying in this book and what this book’s influence was upon history: The Spanish-American War was literally won because people listened to Mahan. If you are not into naval history: don’t bother; the narrative is not engaging at all.

[Robin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Firstly, the cover art depicts a scene outside the time period of this book, leading me to believe the editor was ignorant of the content. Secondly, this wasn't an easy read. The pages lack numbers and there are a significant number of typos. The writing style is of the time (1890) and contains many run-on or overly long sentences. Regarding the content, despite repetition of certain themes, it is very interesting to the student of naval and military history. It is easy to see why this book was so influential. You could even lay on this book the blame for World War 1 or the naval arms race which preceded it. Mahan is obviously trying to implore his own government (the American) to build a strong and capable navy so that any imperial ambitions upon which it embarks can be fulfilled and secured. By the end of the book, he has reluctantly conceded the 'empire of the seas' to England. Whether this is 'evil' as it was to the Bourbon dynasty he will not outright say, though his admiration of the means by which it was achieved is clear. The Spanish come under consistent attack, particularly when as allies of the French their behaviour was 'selfish to the point of disloyalty'. When reading that perhaps upon the incompetence of the incumbent government did the American colonies fall, any British reader will knowingly nod.

The most educationally useful sections for me personally where Mahan's digestion of the events of the Wars of the Spanish and Austrian Successions, the War of Jenkins' Ear and the Seven Years War. He lays clear the link between these in a useful narrative. They represent in fact a continuation of a single struggle between England's growing commercial capitalism, fuelled by a rapacious merchant class and obedient government, and the Bourbon dynasty which was always a step behind and anxious to maintain or increase its own hold on the wealth pouring in from the New World. In the context of the wider struggle of people against capitalism, this book could more accurately be titled 'The Influence of Sea Power Upon Capitalist Expansion' as the nation to which the sea is entrusted will always capitalise on it in the same way: by extending trade and the deprivations of capitalism forever. Whether this nation was the United Kingdom or France or in the future is China or the United States, the result may be the same: the capitalist classes of the controlling nation will grow rich. The lessons for maintaining this sea power remain the same: build strong ports on the lines of communication; maintain a strong navy, keep a sound military spirit within it, use it regularly and use it primarily to destroy the enemy's navy.

'History' to Mahan is the military conquest of the oceans of the planet and the effects of the trade which follows, which included the slave trade. The only mention of the slave trade is its necessary link in the chain which was pulling resources in from the New World, which meant that the English wanted a part of it. England's wars at the start of this book are effectively wars to gain a control of the slave trade, from which the first empires were built. Being concerned only with naval affairs as well as being of its time, this book shows a remarkable lack of awareness of the human element in the grand struggle - History - Mahan is writing about. In fact, the only discussion of the human condition is the fitness or poor state of crews and how this affects a ship's performance in war. All this being said, I still recommend you read this book as it helps to pad out any understanding of the development of capitalism, empire and the military ideologies which dominated thinking during the 'Age of Empire' and led to two world wars, and an extremely violent 20th century.

[Rodney Harvill · Rating 4 out of 5]

When he wrote this book in 1890, retired Admiral Mahan wished to influence American policy decisions relative to the Navy, emphasizing the decisive role of sea power in wartime. Some of his points backed up by historical accounts included:

1. (A point from the preface) The Roman navy had forced Hannibal and later his brother Hasdrubal to march their armies overland fro Iberia to Italy through the Alps rather than sailing, a quicker and less hazardous and costly endeavor. This kept the armies from uniting into an invincible force and permitted Scipio to destroy the two armies separately.
2. Sea commerce protected by sea power had permitted England to bankroll land armies fielded by allies in European wars.
3. Control of the sea had allowed England to capture overseas possessions of enemy belligerents while protecting her own colonies.
4. While cruising warfare such as privateering that was favored by France damaged English commerce, it failed spectacularly to weaken her to the point of defeat.
5. Control of the sea was best accomplished in decisive battle against enemy naval units. Cruising warfare was no substitute for this.

Some of my own observations about this book include:

1. It has been said that Hiram Maxim was once challenged to invent something to enable Europeans' throats with greater facility. His response to this challenge was the Maxim gun, the water cooled machine gun used in the Russo-Japanese War and World War I. Given the number of wars in the time period of interest, the Europeans really liked to fight, at least the elite who had the most to gain.
2. The period of interest followed the Reformation-era religious wars in which Catholic sovereigns were trying to force Protestants back into Catholicism. By this time, secular interests had regained the upper hand, and the wars were about competition for commerce and resources, balance of power and pure unbridled ambition.
3. The ambition of Louis XIV made him a real trouble-maker. I was already aware that his domestic policies that concentrated power in his hands sowed the seeds of the French Revolution (The French Revolution and the Old Regime, Alexis de Tocqueville), but it appears that his moves on the continent that were intended to add to his personal power and wealth ultimately weakened France. Imagine him as a CEO today, Ken Lay's evil twin.
4. I was already aware that the decision of the French and Spanish to help the colonies in the American Revolution was a political decision intended to weaken England and avenge the losses England inflicted on them in the Seven Years War. However, it turns out that the French and Spanish saw the rebelling colonies as a giant sucking sound for English military resources. English army and navy units occupied in North America were not available to fight French and Spanish units in their moves against English holdings in the East and West Indies, India and the Mediterranean. It was in their interest to drag out the Revolution to buy them more time to capitalize on English weakness, and the French even considered allowing the colonies not to win. Spent and defeated colonies would be of little value to a spent England. Now I better understand President Washington's opposition to helping Revolutionary France in their wars with the rest of Europe. It wasn't just America's weak condition and lack of readiness for war at that time.

This book, intended to explain the influence of navies on history, is quite educational and a good read. I recommend it.

[Alex Lawrence · Rating 5 out of 5]

I came across a list of “the most influential books in history.” Some on the lists (there were several different lists) were not a surprise. “Principia Mathametica” by Sir Issac Newton; “Common Sense” by Thomas Paine and of course, The Bible. Others did suprised me- “Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone” being one of the surprises on one list.

But, by far, the biggest surprise was a book that was not on any list, but is always mentioned when one reads any historical or WW1 or WW2. It is also a book that I would venture most people have never heard of, but its impact has been felt across the globe, financially and militarily. Taxes have been raised in many countries because of the teachings of this book. Arms races have begun, and tens of thousands died led by this books disciples. Wars have hinged on interpretations of the book’s teaching. Yet the title and author are almost unknown outside of certain communities.

Therefore, I would nominate “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–1783” by Alfred Thayer Mahan as on of the most influential books in history- certainly the twentieth century.

Admiral Lord Jackie Fisher was a firm believer in Mahan’s work and this was a strong influence on the building of HMS Dreadnaught and the subsequent “Dreadnaught race” that followed. This “Dreadnaught race” helped drive the world to WW1- which saw Admiral’s of both sides looking for “the decisive naval engagement.” Thr Jutland would put the great Dreadnaughts (Battleship) and their less armored cousins, the Battle Cruisers to the test and the British Battle Cruisers would be found wanting (as was the British lax cordite handling).

It can be argued that the Spanish-American War ultimately resulted from the Naval build up, prompted by Mahan’s book.

Although WW2 in the pacific was mostly a Naval Air war, the many of the Admiral’s fighting it were of the “Naval Gun Club” and adherents to Mahan. Admiral Yamamoto’s plan at Midway - the turning point of the war- was a plan based upon big battleships destroying the American fleet despite Yamamoto’s understanding of and belief in Naval Air Power. Even Admiral Halsey, who without a doubt understood the importance of the carrier, was drawn away from the Philippine’s looking for a Naval Surface engagement with the Imperial Japanese Navy.

As previously stated, one cannot read any history regarding naval warfare of the first half of the 20th Century without seeing Mahan and his book mentioned. His work was probably the strongest influence on the Naval decision makers of the 20th Century- certainly the first half of the century. And whilst few in the general public maybe aware of the book, it has had a huge impact on the world and how history has unfolded. It should be considered on an book list of the “Most Influential.”

[Eric Engle · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a must read, but must read CRITICALLY. Mahan is basically toying with various ideas to try to cope with America's pre-panama canal two coast navy and thus takes up ideas like "decisive battle" / "battle of decision" and also thinks about commerce war (guerre de course). He correctly identifies that naval power would be core to the defense of the American Republic and the extension of its liberal democratic and capitalist ideas, thus three stars. But in fact wars are never won by one grand decisive battle, whether on land or sea. It is rather the accumulation of a series of victories in succession which seals the fate of a contending power. Meanwhile commerce warfare has repeatedly proven less than decisive, the one time succesfully executed was used by USN to cripple imperial Japan: no oil means no training means Mariana's turkey shoot. That was partly the result of Japanese strategic blindness. Many many other examples of FAIlEd guerre de course can be readily found and the ONE succesful example was in concert with surface superiority: by the time the USN submarines were strangling Japan the USN finally outnumbered the IJN in carriers. Finally, the USA has since dug the canal and appears so far to have checked Chinese efforts at building a nicaragua canal.
So.. the problems Mahan addressed are no longer there, the solutions he proposes are inexact, his ideas were entirely the basis of Japanese naval strategy which in fact failed to achieve victory despite one grand decisive battle called Pearl Harbor. And then what?
Oh. Defeat in a grinding war of naval attrition in which the Japanese empire had no chance.

Mahan is right that the navy is the most important power projection AND defensive tool and SHOULD be concentrated (principle of concentration of force). Most of his other propositions are contestable or even demonstrably false. Right strategy (large navy, concentrated) wrong tactic (seeking one grand decisive battle) as a solution to a no longer existing problem (coastal bifurcation).

Well worth reading, well written, but only partly apt to the current world.

[Friedrich Haas · Rating 4 out of 5]

I remember a line from the Movie Patton, where he yells "I read your book!" It is a wonder that anyone educates the military on their profession as it is deadly enough, but to see what nations do in ignorance, yeah, I get it. First off it is far enough in the past that the language is starting to get difficult. It is flowery to me, yet a soft word as I see it is a cutting remark to them. Secondly, I hate Europe, but then actually humanity because we are all as Europe was. War was the thing you did for any reason, no regard to the people you will kill. NO REGARD WHATSOEVER! people never meant anything to Rulers, and never will. Thirdly it reinforces that school history class is propaganda class 101. England is a great nation beloved of Anglophiles! It isn't deserving. France saved us in the Revolution! They kinda didn't want to, and were probably surprised that they did, seeing how hard they tried to skate by looking good. There is truth in this book. Surprised it isn't banned. Probably because the Ban people don't understand the language and never read it through. The opening is the theory on why a country must have sea power and the balance between offensive warships, commerce raiders, merchantmen, empire, and prosperity. The greater part is detailed battles which can be fascinating in themselves if you understand the terminology and can follow those maps. they reinforced the theory with examples. In a sentence, without sea power, a nation has no power. Japan learned that quickly when the Black Ships forced her open. History proves that sea power is the power on a water world like ours.

[Charles H Berlemann Jr · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have had this book on my shelf since I was a junior in high school. It was a Christmas present. That was almost 23 years ago and at various times I have started and stopped this book. It is thick, it is dense at times with discussions of sailing ships and tactics related to sailing ships, it covers battles about as well known to the reading public today as some of the ancient Asian naval engagements were of the folks in the 1890s when the book was written.

The big theme of this book is showing how European history for the French, Dutch, Spanish and English was influenced over a 123 yr period by various naval engagements. One of the recurring trend lines that Mahan developed is that a Navy is no good unless it is maintained thru both having stores at various home ports, overseas stations and having a "character" as he seemed to define it for naval forces. That character came from the development of commerce shipping. For without commerce to travel the sea and to bring the required money in to help maintain a Navy. From the fall of the Dutch, to the near collapse of the English for a while. The shifting bases like Gibraltar and places in India that the French and British fought over during the 7 years war and even some earlier engagements. The history laid out shows how successful support and maintenance of a Navy helps to keep a country free and prosperity coming into the coffers of the government via the mercantile trades.

Overall, this book appears to still be relevant and should be on most deep strategy and policy folks desks.

[Vic Allen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mahan's argument that whomever rules the seas, rules the world, is so well argued in "Influence" that this 1890 tomb remains one of the foremost books on naval strategy ever composed. His ideas about how states should determine their goals with a weather eye on naval power has remained a staple of statecraft and military planning for more than a century. If an enemy state is not contiguous to your own then you have to rely on sea power to carry out any military action against that state. If your opponent can fend you off at sea, you can never achieve victory. Simple as that.
Mahan's ideas have become universal among the navies of the world. "Influence" is such an overpowering argument for the importance of sea power that the idea hasn't been seriously challenged since its publication.
"Influence" itself is a tomb. Over 500 pages. But Mahan's writing, although dense, is immensely readable. Unfortunately, the maps in this particular edition are useless, small and poorly rendered, and the descriptions of the naval battles included is detailed to the point of confusion, these descriptions of battles only make up a small part of the volume. It is about the strategy of nations at war with the individual battles included to illustrate a point and is not the goal of the work.
"Influence" is a must read for anyone interested in military history or current day world events. Mahan's insights are still relevant and important in understanding why states behave the way they do.

[noblethumos · Rating 5 out of 5]

"The Influence of Sea Power upon History" is a book by American naval officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan, first published in 1890. The book argues that naval power is the key to national strength and prosperity, and that a strong navy is essential for a nation to maintain its global influence.

Mahan's thesis is based on the idea that control of the seas is critical to a nation's economic and military power. He argues that a strong navy can protect a nation's trade routes, project power overseas, and deter potential adversaries. Mahan uses historical examples to illustrate his arguments, including the rise and fall of ancient empires and the emergence of European sea powers in the 16th and 17th centuries.

"The Influence of Sea Power upon History" was influential in shaping the strategic thinking of major naval powers, including the United States, Germany, and Great Britain. Mahan's ideas influenced the development of naval strategy and doctrine, and helped to shape the arms race that preceded World War I.

The book has been criticized for its emphasis on naval power at the expense of other factors that contribute to a nation's strength and influence, such as economic power and diplomacy. However, it remains a classic work in the field of naval history and strategy, and its influence can still be seen in contemporary debates about the role of naval power in global affairs.

GPT

[Tiberiu Condulescu · Rating 4 out of 5]

I've been wanting to read this book since I was a student of international relations, but never got round to doing this. Just about 15 years later, it's never to late, is it? First of all this is certainly a good read for students of the topic and/or history, interested in naval events of the 17th and 18th centuries. I thoroughly enjoyed it, but at times it was very specific about the battles, which don't make a lot of sense if you're not familiar with the naval terminology. A youtube video helped me better understand some things.

Clearly the aim of the author is to point out the crucial importance of sea power upon historical events so as to influence the attitude of the US towards it's own naval policy. In the two centuries discussed the focus is obviously on England and her rise to become mistress of the seas and there is a constant comparison with the great (or not so great) rivals of the time: Holland, France, Spain and Portugal. By the end of it, you generally get the idea why it was England who made it and not France (in some conjuction with Sptain)... while the other nations didn't really have a serious chance in time.

[Frank · Rating 5 out of 5]

The bible for Navy pukes. But control of the seas will always be important until seas rise and we drown like rats.

[Dave · Rating 2 out of 5]

I read this book primarily because of its great influence on decision makers and strategists when it was first published in 1890. A.T. Mahan has been described as one of the most influential authors of his time. Mahan was a career naval officer (Captain), Naval Academy graduate, and lecturer at the U.S. Naval War College.
The book is not and never was written for the general interest reader (like me). The reader must have an in-depth knowledge of European Wars (particularly naval actions) of the book's time frame. Additionally, the reader needs to intimately understand square-rigger sailing and fighting. The book is dense, repetitive, and its prose is not very good. Except for descriptions of naval engagements, which I found informative, I skimmed a good deal of the book. I'm also not sure all of Mahan's broad conclusions make sense. To be fair, though I have the benefit of hindsight.
I would only recommend this book to those highly interested in Mahan or his subject. One note: the kindle version is free on Amazon.

[Tami · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783 is practically a historical document. The book's first copyright was in 1890 by Alfred Thayer Mahan. The copyright was transferred to Ellen Lyle Mahan in 1918 which eventually fell to the publisher who has published twelve editions of this book.

The style of the writing and the format of the text adhere to that of the original text and the traditional style. These aspects not only allow the reader insight and virtually unheard of detail about the various battles discussed but also a view of how those campaigns were viewed in the original author's time.

Unfortunately, these same aspects make this book somewhat cumbersome. The book is meant to be read from start to finish (all 557 pages). Thus, the reader's knowledge gradually grows as the book progresses making it difficult to look up details on a particular change of technology or a specific campaign.