Although little known today, Raymond Ruyer was a post–World War II French philosopher whose works and ideas were significant influences on major thinkers, including Deleuze, Guattari, and Simondon. With the publication of this translation of Neofinalism, considered by many to be Ruyer’s magnum opus, English-language readers can see at last how this seminal mind allied philosophy with science. Unfazed by the idea of philosophy ending where science began, Ruyer elaborated a singular, nearly unclassifiable metaphysics and reactivated philosophy’s capacity to reflect on its canonical What exists? How are we to account for life? What is the status of subjectivity? And how is freedom possible? Ha
Neofinalism offers a systematic and lucidly argued treatise that deploys the innovative concepts of self-survey, form, and absolute surface to shape a theory of the virtual and the transspatial. It also makes a compelling plea for a renewed appreciation of the creative activity that organizes spatiotemporal structures and makes possible the emergence of real beings in a dynamic universe.
Ruyer is someone who has really impressive insights on the method of science, especially biology. Actually, he is not that much known in the English speaking world but it doesn't mean his views don't count so much. Rather, even if his intellectual milieu was not that wide even in his life, his entourage was so meritorious and his works were highly respected.
I think these pertinent remarks on his life and career reflect so much about his views, particularly developed in this work.
According to him, in the twentieth century, nature is interpreted in a way that models are fit into a functional analysis in which the basic particles (atoms, quarks, etc.) constitute the world. Herein, what counts for a scientific analysis is the function it plays. For example, a human brain is a tool for implementing functions of symbol manipulation, pattern recognition and so on. Thus, the analogy between the organic brain-neural processing and computer hardware-software holds true as long as their "functions" correspond to one another. After this constative remarks, Ruyer develops a counter-intuitive idea of the distinction between the forms and structures.
Forms are entities having irreducible unity, which means that a form cannot be explained in terms of aggregates of particles, rather they are themselves show a characteristic of a particle, a unity enveloping an actual infinity and hence can be divided but still cannot be divided if we are into "this particle", since after the division, what remains will not have the same nature with the former form. For him, there must be a metaphysics of contemporary science and it must be concerned with those forms showing an absolute character, since it is not in the same plane, say, not in the same nature, with those statistical aggregates. Forms can be said to be atoms, quarks, molecules, cells, embryos and the brain. What it means is I can obviously divide the brain into neurons, biochemicals, and cells within it, the overall character of what we observe changes after this analysis. While statistical aggregates can finitely be divided into some building blocks, say, fundamental bricks; the falsibiality which renders science powerful for Popper, enables one to indefinitely divide this fundamental brick into some other stones that constitute it.
However, for Ruyer, although a form envelopes an actual infinity it cannot be divided in order to explain it, or when we divide a form into its so-called constituents, we change our category, our nature of observation from a metaphysical investigation corresponding to the contemporary science to a functional, statistical and pragmatic analysis of molar structures such as clouds, mountains, even brain (in this composite sense)
In order to explain this togetherness of the form, Ruyer utilizes the term absolute survey (le survol absolu) for which we cannot characterize any dimension since we cannot localize the relations of its molar, structural constituents in a single map. This also holds when we start from the so-called bottom to up in order to generate an absolute form by unifying the aggregate characteristics of the units, such that, for instance, in the case of a water molecule, we cannot localise where 2 Hydrogen atoms finish and 1 oxygen starts as we put simply in the schema. Ruyer creates another concept, called overlapping (recouvrement) with the aim of explanation of the genesis of those absolute forms in nature. What "overlapping" contains is the repetition of a rhythm, a survey (survol) like the continual folds of paper onto its own, indeed what Ruyer calls, a "formation.", rather than "functioning" which can be performed by distinct parts. Thus 2 moles of Hydrogen and 1 mole of oxygen do not function as water, instead, they form it. And this formation is a pure activity creating the irreducible individuals which repeat itself in a self-forming act. (it's better to note that he calls it non-organic life, thus there is a change in the demarcation between organic and inorganic attesting the demarcation of life, where is, for Ruyer, determined through the forms-in-itself)
Finally, I would like to mention one of the other striking thesis that Ruyer defends. I'm not sure if it can be mixed up with some other points of view in the philosophy of mind in the analytic tradition but it worths saying: Externalism. However, it's not a semantic type like that of Putnam, but an externalism of Psyche, Life reconstitutes itself in the process of self-formation, from the individuals not starting from organic unities, but from the basic physical unities such as atoms. (Maybe today, it can be extended to quarks. Theoretically, Ruyer leaves the door open, and in this book, even he tries to gaze into different forms and their formations, which can, indeed, be enhanced.)
As far as externalism is concerned, Ruyer encounters with three types of externalisms that the life is exposed. First is the formation of the bodily organs over the course of evolution of the organism. For the beings having embryo like us, our body and its organs become with respect to its neo-finalist act of organic formation. Second, those organic formations reflect the same kind of technicity. Finally, the consciousness which knows always less than the embryo, has an absolute survey in its overall process. Herein, Ruyer maintains that consciousness does not represent something it the so-called mind, but it places itself in the exterior itself by its immediate, dimensionless, self-formation through the external objects it is engaged.
I think there are some great insights in there, particularly the way he both draws on Whitehead, William James & Bergson and tries to critique them. Great concepts such as "self-survey/absolute survey" and "equipotentiality".
But it does take a lot of work to get through the book. The structure of the book also makes it rather tough to navigate, since the chapters switch back and forth between rather narrow arguments with evolutionary theory, quantum physics and neuroscience on the one hand and broad philosophical engagement with Whitehead, Bergson and William James on the other. I read this with a small dedicated reading group, 10 pages at a time over the course of last summer. I definitely recommend reading it in small doses and over a long period of time (the short chapter structure lends itself to this).
In terms of arguments, he is very detailed in his critique of theories of evolution that were in circulation during his time. Is very aware of and tries to critique major scientific thought of his time. He discusses at length, things like cybernetics, neuroscience, evolutionary theory. The examples from evolutionary history and neuroscience are very fun, I learned a lot.
There is a through-line of a certain form of Christian thought that becomes very explicit at the end though. And makes his overall project much more ambiguous. Feels much more liberal in its politics compared to someone like Simondon who has a similar philosophical project.
The book contains fun illustrations that Ruyer had commissioned. I recommend spending time with them as well.
The final essay by the translator is kind of weird. It doesn't engage Ruyer at all but rather is a discussion on Agamben and Heidegger? Kind of feels misplaced in relation to the rest of the book. I recommend skipping it.
Last, hilariously, like some other French philosophy books written during this time, there is a 2-3 page "summary" at the end that only makes sense if you've already read the entire thing.