Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read.

Start by marking “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?” as Want to Read:

Other editions

Enlarge cover

Rate this book

Clear rating

1 of 5 stars 2 of 5 stars 3 of 5 stars 4 of 5 stars 5 of 5 stars

Open Preview

Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?

Graham Allison

4.23 · Rating details · 3,384 ratings · 347 reviews

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE HEADING TOWARD A WAR NEITHER WANTS. The reason is Thucydides’s Trap, a deadly pattern of structural stress that results when a rising power challenges a ruling one. This phenomenon is as old as history itself. About the Peloponnesian War that devastated ancient Greece, the historian Thucydides explained: “It was the rise of Athens and the fe ...more

Get A Copy

Hardcover, 384 pages

Published May 30th 2017 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt

More Details... Edit Details

Friend Reviews

To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up.

Reader Q&A

To ask other readers questions about Destined for War, please sign up.

Lists with This Book

Killers of the Flower Moon by David Grann

100 Notable Books of 2017 - The New York Times

100 books — 91 voters

Manifesto of the Free People's Union by Jakub Lasak

Corruption, Plutocracy, Oligarchy, Kleptocracy, Corporatocracy — Solutions: Reasoning & Alternatives

399 books — 41 voters

More lists with this book...

Community Reviews

Showing 1-30

Average rating 4.23 ·

Rating details

· 3,384 ratings · 347 reviews

More filters

Sort order

Start your review of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?

Nov 26, 2017 Trish rated it really liked it

Shelves: america, government, nonfiction, war, asia, political-science, foreign-affairs, history

Present foreign policy in the United States is examined in the context of one of the earliest consequential wars ever written about:

“While others identified an array of contributing causes of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides went to the heart of the matter. When he turned the spotlight on ‘the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta,’ he identified a primary driver at the root of some of history’s most catastrophic and puzzling wars.”

Fear. Allison has the advantage of recen Present foreign policy in the United States is examined in the context of one of the earliest consequential wars ever written about:

“While others identified an array of contributing causes of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides went to the heart of the matter. When he turned the spotlight on ‘the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta,’ he identified a primary driver at the root of some of history’s most catastrophic and puzzling wars.”

Fear. Allison has the advantage of recent discoveries in behavioral science which show that “at the basic psychological level…people’s fears of loss (or intimations of ‘decline’) trump our hopes of gain—driving us to take unreasonable risks to protect what is ours.” Applied to the present day, America shouldn’t allow fear of China’s stupendous rise make policy makers forget what is their strategic interest: preserving the free nature of their democracy and fundamental institutions and keeping its people strong and resilient rather than preserving a heretofore unchallenged primacy over the western Pacific. Allison asks why we think we need to preserve that primacy at any cost.

China has finally turned its face to the world and intends to engage. History shows us they have a core belief in the superiority of the Middle Kingdom, so we can expect a fierce nationalism. Allison suggests we need to dial back actions and policies that strengthen an unreasonable hard-line nationalism in China that brooks no opposition. We should be expecting to live with this new rising power and chill with rhetoric that clouds an understanding of what our goals actually are in a changing world.

JFK faced a threat that could have led to war and he persistently dialed down the rhetoric, ignoring advisors, saying the enduring lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis

“Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avoid confrontations that force an adversary to choose between a humiliating retreat and nuclear war.”

An example of the US not heeding this lesson came nearly twenty years prior to JFK’s lonely decision-making. Less than a week before the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor by the Japanese, Tokyo had been complaining that they could not operate under the economic sanctions imposed on them by the U.S. and that they would prefer to fight, but the US ignored the ambassador’s message…

Allison teaches a class at Harvard which discusses instances of Thucydides’ trap—that is, when a rising power confronts a current power the result is war—playing out through history, so he’s had plenty of opportunity to hone his argument. It shows in the smoothness of the argument and clarity of the history he tells to bolster his thesis. We get examples of an established power feeling threatened by a rising power and the conditions under which this resulted in war and when it did not. Two recent examples would include England and Germany before WWI, 1860-1913. We also see the United States and the Soviet Union after WWII: one might argue relations between the two did precipitate an outbreak of hostilities, the Cold War. However, Allison argues the latter example is an example that war is not inevitable.

America since the second world war took on alliances with Europeans mainly, but also Japan and Taiwan, which entailed an American guarantee of lethal force in the case of an invasion or attack. This guarantee of protection came with spoken and unspoken obligations that extended and enhanced America’s influence abroad. In a town hall meeting in 2016, Hillary Clinton explained that countries around the world were often eager and asking for US protection. Allison tells us that, in Thucydides’ time, the Greeks also had an empire

“That empire was acquired not by violence,” they later claimed to the Spartans, but instead “because the allies attached themselves to us and spontaneously asked us to assume the command.”

President Trump has made clear that the US will no longer, while he is president, take a leading role as protector without a kind of tributary role being played by smaller states. China is pleased to take on the role of protector that the U.S. appears no longer to want. In the end, the present American administration may simply move aside to accommodate China without a clear foreign policy strategy.

This book was surprisingly readable and a very good one for clarifying the failures of strategic foreign policy by recent administrations. Allison was able to cut away much obfuscating bluster by spokespeople to have us look at Xi Jinping and Donald Trump with history’s eyeglasses: we see them as leading actors who each personify his country’s “deep aspiration for national greatness.” In his last chapter Allison anticipated Trump’s speech in China this past month, suggesting that each country should pay attention to their own strategic interests. Allison’s words are

“China and the US would be better served not by passive-aggressive ‘should diplomacy’ (calling on the other to exhibit better behavior) or by noble-sounding rhetoric about geopolitical norms, but by unapologetically pursuing their national interests. In high-stakes relationships, predictability and stability—not friendship—matter most. The US should stop playing ‘let’s pretend.’”

However, Donald Trump is anything but predictable and stable. And, Allison reminds us, when states repeatedly fail to act in what appears to be their true national interest, it is often because their policies reflect necessary compromises among parties within their government rather than a single coherent vision. This is true right now in the U.S.; the thing that brings us down may be ourselves rather than China.

Thucydides himself believed fear was at the primary driver at the root of the Peloponnesian War, when a rising Athens threatened Sparta. Donald Trump went out of his way, during the 2016 presidential campaign at least, to hype a type of fear in America about China’s rising militancy and wealth. He almost seemed to open his arms to conflict. The destructiveness of such a contest between the East and the West would be so catastrophic as to be almost unimaginable. Of course Thucydides’ trap is not inevitable, but we must find leaders with great understanding. ...more

flag 34 likes · Like · see review

Jun 14, 2017 Charles J rated it really liked it

Graham Allison, a Harvard professor and sometime government functionary, is clearly a man who thinks a great deal of himself. On the other hand, most of his pride in himself actually seems justified by his experience and thought, and in these Trumpian days, perhaps immodesty is the Spirit of the Age. Therefore, if you can get through the scenes in “Destined For War” where Allison talks down to and instructs David Petraeus like a schoolboy, as the latter sits behind his CIA desk; and the passages ...more

flag 30 likes · Like · see review

Sep 16, 2017 Dillon added it · review of another edition

This was well-written and informative. A few takeaways:
- China's growth can hardly be overstated. It's genuinely impressive, and unprecedented in terms of modern metrics.
- Chinese folks, by and large, have a pretty pragmatic view of the world - democracy is not going to happen as long as the country is getting more prosperous under the CCP. If responsive autocracy is working, why fix it? In other words, hardly anyone is still talking about Tiananmen Square, now that China is on the path to growt This was well-written and informative. A few takeaways:
- China's growth can hardly be overstated. It's genuinely impressive, and unprecedented in terms of modern metrics.
- Chinese folks, by and large, have a pretty pragmatic view of the world - democracy is not going to happen as long as the country is getting more prosperous under the CCP. If responsive autocracy is working, why fix it? In other words, hardly anyone is still talking about Tiananmen Square, now that China is on the path to growth that it's on.
- Not everyone thinks like Americans think. As a newer country, it's important to understand this. The American ability to look back on history is naturally more limited.
- Chinese especially don't think like Americans think (generally speaking)
- Watch for U.S. concessions in Asia in the years to come.
- Watch for rising tension between China and its neighbors in the years to come.
- Preventing war isn't as simple as "well, nobody wants it, so it's not going to happen" or "they've both got too much for it to lose, so it's not going to happen" or "their economies are so intertwined that war would be national suicide, so it's not going to happen." Just as conflicts among individuals often arise out of miscommunication, even when nobody wants conflict, so it is with international conflict - only the information regarding true intention is more difficult to access and the path to escalation can be set upon without either side intending it. One side's Tactful and skillful diplomacy is extremely important. Words and gestures can mean the difference between war and peace, and alliances can really complicate the matter. A key example is the First World War, in which the war that nobody truly wanted happened, with both sides unable to control the path to escalation.
- De-escalation is much more difficult than escalation. Especially because de-escalation can be interpreted as escalation.
- Mutually assured destruction is still a relevant concept, but not every conflict between nuclear powers is bound to go nuclear.
- The U.S. military is still supreme, but expect China to catch up as a natural consequence of their economic growth
- Countries will test each other to know what they're dealing with.
- Again, alliances are really tricky business.
- Chinese ethnocentrism probably runs deeper than its American counterpart. Honestly though, pretty much all the countries in East Asia...
- T.R. was prolific, any way you spin it. He's largely responsible for the America of the twentieth century and as a result, the America of the twenty-first - and if Great Britain's hands weren't tied during so much of the early nineteen hundreds, there probably would have been some more conflict. Hopefully Xi Jinping isn't a Chinese T.R.
- Eventual violent conflict can be avoided, but a lot of things need to go right.
- History is very instructive in this matter.

以往发生的事，将来还会发生；先前做过的事，将来也必再做。日光之下，根本没有新事。列邦动荡，列国倾覆。上帝的声音使大地熔化 ...more

flag 11 likes · Like · see review

Oct 07, 2018 Murtaza rated it really liked it

Shelves: best-of-2018

History shows that changes in the balance of power often occur gradually over time. The spectacular confirmation of the new order sometimes comes only after the fact, when it is punctuated by a decisive war or political collapse. This book argues that the reemergence of China will upend the post-Cold War order in which the United States has been the preeminent power internationally. In the picture that Allison paints, China will not just match the United States as a superpower but will utterly d History shows that changes in the balance of power often occur gradually over time. The spectacular confirmation of the new order sometimes comes only after the fact, when it is punctuated by a decisive war or political collapse. This book argues that the reemergence of China will upend the post-Cold War order in which the United States has been the preeminent power internationally. In the picture that Allison paints, China will not just match the United States as a superpower but will utterly dwarf it within a few decades, particularly in economic terms.

While predicting the future is obviously hazardous the relative growth statistics he cites here are stunning and should be a major wake up call about how decadent America has become during its period of superpower hegemony. For all it’s powerful merits in comparison with Chinese authoritarianism, the dysfunctions of modern American democracy are making meaningful collective action to compete with China effectively impossible. This is a bad portent when one considers the challenges of the years to come.

The Chinese perception of world order is one in which they have a central place. They certainly don’t see themselves as a marginal civilization somewhere in Asia that will allow an outside power to set the terms in its neighborhood. Allison poignantly articulates the stresses that China’s rise is likely to have on the current order. He also examines it in comparison with the United States’ very bellicose emergence as an empire, in addition to several other “Thucydides Trap” situations in history. His examination of Chinese strategic thinking is reasonably compelling, although it is superficial due its brevity and perhaps also overly deterministic since it’s largely based on reviewing old published texts.

There is quite a fatalistic subtext to the book. Not in the sense that war is inevitable (though he makes a convincing case of how it could happen, even against both parties wishes), but rather in the ability of an increasingly dysfunctional United States to hold its own against the rising behemoth that modern China is becoming. Most Americans do not seem to be aware of what is in store for the future or how radically the world is forecasted to change in the next few decades. Let’s hope that the worst outcomes can be avoided, and that at least American leaders will pay attention to the warnings in this book and do what they can to prepare their society accordingly. ...more

flag 8 likes · Like · see review

Aug 09, 2020 Vidur Kapur rated it really liked it

Shelves: chinese-history, history, politics

As a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Graham Allison has had privileged access to policymakers in Washington for many decades, and was mentored by none other than the notorious Henry Kissinger.

What he has seen, vis-à-vis US policy on China, frightens him. American officials have until recently downplayed China's commercial and military gains, and adopted an incoherent strategy, one which "permits everything and prohibits nothing". In actual fact, a patient, carefully calcu As a professor at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Graham Allison has had privileged access to policymakers in Washington for many decades, and was mentored by none other than the notorious Henry Kissinger.

What he has seen, vis-à-vis US policy on China, frightens him. American officials have until recently downplayed China's commercial and military gains, and adopted an incoherent strategy, one which "permits everything and prohibits nothing". In actual fact, a patient, carefully calculated strategy, similar to that devised by policymakers in the late 1940s when confronted with the rise of the Soviet Union, is sorely needed.

Why? Historically, as Allison recounts, when a rising power has challenged the established dominant power, it has more often than not led to destructive warfare. This is the essence of what Allison terms the "Thucydides Trap", for it was Thucydides who first recognised this dynamic.

It should be noted that some classicists have challenged Allison's interpretations of Thucydides, but their objections seem to be rather pedantic. Allison does not claim that war between the United States and China is inevitable, for instance, and notes that Thucydides probably wasn't claiming that war between Athens and Sparta was inevitable either. Nor does Allison ignore the differences between ancient Greece and the modern world: yes, we have nuclear weapons that act as a deterrent to warfare, but participants in war games and simulations (which he describes at length) "are repeatedly surprised to find how often and easily small sparks lead to large wars." And while there are debates about the best translation of Thucydides, the central idea, that of the potential for war during a power transition, has been studied by international relations theorists for decades. Ultimately, many of these classicists seem to be annoyed that political scientists and international relations theorists are encroaching on their territory.

Others, for instance the writer Ian Buruma, have objected to the book on account of the people that the author evidently admires, including Henry Kissinger and Lee Kuan Yew. While they are undoubtedly controversial figures, their insights on China should not go unheeded, and Destined for War does not exclusively rely on these individuals by any means. Allison and his colleagues themselves have clearly had many off-the-record conversations with Chinese officials.

As for the book's recommendations, some critics have claimed that Allison wants to "appease" China just as Nazi Germany was appeased by Britain in the 1930s. This is a misreading: Allison sketches out a number of strategies, including "accommodation" (which requires concessions from China as well as the United States) but also "undermine". Whereas Henry Kissinger, in his earlier book On China, advocated a Pacific Community, similar in scope to the European Union, in order to defuse tensions and foster cooperation between the US, China and other regional powers, Allison is arguably more realistic about what can be achieved.

Others, including the UK Prime Minister's Chief Adviser Dominic Cummings, have interpreted Allison to be implying that the strategies he outlines are mutually exclusive. This, too, is likely to be a misreading: Allison notes that Bismarck would likely have handled the events leading up to the First World War much more deftly than the actual German leadership did, and that he would have employed a mix of strategies in order to do so. Similarly, Allison argues, the bipartisan strategy towards the Soviet Union followed by successive administrations included multiple elements, from agreements on arms control to support for dissidents in Communist-controlled countries. What is key is that Bismarck, and Cold War-era US administrations, had their respective countries' core interests in mind.

To many, this call for a return to geopolitical realism (Allison's mentor was Kissinger, after all) will be a hard pill to swallow. It may involve sacrifices in the South and East China Seas, and indeed on the question of Taiwan. Is the risk of war really large enough to justify these sacrifices; is the status quo not working relatively well? Allison, fairly persuasively in my view, makes the case that war is indeed much more likely than our intuitions might lead us to assume. ...more

flag 7 likes · Like · see review

Sep 02, 2017 Richard Duncan rated it liked it

Shelves: in-the-nook

There is much that is important in this book. Allison makes some strong points about the differences between China’s worldview and our own, and how it affects our respective approaches to the world. He discusses how we need to approach foreign policy, and more importantly, what we need to understand about ourselves before we can come up with a coherent strategy to deal with China and other international challenges.

However, the book never quite comes together. It feels like scraps from several di There is much that is important in this book. Allison makes some strong points about the differences between China’s worldview and our own, and how it affects our respective approaches to the world. He discusses how we need to approach foreign policy, and more importantly, what we need to understand about ourselves before we can come up with a coherent strategy to deal with China and other international challenges.

However, the book never quite comes together. It feels like scraps from several different books, and the basic premise – that the future of the China/America relationship, the likelihood of war, can be illuminated by a study of Thucydides’ work on the war between Athens and Sparta – is used very unevenly and not fully developed.

Allison explores several historic cases in which a developing power and an existing power come into conflict, and looks at why those conflicts did or did not lead to war. I think it is a brilliant concept, and could help shed light on a difficult, complex, and frightening topic.
The first few examples, though, felt dumbed-down and almost pandering. A quick re-cap of an ancient story, a brief lecture with the term “The Thucydides Trap” repeated ad nauseum. (It’s an old trope of non-fiction writers trying a little too hard to make a point. Has anyone else read “The Conundrum?”)

As the stories begin to reflect more recent (and specifically American) history, the book shifts. The tales become much more detailed, but often bog down in endless detail that has nothing to do with the overall theme of the book. Theodore Roosevelt’s personality, etc. etc. etc. And the concept of The Thucydides Trap seems to disappear.

Then Allison returns to the discussion of the relationship between China and the US. This is where the heart of the book lies. Allison is not afraid to bluntly lay out the challenges facing us as we navigate our way through a complex, changing, and frightening world. Options we must consider, though they seem repugnant to us. And a wholesale re-examination of our place in the world that we need to do to truly re-gain any control of our national destiny.

Though saying, essentially, that policy-makers need to be wise is not really very helpful.
So is it a perfect book? Unfortunately, no, far from it. But it is nonetheless an important book for anyone concerned about our relationship with China, and more importantly, with our place in the new world.

My recommendation is to read it, to skim the boring or annoying bits, but to think deeply about the more challenging parts.
...more

flag 6 likes · Like · see review

Aug 01, 2017 Raghu rated it liked it

The spectacular rise of China’s economic and military might in the past twenty years has given rise to hope as well as anxiety and fear among diplomats and policy makers in the United States. Even the academics and historians are intrigued by what it portends for the future. Consequently, we have a plethora of books, essays and analysis in the media and from the publishing houses. This book is one more contribution to the subject, but quite an original and interesting one. It focuses on the ques The spectacular rise of China’s economic and military might in the past twenty years has given rise to hope as well as anxiety and fear among diplomats and policy makers in the United States. Even the academics and historians are intrigued by what it portends for the future. Consequently, we have a plethora of books, essays and analysis in the media and from the publishing houses. This book is one more contribution to the subject, but quite an original and interesting one. It focuses on the question of whether China and the US will inevitably stumble into war with one another, as a result of China’s challenge to displace US as the primary military power in the Asia-Pacific. How does one predict a prognosis of war between two superpowers, who are separated from each other physically by ten thousand kilometers and are linked only by trade and diplomacy? Author Allison reaches far back into history, invoking the theories of Thucydides, a 5th century Athenian historian and general, to provide the framework for an answer. Thucydides analysed the Peloponnesian War of the 5th century BCE between Sparta and Athens and pronounced that severe structural stress is caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one. In such conditions, not just extraordinary , unexpected events, but even ordinary flashpoints of foreign affairs, can trigger large-scale conflict. This is called the Thucydides Trap by the author. History has seen many instances where new rising powers have challenged ruling powers in the world . Allison enumerates sixteen such instances in the past 500 years of world history and shows that as many as twelve of them have resulted in Wars. From these sixteen instances, the author distills the clues as to when war results and when it does not. He then proceeds to apply these principles to the current US - China conflict and suggest prescriptions for how the conflict may be managed.

First of all, is there a rational basis for the US to conclude that China, as a rising power, threatens the United States? Or is the US just demonstrating the normal ruling power syndrome of exaggerated fears, insecurities and dread of changes in the status quo? Let us look at the facts on the ground. On the one hand, Western experts, after deep engagement with China, say that China’s leaders believe that the grand strategy of the US in dealing with China is based on five ‘to’s: to isolate China, to contain China, to diminish China, to internally divide China and to sabotage China’s leadership. Such a deeply held negative view is not conducive to peace, especially when both see each other as equals. The past decade has seen the Chinese economy catch up with the US in GDP (on PPP terms), providing a lot of resources to augment its military strength. In addition, China has seen the ascendency of Xi Jinping as its leader. Xi’s vision is to reclaim the purported historical greatness of China as the pre-eminent power in Asia, before Western imperialism intruded to upset it in the 19th century. A corollary of this vision, as per Xi himself, is to re-establish control over the territories of ‘greater China’, which includes Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the islands in East Asia and south China sea. A further corollary is to recover the historic sphere of influence in its neighbourhood and make them defer to China as was the case in history, according to this narrative. In addition, China wants to command respect of other great Western powers of the world, to offset their century of humiliation. All this is articulated as part of the Centennial goals by Xi himself. With such a dominant vision and a strong suspicion of US motives, conflict seems a natural fall-out. However, in a world used to ideas based on Enlightenment and Reason for two centuries, there will be severe resistance to such a dominant vision, particularly from other powers in Asia, such as Japan, India, Vietnam and Indonesia, not to mention the US and other Western powers. Hence, the US has good reasons to be wary of China and the Thucydides trap.

However, the Thucydides trap does not mean that war is inevitable. The book elicits twelve clues from the past four instances in history where the Thucydides trap skirted war. When I look at these clues, I find that some clues are applicable in this case but do not seem strong enough to prevent war. Some others are not applicable in this case at all. In the end, I find that only three of them are decisively applicable to the current US-China situation. They are: Nuclear weapons on both sides, the doctrine of MAD (Mutually assured destruction) and deep economic interdependence due to globalization. Seen in this light, it looks as though the author has arrived at the same conclusions that others have arrived at long ago even during the Soviet era, without having to invoke the Thucydides Trap. Even though these above mentioned clues might prevent war, the author says that it is necessary for the US to review all its strategic options, however contradictory and ugly. The strategic options are: accommodating China, undermining China, Negotiating a Long Peace and redefining the relationship. As accommodation, the US can consider curtailing its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for concessions on south China sea, withdrawing troops from S.Korea in exchange for Chinese denuclearization of N.Korea. In undermining China, the US could foment regime change or divide China against itself, question the legitimacy of the Communist Party as Ronald Reagan did with the USSR, support Taiwanese, Hong Kong and Tibetan independence, support dissidents, do substantial cyber damage and even train and support insurgents in Xinjiang. In negotiating peace, Washington could limit surveillance operations along China’s borders, especially near China’s military installations on Hainan island in return for Beijing removing anti-ship and anti-air missiles from the south China sea. China could be asked to end patrols near the Senkaku islands in return for the US stopping provocative navigations in the south China sea.

In spite of the phenomenal accomplishments of China in the past thirty years, I find that some assumptions by Western scholars are based on dubious grounds. They accept the Chinese communist line that historically China has been the dominant power in Asia, to which other countries in the neighbourhood deferred, paid tributes in return for Chinese largesse. Such a narrative is advanced by China to project a powerful image of itself, when reality is probably a few notches down. Much as the West might pay obeisance to this narrative, the rest of Asia does not really see it this way at all. It is not true that China was such a dominant power in all of Asia at any time. Many tribes in China’s periphery have harassed Chinese rulers in history and extracted tribute. The Manchus ruled China for 250 years. The Mongols conquered all of China and ruled them for over a century. Areas such as Xinjiang and Tibet are acquisitions by these invaders rather than by the Han Chinese. What happened at the hands of the British and the Japanese in the 19th and 20th centuries is well known. Elsewhere in South-East Asia, the civilization is influenced more by India than China. West Asia is influenced by Islam much more than China. China’s dominance seems to have been limited just to East Asia and Vietnam rather than all over the vast Asian continent. Still, western academics seem to toe the Chinese line that they were the dominant power in Asia in history and that other nations paid tribute to it.

Secondly, Allison seems to readily grant China an equivalence with the US and implore a need to accommodate its superpower ambitions. Except for nuclear weapons and missiles, China lags significantly behind the US in many key areas, like science, technology, per capita income, soft power and many other areas of military capabilities. The US is still a young nation with active immigration which lets it renew itself constantly. Whereas China is said to age faster than its economic growth, limiting its future possibilities. The option of a younger future population through immigration also seems unlikely due to China’s historical insularity. China’s economy is slowing down and it has mounting debt issues. All these factors might point to the daunting odds of China closing the gap between itself and the US. But, many Western scholars seem to grant an easy pass for China as a superpower on par with the US.

Thirdly, I find it odd that many scholars write approvingly of China’s navigation of international affairs and diplomacy as something based on the three pillars of ‘tian xia’ (China’s view of itself as being the center of the world), Confucian wisdom and Sun Tzu’s theories of war. If an Islamic nation conducts its world affairs today based on the Quran or a Christian nation does it based on the Bible, scholars would slam them as being fundamentalist in outlook. Confucian ethics and Sun Tzu’s works, though secular, are much older than the Quran or the Bible and they were guidelines for a world which was much different from what it is today. But China is spoken of admiringly for invoking Confucian wisdom in dealing with the world rather than being slammed as ‘fundamentalist’. I would think that this is a weakness of China rather than its strength, if it is at all true that the Chinese leadership is really guided by these principles.

Nevertheless, this is a thought provoking book, written in a fast-paced style.

...more

flag 4 likes · Like · see review

Apr 15, 2018 Aristotle rated it really liked it · review of another edition

Shelves: 2018-reading-list, history, politics, economics

Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? by Graham Allison

Only the dead have seen the end of war. Or have they? Renowned political scientist Graham Allison seeks to analyze the complex situation that presents itself between the United States and China in Destined for War, and discover if the historical precedent of destructive conflict can truly be avoided. Above all else, I found this book to extremely gripping and informative, written in a digestible essay style that s Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? by Graham Allison

Only the dead have seen the end of war. Or have they? Renowned political scientist Graham Allison seeks to analyze the complex situation that presents itself between the United States and China in Destined for War, and discover if the historical precedent of destructive conflict can truly be avoided. Above all else, I found this book to extremely gripping and informative, written in a digestible essay style that still has it’s creative extensions.

For such a striking the title, the book itself is by far one of the least alarmist pieces of literature I’ve read on the topic of China under the CCP. While the book does haveit’s fair share of heavy handedness, it possesses a far greater understanding of the varying dynamics and nuances underlying China’s policies and politics than I was expecting by far. Allison’s Destined for War also makes broad use of history and statistics from the very first pages of his book, giving all his writing the legitimacy of an expert. Further into the book, his conflict comparisons seek to give examples of both war prevailing and being forgone. This even focus helps Allison’s analysis stay on the objective side of things, being the advocate for Realpolitik that he is. In the books third part which is it’s strongest, a much more focused look at China and the US in the modern day is given. Differences, similarities and war itself is given attention in detail. The final part is a more meditative but very necessary look at how peace can prevail. Destined for War isn’t without some flaws, which I will cover as well.

As mentioned, the title of this book is a bit questionable. Indeed, many of the people I mentioned it to automatically assumed the book to be largely alarmist, which I believe it very well isn’t. I think something as simple as adding a question mark directly at the end of Destined for War would have markedly improved it’s first impression. If I was somebody more sympathetic to both sides of the pacific ocean, I might not have picked up this book in the first place. Luckily for Graham Allison, I’m not. In saying that, I am surprised at how much the contents of this book defy the title. So much so that my own views on the pacific struggle have been significantly re-angled after reading through this piece.

I’ve consistently vouched for the use of evidence in non-fiction titles and I’m rarely unsatisfied with most works, but Allison’s Destined for War superbly impressed. Even without the mountainous Index, Appendix and Notes section housed at the rear of the book, Destined for War does an excellent job of integrating historical and statistical evidence into it’s pages. Whether it’s comparisons, quotes, numbers or percentages, everything appears to be sourced and always used in a measured degree. Essentially, Allison’s use of statistics throughout Part 1 provides a jumping off point for the rest of the book.

A good central chunk of Destined for War is dedicated specifically to historical study, or as it’s termed: ‘Applied History’. Allison uses examples such as Britain and Germany, and more importantly Athens and Sparta. This is important because throughout the book Allison repeatedly quotes, references and even reveres Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War. He uses the work to make important comparisons to today’s confrontation between the USA and China. It’s these largely accurate comparisons that he utilizes to form the basis of his approach towards peace, not only through examples of war but also examples of where peace has occurred as well. Allison never seemed to focus too much on any one thing and the examples never got boring, thus I think it helped the book a great deal.

Destined for War is at it’s strongest in it’s third part. In this part Allison orchestrates four key ideas. Without getting into serious detail or spoilers, he covers all you’d expect him to: Xi Jinping and his connection to the past, OBOR and the Monroe Doctrine, civil differences between the PRC and USA along with several war scenarios. Among these, it was Allison’s theories on a future war between the two nations struck me best. As a fan of strategy and world politics myself, I found they had a great deal of plausibility and accuracy and were rather far from alarmist calls in the media.

The book ends itself on the kind of note I was hoping for: One that looks forward positively towards the future. Allison demonstrated throughout the book a keen understanding of both China and the USA, how they operate, how they see the world, how their people perceive their government and so on. So with this, he takes a look at both today and the past for clues towards peace. With that, he lays a respectable roadmap towards another détente in our age. Only time will tell if these maps are accurate or not, but they do certainly seem well put together.

There were only two main flaws I found with Destined for War. The first is that, while I don’t mind that he is, Graham Allison being an adherent to the ideas of Henry Kissinger limits the scope of his book. It would have been better for him to simply refer to the ageing statesman as a reference alongside all others in the book, rather than showing his obvious faith in him. Kissinger is still debated today as either a war criminal or diplomat of the ages, but considering the amount of litigation against him and the fact that he is still alive, Allison’s use of him in this book struck a wrong chord with me. Allison also makes rare but sweeping claims regarding the history of things like social democracy, capitalism and communism. While I largely agreed with what he had to say, I think his book would have a more active lifespan if he took a step away from the historiography of today.

In summary, Graham Allison’s Destined for War is a well researched analysis of relations between the USA and China that despite Allison’s best efforts still possesses a lot of the archaic beliefs of the post-Cold War school of thought. Whether this was unavoidable or not, I can’t say, but Allison’s consideration for the Information Age is still commendable. While I’ve taken pains to pick it apart, the book did still grant me a much wider degree of thought on the topic and gave me new questions moving forward. I would say it’s a must read for anyone looking to learn more on the future of the world’s two prevalent superpowers. I’d be happy giving it an 8/10. ...more

flag 4 likes · Like · see review

Jan 18, 2018 Steven Peterson rated it really liked it

This is Thucydides’ Paradox (from his towering work, The Peloponnesian Wars) and its implication for American-Chinese relations, as per Graham Allison:

About the Peloponnesian War that devastated ancient Greece, the historian Thucydides explained: “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” Over the past 500 years, these conditions have occurred sixteen times. War broke out in twelve of them. Today, as an unstoppable China approaches an immova ...more

flag 4 likes · Like · see review

May 29, 2020 Noah Graham rated it liked it · review of another edition

The books premise that there will naturally be war between a dominant power and a rising one seems to describe the exception rather than the rule, because as change is the only constant their is always some power rising and some power falling, but wars are not happening in most of the world most of the time.
For example; in the 1980's Japan was asia's leading economy, now it is china. there was no war between the 2.
Similarly russia was asia's dominant military power (Usurped by china again)
I ...more

flag 4 likes · Like · see review

Apr 03, 2017 Owlseyes marked it as to-read

Shelves: china-globalization, hard-april-6-and-7-summit, one-belt, job-losses, south-china-sea-disputes, one-road-initiative, over-with-tpp, how-about-climate-change, currency-manipulator, trade-deficit

President says US will act unilaterally if China does not pressure Pyongyang
in: https://www.ft.com/content/4d9f65d6-1... ...more

flag 4 likes · Like · see review

Feb 21, 2019 Stanislav Stanchev rated it it was ok · review of another edition

Shelves: history, own-physical, 21st-century

Graham Allison's "Destined for War" is an accessible book about one of the most important topics in current international affairs - the relations between the U.S. and China. However, I was actually a bit disappointed with the amount of new content and ideas in the book. The actual idea of a "Thucydides Trap" - where the rise of a new power and the relative decline of the ruling power creates so much stress in the inter-state system that war is likely to break out - was clearly put forth in Allis Graham Allison's "Destined for War" is an accessible book about one of the most important topics in current international affairs - the relations between the U.S. and China. However, I was actually a bit disappointed with the amount of new content and ideas in the book. The actual idea of a "Thucydides Trap" - where the rise of a new power and the relative decline of the ruling power creates so much stress in the inter-state system that war is likely to break out - was clearly put forth in Allison's original 2015 article in The Atlantic. The idea is so simple that it is immediately compelling. But it is not really developed as a proper hypothesis or theory of international relations. In comparison, I though that Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" did a much better and more convincing job at expanding upon the author's central thesis. As a book that deals with a similar topic - but in a more ambitious attempt to generalize and specify the key variables of why wars between major powers occur, I can recommend Dave Copeland's "Origins of Major War".

However, taken as a more popular take on the topic, Allison's book does have some goodies. He draws interesting parallels between the U.S. during the Teddy Roosevelt years and what China seeks to achieve today. However, I wish Chinese history had been explored in much further detail. In places, I almost had the impression (due to the numerous direct quotations) that the author had read material by Lee Kuan Yew, Henry Kissinger and a few others and called it a day.

That is probably very unfair of me, but I was surprised at how little new historical analysis there was in this book. In other places, where I was better able to judge critically, I found outright issues with the argumentation. For instance, Germany is seen as the principal "rising power" that Britain feared in the prelude to WW1. However, the massively impressive The Sleepwalkers" by Cristopher Clark debunks exactly this thesis. Instead, it was Russia that was seen as the Empire#s main challenger and the system's rising power. The entente with Russia and France was a way for Britain to ensure that it would not be the target of Russian aggression and imperial rivalry (and these relations were getting very strained by 1914).

Now, Allison himself writes that - of course - each case of the Thucydides Trap is more complicated "than that" - because "it always is". So I might be nit-picking. Nevertheless, the Britain-Germany case is showcased as a prime example of the Thucydides Trap and yet Allison himself mentions that Britain saw Germany as the rising power, while Germany feared Russia as the rising power instead (?) Would it not be logical to assume that Russia indeed was perceived as the system's rising power in Europe? Or is it more complicated than that - and hence we need a slightly more elaborate model (a la Copeland) to properly explain when major wars occur and when they don't.

Anyway - in summary, I would say that the 2015 article in The Atlantic spurred my own imagination about the Thucydides Trap. By the time I read this book, I may have thought about the issue a lot and hence now feel disappointed. But even with that assumption, I would have been interested in more original insight as to Chinese history and current strategic thinking, because there are so many books about European major wars and so few (that I have read or been recommended) about the vast history of Asia. The scenarios about how a conflict between the US and China could escalate were interesting bits of "what-ifs" but also a bit bare-bones.

All in all, it's a very accessible and easy to read book. It's just not a great book within either international relations or history, in my humble opinion. And I simply expected more, since the author's original idea was at least 3 years old by the time of publication. ...more

flag 3 likes · Like · see review

Apr 24, 2020 Muhammad Jalal rated it it was amazing · review of another edition

An interesting insight into how realists in International Relations view the ongoing security competition between the USA and China in the Asia Pacific and beyond. Allison draws upon his understanding of the Peloponnesian wars and puts forward a novel argument that in the past 500 years, on the majority of occasions the rising power and the established power would find it almost impossible to prevent the steady march to war. Writing before the Coronavirus war of words and the trade war, Allison ...more

flag 3 likes · Like · see review

Mar 30, 2019 Angie Tang rated it did not like it

By far the best review of Allison’s book by Sinologist Arthur Waldron - ouch!
“How to conclude a look at so ill conceived and sloppily executed a book? Do not blame Allison. The problem is the pervasive lack of knowledge of China — a country which is, after all, run by the Communist Party, the police, and the army, and thus difficult to get to know. This black hole of information has perversely created an overabundance of fantasies, some very pessimistic, some as absurdly bright as a foreigner on ...more

flag 3 likes · Like · see review

Nov 02, 2020 Bruno Pascon rated it it was amazing · review of another edition

Great book to understand the geopolitics of the US and China today and the implications should a big rethinking process about the role of each other is not implemented in the short term. Having read this after Yergin’s The New Map was quite complementary and now I will go for Kissinger’s On China to complete a triad on geopolitics and global superpowers.

flag 3 likes · Like · see review

Jun 25, 2017 James Murphy rated it it was amazing

Of the several books I've read this spring on the China-U. S. competition in the western Pacific, Destined for War vies with Christopher Coker's The Improbable War as being the most scholarly. Both rely heavily on history for their analysis of the present.

All I've been reading refers to what's called the Thucydides Trap, the phenomenon existing when a ruling power is threatened with displacement by a rising power. The situation, which is how all these analysts view the current China-U. S. rivalr Of the several books I've read this spring on the China-U. S. competition in the western Pacific, Destined for War vies with Christopher Coker's The Improbable War as being the most scholarly. Both rely heavily on history for their analysis of the present.

All I've been reading refers to what's called the Thucydides Trap, the phenomenon existing when a ruling power is threatened with displacement by a rising power. The situation, which is how all these analysts view the current China-U. S. rivalry in the Pacific, usually slides into war, as did the rivalry between Sparta and Athens 2500 years ago, famously recorded by Thucydides.

Allison is more pessimistic than most. He says for the west there's no solution to the China challenge, no solution to the reawakening of a civilization 5000 years old with a current population of one and a half billion. The history Allison sees in the Pacific revives Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations." He sees the cultural and ideological gap between the two that far apart. And the rivalry is only the latest in a string of 16 Thucydides Trap situations which have arisen since the 15th century. Twelve times the opposing sides have resorted to war. Like Christopher Coker, Allison sees many analogies between the current Asia and the period in Europe preceding WWI. We can stumble into war through a combination of fear and miscalculation. But he sees America's greatest opportunity resembling that of the British at the start of the 20th century when they saw they couldn't match the potential power of America in the western hemisphere and accommodated the U. S.'s rise in order to address challenges in other parts of the globe. This is one way of avoiding conflict in the Pacific. Another is some kind of bargain, a trading of interests, which will allow the two to share responsibilities in the western Pacific. Allison doubts it's in America's character to yield, and he thinks China too embittered by her historical grievances against the west to forgo becoming the outright hegemon.

Destined for War seems to assemble most of the ideas I've come across concerning the great geopolitical rivalry in Asia and places them in the context of the last 600 years of history. Allison believes the Greek circumstances Thucydides observed 25oo years ago is again the best way to view the current danger. ...more

flag 2 likes · Like · see review

Sep 25, 2018 Mbogo J rated it it was amazing

I had initially shelved this book a bit lower on my To Read list then this trade war between China and US(the review is being written in September 2018) has escalated into a full scale war which necessitated an analysis on how close we might be to the "real" war. According to Graham Allison though the chance is low, the probability is non-zero. Reason? Thucydide's Trap.

The trap with a name that I have no intention of pronouncing twice, occurs when a rising power deems the current dominant power ...more

flag 2 likes · Like · see review

Dec 24, 2020 Max rated it really liked it

Shelves: sociology

Read it as part of an EA reading club and really enjoyed it. The book is the result of a history research project which found that 12 out of 16 cases of a rising power threatening to displace ruling power in the end culminated into a war. In the book, Allison is working to extract lessons that help us avoid escalating tensions between US and China. Maybe because of this motivating purpose the historical analyses felt very alive and gripping to me. I think this approach to history works really we ...more

flag 2 likes · Like · see review

Jun 29, 2020 Gary rated it it was amazing

An exceptional book on the possibilities of a confrontation between the two super powers, the US and China. Since the Nixon years, China has been building back to become the mega power we see today. What is their goal ? Who do they have to displace ? The US has been the world's super power since the end of WW2. No longer is this the case as China has now risen from the shadows to become the presumptive leader in all categories. Does this lead us into a WW3 ? Graham's narrative of past and presen ...more

flag 2 likes · Like · see review

May 29, 2018 Andre Grillon rated it it was amazing

Graham Allison’s “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?” (2017) may have a destiny as century’s reference.

In 2014 the IMF estimated that the size of China’s economy in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms has exceeded the United States at $16.7 trillion vs. $16.4 trillion respectively. Consider these amazing statistics:

-China is the worlds largest producer of:
ships, steel, aluminum, furniture, textiles, clothing, computers, semiconductors, communications equipment, p ...more

flag 2 likes · Like · see review

Sep 10, 2020 Jonathan Mckay rated it liked it

54th book of 2020.
tl;dr: Read the cover, read the appendix, skip the rest.

‘Destined for War’ introduces the Thucydides trap, named after Thucydides’ recording of the war between Sparta and Athens. In this pattern, rising powers (e.g. Athens) can end up at war with dominant powers (e.g. Sparta) even though the outcome is against the interests of both parties. According to Graham, in 12/16 cases over the last 500 years, similar shifts in power balance have led to war. The book relies on practi 54th book of 2020.
tl;dr: Read the cover, read the appendix, skip the rest.

‘Destined for War’ introduces the Thucydides trap, named after Thucydides’ recording of the war between Sparta and Athens. In this pattern, rising powers (e.g. Athens) can end up at war with dominant powers (e.g. Sparta) even though the outcome is against the interests of both parties. According to Graham, in 12/16 cases over the last 500 years, similar shifts in power balance have led to war. The book relies on practical history, using past examples to try predict future events. Indeed, this method seems to be the most effective means at predicting political outcomes, and is so simple that it’s baffling we don’t see more of it. Tetlock’s book on political predictions has good evidence on how this method is one of the best ways to make predictions about complex systems (i.e. politics), with repeatably better outcomes than what specific expertise (i.e. professors at Harvard) can achieve.

The book is divided into 3 sections: historical analogs, China overview, and avenues for change. Historical analogs covers in brief Athens vs. Sparta, the arms race of battleships in the early 20th century. The Athens Sparta conflict summary is a good model of the pessimistic scenario for Sino-American relations, England v. Germany less so. The China overview is sadly a few clippings from the Economist over the last 20 years mixed with a healthy dose of threat construction and orientalism. The one bright spot is an outline of past and future scenarios that did or could lead to war.

Previous conflicts between China and great powers:

* Korean War: 1950-53
* Sino-Soviet border: 1969 (reminiscent of India<>China border clashes)
* Taiwan Strait Crisis 1996

Potential future conflicts:

* Accidental collision at sea, near disputed islands
* Taiwanese independence
* North Korean collapse
* War provoked by third party (North Korea, Japanese nationalists)
* Economic conflict to military war (Japan WW2 analog)

The final section, learning from examples where war did not break out was interesting. The most relevant was the peaceful handoff of superpower status from the UK to the US in the late 19th and early 20th century. The Monroe doctrine, if applied to Sino-American relations today could very likely lead to war. The cold war, for all its failures, is also a successful example insofar as no hot war developed.

So why would you skip all this? The appendix has all 16 history cases with nice summaries and conclusions. Reading them it is easy to draw the parallels and differences, and to draw your own conclusions. There isn’t enough new information about China to justify reading the rest of the book, and since there is almost no discussion about which examples should apply to the present, you’ll have to do such thinking on your own anyways.

...more

flag 2 likes · Like · see review

Jun 08, 2020 Peter Wolfley rated it it was amazing · review of another edition

This book has provided me with my favorite new principle: applied history. Just like applied physics, where you try to find the practical use of natural laws, applied history is where you try and distill the lessons of history for practical applications. Is it too late to switch careers and become an applied historian?

This idea of Thucydides’ Trap is a scary one. Especially when viewed from our current perspective with over 3000 years of history behind us. A rising power and a ruling power are ...more

flag 2 likes · Like · see review

Jan 14, 2019 alex rated it did not like it · review of another edition

Shelves: non-fic

This is a very cool concept and I was beyond excited to read it. It assumes that its audience is primarily from the United States, so provides little information on the country's government and history. In comparison, there are large amounts of background information on the Chinese government and history. Without providing the evidence to support their US-bias I find it difficult to trust the author's conclusions.

The US bias implies that if war were to break out between the US and China, it wou ...more

flag 2 likes · Like · see review

Jun 03, 2017 Franklin Wang rated it it was amazing

Excellent data and analysis. As the popular dialogue in the Western media is largely oblivious of China, and Chinese media largely nationalistic, such politic realism and cautious warning Graham provides is rare and precious. U.S. and China have to find a way to compromise and collaborate so that we have a stable and secure world. Let's hope.

For an excellent discussion among Graham and Former U.S. Ambassador to U.N. Samantha Power, and one well-known historian Niall Ferguson, see https://www.you ...more

flag 2 likes · Like · see review

Jun 03, 2019 John Tyson rated it it was amazing

This book should be required reading for anyone with an interest in global affairs.

Allison has written a tight combination of narrative history, status quo analysis, illustrative anecdotes, and realistic hypotheticals that all come together to deliver his argument in an easily digestible way. No small feat for such a broad subject.

I learned so much reading this book, and I’m now eager to read his other works.

flag 2 likes · Like · see review

Oct 26, 2017 Stephen rated it really liked it · review of another edition

Shelves: politics, economics, futures

There are those who believe that America and China are destined for war. As China expands and becomes more assertive in East Asia, it will start to compromise key American interests. How should America respond to this? Is war an option? If so, can it be avoided? These are the key questions that this book answers, and it will be interesting to see how things turn out as events unfold in the course of this century.

What I like about this book is that it doesn't rely on unsupported assertion. It sta There are those who believe that America and China are destined for war. As China expands and becomes more assertive in East Asia, it will start to compromise key American interests. How should America respond to this? Is war an option? If so, can it be avoided? These are the key questions that this book answers, and it will be interesting to see how things turn out as events unfold in the course of this century.

What I like about this book is that it doesn't rely on unsupported assertion. It starts by outlining a model by which we can measure progress, or lack of it. This model - The Thucydides Trap - arises from the study of conflict over the past 500 years. The model examines the question of how an established power - in this case the US - can accommodate a rising power - in this case China - without resorting to armed conflict. The book outlines 16 cases of the trap being triggered since about 1500. Of these, 12 cases were resolved by war, and 4 cases were resolved without resorting to war. If history is a guide, the odds are stacked in favour of some form of armed conflict arising.

It is interesting to examine the detail of the cases where the rivalry did result in war. In many cases, the rising nation could have been steered away from a confrontational course had the established nation exercised a degree of foresight. For example, had Britain encouraged and supported the Confederacy in the American Civil War, the resulting settlement in North America could have divided the continent, allowing for a much smoother passage of events at the start of the twentieth century.

The key point is that war is not inevitable in the model, given sufficient diplomatic skill in guiding events away from conflict. The last section of the book is devoted to this. I found it to be one of the more instructive parts of the book, possibly because of its immediacy. The author outlines a twelve point plan to steer relations away from armed conflict. This serves as a blueprint in the model to gauge exactly how close to armed conflict we are. For example, the first metric is that higher authorities can help resolve rivalry without war. Is there a supra-national body to whom both China and the US defer? Apart from the UN it is hard to think of one, but perhaps the reform of the current diplomatic architecture is needed in order to avoid conflict? It could be that, if we are to avoid war, here needs to be institutional reform of, say, the World Bank, to make it more inclusive of Chinese interests. This template is extremely useful, and warrants further examination.

We can then fit a rising China and an established America into the model. Perhaps one of the more concerning aspects to come out of reading the book is the degree to which neither side understands the other. The US, as the established power, has a self image that is potentially distorted away from the facts on the ground. American politics too readily resorts to a cartoon caricature of the Chinese government, and misses a great deal of the subtlety in Chinese diplomacy. For example, the US withdrew from the TPP too readily, leaving its allies in confusion about policy, and by ceding the strategic initiative in East Asia to China. This is a rash act the probably needs to be over-compensated for at some point in the future.

The whole logic of the book drives the reader back to the core question: are China and the US destined for war? On the present, comparing events with the outcomes of the model, the conclusion I have drawn is that they are on a trajectory to war. Furthermore, if it comes to that, the US will lose simply because of the difficulties of managing logistics across the Pacific. If American politicians realise this, they will accommodate China, but accommodation is not the only possibility.

In addition to accommodation, Professor Allison identifies three other possibilities. The US could undermine China by determining the diplomatic architecture and creating a web of allies around Chinese interests. America could negotiate a long peace with China, allowing its influence to wane gracefully as the Chinese star rises. Finally, the US could redefine the relationship with China as an essential partner rather than as a rival. All of these possibilities come with a domestic political cost in the US. The question is one of whether or not the Americans can find a President courageous enough to try. If not, then war does become inevitable.

...more

flag 1 like · Like · see review

May 18, 2018 Paul O'Leary rated it liked it

I’ve given Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? three stars, but, I’ll be frank, I may be penalizing Graham Allison for my misperceptions. Most reviews appear glowing. But I expected a book that would be more centered around the current position of China and the USA on the political chessboard, our current policies toward China, and how they might be improved or managed. This isn’t really what the book’s about. My bad. Still, the title did influence this misperceptio I’ve given Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? three stars, but, I’ll be frank, I may be penalizing Graham Allison for my misperceptions. Most reviews appear glowing. But I expected a book that would be more centered around the current position of China and the USA on the political chessboard, our current policies toward China, and how they might be improved or managed. This isn’t really what the book’s about. My bad. Still, the title did influence this misperception, and as many editors select titles for marketing purposes, maybe I should give the editor the three stars. As I bought my copy second hand, I bear no deep grudge.

What’s this book really about? Graham Allison has a pet project over at Harvard University called The Thucydides’s Trap Project which has a real philosophy of history feel to it. At least inasmuch as to interpreting how certain superpowers end up going to war against one another, and why others don’t. Thucydides, the chronological second of the great ancient Greek historians, fits in all of this as the original author who outlined within his History of the Peloponnesian War the theory that powerful states try to get away with as much as they can, using the muscle they believe they have, if they think that they can, while weaker states are mostly left to suffer from the consequences. Political Darwinism pre-dates Charles by millennia, not years, it would seem. Whereas most states feel more comfortable playing the bully than the victim they’re understandably covetous of their king of the hill status. Another country experiencing its own economic and/or martial growth may cause the big bully on the geopolitical block to fluster at the perceived menace to its own status, causing the bully to react by threatening or feigning a submission from the up-comer, which may in the end lead to much International fustigation. This slide can be interpreted by both parties as an outcome neither sought nor desired. The bully just wants to be reassured by an appeasing, deferential submission. The up-and-coming nation often only wants to claim its new deserved place in the worldly order of things. Neither may really want war. But neither will allow the other its imagined advantage. Allison’s point which he stresses throughout this book, using numerous examples drawn from a wide swath of history, is that the trigger starting the steady march toward war can seem fairly insignificant, or even nonexistent (as in the second Tonkin Gulf incident which directly lead to the Vietnam War). Fear can obscure the facts of life and politics perhaps worse than a wounded vaulting pride, until a nation gambles with death by anteing up into national warfare. The historical examples underpinning that philosophy of history of the Thucydides’s Trap takes up the first third of the book.

The middle section examines China’s past and present position in the world with frequent references to Kissinger’s recent book On China and the author’s own book on Lee Kuan Yew. And I do mean frequent. When not quoting from the above, Allison unabashedly plumps on China. The Chinese save 30% of their income on average; Americans remain mired in debt. China invests heavily in research and development, while maintaining a morally plastic position on intellectual property rights that always favors the Middle Kingdom. China builds its infrastructure quickly, and does much more of it than we. The author cites as specific example of American sluggishness the construction the Charles River Bridge which has been under way in Massachusetts since 2015, before the author’s own watchful eye from his nearby office. Allison notes that China managed to build a larger bridge than the Charles in just under two days(in fairness, I passed by the Charles a couple of days ago and work seems “almost” wrapped up). Xi contrasts with Trump, according to Allison, less than one might expect as the political goal of China now is to “Make China Great Again”. Deja vu, huh? Allison claims that this bond extends beyond mere border politics: the Chinese have a common racial sensibility which creates a cohesion that perhaps provides advantages over other countries possessing less imagined commonality from which to draw from. Allison pokes around at the interesting dynamic between the nation of Chinese masses who support Xi and his promises of prosperity; the army pledging oath to him and party; the communist party which he presently heads which is reliant for its current stability and wealth on the open market system of the rest of the world; and an obsession with domestic performance that somehow seems to keep so many these different balls in the air. One gets the feeling that reading between these lines will be a must for American diplomats dealing with China in the future. In the end and after a cursory assessment, China matches up to be a formidable, powerful political opponent to be respected. Allison points out that a nation of China’s size won’t idly submit to being handed by western powers an honorary status as a world “responsible stakeholder” among others with the right to occasionally clear its throat on global issues—especially concerning their own direct sphere of influence.

The last section of the book offers analysis and approaches in thought that the author believe might help America develop a diplomatic strategy concerning China’s “rise” in the world. This begins with a chapter on Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”. Hints abound hereafter. China is timeless(posing the question: who is the true upstart?); America makes much of its recent origins. China views international law as a recent novelty that has yet to receive its all-important Mandarin imprimatur; America espouses rule of law as the only true legitimate governmental order. China can wait out negotiations for generations(in contrast to their building modus, apparently), and America likes frequent big political gestures(every four years or so). Allison clearly views an antagonistic relationship with China devoid of serious negotiations based on mutual benefits as primitive and likely to lead to a certain Thucydides Trap. Allison makes a very reasonable assertion that America should stop throwing all its wants into a large bag, then emptying them out on the negotiating table. Needs require preferencing over wants and these should be prioritized as well. The stereotype of the “inscrutable Asian” should be abandoned in favor of a politics of the possible, as westerns often reflect their silly xenophobic myths back upon themselves to their detriment. Perhaps Allison’s last couple pages exhorting our government to get back to “do(ing) strategy” instead of merely avoiding “stupid shit” might have been the best part of the book for me. Playing chess with the Chinese may take generations, but diplomacy may require a deep search for a win-win solutions, rather than an adversarial approach. Cyber-espionage could be very negotiable as a foreign matter less important to China’s political core and quickly resolved if the USA were prepared to offer a win for China, say in the South China Seas. Almost certainly getting China to respect intellectual property rights will be a more difficult haggle demanding great patient and creativity. When President Bill Clinton attempted to address this dilemma back in the mid 90s, China responded by demurring, but acknowledged that they’d be happy to purchase all of the USA government’s surplus grain at a discount to keep their own internal prices below the world market rate. Had we taken them up on this offer then, would we be further down the road toward diplomatic understanding? Maybe not. But the key to even mediocre diplomacy is to keep the other side somewhat interested in what you have to say. Trade war threats and ultimatums against a nation accustomed to taking naps for centuries can be less than productive. Especially as the trade gap widens in their favor and the interest on their foreign (American) investments pay out... ...more

flag 1 like · Like · see review

May 28, 2018 Bettie rated it liked it

Shelves: history, politics, filthy-lucre, boo-scary, spring-2018, china, skim-through, reference

Description: CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE HEADING TOWARD A WAR NEITHER WANTS. The reason is Thucydides’s Trap, a deadly pattern of structural stress that results when a rising power challenges a ruling one. This phenomenon is as old as history itself. About the Peloponnesian War that devastated ancient Greece, the historian Thucydides explained: “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” Over the past 500 years, these conditions have occur ...more

flag 1 like · Like · see review

Mar 19, 2019 Ashish rated it liked it

Shelves: non-fi, war, history

This is pretty interesting. Looking at sociological, economic, historical and political patterns that join the threads between minor unconnected events and paint the larger picture that's been there under the surface, identifying patterns of history and using them to predict probabilities into future events... there's something almost Hari Seldonian about the concept.
I love the term 'Applied History'. History is so much more than a collection of dead facts - it's a living, breathing story that' ...more

flag 1 like · Like · see review

Sep 04, 2020 Moses rated it it was amazing

Shelves: 2020

An excellent and historically-informed strategic summary of the perils and opportunities in Sino-American relations in the 21st century.

The upshot is that in cases from Athens and Sparta to Germany and the UK, rising powers make established powers nervous, and this often leads to war. Allison's approach is to use historical precedent and diplomatic know-how to explore different scenarios that could lead to war between China and the US, and different scenarios in which war is averted.

One surprisi ...more

flag 1 like · Like · see review

« previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 next »

new topic
Discuss This Book

There are no discussion topics on this book yet. Be the first to start one »

Recommend It | Stats | Recent Status Updates

Readers also enjoyed

See similar books…

Genres

History

171 users

Politics

162 users

Cultural > China

124 users

Nonfiction

118 users

War

43 users

Economics

26 users

Political Science > International Relations

25 users

War > Military Fiction

24 users

Politics > Political Science

22 users

Cultural > Asia

19 users

See top shelves…

About Graham Allison

Graham Allison

87 followers

Librarian Note: Also writes under the name Graham T. Allison.

Graham Allison is Director of Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the bestselling author of Destined for War: America, China, and Thucydides's Trap (2017); Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World (2013); Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable C ...more

Books by Graham Allison

Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World

Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World (Belfer Center Studies in International Security)

Định mệnh chiến tranh Mỹ và Trung Quốc có thể thoát bẫy Thucydides?

Skazani na wojnę? Czy Ameryka i Chiny unikną pułapki Tukidydesa?

More…

News & Interviews

Meet 33 of 2021's Hottest Romances

Looking for a fictional meet-cute in the new year? We've got some steamy novels for you to snuggle up with, including Casey McQuiston's...

Trivia About Destined for War:...

No trivia or quizzes yet. Add some now »

Quotes from Destined for War:...

“Here we are on top of the world. We have arrived at this peak to stay there forever. There is, of course, this thing called history. But history is something unpleasant that happens to other people. —Arnold Toynbee, recalling the 1897 diamond jubilee celebration of Queen Victoria Like other practicing historians, I am often asked what the “lessons of history” are. I answer that the only lesson I have learnt from studying the past is that there are no permanent winners and losers. —Ramachandra Guha” — 4 likes

“When states repeatedly fail to act in what appears to be their true national interest, it is often because their policies reflect necessary compromises among parties within their government rather than a single coherent vision.” — 2 likes

More quotes…

See a Problem?

Preview — Destined for War by Graham Allison

Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?

Get A Copy

Friend Reviews

Reader Q&A

Lists with This Book

Community Reviews

new topic
Discuss This Book

Readers also enjoyed

Genres

About Graham Allison

Books by Graham Allison

News & Interviews

Trivia About Destined for War:...

Quotes from Destined for War:...

See a Problem?

Preview — Destined for War by Graham Allison

Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?

Get A Copy

Friend Reviews

Reader Q&A

Lists with This Book

Community Reviews

new topicDiscuss This Book

Readers also enjoyed

Genres

About Graham Allison

Books by Graham Allison

News & Interviews

Trivia About Destined for War:...

Quotes from Destined for War:...

new topic
Discuss This Book