Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation

by Alexandre Debs, Nuno P. Monteiro

When do states acquire nuclear weapons? Overturning a decade of scholarship focusing on other factors, Debs and Monteiro show in Nuclear Politics that proliferation is driven by security concerns. Proliferation occurs only when a state has both the willingness and opportunity to build the bomb. A state has the willingness to nuclearize when it faces a serious security threat without the support of a reliable ally. It has the opportunity when its conventional forces or allied protection are sufficient to deter preventive attacks. This explains why so few countries have developed nuclear weapons. Unthreatened or protected states do not want them; weak and unprotected ones cannot get them. This powerful theory combined with extensive historical research on the nuclear trajectory of sixteen countries will make Nuclear Politics a standard reference in international security studies, informing scholarly and policy debates on nuclear proliferation - and US non-proliferation efforts - for decades to come.

Genres: Politics

648 pages, Paperback

Published December 15, 2016

Reviews

[Viet Phuong · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very comprehensive (and thick!) book about the path to nuclear weapons and nuclear forbearance of various states. Not really a breakthrough in proliferation study, though, as the authors' main purpose in writing this book is to reinforce the realist argument about the security-based reasons behind states' decision to pursuit or forgo the nuclear option without refuting the existing studies. The concept of "nuclear acquisition" of this book sometimes bothers me, as the authors totally ignored the technological aspects of a nuclear program and in many cases confused between a political decision to "go nuclear", a demonstration of "being able to detonate a nuclear bomb", and an actual nuclear capability (including delivery systems, first strike, and even second strike capability). The archive research in this book does not bring out any new finding either, as the authors mostly based their assessment on secondary sources or reports by U.S. intelligence agencies. Finally, the lack of discussion about Soviet perception of proliferation attempts by its adversaries (and their calculation about any possible preemptive/counterproliferation strike by the Soviet forces) is also a little disappointment, as the security-based argument of this book heavily depends on the deterrent value of such strikes. Nevertheless, such a comprehensive book (and a very open-minded one, as the authors only tried to complement the current state of research, and supported a hybrid agenda of proliferation study) is much needed for students of this complex subject.