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Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path Toward America
As early as the 1920s Adolf Hitler argued that his struggle for dominance would be worldwide. Before war began in Europe, Berlin had already placed contracts for a massive surface navy and four-engine bombers that could cross the Atlantic. Norman J. W. Goda traces the documentary evidence of Germany's long-term plans to extend its conquests to America.
This cogently argued book focuses on Germany's secret efforts to gain base sites for the new navy and long-range bombers in French North West Africa, Spain's Canary Islands, and Portugal's Azores and Cape Verde Islands. During this period Hitler rated the base issue a higher priority than the efficient prosecution of the war against Great Britain and second only to the Eastern Campaign.
In the end, Berlin failed to gain base sites. The effort antagonized Spain and France, pushing them away from a more actively pro-German stance. Germany also misjudged America's capability to capture the sites and consequently left Northwest Africa relatively unprepared for the Allied invasion of 1942.
Goda questions both the traditional notion that Germany operated from an unplanned opportunism and the argument that its territorial demands were limited to the European continent. His close reading of diplomatic and military archives opens new windows on Franco's Spain and Pétain's France. By focusing on policy formulation and implementation at the political and diplomatic level, he adds evidence for the view that Hitler's ambitions were not just talk but the basis for concrete military plans.
This cogently argued book focuses on Germany's secret efforts to gain base sites for the new navy and long-range bombers in French North West Africa, Spain's Canary Islands, and Portugal's Azores and Cape Verde Islands. During this period Hitler rated the base issue a higher priority than the efficient prosecution of the war against Great Britain and second only to the Eastern Campaign.
In the end, Berlin failed to gain base sites. The effort antagonized Spain and France, pushing them away from a more actively pro-German stance. Germany also misjudged America's capability to capture the sites and consequently left Northwest Africa relatively unprepared for the Allied invasion of 1942.
Goda questions both the traditional notion that Germany operated from an unplanned opportunism and the argument that its territorial demands were limited to the European continent. His close reading of diplomatic and military archives opens new windows on Franco's Spain and Pétain's France. By focusing on policy formulation and implementation at the political and diplomatic level, he adds evidence for the view that Hitler's ambitions were not just talk but the basis for concrete military plans.
352 pages, Hardcover
First published April 1, 1998
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
August 4, 2021
This book is a genuinely interesting work of history, but it sails under a false flag. It may seriously disappoint the reader who takes the cover at face value.
It is a detailed account of the fate of the French colonies in North and West Africa during the period between the French armistice in the summer of 1940 and the Allied invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch) in the autumn of 1942. The author extensively researched how Hitler's plans for the region came to nothing because of his strategic and diplomatic failure. The desire of Nazi Germany to establish bases on the West coast of Africa (mainly Casablanca and Dakar) as well as on off-shore island groups (including the Canaries, the Azores, Madeira and the Cape Verde Archipelago) is little known and forms an interesting part of this account. But German, Italian, Spanish and French politicians and generals all had their own irreconcilable desires for the region. Hitler tried to cheat his way to a solution, and failed. Thus the French (and Spanish and Portuguese) colonies were largely left to their own fate. And as a consequence, Gibraltar remained a very useful British base.
It's a complex story of politics and negotiation in bad faith, that casts an unforgiving light on the attitudes of the leadership of the fascist states. Goda repeatedly makes the point that Vichy-France's leadership wanted to collaborate with Germany and Italy, but the latter were most unwilling to accept the state they had defeated (and planned to strip of its assets) even as a sort-of ally. As for Spain, Goda tells how Franco's policy meandered from greed to suspicion and back, until suspicion finally won. It all takes patience to digest, but it is very informative.
But that is also very much a niche subject. The cover was designed to emphasise the global role that Hitler and his admirals had in mind for their desired bases in the Eastern Atlantic, in a possible later conflict with the USA. While supported by some evidence, this is a far-stretched hypothetical and a minor point in the story. The cover subtitle refers to the "path towards America" as if Hitler imagined that islands off the coast of Africa could be jump-off points for an invasion of the new world: Even he was not that crazy. But German dictator was a strategic shopaholic who would always find a reason to occupy something, freely scattering his forces from Scandinavia to the Caucasus, from the Channel Islands to the Balkan. It's hardly surprising that he would find a reason to push even such a foolhardy project as the occupation of the Cape Verde Archipelago, which is some 5000km from Berlin and about the same distance from North America. But that really doesn't amount to much.
So, a good academic study of German designs on basis in Africa during WW2, with exhaustive citations of sources and bibliography, rather unfortunately packaged under a cover that promises too much sensation. Maybe Texas A&M University Press sold some extra copies because of it, but I suspect they did professor Goda a disservice.
It is a detailed account of the fate of the French colonies in North and West Africa during the period between the French armistice in the summer of 1940 and the Allied invasion of North Africa (Operation Torch) in the autumn of 1942. The author extensively researched how Hitler's plans for the region came to nothing because of his strategic and diplomatic failure. The desire of Nazi Germany to establish bases on the West coast of Africa (mainly Casablanca and Dakar) as well as on off-shore island groups (including the Canaries, the Azores, Madeira and the Cape Verde Archipelago) is little known and forms an interesting part of this account. But German, Italian, Spanish and French politicians and generals all had their own irreconcilable desires for the region. Hitler tried to cheat his way to a solution, and failed. Thus the French (and Spanish and Portuguese) colonies were largely left to their own fate. And as a consequence, Gibraltar remained a very useful British base.
It's a complex story of politics and negotiation in bad faith, that casts an unforgiving light on the attitudes of the leadership of the fascist states. Goda repeatedly makes the point that Vichy-France's leadership wanted to collaborate with Germany and Italy, but the latter were most unwilling to accept the state they had defeated (and planned to strip of its assets) even as a sort-of ally. As for Spain, Goda tells how Franco's policy meandered from greed to suspicion and back, until suspicion finally won. It all takes patience to digest, but it is very informative.
But that is also very much a niche subject. The cover was designed to emphasise the global role that Hitler and his admirals had in mind for their desired bases in the Eastern Atlantic, in a possible later conflict with the USA. While supported by some evidence, this is a far-stretched hypothetical and a minor point in the story. The cover subtitle refers to the "path towards America" as if Hitler imagined that islands off the coast of Africa could be jump-off points for an invasion of the new world: Even he was not that crazy. But German dictator was a strategic shopaholic who would always find a reason to occupy something, freely scattering his forces from Scandinavia to the Caucasus, from the Channel Islands to the Balkan. It's hardly surprising that he would find a reason to push even such a foolhardy project as the occupation of the Cape Verde Archipelago, which is some 5000km from Berlin and about the same distance from North America. But that really doesn't amount to much.
So, a good academic study of German designs on basis in Africa during WW2, with exhaustive citations of sources and bibliography, rather unfortunately packaged under a cover that promises too much sensation. Maybe Texas A&M University Press sold some extra copies because of it, but I suspect they did professor Goda a disservice.
August 3, 2024
I'll start by saying this book is very dense, the narrative is very convoluted and difficult to follow. There must be over a thousand endnotes, they take up almost a third of the page count with almost eighty pages of them.
This book was very demanding, but the reward was well worth the effort. This book goes into almost exhaustive detail on aspects of the war that you almost never hear about anywhere else.
The core of the text involves German plans to establish bases in North Africa and the Atlantic islands of Spain and Portugal. But it is much more than this, it catalogues the relations between Vichy and the Axis, and between Spain and the Axis.
The question of Gibraltar is also examined, as is the aims of Germany in North Africa in general.
The author's case sometimes relies on circumstantial evidence, as when he argues that Hitler's request for airbases near Casablanca were meant for a future war with the US instead of the current war with the UK.
While this might be somewhat shaky, his overall thesis is pretty convincing. There's no doubt that all of these positions would have been useful in a war against England alone, but Hitler is quoted several times as envisioning a war in the future against the US for control of the Atlantic.
Hitler's colossal failure to take advantage of either Spain or France is neatly explained, in that Germany hoped not to work through them so much as to take over their bases for herself.
The most enlightening and probably most controversial section deals with Franco's policy, and here Goda argues that Spain was serious about joining the Axis. Franco's aims are enigmatic and hard to follow, and there have been many interpretations proposed for what his goals really were.
Goda is convinced that Franco was on the cusp of joining the war. He states that Hitler in fact agreed to Franco's economic demands, outrageous as they were, and that the real reason that Spain did not align with the Axis was less Franco's delaying tactics and more Hitler's preference to work through Vichy.
In this respect too, we get a glimpse of the continuing importance of France even after the defeat in 1940, which all too often gets glossed over. Both Hitler and the Allies were greatly concerned with the French colonial empire, wishing to take advantage of it themselves while denying it to their opponents.
This book will get you thinking a lot, about all kinds of issues dealing with WWII. I can't recommend it enough.
This book was very demanding, but the reward was well worth the effort. This book goes into almost exhaustive detail on aspects of the war that you almost never hear about anywhere else.
The core of the text involves German plans to establish bases in North Africa and the Atlantic islands of Spain and Portugal. But it is much more than this, it catalogues the relations between Vichy and the Axis, and between Spain and the Axis.
The question of Gibraltar is also examined, as is the aims of Germany in North Africa in general.
The author's case sometimes relies on circumstantial evidence, as when he argues that Hitler's request for airbases near Casablanca were meant for a future war with the US instead of the current war with the UK.
While this might be somewhat shaky, his overall thesis is pretty convincing. There's no doubt that all of these positions would have been useful in a war against England alone, but Hitler is quoted several times as envisioning a war in the future against the US for control of the Atlantic.
Hitler's colossal failure to take advantage of either Spain or France is neatly explained, in that Germany hoped not to work through them so much as to take over their bases for herself.
The most enlightening and probably most controversial section deals with Franco's policy, and here Goda argues that Spain was serious about joining the Axis. Franco's aims are enigmatic and hard to follow, and there have been many interpretations proposed for what his goals really were.
Goda is convinced that Franco was on the cusp of joining the war. He states that Hitler in fact agreed to Franco's economic demands, outrageous as they were, and that the real reason that Spain did not align with the Axis was less Franco's delaying tactics and more Hitler's preference to work through Vichy.
In this respect too, we get a glimpse of the continuing importance of France even after the defeat in 1940, which all too often gets glossed over. Both Hitler and the Allies were greatly concerned with the French colonial empire, wishing to take advantage of it themselves while denying it to their opponents.
This book will get you thinking a lot, about all kinds of issues dealing with WWII. I can't recommend it enough.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews