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A Country Made by War
Covering every major conflict since the Revolutionary War, the author explores how American society was shaped by war and how these conflicts were an integral part of Americas's technological development
629 pages, Paperback
Published July 14, 1990
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
May 13, 2012
I read this years ago. It is still fresh on my mind. I look at money, transportation and our very landscape different now thanks to this book.
A very good read.
A very good read.
February 19, 2008
A solid history that strips away a lot of traditional whitewash; if the reader didn't already wonder what people were talking about when they called America a peace-loving nation, he/she will wonder just that after reading this.
Presented not in a spirit of judgment but rather a simple just-the-facts, "Look, this is how it is and this is what really happened" manner. An eye-opener that should be in the library of any serious student of American history or of geopolitics.
Presented not in a spirit of judgment but rather a simple just-the-facts, "Look, this is how it is and this is what really happened" manner. An eye-opener that should be in the library of any serious student of American history or of geopolitics.
July 22, 2008
A great history of the United States. I read it several years ago but it is one of my favorites and on my list to read again.
August 22, 2026
The title is a bit misleading--the book does not try to make a case that the US is more warlike or militarized than other countries. Most of it is a straightforward military history, explaining changes in theory, politics, technology, and organization. There are snapshots of key figures, both well-known (e.g. Marshall) and obscure (MG Fox Connor, mentor to a young Eisenhower). There are interesting and novel judgments every here and there.
It becomes more intriguing in the last two chapters, on Vietnam and on the future (as seen in 1989). The author traces the politicizing of senior military officers to President Eisenhower's era: they became reluctant to give honest military advice if it conflicted with favored policies, for fear of being relieved. Eventually grand strategy was given up to Johnson, McNamara, and whiz kids. High-level military advice on Vietnam was either ignored or not sought, producing a predictable debacle.
The last chapter provides extended reflection on the state of the US military and some judgments about the future. A demoralized and hollowed-out military is slowly recovering from Vietnam, but it's involved in a general decay and loss of confidence efficiency in all American institutions. Skills and training are being slowly improved and new arms are being acquired. The military is focused on how to defeat a Soviet attempt to conquer western Europe and on how to deter a Soviet nuclear attack. (Interestingly, the author maintains that the real function of the nuclear triad is not to ride out a surprise attack and reply in kind, as generally discussed, but to launch a pre-emptive attack when preparations for a first stack are detected.) The US military has three great strengths, which give grounds for optimism: high levels of education, traditional faith in firepower, and wide use of civilian/military dual-use technology.
The author's predictions about the future are not terribly far-seeing. He is correct that precision weapons will transform war. He rightly stresses the importance of morale, sense of purpose, and organizational heritage. However, he dismisses the B-1 bomber, still flying now, as a "fiasco," and disparages the M-16, also still in widespread service. He does not predict an overwhelming victory as in the 1991 Gulf War, nor does he anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union or the resurgence of intense interest in guerrilla warfare. He predicts that line infantry will no longer exist after the year 2000.
It becomes more intriguing in the last two chapters, on Vietnam and on the future (as seen in 1989). The author traces the politicizing of senior military officers to President Eisenhower's era: they became reluctant to give honest military advice if it conflicted with favored policies, for fear of being relieved. Eventually grand strategy was given up to Johnson, McNamara, and whiz kids. High-level military advice on Vietnam was either ignored or not sought, producing a predictable debacle.
The last chapter provides extended reflection on the state of the US military and some judgments about the future. A demoralized and hollowed-out military is slowly recovering from Vietnam, but it's involved in a general decay and loss of confidence efficiency in all American institutions. Skills and training are being slowly improved and new arms are being acquired. The military is focused on how to defeat a Soviet attempt to conquer western Europe and on how to deter a Soviet nuclear attack. (Interestingly, the author maintains that the real function of the nuclear triad is not to ride out a surprise attack and reply in kind, as generally discussed, but to launch a pre-emptive attack when preparations for a first stack are detected.) The US military has three great strengths, which give grounds for optimism: high levels of education, traditional faith in firepower, and wide use of civilian/military dual-use technology.
The author's predictions about the future are not terribly far-seeing. He is correct that precision weapons will transform war. He rightly stresses the importance of morale, sense of purpose, and organizational heritage. However, he dismisses the B-1 bomber, still flying now, as a "fiasco," and disparages the M-16, also still in widespread service. He does not predict an overwhelming victory as in the 1991 Gulf War, nor does he anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union or the resurgence of intense interest in guerrilla warfare. He predicts that line infantry will no longer exist after the year 2000.
June 23, 2025
Perret's history of U.S. Presidents fulfilling Pentagon needs clearly demonstrates how USA's two major parties are simply two sides of the same coin.
Democrats and Republicans, many since the 1950s as ex-CIA, share one consistent principle: allegiance to U.S.-powered global empire. Both major parties march lockstep when the Pentagon wants to drop bombs on USA's global neighbors.
Perret well illustrates how there is no meaningful difference between the major parties when the war drums beat.
Today's pretext of Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons is one more familiar lie. Just like Vietnam and many previous wars, hoodwinked Yanks are being dragged into war based on deliberate deception.
Democrats and Republicans, many since the 1950s as ex-CIA, share one consistent principle: allegiance to U.S.-powered global empire. Both major parties march lockstep when the Pentagon wants to drop bombs on USA's global neighbors.
Perret well illustrates how there is no meaningful difference between the major parties when the war drums beat.
Today's pretext of Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons is one more familiar lie. Just like Vietnam and many previous wars, hoodwinked Yanks are being dragged into war based on deliberate deception.
November 21, 2024
A history of the United States as told through conflicts and war from its founding through Vietnam. It's a bit dated but there's some interesting history in here, especially for the Revolutionary and Civil Wars. Overall pretty meh and forgettable.
March 16, 2012
A comprehensive account of the military history of the United States from 1789 to the mid-1980s. It's a bit unfortunate that it was published when it was, about a year before the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union: it'd be fascinating to see what Perret would make of the subsequent twenty years of American military history, which entailed a (difficult) transformation of the armed forces with further emphasis on special forces and the electronic battlefield, while further supporting Perret's view that the Uptonian unpreparedness hypothesis is wrong.
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April 9, 2011Another list of imperial military and political failures disguised as modern day intellectualism...
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews