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Iran-Contra: Reagan's Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power
Choice Outstanding Academic Title
Everything began to unravel on October 5, 1986, when a Nicaraguan soldier downed an American plane carrying arms to “Contra” guerrillas, exposing a tightly held U.S. clandestine program. A month later, reports surfaced that Washington had been covertly selling arms to Iran (our sworn enemy and a state sponsor of terrorism), in exchange for help freeing hostages in Beirut. The profits, it turned out, were going to support the Contras, despite an explicit ban by Congress.
In the firestorm that erupted, shocking details emerged, raising the prospect of impeachment, and the American public confronted a scandal as momentous as it was confusing. At its center was President Ronald Reagan amid a swirl of questions about illegal wars, consorting with terrorists, and the abuse of presidential power.
Yet, despite the enormity of the issues, the affair dropped from the public radar due to media overkill, years of legal wrangling, and a vigorous campaign to forestall another Watergate. As a result, many Americans failed to grasp the scandal's full import.
Through exhaustive use of declassified documents, previously unavailable investigative materials, and wide-ranging interviews, Malcolm Byrne revisits this largely forgotten and misrepresented episode. Placing the events in their historical and political context (notably the Cold War and a sharp partisan domestic divide), he explores what made the affair possible and meticulously relates how it unfolded—including clarifying minor myths about cakes, keys, bibles, diversion memos, and shredding parties.
Iran-Contra demonstrates that, far from being a "junta" against the president, the affair could not have occurred without awareness and approval at the very top of the U.S. government. Byrne reveals an unmistakable pattern of dubious behavior—including potentially illegal conduct by the president, vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, the CIA director and others—that formed the true core of the scandal.
Given the lack of meaningful consequences for those involved, the volume raises critical questions about the ability of our current system of checks and balances to address presidential abuses of power, and about the possibility of similar outbreaks in the future.
Everything began to unravel on October 5, 1986, when a Nicaraguan soldier downed an American plane carrying arms to “Contra” guerrillas, exposing a tightly held U.S. clandestine program. A month later, reports surfaced that Washington had been covertly selling arms to Iran (our sworn enemy and a state sponsor of terrorism), in exchange for help freeing hostages in Beirut. The profits, it turned out, were going to support the Contras, despite an explicit ban by Congress.
In the firestorm that erupted, shocking details emerged, raising the prospect of impeachment, and the American public confronted a scandal as momentous as it was confusing. At its center was President Ronald Reagan amid a swirl of questions about illegal wars, consorting with terrorists, and the abuse of presidential power.
Yet, despite the enormity of the issues, the affair dropped from the public radar due to media overkill, years of legal wrangling, and a vigorous campaign to forestall another Watergate. As a result, many Americans failed to grasp the scandal's full import.
Through exhaustive use of declassified documents, previously unavailable investigative materials, and wide-ranging interviews, Malcolm Byrne revisits this largely forgotten and misrepresented episode. Placing the events in their historical and political context (notably the Cold War and a sharp partisan domestic divide), he explores what made the affair possible and meticulously relates how it unfolded—including clarifying minor myths about cakes, keys, bibles, diversion memos, and shredding parties.
Iran-Contra demonstrates that, far from being a "junta" against the president, the affair could not have occurred without awareness and approval at the very top of the U.S. government. Byrne reveals an unmistakable pattern of dubious behavior—including potentially illegal conduct by the president, vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, the CIA director and others—that formed the true core of the scandal.
Given the lack of meaningful consequences for those involved, the volume raises critical questions about the ability of our current system of checks and balances to address presidential abuses of power, and about the possibility of similar outbreaks in the future.
464 pages, Hardcover
First published September 15, 2014
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September 26, 2024
While many have expressed a strong liking for former US President Ronald Reagan, there were issues that could easily have toppled him. After years of research and using key documents that had only recently been declassified, Malcolm Byrne explores one of the significant political gaffes Reagan had tied to him, though many tried to keep him from ending up too bruised. The Iran-Contra Affair would subsume media outlets and television sets during the mid-1980s. Events showed how the president’s closest advisors sought to break rules set by Congress to push ideas Reagan wanted solidified. How much did Reagan know and where did his involvement end? Byrne takes the reader through much of the backstory and delves deeply into all aspects of both international events and how the Reagan Administration worked to solve them both by illegally supplying things the general public would never accept. Stunning in its delivery and detail, Malcolm Byrne educates effectively and provides nuggets that helps tie it all together.
While it seems like a lifetime ago, Americans felt they had a great country under Ronald Regan. He nipped unemployment in the bud and offered lower taxes, while tackling many of the issues to which his predecessors only gave lip service. This led to a heightened popularity and helped Reagon crush his opponent in the 1984 presidential election at levels Trump could only dream of achieving. However, under it all, there was a massive secret and one that Malcolm Byrne has spent tireless hours trying to piece together. The result is a book that explores all angles and shows just how implicit the entire Reagan team was and what they did when they were caught.
Byrne spends the first part of the book exploring the backstories about both situations. In Nicaragua, there had been a new and troubling Marxist government that emerged in 1979, much to Reagan’s chagrin. He viewed that when he took office, he would begin a plan of ensuring that the Soviets no longer had a stranglehold over the Americas, rooting out any leftist government that came to power, thereby promising the world that the spigot of Communism ran dry in his hemisphere. Byrne explores, in detail, all that took place to make sure that this happened with CIA operatives sending support to the guerrilla groups in the region and using surround countries to set up training and arms deliveries. Congress tightened the rues and tried to make it more difficult, though Reagan refused to stand down, simply moving his actions of the radar and into the shadows.
As for Iran, when the shah was deposed in 1979 and the Islamic movement filled the void, there was no longer an American-friendly leader in the country. Not only was this a lack of control in the Middle East, keeping Iraq at bay, but there was no cork to prevent Soviet incursion in this arena as well. Reagan knew the tensions in the region, especially since the American hostage crisis that doomed the Carter Administration, but he knew that he had to curry some favour with the Iranians. Reagan chose to funnel weapons and parts to Iran to ensure they were supported. A cold shoulder brotherhood, one might call it, with the Israelis serving as middlemen in the entire process. This was another gaffe that Congress tried to block, but Reagan was ready and willing. Tying the two together made it an affair to remember. Iran would release hostages for arms received and offer some money as well. The US would use back channels to send the money from Iran through weapons dealers to purchase arms for the Contras, thereby supporting two groups Congress banned. Exposure could create massive issues within America’s legislative branch.
October 5, 1986 was a key moment, when it all began to crumble. After a Nicaraguan soldier shot down a plane delivering weapons to the ‘Contra’ guerrillas, the pilot spoke about how he was doing this for the CIA, which contravened a significant decision the US Congress made surrounding funding the war in the Central America. It was then expanded to show that there was money coming from Iran to help purchase these arms yet another faux pas that the American people would have to stomach. From there, things got significantly more difficult for Reagan, his closest advisors, and the country as a whole. ‘Who knew what and when’ became buzzwords that re-emerged after a short hiatus from the Watergate years.
As Byrne describes in detail, the guilt was extensive and could be traced back to many. While the scapegoat, Lt. Col. Oliver North, was surely deeply involved with the delivery of arms, monies, and working to negotiate hostage release, many others were in the mud as well. Knowing full well that Congress did not allow the plan, many sought to use back channels to get it done, something President Reagan knew about and condoned, as Byrne illustrates repeatedly. There was no ignorance to be had here, as much as those closest to the president tried to convince the press and members of Congress.
As Byrne depicts in the closing chapters, a cover-up was in place and President Reagan was protected by a wall. Many in the Administration would suffer for the gaffes and lies to Congress, when it came time to present evidence but Reagan got off scot-free, though many wonder if his ailing memory saved him from harsher punishments. The American public was kept from knowing a great deal, even when Congress began poking around, though the end result was somewhat anti-climactic. No impeachment, few firings, and nothing overly scandalous that could not be patched up by the time the voters went back to the polls. They would have no Reagan to choose, but Vice-President George H.W. Bush, who was just as implicated in matters. However, perhaps that’s for another book or scholarly article.
I have long wanted to read about and learn what happened with Iran-Contra. I was a child when it all came to pass and remember snippets of things on television. When I saw the recent Reagan movie, it came up again, so I told myself I would have to make an effort. I am pleased that I found Malcolm Byrne’s book, as it tackles all in an efficient and clear manner. Each chapter is broken down into small vignettes, which explain what is going on and the many actors involved. I can admit to learning so much and having it presented in a clear fashion made it more digestible. Byrne has used countless documents, interviews, and transcripts to put this book together and provides the reader with a significant trove of intel which allows them to make the choice for themselves. Was Reagan a key player and should he have been brought before Congress or impeached? A stellar read that left me with a better understanding of the issues, the payers, and the fallout.
Kudos, Mr. Byrne, for this great piece I needed to read.
Love/hate the review? An ever-growing collection of others appears at:
http://pecheyponderings.wordpress.com/
While it seems like a lifetime ago, Americans felt they had a great country under Ronald Regan. He nipped unemployment in the bud and offered lower taxes, while tackling many of the issues to which his predecessors only gave lip service. This led to a heightened popularity and helped Reagon crush his opponent in the 1984 presidential election at levels Trump could only dream of achieving. However, under it all, there was a massive secret and one that Malcolm Byrne has spent tireless hours trying to piece together. The result is a book that explores all angles and shows just how implicit the entire Reagan team was and what they did when they were caught.
Byrne spends the first part of the book exploring the backstories about both situations. In Nicaragua, there had been a new and troubling Marxist government that emerged in 1979, much to Reagan’s chagrin. He viewed that when he took office, he would begin a plan of ensuring that the Soviets no longer had a stranglehold over the Americas, rooting out any leftist government that came to power, thereby promising the world that the spigot of Communism ran dry in his hemisphere. Byrne explores, in detail, all that took place to make sure that this happened with CIA operatives sending support to the guerrilla groups in the region and using surround countries to set up training and arms deliveries. Congress tightened the rues and tried to make it more difficult, though Reagan refused to stand down, simply moving his actions of the radar and into the shadows.
As for Iran, when the shah was deposed in 1979 and the Islamic movement filled the void, there was no longer an American-friendly leader in the country. Not only was this a lack of control in the Middle East, keeping Iraq at bay, but there was no cork to prevent Soviet incursion in this arena as well. Reagan knew the tensions in the region, especially since the American hostage crisis that doomed the Carter Administration, but he knew that he had to curry some favour with the Iranians. Reagan chose to funnel weapons and parts to Iran to ensure they were supported. A cold shoulder brotherhood, one might call it, with the Israelis serving as middlemen in the entire process. This was another gaffe that Congress tried to block, but Reagan was ready and willing. Tying the two together made it an affair to remember. Iran would release hostages for arms received and offer some money as well. The US would use back channels to send the money from Iran through weapons dealers to purchase arms for the Contras, thereby supporting two groups Congress banned. Exposure could create massive issues within America’s legislative branch.
October 5, 1986 was a key moment, when it all began to crumble. After a Nicaraguan soldier shot down a plane delivering weapons to the ‘Contra’ guerrillas, the pilot spoke about how he was doing this for the CIA, which contravened a significant decision the US Congress made surrounding funding the war in the Central America. It was then expanded to show that there was money coming from Iran to help purchase these arms yet another faux pas that the American people would have to stomach. From there, things got significantly more difficult for Reagan, his closest advisors, and the country as a whole. ‘Who knew what and when’ became buzzwords that re-emerged after a short hiatus from the Watergate years.
As Byrne describes in detail, the guilt was extensive and could be traced back to many. While the scapegoat, Lt. Col. Oliver North, was surely deeply involved with the delivery of arms, monies, and working to negotiate hostage release, many others were in the mud as well. Knowing full well that Congress did not allow the plan, many sought to use back channels to get it done, something President Reagan knew about and condoned, as Byrne illustrates repeatedly. There was no ignorance to be had here, as much as those closest to the president tried to convince the press and members of Congress.
As Byrne depicts in the closing chapters, a cover-up was in place and President Reagan was protected by a wall. Many in the Administration would suffer for the gaffes and lies to Congress, when it came time to present evidence but Reagan got off scot-free, though many wonder if his ailing memory saved him from harsher punishments. The American public was kept from knowing a great deal, even when Congress began poking around, though the end result was somewhat anti-climactic. No impeachment, few firings, and nothing overly scandalous that could not be patched up by the time the voters went back to the polls. They would have no Reagan to choose, but Vice-President George H.W. Bush, who was just as implicated in matters. However, perhaps that’s for another book or scholarly article.
I have long wanted to read about and learn what happened with Iran-Contra. I was a child when it all came to pass and remember snippets of things on television. When I saw the recent Reagan movie, it came up again, so I told myself I would have to make an effort. I am pleased that I found Malcolm Byrne’s book, as it tackles all in an efficient and clear manner. Each chapter is broken down into small vignettes, which explain what is going on and the many actors involved. I can admit to learning so much and having it presented in a clear fashion made it more digestible. Byrne has used countless documents, interviews, and transcripts to put this book together and provides the reader with a significant trove of intel which allows them to make the choice for themselves. Was Reagan a key player and should he have been brought before Congress or impeached? A stellar read that left me with a better understanding of the issues, the payers, and the fallout.
Kudos, Mr. Byrne, for this great piece I needed to read.
Love/hate the review? An ever-growing collection of others appears at:
http://pecheyponderings.wordpress.com/
January 31, 2015
One unfortunate consequence of the Watergate scandal was the demise of the White House taping system. Historians of the post-Nixon era must settle for memoirs, diaries, interviews, private collections, and official records stored in the National Archives and printed in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Memories are selective, however; policymakers tend to win their own memoranda of conversations; and, no piece of paper can match a surreptitiously-recorded meeting with the president of the United States.
With the Ronald Reagan administration, minutes of the majority of meetings of two principals committees -- the National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Planning Group (NSPG) -- are available to researchers at the Reagan Library in Simi Valley, California, and are highly illuminating. Especially in the early years of that administration, Counselor to the President Edwin Meese, a longtime Reagan associate with no formal foreign policy brief, is the person steering the conversation. One might even regard Meese as the de facto National Security Advisor in 1981, since the person actually bearing the title that year, Richard Allen, reported to him.
Five years later, then-Attorney General Meese may well have saved Reagan’s presidency. On November 25, 1986, he took over a White House press briefing after his boss announced the resignation of National Security Advisor John Poindexter and the dismissal of NSC staffer Lt. Colonel Oliver North. Meese provided the results of an initial White House inquiry after newspaper reports surfaced of clandestine U.S. arms transfers to Iran and illicit support for Contras fighting against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The gist of the reporting was indeed true. Meese’s priority was, however, to protect the president. That meant directing the glare of the media and focusing the congressional spotlight on the diversion of funds from one account to the other -- as opposed to whether Reagan had violated the Boland Amendment, which prohibited assistance to the Contras to overthrow the Sandinista regime; or the Hughes-Ryan Act, which required that he submit to Congress a presidential finding before authorizing covert action. Because few had ever touted Reagan as a detail-oriented micromanager, it was eminently plausible that the president had been unaware of rogue actions on the part of North, Poindexter, or former national security advisor Robert “Bud” McFarlane.
In his valuable new book, Iran-Contra: Reagan's Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power, Malcolm Byrne takes aim at Meese’s version of the story. “In fact,” he argues, “the driving force behind both sides of the scandal was President Reagan himself.” Documentary evidence, he contends, shows that “Reagan was a forceful participant in policy discussions, not the cartoon image of utter detachment often portrayed, and provided the primary guidance and direction to his staff on policies close to his heart.” Among those policies were assisting the Contras and crafting ways to free the hostages in Lebanon. “The president approved every significant facet of the Iran arms deals,” Byrne goes on to say, “and he encouraged conduct by top aides . . . to subsidize the Contra war despite the congressional prohibition on U.S. aid.”
Byrne has been working to unearth the details and meaning of Iran-Contra practically since the scandal broke. In 1987, he edited The Chronology: The Documented Day-by-Day Account of Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras; in 1993, he co-edited with Peter Kornbluh, an annotated collection of primary documents, The Iran-Contra Scandal. In Iran-Contra, his first narrative account, he mobilizes earlier evidence in addition to a body of material stemming from Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests over the past twenty years. But he seems more interested in developing an argument than showing off everything he has found. One of Byrne’s many strengths as a writer is that he does not jam puzzle pieces where they do not belong. The subtitle and cover do not augur its becoming a permanent fixture at the Reagan Library gift store. Readers of all political stripes should nevertheless consider this book; aspirants to high office who seek to avoid mistakes would do well to read it.
Byrne’s stated purpose is to save the Iran-Contra affair from “consignment to historical irrelevance.” This is not what observers at the time might have anticipated. Watch any few minutes from the joint House and Senate hearings in late spring 1987, and Iran-Contra appears to have imperiled the survival of the Republic. Then again, the national mood that year was gloomy. West German and Japanese companies were outpacing American firms. Paul Kennedy’s declinist Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and Allan Bloom’s disquieting Closing of the American Mind topped bestseller lists. On October 19, “Black Monday,” the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than 20% in what remains the single worst single-day loss ever. All this came as Americans geared up for a brutal presidential election campaign.
Somewhere in the years that followed -- be it the miraculous events of 1989 in Eastern and Central Europe, the smashing U.S. victory in Operation Desert Storm, or the collapse of the Soviet Union -- Iran-Contra receded from view. It did not end for figures such as John Poindexter or Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams, who endured costly legal battles while Oliver North became rich. Nor was it over for Lawrence Walsh, the Republican former deputy attorney general whom Congress enlisted in late 1986 to untangle the facts. Democrats cheered when Walsh re-indicted former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on the eve of the 1992 election. Six years later, their enthusiasm for the Office of the Independent Counsel waned as the House of Representatives impeached President Bill Clinton for having a sexual relationship with a White House intern.
For some, the memory of the investigation eclipsed that of the Iran-Contra scandal itself. Congressman Dick Cheney of Wyoming had been the ranking Republican on the House Committee during the proceedings. On him it clearly left an impression. “If you want reference to an obscure text, go look at the minority views that were filed with the Iran-Contra Committee,” Cheney told reporters in 2005. “Nobody has ever read them, but . . . [they] are very good in laying out a robust view of the president’s prerogatives with respect to the conduct of especially foreign policy and national security matters.”
Presidential prerogative, of course, does not automatically determine presidential behavior. Capabilities differ from intentions. During the Watergate hearings, Senator Howard Baker, who replaced White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan in February 1987, famously asked the question: “what did the president know, and when did he know it?” In the case of Reagan and Iran-Contra, a more pertinent question remains: “what did the president decide, and when did he decide it?”
Shortly after Meese’s White House briefing, Saturday Night Live ran a skit featuring the late, great Phil Hartman as the Gipper. The scene begins with a doddering Reagan concluding an interview in which he apologizes for remembering so very little. No sooner has the reporter left the room than Reagan summons his national security team to bark orders at Ed Meese, Don Regan, and the rest of the gang. “[National Security Advisor Frank] Carlucci, you’re new, here's how we run things. The red countries are the countries we sell arms to. The green countries are the countries where we wash our money.” The president is about to identify the blue countries when an aide interrupts to announce the arrival of the Girl Scout who sold the most brownies in America. “Damn! . . . This is the part of the job I hate!”
The Reagan who emerges from Byrne’s book did not actually command his national security team this way (also, he was surely thrilled to meet entrepreneurial girl scouts). But the Saturday Night Live skit is a great imagining of the president’s id. Reagan’s affinity for the Contras was disproportionate to whatever threat Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega posed at the time. More understandable is his devotion to an effort to free American hostages in Lebanon. One does not require recordings to understand Reagan. “Critics frequently lampooned him as disengaged from the policy process to the point of requiring cue cards,” Byrne writes. “There were grounds for this caricature on issues in which he had no deep interest, but on subjects he felt strongly about, such as the Contras or the hostages, it was inadequate.” Indeed, the president was “at his most impressive during crises” such as the extended hostage situation or the Achille Lauro hijacking in October 1985. He was willing to answer charges of illegality, as Weinberger later put it -- just not the charge that “big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages.”
And yet, Reagan seldom acted decisively. In the summer of 1985, as the president recovered from cancer surgery, he listened as National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane floated the idea of reaching out, via a middleman, to “moderates in Iran” who purported to wield influence over the terrorist organization Hezbollah. “The president’s views were opaque,” Byrne writes. “When his aides disagreed, he often did not commit himself right away. As a result, each participant left the meeting with his own reading of where things stood. Shultz and Weinberger believed he opposed the idea; McFarlane thought he was inclined to go ahead.” In the months following this particular encounter, the secretaries of state and defense focused their attention on the phenomenon of Mikhail Gorbachev and the challenges it posed to U.S. strategic planning and arms negotiations. They picked their battles -- frequently with each other -- and probably hoped that McFarlane’s ambitions would lose momentum.
They did not. McFarlane pursued the Iran gambit even as he seemed to acknowledge his own physical and emotional exhaustion before resigning in December 1985. Reagan’s personal diaries, published in 2007, show that he knew about the transfer of arms to Iran by that month at the latest. His entry of December 7, 1985, reads: “had a meeting with Don R., Cap W. & Bud M., John P., Geo. Shultz & Mahan [sic] of C.I.A. This has to do with the complex plan which could return our 5 hostages & help some officials in Iran who want to turn that country from [its] present course & on to a better relationship with us. It calls for Israel selling some weapons to Iran. As they are delivered in installments by air our hostages will be released. The weapons will go to the moderate leaders in the army who are essential if there’s to be a change to a more stable govt. We then sell Israel replacements for the delivered weapons. None of this is a gift—the Iranians pay cash for the weapons—so does Israel. George S., Cap & Don are opposed—Cong. has imposed a law on us that we [can’t] sell Iran weapons or sell any other country weapons for re-sale to Iran. Geo. also thinks this violates our policy of not paying off terrorists. I claim the weapons are for those who want to change the govt. of Iran & no ransom is being pd. for the hostages. No direct sale would be made by us to Iran but we would be replacing the weapons sold by Israel. We’re at a stalemate.”
The above passage accords with the reasoning that Reagan provided after the scandal broke the following year. Few accepted the explanation of “no arms for hostages.” In the wake of the February 26, 1987 publication of the Tower Commission report, Reagan expressed regret. “A few months ago, I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages,” he told the nation on March 4, 1987. “My heart and my best intentions still tell me that’s true, but the facts and evidence tell me it is not.” True to form, Reagan the performer nailed this delivery.
Congressional hearings later that spring focused on whether the president had known that funds garnered from profits on arms sales to the Iranians had been diverted to the Contras whose support, again, Congress had restricted. Meese’s initial framing of Iran-Contra had paid off. In his own bravura performance, Colonel Oliver North claimed not to have shared with the president knowledge of the diversion. In this new book, Byrne acknowledges that he has found no “smoking gun” quality of evidence to contradict North on this claim.
And yet, as Byrne argues convincingly, Iran-Contra qualified as a concerted policy. It comprised shady characters such as the profiteering Richard Secord, the dubious Manucher Ghorbanifar, and the hapless Eugene Hasenfus, none of whom had any direct dealings with the president. The principals in the affair did, however; they acted in light of what they believe the president wanted. Ideology and fantasy played key roles. In the world of American conservatism in the 1980s, Oliver North was Brünnhilde to Ronald Reagan’s Wotan: the former proceeded according to the latter’s will in the absence of explicit orders.
Why were McFarlane, North, and Poindexter motived to take such risks? When it came to McFarlane, I think, the potential opportunity to pull off with Iran what Henry Kissinger had done with China was irresistible. For all three individuals, only a dramatic geopolitical reorientation could reverse the troubling Cold War strategic balance in the early to mid-1980s. Ultimately, Gorbachev’s reforms mooted these concerns. No one in Washington cared so much about Nicaragua after the Soviet leader cut the cord on revolutionary nationalism in the Third World. The contest between the United States and Iran, however, outlasted the sudden collapse of Soviet power from 1989-1991. As Malcolm Byrne demonstrates in his very fine book, the Iran-Contra affair belongs as a key chapter in that longer story.
http://historynewsnetwork.org/article...
With the Ronald Reagan administration, minutes of the majority of meetings of two principals committees -- the National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Planning Group (NSPG) -- are available to researchers at the Reagan Library in Simi Valley, California, and are highly illuminating. Especially in the early years of that administration, Counselor to the President Edwin Meese, a longtime Reagan associate with no formal foreign policy brief, is the person steering the conversation. One might even regard Meese as the de facto National Security Advisor in 1981, since the person actually bearing the title that year, Richard Allen, reported to him.
Five years later, then-Attorney General Meese may well have saved Reagan’s presidency. On November 25, 1986, he took over a White House press briefing after his boss announced the resignation of National Security Advisor John Poindexter and the dismissal of NSC staffer Lt. Colonel Oliver North. Meese provided the results of an initial White House inquiry after newspaper reports surfaced of clandestine U.S. arms transfers to Iran and illicit support for Contras fighting against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The gist of the reporting was indeed true. Meese’s priority was, however, to protect the president. That meant directing the glare of the media and focusing the congressional spotlight on the diversion of funds from one account to the other -- as opposed to whether Reagan had violated the Boland Amendment, which prohibited assistance to the Contras to overthrow the Sandinista regime; or the Hughes-Ryan Act, which required that he submit to Congress a presidential finding before authorizing covert action. Because few had ever touted Reagan as a detail-oriented micromanager, it was eminently plausible that the president had been unaware of rogue actions on the part of North, Poindexter, or former national security advisor Robert “Bud” McFarlane.
In his valuable new book, Iran-Contra: Reagan's Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power, Malcolm Byrne takes aim at Meese’s version of the story. “In fact,” he argues, “the driving force behind both sides of the scandal was President Reagan himself.” Documentary evidence, he contends, shows that “Reagan was a forceful participant in policy discussions, not the cartoon image of utter detachment often portrayed, and provided the primary guidance and direction to his staff on policies close to his heart.” Among those policies were assisting the Contras and crafting ways to free the hostages in Lebanon. “The president approved every significant facet of the Iran arms deals,” Byrne goes on to say, “and he encouraged conduct by top aides . . . to subsidize the Contra war despite the congressional prohibition on U.S. aid.”
Byrne has been working to unearth the details and meaning of Iran-Contra practically since the scandal broke. In 1987, he edited The Chronology: The Documented Day-by-Day Account of Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras; in 1993, he co-edited with Peter Kornbluh, an annotated collection of primary documents, The Iran-Contra Scandal. In Iran-Contra, his first narrative account, he mobilizes earlier evidence in addition to a body of material stemming from Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests over the past twenty years. But he seems more interested in developing an argument than showing off everything he has found. One of Byrne’s many strengths as a writer is that he does not jam puzzle pieces where they do not belong. The subtitle and cover do not augur its becoming a permanent fixture at the Reagan Library gift store. Readers of all political stripes should nevertheless consider this book; aspirants to high office who seek to avoid mistakes would do well to read it.
Byrne’s stated purpose is to save the Iran-Contra affair from “consignment to historical irrelevance.” This is not what observers at the time might have anticipated. Watch any few minutes from the joint House and Senate hearings in late spring 1987, and Iran-Contra appears to have imperiled the survival of the Republic. Then again, the national mood that year was gloomy. West German and Japanese companies were outpacing American firms. Paul Kennedy’s declinist Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and Allan Bloom’s disquieting Closing of the American Mind topped bestseller lists. On October 19, “Black Monday,” the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than 20% in what remains the single worst single-day loss ever. All this came as Americans geared up for a brutal presidential election campaign.
Somewhere in the years that followed -- be it the miraculous events of 1989 in Eastern and Central Europe, the smashing U.S. victory in Operation Desert Storm, or the collapse of the Soviet Union -- Iran-Contra receded from view. It did not end for figures such as John Poindexter or Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams, who endured costly legal battles while Oliver North became rich. Nor was it over for Lawrence Walsh, the Republican former deputy attorney general whom Congress enlisted in late 1986 to untangle the facts. Democrats cheered when Walsh re-indicted former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on the eve of the 1992 election. Six years later, their enthusiasm for the Office of the Independent Counsel waned as the House of Representatives impeached President Bill Clinton for having a sexual relationship with a White House intern.
For some, the memory of the investigation eclipsed that of the Iran-Contra scandal itself. Congressman Dick Cheney of Wyoming had been the ranking Republican on the House Committee during the proceedings. On him it clearly left an impression. “If you want reference to an obscure text, go look at the minority views that were filed with the Iran-Contra Committee,” Cheney told reporters in 2005. “Nobody has ever read them, but . . . [they] are very good in laying out a robust view of the president’s prerogatives with respect to the conduct of especially foreign policy and national security matters.”
Presidential prerogative, of course, does not automatically determine presidential behavior. Capabilities differ from intentions. During the Watergate hearings, Senator Howard Baker, who replaced White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan in February 1987, famously asked the question: “what did the president know, and when did he know it?” In the case of Reagan and Iran-Contra, a more pertinent question remains: “what did the president decide, and when did he decide it?”
Shortly after Meese’s White House briefing, Saturday Night Live ran a skit featuring the late, great Phil Hartman as the Gipper. The scene begins with a doddering Reagan concluding an interview in which he apologizes for remembering so very little. No sooner has the reporter left the room than Reagan summons his national security team to bark orders at Ed Meese, Don Regan, and the rest of the gang. “[National Security Advisor Frank] Carlucci, you’re new, here's how we run things. The red countries are the countries we sell arms to. The green countries are the countries where we wash our money.” The president is about to identify the blue countries when an aide interrupts to announce the arrival of the Girl Scout who sold the most brownies in America. “Damn! . . . This is the part of the job I hate!”
The Reagan who emerges from Byrne’s book did not actually command his national security team this way (also, he was surely thrilled to meet entrepreneurial girl scouts). But the Saturday Night Live skit is a great imagining of the president’s id. Reagan’s affinity for the Contras was disproportionate to whatever threat Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega posed at the time. More understandable is his devotion to an effort to free American hostages in Lebanon. One does not require recordings to understand Reagan. “Critics frequently lampooned him as disengaged from the policy process to the point of requiring cue cards,” Byrne writes. “There were grounds for this caricature on issues in which he had no deep interest, but on subjects he felt strongly about, such as the Contras or the hostages, it was inadequate.” Indeed, the president was “at his most impressive during crises” such as the extended hostage situation or the Achille Lauro hijacking in October 1985. He was willing to answer charges of illegality, as Weinberger later put it -- just not the charge that “big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages.”
And yet, Reagan seldom acted decisively. In the summer of 1985, as the president recovered from cancer surgery, he listened as National Security Advisor Bud McFarlane floated the idea of reaching out, via a middleman, to “moderates in Iran” who purported to wield influence over the terrorist organization Hezbollah. “The president’s views were opaque,” Byrne writes. “When his aides disagreed, he often did not commit himself right away. As a result, each participant left the meeting with his own reading of where things stood. Shultz and Weinberger believed he opposed the idea; McFarlane thought he was inclined to go ahead.” In the months following this particular encounter, the secretaries of state and defense focused their attention on the phenomenon of Mikhail Gorbachev and the challenges it posed to U.S. strategic planning and arms negotiations. They picked their battles -- frequently with each other -- and probably hoped that McFarlane’s ambitions would lose momentum.
They did not. McFarlane pursued the Iran gambit even as he seemed to acknowledge his own physical and emotional exhaustion before resigning in December 1985. Reagan’s personal diaries, published in 2007, show that he knew about the transfer of arms to Iran by that month at the latest. His entry of December 7, 1985, reads: “had a meeting with Don R., Cap W. & Bud M., John P., Geo. Shultz & Mahan [sic] of C.I.A. This has to do with the complex plan which could return our 5 hostages & help some officials in Iran who want to turn that country from [its] present course & on to a better relationship with us. It calls for Israel selling some weapons to Iran. As they are delivered in installments by air our hostages will be released. The weapons will go to the moderate leaders in the army who are essential if there’s to be a change to a more stable govt. We then sell Israel replacements for the delivered weapons. None of this is a gift—the Iranians pay cash for the weapons—so does Israel. George S., Cap & Don are opposed—Cong. has imposed a law on us that we [can’t] sell Iran weapons or sell any other country weapons for re-sale to Iran. Geo. also thinks this violates our policy of not paying off terrorists. I claim the weapons are for those who want to change the govt. of Iran & no ransom is being pd. for the hostages. No direct sale would be made by us to Iran but we would be replacing the weapons sold by Israel. We’re at a stalemate.”
The above passage accords with the reasoning that Reagan provided after the scandal broke the following year. Few accepted the explanation of “no arms for hostages.” In the wake of the February 26, 1987 publication of the Tower Commission report, Reagan expressed regret. “A few months ago, I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages,” he told the nation on March 4, 1987. “My heart and my best intentions still tell me that’s true, but the facts and evidence tell me it is not.” True to form, Reagan the performer nailed this delivery.
Congressional hearings later that spring focused on whether the president had known that funds garnered from profits on arms sales to the Iranians had been diverted to the Contras whose support, again, Congress had restricted. Meese’s initial framing of Iran-Contra had paid off. In his own bravura performance, Colonel Oliver North claimed not to have shared with the president knowledge of the diversion. In this new book, Byrne acknowledges that he has found no “smoking gun” quality of evidence to contradict North on this claim.
And yet, as Byrne argues convincingly, Iran-Contra qualified as a concerted policy. It comprised shady characters such as the profiteering Richard Secord, the dubious Manucher Ghorbanifar, and the hapless Eugene Hasenfus, none of whom had any direct dealings with the president. The principals in the affair did, however; they acted in light of what they believe the president wanted. Ideology and fantasy played key roles. In the world of American conservatism in the 1980s, Oliver North was Brünnhilde to Ronald Reagan’s Wotan: the former proceeded according to the latter’s will in the absence of explicit orders.
Why were McFarlane, North, and Poindexter motived to take such risks? When it came to McFarlane, I think, the potential opportunity to pull off with Iran what Henry Kissinger had done with China was irresistible. For all three individuals, only a dramatic geopolitical reorientation could reverse the troubling Cold War strategic balance in the early to mid-1980s. Ultimately, Gorbachev’s reforms mooted these concerns. No one in Washington cared so much about Nicaragua after the Soviet leader cut the cord on revolutionary nationalism in the Third World. The contest between the United States and Iran, however, outlasted the sudden collapse of Soviet power from 1989-1991. As Malcolm Byrne demonstrates in his very fine book, the Iran-Contra affair belongs as a key chapter in that longer story.
http://historynewsnetwork.org/article...
April 6, 2025
A thoroughly investigated, linear narrative history of Iran-Contra, a scandal as complicated and ugly as Watergate that preceded it. Originally published in 2014, Malcolm Byrne and a team of researchers produced this book from a mountain of historical records, many finally made public through Freedom of Information Act requests by the National Security Archive, where Byrne worked at the time. He quotes extensively throughout the book from meeting minutes, personal notes from various aides like Robert McFarlane, and Col. Oliver North's notebooks. This is the most information you will find about Iran-Contra in one volume. Sometimes the sheer amount along with a dry writing style made it hard to keep track of all the details. Regardless, it makes the case that President Reagan was the driving force behind the scandal.
While Nixon ultimately failed to successfully cover up Watergate, Reagan and his advisors were able to close ranks, sacrifice some lower level people, and offer just enough diversions that the scandal never took off with the American public. It was eventually overtaken by other events in the news cycle, like the collapse of the Soviet Union, and became a historical footnote. Byrne shows how Americans missed an opportunity to address limits in the Constitution and the legal system that allowed this event to happen, and may allow similar events to happen again. "Thus the book does not just scrutinize the Reagan administration and individual players, it points out structural issues that continue to be a factor in our system of government and makes it clear the scandal was not just an aberration."
Historical context is summed up in the Preface, including the background of the cold war creation of the National Security Council, Congress' attempts to limit Executive branch powers after Watergate, and the revolutions in both Iran and Nicaragua. The Introduction lays out how the covert machinations came into public view with the shooting down of a C-123 cargo plane over Nicaragua, the capture of Eugene Hasenfus by the Sandinistas, and his confession that he was smuggling arms to insurgents for the CIA. Chapters alternate between the Iran and Contra parts of the affair until Chapter 8, which covers the point they converged. Chapters 13 through 15 look at the aftermath with the cover-up attempts and the lengthy investigations by Congress and the independent counsel. Like Watergate, Iran-Contra took place over years before it even became public. Like Watergate, there was a amateurish quality to the planning and implementation. And like Watergate, there were a lot of people involved, both centrally and at the periphery. Byrne's book is lacking a list of major participants. I created my own as I read in order to keep track of who was who.
Part of what lead to the entire conspiracy was Ronald Reagan's hawkish belief in interventionist foreign policy, his conviction of global communism's dire threat, and his faith in the Monroe Doctrine. For him, the Soviet Union replaced Western European imperialism as the justification for conflating U.S. interests with Latin America's and claiming them as a sphere of influence. He also held very strong views on the need for an imperial presidency. He believed that any limits Congress placed on the Executive were not checks and balances from a co-equal branch, but partisan politics that would hand cold war advantage to the Soviet Union and endanger the United States. If you're sensing a theme with communism, you're not alone. Byrne shows repeatedly how Reagan divided the world into two stark camps, countries that were with the U.S., and those who supported Moscow. He didn't accept that governments, like Khomeini's in Tehran did, might reject both sides.
Also a factor was Reagan's management style. He practiced what he called a cabinet government model, where policy advancement would be delegated to the best people a president could choose. In reality, he rarely checked in on progress and failed to mediate arguments, which "encouraged the strong personalities in his administration to push their own agendas at the expense of cooperation and consensus or risk being outmaneuvered by their colleagues." After reading about Watergate, the lack of leadership and backstabbing court politics was all too familiar. Finally, Reagan was deeply invested in freeing the hostages taken in Beirut by Hezbollah. While it's to his credit that he cared about them and their families, his strong emotions helped cloud his judgement.
From the beginning, President Reagan encouraged and supported a partisan National Security Council and hardline cabinet members to take more and stronger covert actions when they were supposed to be supplying neutral advice. Even then White House Counsel (later Attorney General) Edwin Meese was weighing in on foreign covert actions, although this fell well outside his job description. It was generally understood within the White House that these were to be hidden from both Congress and the public, starting with the separate presidential decision directives on Nicaragua in the fall of 1982—one was for Congress and the public record, the real one for the Executive branch. Quid pro quos were offered to foreign governments to secure secret funding outside of Congress—essentially bribes. Warped readings of some laws in order to bypass or break other laws was encouraged as tissue-thin cover, all in the name of national security.
For instance, North was brought in to set up a supply of arms to the Contras through the NSC instead of the CIA, therefore appearing to comply with the Boland Amendment. But plenty of CIA agents were involved, and agency head William Casey was kept regularly updated. (North, by the way, comes off as dangerously ambitious and almost as delusional as G. Gordon Liddy. One of the code names he gave himself was "Steelhammer." Another was "Blood and Guts.") Fabrications were indulged and rule breakers were rewarded. You can see the road to nonexistent WMDs and John Eastman's election law lunacy from here.
Perhaps the most concerning takeaway was that because there were no consequences for many of the participants, they felt their illegal and unconstitutional actions were vindicated. Many went on to influential roles in later administrations. As former CIA officer Bruce Riedel says in the Forward, "The abuse of power that lay at the heart of Iran-Contra was for these players only the legitimate use of executive powers. Many of the lies that led to Iran-Contra would be models for the deceptions that led to the misguided U.S. war on Iraq in 2003. …Too often we have been too eager to look forward after scandal breaks, not backward, and consequently have ignored the lessons of past abuses of power." More's the pity. These abuses have very real world consequences.
See also:
Watergate: A New History by Garrett M. Graff is the latest and most complete documentation of Nixon's abuse of presidential power. It's much longer than Byrne's book, but clearly and even entertainingly told. My review is here.
Steve A. Yetiv's National Security through a Cockeyed Lens: How Cognitive Bias Impacts U.S. Foreign Policy takes a look at several national security episodes, including Iran-Contra, and how various human biases in thinking affected the decisions made.
Reagan and many of his administration's hard-liners were influenced by the paranoia of the cold war and the American mid-century Red Scare. The War of Nerves: Inside the Cold War Mind by Martin Sixsmith looks at the psychological battles between East and West.
While Nixon ultimately failed to successfully cover up Watergate, Reagan and his advisors were able to close ranks, sacrifice some lower level people, and offer just enough diversions that the scandal never took off with the American public. It was eventually overtaken by other events in the news cycle, like the collapse of the Soviet Union, and became a historical footnote. Byrne shows how Americans missed an opportunity to address limits in the Constitution and the legal system that allowed this event to happen, and may allow similar events to happen again. "Thus the book does not just scrutinize the Reagan administration and individual players, it points out structural issues that continue to be a factor in our system of government and makes it clear the scandal was not just an aberration."
Historical context is summed up in the Preface, including the background of the cold war creation of the National Security Council, Congress' attempts to limit Executive branch powers after Watergate, and the revolutions in both Iran and Nicaragua. The Introduction lays out how the covert machinations came into public view with the shooting down of a C-123 cargo plane over Nicaragua, the capture of Eugene Hasenfus by the Sandinistas, and his confession that he was smuggling arms to insurgents for the CIA. Chapters alternate between the Iran and Contra parts of the affair until Chapter 8, which covers the point they converged. Chapters 13 through 15 look at the aftermath with the cover-up attempts and the lengthy investigations by Congress and the independent counsel. Like Watergate, Iran-Contra took place over years before it even became public. Like Watergate, there was a amateurish quality to the planning and implementation. And like Watergate, there were a lot of people involved, both centrally and at the periphery. Byrne's book is lacking a list of major participants. I created my own as I read in order to keep track of who was who.
Part of what lead to the entire conspiracy was Ronald Reagan's hawkish belief in interventionist foreign policy, his conviction of global communism's dire threat, and his faith in the Monroe Doctrine. For him, the Soviet Union replaced Western European imperialism as the justification for conflating U.S. interests with Latin America's and claiming them as a sphere of influence. He also held very strong views on the need for an imperial presidency. He believed that any limits Congress placed on the Executive were not checks and balances from a co-equal branch, but partisan politics that would hand cold war advantage to the Soviet Union and endanger the United States. If you're sensing a theme with communism, you're not alone. Byrne shows repeatedly how Reagan divided the world into two stark camps, countries that were with the U.S., and those who supported Moscow. He didn't accept that governments, like Khomeini's in Tehran did, might reject both sides.
Also a factor was Reagan's management style. He practiced what he called a cabinet government model, where policy advancement would be delegated to the best people a president could choose. In reality, he rarely checked in on progress and failed to mediate arguments, which "encouraged the strong personalities in his administration to push their own agendas at the expense of cooperation and consensus or risk being outmaneuvered by their colleagues." After reading about Watergate, the lack of leadership and backstabbing court politics was all too familiar. Finally, Reagan was deeply invested in freeing the hostages taken in Beirut by Hezbollah. While it's to his credit that he cared about them and their families, his strong emotions helped cloud his judgement.
From the beginning, President Reagan encouraged and supported a partisan National Security Council and hardline cabinet members to take more and stronger covert actions when they were supposed to be supplying neutral advice. Even then White House Counsel (later Attorney General) Edwin Meese was weighing in on foreign covert actions, although this fell well outside his job description. It was generally understood within the White House that these were to be hidden from both Congress and the public, starting with the separate presidential decision directives on Nicaragua in the fall of 1982—one was for Congress and the public record, the real one for the Executive branch. Quid pro quos were offered to foreign governments to secure secret funding outside of Congress—essentially bribes. Warped readings of some laws in order to bypass or break other laws was encouraged as tissue-thin cover, all in the name of national security.
For instance, North was brought in to set up a supply of arms to the Contras through the NSC instead of the CIA, therefore appearing to comply with the Boland Amendment. But plenty of CIA agents were involved, and agency head William Casey was kept regularly updated. (North, by the way, comes off as dangerously ambitious and almost as delusional as G. Gordon Liddy. One of the code names he gave himself was "Steelhammer." Another was "Blood and Guts.") Fabrications were indulged and rule breakers were rewarded. You can see the road to nonexistent WMDs and John Eastman's election law lunacy from here.
Perhaps the most concerning takeaway was that because there were no consequences for many of the participants, they felt their illegal and unconstitutional actions were vindicated. Many went on to influential roles in later administrations. As former CIA officer Bruce Riedel says in the Forward, "The abuse of power that lay at the heart of Iran-Contra was for these players only the legitimate use of executive powers. Many of the lies that led to Iran-Contra would be models for the deceptions that led to the misguided U.S. war on Iraq in 2003. …Too often we have been too eager to look forward after scandal breaks, not backward, and consequently have ignored the lessons of past abuses of power." More's the pity. These abuses have very real world consequences.
See also:
Watergate: A New History by Garrett M. Graff is the latest and most complete documentation of Nixon's abuse of presidential power. It's much longer than Byrne's book, but clearly and even entertainingly told. My review is here.
Steve A. Yetiv's National Security through a Cockeyed Lens: How Cognitive Bias Impacts U.S. Foreign Policy takes a look at several national security episodes, including Iran-Contra, and how various human biases in thinking affected the decisions made.
Reagan and many of his administration's hard-liners were influenced by the paranoia of the cold war and the American mid-century Red Scare. The War of Nerves: Inside the Cold War Mind by Martin Sixsmith looks at the psychological battles between East and West.
January 17, 2015
From http://weeksnotice.blogspot.com/2015/...
Despite its hyperbolic subtitle, Malcolm Byrne's Iran-Contra: Reagan's Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power (2014) is a carefully constructed and highly detailed account of the Iran-Contra scandal, using both newly declassified documents (the author is Deputy Director at the National Security Archive) and interviews. It's not a fast read, but it's a very good one. The core contribution is to cement the answer to the classic Watergate question, "What did the president know, and when did he know it?" The answer for Ronald Reagan was "A lot, and early on, then he lied about it."
The overriding factor was Reagan's fervent desire to free the hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon and his utter disinterest in whether the actions--selling arms to the Iranians for their help, then using proceeds to fund the Contras in Nicaragua--aimed at doing so were legal. It becomes clear that he never expressed doubt about legality. He pushed for action and wanted results, so everyone took that as permission, even though they even would write that it was all illegal. Byrne notes concerns about Reagan's mental state, but also shows how Reagan kept up with key details and kept pushing. Basically, if policy was intended to free hostages, then for Reagan by definition it was legal.
Others knew better, but didn't stop anything because the president wanted this done. Once it became clear the illegal activities would become public, they started lying and destroying documents like crazy. As John Poindexter described this destruction, "I decided that it would be politically embarrassing to the President at this point because it would substantiate what was being alleged...and so I decided to destroy it" (p. 269). When asked about his lying under oath to Congress, Oliver North said, "I knew it wasn't right not to tell the truth on those things but I didn't think it was unlawful" (pp. 314-315).
North took Reagan's desires and ran with them, usually amateurishly. Sadly, he was well liked and respected (at the hearings later, one staffer testified and even entered a poem into the record about how he was thankful Ollie North walked the earth!) so had wide latitude. North, meanwhile, was a born liar. As soon as he helped get the entire project off the ground, he lied to anyone and everyone about anything, large and small. He literally lied constantly.
George H.W. Bush (who as VP was present at many of the same meetings as Reagan) lied as well, and initially pretended he didn't have a diary, which had a lot of damaging information. Ironically, in his diary he criticized Secretary of State George Shultz for keeping a diary. Then on Christmas Eve 1992, very soon before he left office, he pardoned six key participants, which also had the convenient effect of preventing any more testimony from emerging that would incriminate him.
A notable point of the book is how little anyone knew about Nicaragua, or Central America generally. And they didn't care. When Costa Rican President Oscar Arias started blocking Contra activity in his country, North wrote that "Boy needs to be straightened out by heavyweights" (p. 232). Iran-Contra is fundamentally about illegal actions in the executive branch, but it's also about U.S.-Latin American relations. The only reason North focused so much on Nicaragua was that Reagan (and all his aides) had a distorted, paternalistic, and simplistic view of what was happening there.
Byrne makes clear that only a small fraction of relevant documents have seen the light of day. This is a topic that will deservedly keep producing new analyses, and don't be surprised if they show even more how deeply President Reagan and many of his officials were aware and supportive of illegal activity.
Despite its hyperbolic subtitle, Malcolm Byrne's Iran-Contra: Reagan's Scandal and the Unchecked Abuse of Presidential Power (2014) is a carefully constructed and highly detailed account of the Iran-Contra scandal, using both newly declassified documents (the author is Deputy Director at the National Security Archive) and interviews. It's not a fast read, but it's a very good one. The core contribution is to cement the answer to the classic Watergate question, "What did the president know, and when did he know it?" The answer for Ronald Reagan was "A lot, and early on, then he lied about it."
The overriding factor was Reagan's fervent desire to free the hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon and his utter disinterest in whether the actions--selling arms to the Iranians for their help, then using proceeds to fund the Contras in Nicaragua--aimed at doing so were legal. It becomes clear that he never expressed doubt about legality. He pushed for action and wanted results, so everyone took that as permission, even though they even would write that it was all illegal. Byrne notes concerns about Reagan's mental state, but also shows how Reagan kept up with key details and kept pushing. Basically, if policy was intended to free hostages, then for Reagan by definition it was legal.
Others knew better, but didn't stop anything because the president wanted this done. Once it became clear the illegal activities would become public, they started lying and destroying documents like crazy. As John Poindexter described this destruction, "I decided that it would be politically embarrassing to the President at this point because it would substantiate what was being alleged...and so I decided to destroy it" (p. 269). When asked about his lying under oath to Congress, Oliver North said, "I knew it wasn't right not to tell the truth on those things but I didn't think it was unlawful" (pp. 314-315).
North took Reagan's desires and ran with them, usually amateurishly. Sadly, he was well liked and respected (at the hearings later, one staffer testified and even entered a poem into the record about how he was thankful Ollie North walked the earth!) so had wide latitude. North, meanwhile, was a born liar. As soon as he helped get the entire project off the ground, he lied to anyone and everyone about anything, large and small. He literally lied constantly.
George H.W. Bush (who as VP was present at many of the same meetings as Reagan) lied as well, and initially pretended he didn't have a diary, which had a lot of damaging information. Ironically, in his diary he criticized Secretary of State George Shultz for keeping a diary. Then on Christmas Eve 1992, very soon before he left office, he pardoned six key participants, which also had the convenient effect of preventing any more testimony from emerging that would incriminate him.
A notable point of the book is how little anyone knew about Nicaragua, or Central America generally. And they didn't care. When Costa Rican President Oscar Arias started blocking Contra activity in his country, North wrote that "Boy needs to be straightened out by heavyweights" (p. 232). Iran-Contra is fundamentally about illegal actions in the executive branch, but it's also about U.S.-Latin American relations. The only reason North focused so much on Nicaragua was that Reagan (and all his aides) had a distorted, paternalistic, and simplistic view of what was happening there.
Byrne makes clear that only a small fraction of relevant documents have seen the light of day. This is a topic that will deservedly keep producing new analyses, and don't be surprised if they show even more how deeply President Reagan and many of his officials were aware and supportive of illegal activity.
November 23, 2014
This book was advertised as the most complete account of Reagan's notorious scandal, and I can agree with this although I've not read the other accounts. Malcolm Byrne, the author, had all the material, records, diaries, personal notes that have been released through the FOIA. Byrne is a director at the National Security Archive, based in Georgetown, which relentlessly pushes our government to release records to the public.
The book is quite detailed and you can skip sections, but don't skip too many, for it is a treasure trove of stories, vignettes, and amazing concoctions created by the likes of Ollie North, CIA Director Casey, Richard Secord, McFarland, the CIA operatives, Israeli players, and Iranian intermediaries. If you were paying attention during the late 80's and early 90's, then your memory will be refreshed and the story completed. If this is completely new for you, be prepared to read what will be an amazing, but unsettling, story of how a President with his National Security Council populated with passionate ideologies can circumvent the law, justify their ethics and almost any behavior to achieve their ends. But then, it was Bush Sr. (himself fully involved) who took the wind out of the special prosecutor's sails by pardoning key players in the 11th hour of his presidency.
Regardless of the pardon, the behaviors are all there, fully documented, often in their own hand with notes and diaries, and in the hearings even admitted! Remember it was Ollie North and his secretary Fawn Hall who said openly under oath that it was their duty to shred the records because they could be used to incriminate the President.
What will be insightful are the author's linkage of personalities like Cheney to later events, and the evolution of the power of the National Security Council which competes with the State Dept to administer US foreign policy. There is a thread that began back in Nixon's day (remember Henry Kissinger?) that can be traced to Bush Sr, and the GW Bush administrations especially, but I suspect with more study one can fairly associate the Democratic administrations use of the NSC as a powerful executive arm that can rival or trump the power of Congress.
The book is quite detailed and you can skip sections, but don't skip too many, for it is a treasure trove of stories, vignettes, and amazing concoctions created by the likes of Ollie North, CIA Director Casey, Richard Secord, McFarland, the CIA operatives, Israeli players, and Iranian intermediaries. If you were paying attention during the late 80's and early 90's, then your memory will be refreshed and the story completed. If this is completely new for you, be prepared to read what will be an amazing, but unsettling, story of how a President with his National Security Council populated with passionate ideologies can circumvent the law, justify their ethics and almost any behavior to achieve their ends. But then, it was Bush Sr. (himself fully involved) who took the wind out of the special prosecutor's sails by pardoning key players in the 11th hour of his presidency.
Regardless of the pardon, the behaviors are all there, fully documented, often in their own hand with notes and diaries, and in the hearings even admitted! Remember it was Ollie North and his secretary Fawn Hall who said openly under oath that it was their duty to shred the records because they could be used to incriminate the President.
What will be insightful are the author's linkage of personalities like Cheney to later events, and the evolution of the power of the National Security Council which competes with the State Dept to administer US foreign policy. There is a thread that began back in Nixon's day (remember Henry Kissinger?) that can be traced to Bush Sr, and the GW Bush administrations especially, but I suspect with more study one can fairly associate the Democratic administrations use of the NSC as a powerful executive arm that can rival or trump the power of Congress.
March 5, 2021
It was really good. Very detailed but I didn’t get bogged down in the details. Not a novel-like narrative really, but good simple clear writing that was easy to follow. Except all of the names. He really should have provided a dramatis personæ. I had to make one of my own and it was annoying. Otherwise, super interesting. And annoying because they were such lying bastards. It’s has a lot to show about what’s happening now (2019) though. Not just parallels, but lessons that are relevant, “bigly.”
Did I mention the details? Everything in there is supported by documentation. It’s the book I wish Fire and Fury by Wolff and Fear by Bob Woodward had been. But some of the sources were just declassified quite recently. I guess it’s why historians says that it takes 30 years or more for the real truth to be known.
Did I mention the details? Everything in there is supported by documentation. It’s the book I wish Fire and Fury by Wolff and Fear by Bob Woodward had been. But some of the sources were just declassified quite recently. I guess it’s why historians says that it takes 30 years or more for the real truth to be known.
July 25, 2023
It was very thorough and a hard book to read unless you have long periods to read it. I picked it because it was rated the best book on this topic. It was very detailed and it gave information on the what happened between selling arms to Iran to get hostages out of Lebanon and then using those funds to fund the Contras fighting in Nicaragua. Both affairs illegal or illegal in spirit. It showed the ends justified the means in DC and how the Americans were played in different instances of these schemes.
Finally it blows up and suddenly a lot of amnesia breaks out in Washington from being at meetings to the location of the notes they took.
Finally it blows up and suddenly a lot of amnesia breaks out in Washington from being at meetings to the location of the notes they took.
August 31, 2021
About as comprehensive a history of the Iran-Contra affair as I can imagine writing, at least in a popular history book. I've been fascinated by these events, mostly because they seem to have largely disappeared from the public consciousness. After finishing the book, I still don't understand why that is, except that possibly the myth of Ronald Reagan was big enough and durable enough to outlast the scandal.
As so often happens with books like this, it can be a little difficult keeping track of all of the players, and since the story is not told strictly chronologically, occasionally timing of specific events gets a little muddled. Still, it's a well-documented look at a subject that, in my opinion, should be much better known and remembered.
As so often happens with books like this, it can be a little difficult keeping track of all of the players, and since the story is not told strictly chronologically, occasionally timing of specific events gets a little muddled. Still, it's a well-documented look at a subject that, in my opinion, should be much better known and remembered.
Read
October 6, 2020As I expected, an exhaustive account that makes it clear that Reagan signaled to his subordinates that he wanted the hostages out and the Contras supported. He deluded himself that he was not trading arms for hostages and frankly didn't care if they evaded Congress.
But he had "plausible deniability" on the details.
But he had "plausible deniability" on the details.
February 24, 2024
For such a complicated topic, Malcolm Byrne has done a superb job of creating an easy-to-follow digest of the events and people involved. It is especially concerning that none of the actors involved received any meaningful punishment for their actions, and that this event faded so quickly from the common consciousness. This inevitably will have lead to the wrong kinds of lessons being learnt by those in power, and indeed, Dick Cheney is a prime example of this.
I think anyone trying to grapple with the role that unaccountable and opaque intelligence agencies and bodies of power play in our world today would do well to read this book as a means of understanding: 1. a case study in the abuse of power, and 2. how the failure to prosecute or come away with any meaningful changes to the executive body's ability to perpetuate further such injustices, will only have served as incentive to do so again in the future.
I think anyone trying to grapple with the role that unaccountable and opaque intelligence agencies and bodies of power play in our world today would do well to read this book as a means of understanding: 1. a case study in the abuse of power, and 2. how the failure to prosecute or come away with any meaningful changes to the executive body's ability to perpetuate further such injustices, will only have served as incentive to do so again in the future.
October 10, 2019
Read some parts of it.
December 17, 2021
Great read.
Very informative. I have always looked at Ronald Reagan as one of the best, this book paints a little different picture of him.
Very informative. I have always looked at Ronald Reagan as one of the best, this book paints a little different picture of him.
April 22, 2022
Really detailed and explains the power of governance during mid 80s.
March 9, 2023
So much that I never knew or understood. Fascinating!
January 4, 2015
I like historical books, but this was tedious to read.
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