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The Time of Illusion: An Historical and Reflective Account of the Nixon Era
An analytical account of the nation's political life and key related events and presidential activities during the Nixon years, ascribing to them a logic, coherence, and meaning not discernable at the time
416 pages, Paperback
First published December 12, 1975
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
October 1, 2016
One of the books that has most influenced my thinking 0ver the course of my life.
April 29, 2021
It covers the evolution from the Cold War into and out of Vietnam. There is a major focus on Richard Nixon's presidency.
It's somewhat dated since many more sources have come to light in the past 40 years, but still worthwhile.
It's somewhat dated since many more sources have come to light in the past 40 years, but still worthwhile.
May 29, 2023
It was extremely difficult for me to put down this book. Richard Nixon (RN) is an interesting study for those interested in politics. In a democracy, one would expect leaders to promote and fulfill the will of the people, obey institutions, and act within the bounds of the law. If this is true, then according to this book, RN was a different kind of leader. While a 'rational' leader may have sufficient reasons to concede to the necessity for laws and the benefits for obeying them, RN's aim was to proselytize and overthrow America's legal order.
What struck me most about this book was the President's courage and determination to consolidate state power in the executive. It was so easy for him to lie and evince opinions aimed at promoting his lawless actions both in the domestic and foreign fronts. For instance, he carried on an illegal war against North-Vietnam which he had promised to end, he called for his 'right' to appoint supreme court justices of his own choosing, he limited press freedom, he weakened and undermined state institutions and conducted illegal surveillance of against both his supporters and political opponents.
To achieve these ends, according to Schell, RN employed various theories and tactics. Some of the theories that he used included that of America's credibility and inherent power of the president. According to RN, his actions were justified because they ensured the place of America as a global power. As for tactics, RN employed a number, the main one being secrecy. When you come to think of it, a man does things in secret in order to avoid punishment.
The President, through secrecy, wanted to act freely and with impunity without any checks and balances from other state institutions and without the public's knowledge. His aim was to keep the public in the dark by saying one thing and dong the exact opposite. However, he grossly overestimated the success of his own plans while underestimating the public's capacity to see through them. In the end, RN achieved the opposite of what he had aimed to do which was to increase the President's power and maintain America's credibility in the world's stage.
They say that a good gambler always knows before other people when his luck is beginning to turn and a bad gambler believes it when it isn't true. RN was a bad gambler. He started out by risking America's credibility and power to gain more credibility and power and suffered reprisals that led to the loss of both credibility and power.
What struck me most about this book was the President's courage and determination to consolidate state power in the executive. It was so easy for him to lie and evince opinions aimed at promoting his lawless actions both in the domestic and foreign fronts. For instance, he carried on an illegal war against North-Vietnam which he had promised to end, he called for his 'right' to appoint supreme court justices of his own choosing, he limited press freedom, he weakened and undermined state institutions and conducted illegal surveillance of against both his supporters and political opponents.
To achieve these ends, according to Schell, RN employed various theories and tactics. Some of the theories that he used included that of America's credibility and inherent power of the president. According to RN, his actions were justified because they ensured the place of America as a global power. As for tactics, RN employed a number, the main one being secrecy. When you come to think of it, a man does things in secret in order to avoid punishment.
The President, through secrecy, wanted to act freely and with impunity without any checks and balances from other state institutions and without the public's knowledge. His aim was to keep the public in the dark by saying one thing and dong the exact opposite. However, he grossly overestimated the success of his own plans while underestimating the public's capacity to see through them. In the end, RN achieved the opposite of what he had aimed to do which was to increase the President's power and maintain America's credibility in the world's stage.
They say that a good gambler always knows before other people when his luck is beginning to turn and a bad gambler believes it when it isn't true. RN was a bad gambler. He started out by risking America's credibility and power to gain more credibility and power and suffered reprisals that led to the loss of both credibility and power.
February 10, 2026
Unique and excellent, if a bit repetitive.
The wonderful thing about this book, unlike most of the ones on Nixon criminality, is it isn’t completely overshadowed by the inevitability of Watergate. We get a pretty good coverage of the earlier years of the administration, almost contemporaneous in their beat-by-beat care. (Unlike Nixonland, though, this isn’t a broader political-cultural history.)
Schell also hammers, throughout, the separation of image and substance during the Nixon administration and its creeping side-effects. He gradually plays out—and at the end, wholly restates—a unified theory of how since nuclear weapons could never be used, the question of bluster and credibility became paramount, first in foreign affairs and with Vietnam growing to consume domestic politics as well.
This overall thesis is what makes the book so interesting and repetitive at times, but it added a lot to my understanding of these years. Reminds me of Wills’ Bomb Power on nuclear policy consuming the executive branch, Craig & Logevall’s book on foreign policy as an expression of domestic pressures, and James William Gibson’s The Perfect War on the self-perpetuating logic of the Vietnam War. (Schell would also continue the thread in his anti-nuclear books, famously in 1982’s The Fate of the Earth.)
It also, especially for a book written in 1975, is stunningly prophetic and reminiscent of the current Trump administration—from reorganizations to consolidate executive branch power, to the casual double-speak and a press willing to go along with it. Like, maybe even more present-feeling than Perlstein’s work on the era, which is a wild achievement.
Biggest downside is, being written in 1975, Schell didn’t have access to the information that’s come out since, especially for non-Vietnam subterfuge earlier in the Cold War. He pushes Kennedy-Johnson-LBJ as a novel, if inevitable, aberration from mostly-honest policymaking; the record of Truman and Eisenhower aiding anti-communists abroad makes that a harder sell.
Still great, though! I can’t believe this is out of print, but hopefully NYRB Classics will pick it up down the road.
The wonderful thing about this book, unlike most of the ones on Nixon criminality, is it isn’t completely overshadowed by the inevitability of Watergate. We get a pretty good coverage of the earlier years of the administration, almost contemporaneous in their beat-by-beat care. (Unlike Nixonland, though, this isn’t a broader political-cultural history.)
Schell also hammers, throughout, the separation of image and substance during the Nixon administration and its creeping side-effects. He gradually plays out—and at the end, wholly restates—a unified theory of how since nuclear weapons could never be used, the question of bluster and credibility became paramount, first in foreign affairs and with Vietnam growing to consume domestic politics as well.
This overall thesis is what makes the book so interesting and repetitive at times, but it added a lot to my understanding of these years. Reminds me of Wills’ Bomb Power on nuclear policy consuming the executive branch, Craig & Logevall’s book on foreign policy as an expression of domestic pressures, and James William Gibson’s The Perfect War on the self-perpetuating logic of the Vietnam War. (Schell would also continue the thread in his anti-nuclear books, famously in 1982’s The Fate of the Earth.)
It also, especially for a book written in 1975, is stunningly prophetic and reminiscent of the current Trump administration—from reorganizations to consolidate executive branch power, to the casual double-speak and a press willing to go along with it. Like, maybe even more present-feeling than Perlstein’s work on the era, which is a wild achievement.
Biggest downside is, being written in 1975, Schell didn’t have access to the information that’s come out since, especially for non-Vietnam subterfuge earlier in the Cold War. He pushes Kennedy-Johnson-LBJ as a novel, if inevitable, aberration from mostly-honest policymaking; the record of Truman and Eisenhower aiding anti-communists abroad makes that a harder sell.
Still great, though! I can’t believe this is out of print, but hopefully NYRB Classics will pick it up down the road.
March 7, 2007
This is a collection of all Schell's Watergate/Nixon-era pieces from The New Yorker. Schell, who was a classmate of Wallace Shawn's, wrote for famous New Yorker editor William Shawn (father of Wallace). I'm a bit of a Watergate freak and this is one of those books that I just pick up from time to time and read in chunks.
October 5, 2009
Had to read this for a class in college about the presidency. I still own the book. Don't remember all that much about it, but that it was good. A different coverage of the Nixon years.
October 13, 2013
Really good, in-depth look at Watergate
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews