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At Dawn We Slept - The Untold Story Of Pearl Harbor
Decades after the attack that plunged America into WWII, At Dawn We Slept remains the greatest account of Pearl Harbor ever written. This gripping study scrupulously reconstructs the Japanese attack, from its conception (less than a year before the actual raid) to its lightning execution; & it reveals the true reason for the American debacle: the insurmountable disbelief in the Japanese threat that kept America from heeding advance warnings & caused leaders to ignore evidence submitted by our own intelligence sources. Based on 37 years of intense research & countless interviews, & incorporating previously untranslated documents, At Dawn We Slept is history with the dramatic sweep of a martial epic.
873 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 1981
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4532 people want to read
About the author
Gordon W. Prange
25 books45 followersA graduate of the University of Iowa, from where he received his Ph.D. in 1937, Gordon Prange began his teaching career as a professor of history at the University of Maryland. In 1942, he was granted a leave of absence from the University to embark on a wartime career as an officer in the United States Navy. Sent to Japan in 1945 as a member of the American Occupation Forces, after completing his Navy service he continued in Japan as a civilian from 1946 to 1951 as chief of General Douglas MacArthur's 100-person historical staff. When censorship of the Japanese media by Allied Forces was lifted in 1949 and the Civil Censorship Detachment disestablished, Professor Prange, recognizing the historical significance of the CCD material, arranged for its shipment to the University of Maryland. The materials arrived at the University in 1950. On September 15, 1978, the Board of Regents of the University of Maryland passed a motion to name the collection the 'Gordon W. Prange Collection: The Allied Presence in Japan, 1945-1952.' Professor Prange continued to teach at the University of Maryland until several months before his death on May 15, 1980. He is still remembered by alumni as one of the University's truly great teachers, and is well known today for major works on the war in the Pacific, particularly Tora! Tora! Tora!" The Terrapin, the University of Maryland's yearbook, said of his World War I and World War II history lectures in 1964: "Students flock to his class and sit enraptured as he animates the pages of twentieth century European history through his goosesteps, 'Seig Heils', 'Achtungs', machine gun retorts and frantic gestures.
Dr. Prange's manuscript about the attack on Pearl Harbor is credited as the basis for the screenplay Tora! Tora! Tora!, filmed in 1970 while Prange took a leave of absence from the University of Maryland to serve as technical consultant during its filming. His extensive research into the attack on Pearl Harbor was the subject of a PBS television program in 2000, "Prange and Pearl Harbor: A Magnificent Obsession", and was acclaimed "a definitive book on the event" by The Washington Post.
Dr. Prange's manuscript about the attack on Pearl Harbor is credited as the basis for the screenplay Tora! Tora! Tora!, filmed in 1970 while Prange took a leave of absence from the University of Maryland to serve as technical consultant during its filming. His extensive research into the attack on Pearl Harbor was the subject of a PBS television program in 2000, "Prange and Pearl Harbor: A Magnificent Obsession", and was acclaimed "a definitive book on the event" by The Washington Post.
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November 23, 2019
“At a point off Lahilahi Point, at 0749 [Mitsuo] Fuchida arrived at zero hour. With chills chasing each other up and down his spine, he gave…the attack signal, To, to, to, the first syllable of totsugekiseyo (charge). Then he ordered the radioman to tap out the order for all pilots. Aboard Nagato in the Inland Sea, a staff officer burst into [Matome] Ugaki’s cabin with the news, and Yamamoto’s chief of staff bounded for the Operations Room…Fuchida’s radio was still clicking when the first wave broke into its component parts. Fuchida swung around Barber’s Point, and sure beyond all possible doubt that they had indeed achieved maximum strategic surprise, at 0753 he sang out, “Tora! Tora! Tora! (“Tiger! Tiger! Tiger!) – the code words which told the entire Japanese Navy that they had caught the Pacific Fleet unawares…”
- Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor
Pearl Harbor is nearing the end of its afterlife in living memory. Soon enough, all who were alive at the time will be gone, and all that will remain are their reminisces.
Nonetheless, even as it recedes, even as World War II starts to become a distant event, fought by others, rather than something that grandpa went through, Pearl Harbor maintains a hold on our thoughts and imaginations. It is a touchstone moment, and you do not have to be a history buff to know what someone means when they reference Japan’s dawn air assault on Hawaii, December 7, 1941.
Towering over our understanding of Pearl Harbor is Gordon W. Prange’s At Dawn We Slept.
The story behind the book is fascinating and sad. Prange researched Pearl Harbor for 37 years. He interviewed just about every important surviving participant, including Admiral Husband Kimmel, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and Minoru Genda, the Japanese airman who planned the attacks. Prange eventually wrote a manuscript that was 3,500 pages long.
Life, however, is seldom large enough for our projects, our dreams. Prange died tragically of cancer at the age of 69, and it was left to his two assistants (who became co-authors) to forge a book out of Prange's prodigious work.
Eventually, Prange's collaborators carved five books from Prange’s manuscripts, including a trilogy on Pearl Harbor: At Dawn We Slept, which details how the Japanese planned and executed Pearl Harbor; Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History, which argues that despite whispers to the contrary, FDR did not orchestrate the attacks, either by commission or omission; and December 7, 1941: the Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor, which is a Walter Lord-style narrative of the battle itself.
The massive (738 pages of text) At Dawn We Slept is separated into three sections: planning, execution, and aftermath. The first two sections are told mainly from the Japanese point of view. This is a result of Prange's original intent, which was to tell the Japanese side of the story. Prange seemed to be a believer in the “great man” theory of history, the universe pivoting on the decisions, personalities, and whims of individuals. As such, he gives a great deal of attention to the major players:
After briefly setting the context for the attack – Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and its threat from America – Prange plunges right into the conception and planning. The idea was the brainchild of Isoroku Yamamoto, who was educated in America and had great respect for the country. Yamamoto is often presented as a reluctant warrior, allegedly fearing that Japan had awakened "a sleeping giant, and filled him with a terrible resolve." Despite whatever misgivings Yamamoto had, Prange shows him as a man who really believed in the attack. He was a gambler and he wanted to play his ace. When given the opportunity, he advocated for it forcefully.
While Yamamoto and Genda were working out the logistics, including torpedo tactics that would work in Pearl's shallow waters, the Japanese were simultaneously lulling America into a diplomatic sense of complacency. Much of the anger that followed Pearl Harbor came from Japanese perfidy in promising peace while planning (and ultimately executing) a war.
At Dawn We Slept presents a slightly more complex interpretation, with a tug-of-war between Japan’s military and diplomatic branches (with Tojo's war clique having most of the power). Thus, Prange gives a sympathetic portrait of Japanese Ambassador Nomura, an honest, honorable man, who was lied to by his own country.
Interspersed with Japanese preparations is the American story, which can best be encapsulated by a phrase heard often after September 11, 2001: “A failure of imagination.”
The Americans never discovered a smoking gun before December 7. Instead, there were dozens of indicators that the Japanese were planning something, including information, days before the attack, that the Japanese were burning their codes. The failure of the Pearl Harbor commanders - Kimmel and General Walter Short - was to conceive of a carrier attack and make adequate preparations. Instead of installing torpedo nets, sending out air patrols, and preparing to repel an attack, Kimmel and Short (Short especially) were obsessed with sabotage and fifth columnists.
The attack itself is relegated to only a couple chapters. If you want a blow-by-blow account of the air raid, you will have to pick up Prange’s December 7, 1941, or Walter Lord’s Day of Infamy.
The third and final section deals with the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. These chapters go into great detail about the numerous investigations: the Roberts Commission; the Naval Court of Inquiry; the Army Board Hearings; and finally, the Congressional Investigation. I found this a bit repetitious, as the earlier narrative already covered the mistakes that were made.
In this final section, the Japanese disappear completely. On a storytelling level, this prevents them from receiving a proper epilogue. It’s too bad, since Prange dedicated so much time to them in the early stages. Rather, Prange and his co-authors choose to follow Admiral Kimmel, and his efforts to redeem himself. It's pretty clear that Prange, through his personal contacts with the admiral, had a great deal of respect for him, despite his limitations:
Prange's title implies that America was caught napping. His ultimate lesson, though, made explicit in the book, was that the "unexpected can happen and often does."
My chief takeaway is the impossibility of laying blame on any one person. Before Pearl Harbor, there were hundreds of indicators of disaster, but no one person had all the information. Instead, all these different people had small pieces of the puzzle. At any point along the line, someone could have collected all (or a sizable number) of these intelligence scraps and created a picture. That didn’t happen, a failing that has been repeated.
As the attack date neared, and warning lights started flashing, there came more and more chances to blow the Japanese plans: the Naval Department could have given Kimmel the Japanese diplomatic intercepts (that showed the Japanese breaking off relations at 1:00 p.m. on Dec. 7, Washington time); Kimmel could have had planes scouting the north; the Japanese sub sightings could have been reported sooner; the warning from the radar station could have been taken seriously, instead of ignored. If any of these things (or others) had occurred, the attack might have been a disaster for the Japanese. Ignoring this reality, and trying to convict one person, is an exercise in ludicrousness.
The desire to find fault is psychologically rooted. It's easier for us to say it was Kimmel's fault or Short's fault or Roosevelt’s fault than to admit we might be vulnerable to forces stronger or more ruthless or cleverer than our own.
There were times when I struggled with At Dawn We Slept on a purely literary level. For all Prange’s talents, and for all the efforts of his co-authors, the prose tends to be an afterthought to disseminating the massive amount of research they compiled. Nevertheless, this is a classic account of a momentous day, written – more or less – by a man who towers over this particular subject in a way that very few historians can even contemplate.
- Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor
Pearl Harbor is nearing the end of its afterlife in living memory. Soon enough, all who were alive at the time will be gone, and all that will remain are their reminisces.
Nonetheless, even as it recedes, even as World War II starts to become a distant event, fought by others, rather than something that grandpa went through, Pearl Harbor maintains a hold on our thoughts and imaginations. It is a touchstone moment, and you do not have to be a history buff to know what someone means when they reference Japan’s dawn air assault on Hawaii, December 7, 1941.
Towering over our understanding of Pearl Harbor is Gordon W. Prange’s At Dawn We Slept.
The story behind the book is fascinating and sad. Prange researched Pearl Harbor for 37 years. He interviewed just about every important surviving participant, including Admiral Husband Kimmel, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and Minoru Genda, the Japanese airman who planned the attacks. Prange eventually wrote a manuscript that was 3,500 pages long.
Life, however, is seldom large enough for our projects, our dreams. Prange died tragically of cancer at the age of 69, and it was left to his two assistants (who became co-authors) to forge a book out of Prange's prodigious work.
Eventually, Prange's collaborators carved five books from Prange’s manuscripts, including a trilogy on Pearl Harbor: At Dawn We Slept, which details how the Japanese planned and executed Pearl Harbor; Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History, which argues that despite whispers to the contrary, FDR did not orchestrate the attacks, either by commission or omission; and December 7, 1941: the Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor, which is a Walter Lord-style narrative of the battle itself.
The massive (738 pages of text) At Dawn We Slept is separated into three sections: planning, execution, and aftermath. The first two sections are told mainly from the Japanese point of view. This is a result of Prange's original intent, which was to tell the Japanese side of the story. Prange seemed to be a believer in the “great man” theory of history, the universe pivoting on the decisions, personalities, and whims of individuals. As such, he gives a great deal of attention to the major players:
A photograph taken at the height of [Yamamoto's:] powers portray a man short even by Japanese standards (five feet three inches), with broad shoulders accentuated by massive epaulets and a thick chest crowded with orders and medals. But a strong, commanding face dominates and subdues the trappings. The angular jaw slants sharply to an emphatic chin. The lips are full, clean-cut, under a straight prominent nose...Gray hair in an uncompromising crew cut surmounts the whole. It is the face of a man of action and a visionary, reflecting willpower and drive as well as sensitivity.
After briefly setting the context for the attack – Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and its threat from America – Prange plunges right into the conception and planning. The idea was the brainchild of Isoroku Yamamoto, who was educated in America and had great respect for the country. Yamamoto is often presented as a reluctant warrior, allegedly fearing that Japan had awakened "a sleeping giant, and filled him with a terrible resolve." Despite whatever misgivings Yamamoto had, Prange shows him as a man who really believed in the attack. He was a gambler and he wanted to play his ace. When given the opportunity, he advocated for it forcefully.
While Yamamoto and Genda were working out the logistics, including torpedo tactics that would work in Pearl's shallow waters, the Japanese were simultaneously lulling America into a diplomatic sense of complacency. Much of the anger that followed Pearl Harbor came from Japanese perfidy in promising peace while planning (and ultimately executing) a war.
At Dawn We Slept presents a slightly more complex interpretation, with a tug-of-war between Japan’s military and diplomatic branches (with Tojo's war clique having most of the power). Thus, Prange gives a sympathetic portrait of Japanese Ambassador Nomura, an honest, honorable man, who was lied to by his own country.
Interspersed with Japanese preparations is the American story, which can best be encapsulated by a phrase heard often after September 11, 2001: “A failure of imagination.”
The Americans never discovered a smoking gun before December 7. Instead, there were dozens of indicators that the Japanese were planning something, including information, days before the attack, that the Japanese were burning their codes. The failure of the Pearl Harbor commanders - Kimmel and General Walter Short - was to conceive of a carrier attack and make adequate preparations. Instead of installing torpedo nets, sending out air patrols, and preparing to repel an attack, Kimmel and Short (Short especially) were obsessed with sabotage and fifth columnists.
The attack itself is relegated to only a couple chapters. If you want a blow-by-blow account of the air raid, you will have to pick up Prange’s December 7, 1941, or Walter Lord’s Day of Infamy.
The third and final section deals with the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. These chapters go into great detail about the numerous investigations: the Roberts Commission; the Naval Court of Inquiry; the Army Board Hearings; and finally, the Congressional Investigation. I found this a bit repetitious, as the earlier narrative already covered the mistakes that were made.
In this final section, the Japanese disappear completely. On a storytelling level, this prevents them from receiving a proper epilogue. It’s too bad, since Prange dedicated so much time to them in the early stages. Rather, Prange and his co-authors choose to follow Admiral Kimmel, and his efforts to redeem himself. It's pretty clear that Prange, through his personal contacts with the admiral, had a great deal of respect for him, despite his limitations:
Yet one cannot wonder that Kimmel turned almost morbid. He had grown to eminence in an atmosphere of clear-cut quid pro quo. If one obeyed the laws of God and man, studied diligently, denied oneself, worked hard, took one's place in the community, discharged one's duties, dealt justly with one's fellowman, one would prosper and reach the end of the road full of years and honor. Kimmel had done all of these things...
Prange's title implies that America was caught napping. His ultimate lesson, though, made explicit in the book, was that the "unexpected can happen and often does."
My chief takeaway is the impossibility of laying blame on any one person. Before Pearl Harbor, there were hundreds of indicators of disaster, but no one person had all the information. Instead, all these different people had small pieces of the puzzle. At any point along the line, someone could have collected all (or a sizable number) of these intelligence scraps and created a picture. That didn’t happen, a failing that has been repeated.
As the attack date neared, and warning lights started flashing, there came more and more chances to blow the Japanese plans: the Naval Department could have given Kimmel the Japanese diplomatic intercepts (that showed the Japanese breaking off relations at 1:00 p.m. on Dec. 7, Washington time); Kimmel could have had planes scouting the north; the Japanese sub sightings could have been reported sooner; the warning from the radar station could have been taken seriously, instead of ignored. If any of these things (or others) had occurred, the attack might have been a disaster for the Japanese. Ignoring this reality, and trying to convict one person, is an exercise in ludicrousness.
The desire to find fault is psychologically rooted. It's easier for us to say it was Kimmel's fault or Short's fault or Roosevelt’s fault than to admit we might be vulnerable to forces stronger or more ruthless or cleverer than our own.
There were times when I struggled with At Dawn We Slept on a purely literary level. For all Prange’s talents, and for all the efforts of his co-authors, the prose tends to be an afterthought to disseminating the massive amount of research they compiled. Nevertheless, this is a classic account of a momentous day, written – more or less – by a man who towers over this particular subject in a way that very few historians can even contemplate.
July 20, 2023
A few interesting items on this very loooong books kept my rating at three instead of two. Found it fascinating that the Japanese Government knew there was no way they could beat America in a war but if they crippled the Navy in Pearl Harbor, they could sue for peace and still continue to invade Asia. Another fascination was the total unforgivable ignorance of President Franklin Roosevelt. As a former Secretary of Navy, Roosevelt had the inexcusable blunder of keeping most of the fleet like sitting ducks in Pearl Harbor.
The rest of the books shows how 2 Admirals and Roosevelt tried to fix the blame on this horrible tragedy on others, so much so that their finger pointing lead all 3 to be double jointed.
The rest of the books shows how 2 Admirals and Roosevelt tried to fix the blame on this horrible tragedy on others, so much so that their finger pointing lead all 3 to be double jointed.
June 30, 2020
An amazing book that is a comprehensive look at the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor in December of 1941. Prange had incredible access to the Japanese side after the end of World War II as he was stationed in Japan and spent many days talking to the officers and men of the Navy of Japan as well as spending decades interviewing the participants of this seminal event of the 20th century.
Prange spent over twenty years researching the planning of the Japanese attack in Hawaii and we certainly get all of that research. I knew little of what went on in Japan and only had heard the American side which was quick to find scape goats among without giving much credit to their opponents.
The logic of Prange's prose brought to life the era of 1940 and 1941 as we count down to that morning at Pearl Harbor of December of 1941. It was a very long book and the lengthy discussion of all the investigations of the tragedy I believe acted as an anti-climax after the intensity of the lead up to the event. I highly recommend this work from 1981.
Prange spent over twenty years researching the planning of the Japanese attack in Hawaii and we certainly get all of that research. I knew little of what went on in Japan and only had heard the American side which was quick to find scape goats among without giving much credit to their opponents.
The logic of Prange's prose brought to life the era of 1940 and 1941 as we count down to that morning at Pearl Harbor of December of 1941. It was a very long book and the lengthy discussion of all the investigations of the tragedy I believe acted as an anti-climax after the intensity of the lead up to the event. I highly recommend this work from 1981.
January 7, 2009
This is excellent. It holds your interest despite being HUGE. He pulls together the whole story every every point of view. I got three big points from this book.
1] The US Europe first was our idea. I had always those clever Churchill had talked us into it. It was one of the top men in the Navy. The thinking was to fight Japan we have to cross an ocean. To fight Germany we have a base in England. If we concentrate on Japan first we might lose our base of England.
2] Many US leaders were afraid of a Congressional fault finding hearing into Pearl Harbor. They feared having to take the stand and under oath having to reveal ULTRA (out code breaking efforts) I think that attitude has changed.
3] A planned third wave was canceled. It was going to bomb the sub pens and fuel storage. Nagumo canceled this wave. The fuel dumps would have burned for a month and forced the US fleet to re-locate to San Diego. This was the Japanese goal. Basically, Nagumo was still a believer in the battleship and had no faith in the tools of the aircraft carriers with which he had been entrusted.
1] The US Europe first was our idea. I had always those clever Churchill had talked us into it. It was one of the top men in the Navy. The thinking was to fight Japan we have to cross an ocean. To fight Germany we have a base in England. If we concentrate on Japan first we might lose our base of England.
2] Many US leaders were afraid of a Congressional fault finding hearing into Pearl Harbor. They feared having to take the stand and under oath having to reveal ULTRA (out code breaking efforts) I think that attitude has changed.
3] A planned third wave was canceled. It was going to bomb the sub pens and fuel storage. Nagumo canceled this wave. The fuel dumps would have burned for a month and forced the US fleet to re-locate to San Diego. This was the Japanese goal. Basically, Nagumo was still a believer in the battleship and had no faith in the tools of the aircraft carriers with which he had been entrusted.
April 15, 2013
As the description indicates, this is an exhaustive account of the Pearl Harbor attack. Much attention is paid to the issue of culpability as regards both the US naval and army commands as well as the administration of President Roosevelt itself. Prange argues against the Beard Thesis and exonerates FDR.
August 1, 2011
It’s not often that I get to use the word, definitive, but it certainly fits At Dawn We Slept. This book offers its readers everything they could possibly want with regard to the who, what, when, where, and why of the planning and execution of the raid, as well as the who, what, when, where, and why of how the U. S. failed to anticipate their actions and protect Pearl Harbor from a likely attack. It is filled with the incredible research done by Gordon Prange over almost 40 years, tracing down not only written information in letters, diaries, newspapers, magazines, and government records, but finding and interviewing well over 100 people, both in the U. S. and Japan.
I was surprised that I grew to be so interested in some of the major players in this moment in history that I actually felt for them a great deal of sympathy or, in the case, of some, cheered them on. Through this very long book they became like family or close friends.
Of course, I’ve lived my entire life knowing much about the Pearl Harbor attack. The following are some of the things I learned which were new to me or different than I had come to believe:
Yamamoto clearly understood that Japan had no hope of ultimate victory over the United States. He perceived Pearl Harbor as a knockout punch – damage and temporary containment.
The Japanese gathered mounds of information about Pearl Harbor merely by having one of their agents drive around the area and take notes. Security was so lax that the comings and goings of all ships were published in the newspapers every morning.
Neither Short nor Kimmel were privy to the Honolulu intercepts of Japanese coded transmissions, which were translated daily, and delivered to a very select few.
The Japanese originally estimated that the Pearl Harbor attack would cost them one third of their task force because they anticipated that the U. S. would discover them and respond accordingly.
Ambassador Nomura had no knowledge of the planning of Pearl Harbor. He only learned of it after he had returned from his final trip to the U. S. Ambassador. The Japanese government purposely kept him in the dark.
As early as October 11 Japan chose the date of December 7 (Hawaii time) for the attack.
FDR did not know about Pearl Harbor prior to its occurrence. He did not intentionally suppress information in order to bring it about.
The first blood spilt was by a Japanese and first shot fired was by the U. S.
On a personal note, the book was too inclusive. The editors did the reader no favors by putting in all that was gathered. Also, I found it very annoying that they used [sic] so often when the text was grammatically incorrect, especially since Prange misused forms of bring and take.
I was surprised that I grew to be so interested in some of the major players in this moment in history that I actually felt for them a great deal of sympathy or, in the case, of some, cheered them on. Through this very long book they became like family or close friends.
Of course, I’ve lived my entire life knowing much about the Pearl Harbor attack. The following are some of the things I learned which were new to me or different than I had come to believe:
Yamamoto clearly understood that Japan had no hope of ultimate victory over the United States. He perceived Pearl Harbor as a knockout punch – damage and temporary containment.
The Japanese gathered mounds of information about Pearl Harbor merely by having one of their agents drive around the area and take notes. Security was so lax that the comings and goings of all ships were published in the newspapers every morning.
Neither Short nor Kimmel were privy to the Honolulu intercepts of Japanese coded transmissions, which were translated daily, and delivered to a very select few.
The Japanese originally estimated that the Pearl Harbor attack would cost them one third of their task force because they anticipated that the U. S. would discover them and respond accordingly.
Ambassador Nomura had no knowledge of the planning of Pearl Harbor. He only learned of it after he had returned from his final trip to the U. S. Ambassador. The Japanese government purposely kept him in the dark.
As early as October 11 Japan chose the date of December 7 (Hawaii time) for the attack.
FDR did not know about Pearl Harbor prior to its occurrence. He did not intentionally suppress information in order to bring it about.
The first blood spilt was by a Japanese and first shot fired was by the U. S.
On a personal note, the book was too inclusive. The editors did the reader no favors by putting in all that was gathered. Also, I found it very annoying that they used [sic] so often when the text was grammatically incorrect, especially since Prange misused forms of bring and take.
August 9, 2022
If you're looking for a detailed description or analysis of the morning of December 7, 1941 at Pearl Harbor, you should look elsewhere. If you want to know anything and everything else about both sides of the Pearl Harbor attack, you need look no further than this book. The extensiveness and thoroughness of Prange's research are apparent in every page. That occasionally leads to receptiveness and a tedious stretch or two but enduring those is worth the overall result. Prange doesn't provide answers to all the questions about Pearl Harbor but then, neither did the five or so courts, boards, and investigations that spent hundreds of days and millions of dollars trying to determine who was responsible for our "day of infamy."
November 16, 2020
My dilemma is how to compose a comprehensive review of an exhaustive, comprehensive, and factual study of the entire Pearl Harbor attack from the perspective of both the Japanese and American military and civilian points of view and keep it short for the Goodreads reader who uses these reviews to make a quick determination as to whether to devote weeks if not months to reading this or any other book.
Less than 100 pages of this nearly 900 page book cover the actual attack on Pearl Harbor that “infamous” Sunday morning. Beginning with the Japanese experiences dating from their 1904 “sneak attack” on Port Arthur, Prange traces the development of the Hawaiian attack from its concept forward while simultaneously tracking the diplomatic, military, political, and intelligence activities of both Japanese and Americans. Post attack writing includes detailed coverage of the eight official United States investigations that attempted to discover the why’s of the attack and who to blame for it.
This not a book for the average reader with an interest in simply getting an overview of the Pearl Harbor debacle as Prange weaves his way through the myriad threads that comprised the thoughts and actions of those involved. One example is the difficulty the novice reader would have with the names of the Japanese officials such as Foreign Minister TOGO and Premier TOJO among others. The coverage of post attack investigations is thorough requiring a reader to frequently “pause and go back” in order to keep all the details straight in his or her mind.
Having said all this, I certainly recommend this book to the interested student of history as it is the most authoritative work on the attack on Pearl Harbor but be prepared to devote many hours to read it. This is not your “summer beach read”.
Less than 100 pages of this nearly 900 page book cover the actual attack on Pearl Harbor that “infamous” Sunday morning. Beginning with the Japanese experiences dating from their 1904 “sneak attack” on Port Arthur, Prange traces the development of the Hawaiian attack from its concept forward while simultaneously tracking the diplomatic, military, political, and intelligence activities of both Japanese and Americans. Post attack writing includes detailed coverage of the eight official United States investigations that attempted to discover the why’s of the attack and who to blame for it.
This not a book for the average reader with an interest in simply getting an overview of the Pearl Harbor debacle as Prange weaves his way through the myriad threads that comprised the thoughts and actions of those involved. One example is the difficulty the novice reader would have with the names of the Japanese officials such as Foreign Minister TOGO and Premier TOJO among others. The coverage of post attack investigations is thorough requiring a reader to frequently “pause and go back” in order to keep all the details straight in his or her mind.
Having said all this, I certainly recommend this book to the interested student of history as it is the most authoritative work on the attack on Pearl Harbor but be prepared to devote many hours to read it. This is not your “summer beach read”.
July 27, 2020
This book is rightly considered the penultimate history of Pearl Harbor. It is thoroughly researched and excellently written. However it isn’t a casual read. It is crammed full of details on the people and events surrounding that fateful Sunday so be prepared to give it your full attention and concentration.
April 5, 2013
This was an excellent history. Very readable, every chapter is bite-sized, so one feels brisk progress is being made despite the overall length of the book. Many many actors from both Japanese and US sides are engaged, which can be daunting though unnecessary to worry about keeping track of each. The major players are evident, and one very quickly identifies those.
Lots of lessons to be taken away, still applicable in today's world where a plethora of sensors and endless streams of intelligence appear to reduce the potential for surprise, but maybe those advances only lull us into a false sense of security. That Kimmel and Short, two very successful professionals, could arrive at these significant positions of responsibility and yet not effectively assess the defense gaps and shortfalls on Oahu, or be prescient enough given the context of US-Japanese relations, amazes. "Pearl Harbor demonstrated one enduring lesson: The unexpected can happen and often does."
Page 279: "The navy minister was a full admiral on active duty... instead of a civilian holding both whip and check rein. Thus, the Japanese Navy, like the Army (General Tojo had been made the new premier by Hirohito on 17 Oct 1941), did not consider itself answerable to the civil government. This gave the Navy a large slice of uncontrolled power and helped build up the psychology, prevalent in both armed services, that the country existed to support the military, rather than vice versa... Unfortunately Japan also had the bad judgment to employ them ["the power, the purpose and the plan"] in a reckless war it could not possibly win."
Lots of lessons to be taken away, still applicable in today's world where a plethora of sensors and endless streams of intelligence appear to reduce the potential for surprise, but maybe those advances only lull us into a false sense of security. That Kimmel and Short, two very successful professionals, could arrive at these significant positions of responsibility and yet not effectively assess the defense gaps and shortfalls on Oahu, or be prescient enough given the context of US-Japanese relations, amazes. "Pearl Harbor demonstrated one enduring lesson: The unexpected can happen and often does."
Page 279: "The navy minister was a full admiral on active duty... instead of a civilian holding both whip and check rein. Thus, the Japanese Navy, like the Army (General Tojo had been made the new premier by Hirohito on 17 Oct 1941), did not consider itself answerable to the civil government. This gave the Navy a large slice of uncontrolled power and helped build up the psychology, prevalent in both armed services, that the country existed to support the military, rather than vice versa... Unfortunately Japan also had the bad judgment to employ them ["the power, the purpose and the plan"] in a reckless war it could not possibly win."
June 14, 2011
if you ever think you might want to be a management mentor, make sure you read this incredible treatise on the debacles leading up to Dec 7, 1947. you can learn more about how not to run a boat reading this book than any other single book.
Prange's scholarship is unequaled. His writing is easy and brilliant, and his depth of understanding of the events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor, from both sides of the Atlantic, paint as clear a picture of that day as anyone possibly could. truly a masterpiece.
Prange's scholarship is unequaled. His writing is easy and brilliant, and his depth of understanding of the events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor, from both sides of the Atlantic, paint as clear a picture of that day as anyone possibly could. truly a masterpiece.
May 27, 2020
Weighing in at over 750 pages this is a dense, encyclopedic examination of the attack of Pearl Harbor from both the American and Japanese point of view. The movie Tora Tora Tora which itself is more than 3 hours long is based on this book. It consists of three parts: the Prelude, the Attack and the Aftermath. By far the most interesting for me was part 3 examining the multiple investigations of why the US was caught napping and unprepared for what many viewed as an obvious target of Japan as tension between the two countries escalated throughout 1941.
It’s a long slog but worth the effort
It’s a long slog but worth the effort
September 4, 2009
A very thorough telling of the steps Japan took to launch the Pearl Harbor attack. I well-told history, but often repetitive. It was difficult to keep straight all the characters. Still, a good read and very informative, particularly if you don't have much knowledge of the Pacific theater during WWII.
February 2, 2011
You've gotta like history (in minute detail), but if you do, this is your book.
April 21, 2013
Interesting but gets bogged down in details that aren't important
September 17, 2020
One cannot imagine a more thorough, all encompassing study of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Prange, who spent a good many years of his life researching and writing this story told from the perspectives of both the Japanese and Americans, details the conception of the plan in Japan, the American defenses in Hawaii, the diplomatic minuet that dragged across the span of months and the execution of one of the most daring, improbable raids in military history. Only the most devout jingoists or hard bitten ethnocentrics cannot but admire that Japan pulled off, tragically for those Americans who were caught unaware on that Sunday morning in December 1941.
The Japanese planned and trained for the mission of a lifetime and against all odds sailed 6 aircraft carriers within 200 miles of Oahu and launched the first wave air attack against the US undetected. American mistakes and failures contributing to the total surprise achieved by Japan were tragic and Prange details the fallout, blame game, and national searching that ensued. But for all of Japan’s success that day and a good share of fortunate luck, the “what if” they had been daring enough to refuel and attack again is a great historical question because the Japanese failed to destroy the fuel depots and thus the harm to Hawaii was only temporary. Japan achieved its aim of dealing a mighty blow to the American fleet, protecting its southern flank and returning its carriers home unscathed. Yet they could have inflicted far greater damage with likely minimal greater risk.
The book reads like a thriller and I was engrossed up to the point of attack. Fascinating and compelling read.
The Japanese planned and trained for the mission of a lifetime and against all odds sailed 6 aircraft carriers within 200 miles of Oahu and launched the first wave air attack against the US undetected. American mistakes and failures contributing to the total surprise achieved by Japan were tragic and Prange details the fallout, blame game, and national searching that ensued. But for all of Japan’s success that day and a good share of fortunate luck, the “what if” they had been daring enough to refuel and attack again is a great historical question because the Japanese failed to destroy the fuel depots and thus the harm to Hawaii was only temporary. Japan achieved its aim of dealing a mighty blow to the American fleet, protecting its southern flank and returning its carriers home unscathed. Yet they could have inflicted far greater damage with likely minimal greater risk.
The book reads like a thriller and I was engrossed up to the point of attack. Fascinating and compelling read.
July 27, 2025
I find the Pacific War fascinating and have read many books about it, but found it was a challenge to get through this one. At Dawn We slept is long, plodding, and overstays its welcome. For starters, it's 900 pages long, and surprisingly little of it actually deals with the attack on Pearl Harbor- only about 50 pages or so. In a book about Pearl Harbor, I had hoped more of it would deal with the battle itself. The vast majority of the book focuses on the diplomatic maneuvering between Japan and the US in the months leading up to the attack. Some of it is interesting, but it goes into such incredible detail of the people involved that it gets annoying and seems irrelevant to the larger picture. Are multiple pages really necessary to explain the educational background and life of some obscure USN officer that didn't even play a major role in the attack? Pages are burned constantly on minute details that just don't seem relevant. The last 200 pages deal with the congressional inquiry into the disaster and the postwar discussion surrounding who was at fault for US unpreparedness. Prange argues the whole postwar revisionist conspiracy that FDR and the top brass in the navy withheld vital intelligence surrounding the attack is nonsense; he mostly blames the commanding officers of the Hawaii department, Short and Kimmel, for not being diligent and taking seriously the possible threat posed to Hawaii. I agree with his interpretations and appreciate that his book is well researched, it's just he could've improved it by shaving a good 300 pages off the final manuscript. I think Prange's sequel book Miracle at Midway is far superior for being more focused and better written. I wouldn't recommend this one unless you can't read enough about Pearl Harbor.
February 15, 2019
I just couldn’t finish this. I was attracted by the promise that “the attack doesn’t even happen until halfway through the book, “ as one reviewer said. But I would have preferred going further back in history. The book started on 1940; I’d like to have gone back to the 1920s.
You know what finally broke me, though? The repetitive way the author introduced EVERY new character. I couldn’t take another guy with “close-cropped hair parted on the left, steely eyes, and a determined chin.”
I only got through 11%, so maybe once all the players were introduced it really took off, but I just couldn’t stick it out with so many other books to be read. I may try this book again in the future... the positive reviews make me want to persist.
You know what finally broke me, though? The repetitive way the author introduced EVERY new character. I couldn’t take another guy with “close-cropped hair parted on the left, steely eyes, and a determined chin.”
I only got through 11%, so maybe once all the players were introduced it really took off, but I just couldn’t stick it out with so many other books to be read. I may try this book again in the future... the positive reviews make me want to persist.
June 18, 2021
An excellent comprehensive review of Pearl Harbor which was extensively edited and rewritten by colleagues after Prange's death. It is easy, I think, to identify those parts written by Prange as he spends a lot of words describing an individual's appearance as somehow looks are destiny but other than that minor observation it is a comprehensive review of PH and its aftermath. It leaves many things unanswered because in history like life there are many questions incapable of being answered.
August 2, 2024
This book opens your eyes so much to the history of Pearl Harbor and the struggles our nation went through at the time. I hope to get to read more from this author and get the insight he gives into this time of world history. My great-grandfather was part of the clean-up crew that went to Pearl Harbor to help out, and this book made me look up to him even more if that was even possible. Books like this make history stay relevant and alive and to me that's really important.
October 2, 2025
Looks like a long time since someone read this book. If you love history and the behind the scenes details this one is for you! It might be 735 pages but not a wasted word. It kept me turning pages and wanting more. I’m sure it is the definitive history of what happened before during and after that fateful day. Read it you won’t be disappointed!
July 19, 2023
Exceptionally detailed, thorough analysis of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Until I read this book, I had mistakenly believed that full responsibility lay at the feet of US Admiral Kimmel. Instead, there was ample blame on many people.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
October 26, 2025
So complete. So thorough. The author was able to interview many Japanese generals after the war while stationed in Tokyo. Fascinating. Especially the last part of the book which goes through in detail the charges brought up against general Short and general Kimmel, commanders in Honolulu. The author is very fair in pointing out the blame, which is shared by Washington and Honolulu.
January 16, 2026
It was amazing, very accurate, and well written.
January 23, 2020
Over the years like a lot of guys I've watched many what happened at Pearl Harbor. I believe all the directors and producers must have read "At Dawn We Slept". This work is well footnoted and the works cited is extensive. This work is the place to start for anyone writing a paper, making a documentary, or just interested as to what happened on Dec 7th 1941. If you want more just go the appendices. Prang covers most or all of the revisionist and conspiracy theory's that surround Dec 7th and debunks them. Also Prang has no ax to grind and is fair to all the principal players. Yes Admiral Kimmel and Gen Stark take most of the blame. Some blame is placed squarely in Washington because that is where that portion of the what happened falls. The biggest take away from At Dawn We Slept is that the same intelligence gathering and interpretation failures that happened in 1941 still plague us today.
The take away, if you follow intelligence failures or near failures, is the lack of coordination and sharing of information between agencies responsible for gathering and disseminating said intelligence. In the year leading up to Dec 7th the Army and Navy not only kept the other in the dark but didn't coordinate in Hawaii with each other. They didn't even talk about foreign relations or the islands defenses when they did meet. Kimmel and Stark were on the same island but could have been on different planets as far as their working relation ship went. Also not much thought of the FBI, Honolulu Police and the Hawaii Dept of the Attorney General all had information about the Japanese Consulate in Hawaii, but that information was shipped to Washington where it was interpreted and then disseminated back to the field. The field and Washington didn't inform either the Army or the Navy that the FBI and Hawaii Dept had information on the Japanese. Information that would have been invaluable to the intelligence services in Hawaii. This lack of communication between services and agencies was bad in 1941 with only five agencies involved, Army, Navy, State, FBI, and territorial government. This lack of communication has gotten worse.
Look at the intelligence on the Tet offensive during Vietnam, The world Trade Center bombing in 96, Oklahoma city, and finally 9/11. Lots of information in many hands but no central clearing house for it. Now for the real bad news that should make any one who reads this today squirm. The turf wars in HQ of the various Departments who are responsible for intelligence gathering and dissemination in Washington are just as bad as they were in the year leading up to Dec 7th. Actually, because the number of agencies that are gathering intelligence for the defense of this country has increased to 14: Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA, FBI, DEA, ATF, Home Land, Treasury, Coast Guard, Customs and Boarder Patrol, NSA, National Park Service, and every major city police department. All these agencies have intelligence gathering networks. And very little information sis shared between them. The same situation as Dec 7th 1941. A sad state of affairs.
Prangs work is great and I recommend reading this work if you haven't before the next intelligence failure gets you or yours killed.
The take away, if you follow intelligence failures or near failures, is the lack of coordination and sharing of information between agencies responsible for gathering and disseminating said intelligence. In the year leading up to Dec 7th the Army and Navy not only kept the other in the dark but didn't coordinate in Hawaii with each other. They didn't even talk about foreign relations or the islands defenses when they did meet. Kimmel and Stark were on the same island but could have been on different planets as far as their working relation ship went. Also not much thought of the FBI, Honolulu Police and the Hawaii Dept of the Attorney General all had information about the Japanese Consulate in Hawaii, but that information was shipped to Washington where it was interpreted and then disseminated back to the field. The field and Washington didn't inform either the Army or the Navy that the FBI and Hawaii Dept had information on the Japanese. Information that would have been invaluable to the intelligence services in Hawaii. This lack of communication between services and agencies was bad in 1941 with only five agencies involved, Army, Navy, State, FBI, and territorial government. This lack of communication has gotten worse.
Look at the intelligence on the Tet offensive during Vietnam, The world Trade Center bombing in 96, Oklahoma city, and finally 9/11. Lots of information in many hands but no central clearing house for it. Now for the real bad news that should make any one who reads this today squirm. The turf wars in HQ of the various Departments who are responsible for intelligence gathering and dissemination in Washington are just as bad as they were in the year leading up to Dec 7th. Actually, because the number of agencies that are gathering intelligence for the defense of this country has increased to 14: Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA, FBI, DEA, ATF, Home Land, Treasury, Coast Guard, Customs and Boarder Patrol, NSA, National Park Service, and every major city police department. All these agencies have intelligence gathering networks. And very little information sis shared between them. The same situation as Dec 7th 1941. A sad state of affairs.
Prangs work is great and I recommend reading this work if you haven't before the next intelligence failure gets you or yours killed.
October 31, 2016
An ambitious, academic work on the causes, reasons, outcomes and aftermaths of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Its probably one of the most well known events of WWII, but there was a lot that I never knew. Especially on the Japanese side, where the idea came from? how and when it was decided to go, and the logistical problems that arose. Not the least of which was that they had to completely redesign torpedo bombs, as they would not work in the shallow draft of the harbor. On the US side, I was amazed to see that bureaucracy and partisanship is nothing new and existed even during the unifying events of the war.
In the rear-view mirror of history, it is very easy to see where things went wrong and how the attack couldn't have been anticipated or prevented. In the book relatively little time is spent on the actual attak itself and the last big section deals with the aftermath, mostly around the many hearings and investigations that were undertaken to assign blame. Someone has to be blamed, right? To be honest, it was here that I tapped out and put the book down and decided to call it finished. The politics and who did what to whom, or who didn't do what to some other whom, didn't really interest me.
Despite this disappointing finish (for me), it is a worthwhile read for any history buff. Truth is always stranger and more interesting than fiction, or at least it usually is.
"He stands before the inquisitive historian in taut watchfulness, courteous, painstaking, and inscrutable, forever holding the citadel of his own personality"
6/10
S: 6/26/16 - F: 10/30/16 (127 Days)
In the rear-view mirror of history, it is very easy to see where things went wrong and how the attack couldn't have been anticipated or prevented. In the book relatively little time is spent on the actual attak itself and the last big section deals with the aftermath, mostly around the many hearings and investigations that were undertaken to assign blame. Someone has to be blamed, right? To be honest, it was here that I tapped out and put the book down and decided to call it finished. The politics and who did what to whom, or who didn't do what to some other whom, didn't really interest me.
Despite this disappointing finish (for me), it is a worthwhile read for any history buff. Truth is always stranger and more interesting than fiction, or at least it usually is.
"He stands before the inquisitive historian in taut watchfulness, courteous, painstaking, and inscrutable, forever holding the citadel of his own personality"
6/10
S: 6/26/16 - F: 10/30/16 (127 Days)
January 21, 2016
Exhaustively researched and documented account of the planning, execution, and aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Very objective approach to the subject.
The book describes the detailed planning, training and execution of the assault by the Japanese Navy; the political conundrum facing the FDR administration; the perfect storm of miscommunication, missed communication, and confusion by American military leadership; and almost unbelievable good luck of the Japanese forces, that resulted in what we now call "Pearl Harbor".
Although this book is probably not for the casual reader of military history due to its length and incredible detail, it is well written and will leave you far more informed about the events leading to December 7, 1941, than you could have imagined.
The book describes the detailed planning, training and execution of the assault by the Japanese Navy; the political conundrum facing the FDR administration; the perfect storm of miscommunication, missed communication, and confusion by American military leadership; and almost unbelievable good luck of the Japanese forces, that resulted in what we now call "Pearl Harbor".
Although this book is probably not for the casual reader of military history due to its length and incredible detail, it is well written and will leave you far more informed about the events leading to December 7, 1941, than you could have imagined.
December 27, 2019
This is an incredibly tedious book. I enjoy reading military history but this book goes into every detail regarding the planning, preparations, espionage, politics, the actual attack on Pearl Harbor, the political fallout, the investigations and finally the trials that followed. The details, except for the actual attack itself, are excruciating dry. It was difficult for me to follow much of the intelligence gathering, code breaking and spying. If you want great detail in every aspect of the events leading up to the battle, the battle itself and what happened afterwards, you will enjoy this; I didn't.
I'm not saying the book wasn't well researched but it will be a long time before I read another book like this again.
I'm not saying the book wasn't well researched but it will be a long time before I read another book like this again.
August 21, 2022
This book is obviously about the attack on United States Naval ships and air fields in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The Attack took place on December 07, 1941, and the result of that attack was the entrance of the United States into World War II, both in the European Theatre and the Pacific Theatre. This book tracks the developments in both Japan and the United States in the weeks leading up to the attack, which I found very interesting. I have read about both things, but not often about them simultaneously. The book was written in a fairly dramatic way, as one would normally associate with a fiction book, though this is nonfiction. I have to admit that it was not my favorite on the subject, but it was still a good read. Plus, I got it for a good price.
July 11, 2018
I want to give this book more stars, because they worked very diligently and as unbiasedly as possible. The writing still manages to show some poeticism and personality sometimes. Turns out, though, I didn’t need a book this thorough; it gets incredibly repetitive. No stone is left unturned, and I got bored with seeing the same old dirt underneath. I would enjoy a book that covers all the topics enclosed herein with a little less detail. There was no need to beat the dead horse this hard.
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