The American Army and the First World War

(Armies of the Great War)

David R. Woodward

4.36 · Rating details · 14 ratings · 4 reviews

This is a definitive history of the American Army's role and performance during the First World War. Drawing from a rich pool of archival sources, David Woodward sheds new light on key themes such as the mobilisation of US forces, the interdependence of military diplomacy, coalition war-making, the combat effectiveness of the AEF and the leadership of its commander John J. ...more

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Paperback, 481 pages

Published August 29th 2014 by Cambridge University Press (first published June 16th 2014)

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Jun 03, 2015 Jonathan rated it it was amazing

Shelves: world-war-1, american-history

A very well-written and thorough examination of the hows, whys and campaigns of the American army in World War I. What I especially liked was that this is not simply a battle history but also that Professor Woodward examines the strategy, politics and diplomacy of America's military policies, and how these policies affected her relationships with her allies. In short: in order to impose his vision of the world and how the peace should be structured after the war, Woodrow Wilson insisted on an in A very well-written and thorough examination of the hows, whys and campaigns of the American army in World War I. What I especially liked was that this is not simply a battle history but also that Professor Woodward examines the strategy, politics and diplomacy of America's military policies, and how these policies affected her relationships with her allies. In short: in order to impose his vision of the world and how the peace should be structured after the war, Woodrow Wilson insisted on an independent and autonomous American army in France, just as Britain and France had. The problem with this was that the US Army before the war was both tiny and totally unprepared for mass industrialized warfare as was taking place on the Western Front at that time. In addition to this, America's industrial mobilization totally failed to provide her army with the weapons it needed to fight, so the USA was forced to receive most of her military hardware from her allies. Both Britain and France had reached the bottom of their manpower barrel at that point in the war, so they preferred to amalgamate small American units into their depleted armies, something both Wilson and Pershing were not ready to countenance. Just to make things interesting, American leaders and staffs were inexperienced and not well trained, and Pershing seemed determine to ignore the actual conditions of combat on the Western Front and believed that lightly armed infantry trained in "open warfare" was the answer to the stalemate that existed there. As a result of this, the American army was something of a blunt instrument on the Western Front and suffered far more casualties than was warranted. Nonetheless, America's intervention in the First World War was crucial to the Allies' victory, both militarily and for the morale of the combatants. There is also a useful chapter on the not-so-well-known American interventions in Russia after the revolution in that country. The book takes advantage of the latest research on the various topics dealing with the US Army in the Great War, and certainly belongs on the shelf of anyone who is interested in that war. First rate.

I'm still interested in knowing why the series editors felt it proper to put a picture of US Marines on the cover of a book about the US Army. ...more

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May 10, 2019 Johnny rated it it was amazing

A great read that goes beyond the simple battlefield narrative and pulls little punches where needed. He provides a lot of information but couches it so that it doesn't distract from the narrative but enhances it. ...more

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Dec 12, 2014 Edgar Raines rated it it was amazing

This is a first rate academic study of the American military participation in World War I. Woodward faults Woodrow Wilson's hands off war leadership and the at times bumbling mobilization. He is particularly critical of Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, the General Staff, and the War Department bureaus. General Peyton C. March gets high marks for forcefulness but also some share of the blame for the administrative confusion that sent barely trained men into combat. General John J. Pershing had g This is a first rate academic study of the American military participation in World War I. Woodward faults Woodrow Wilson's hands off war leadership and the at times bumbling mobilization. He is particularly critical of Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, the General Staff, and the War Department bureaus. General Peyton C. March gets high marks for forcefulness but also some share of the blame for the administrative confusion that sent barely trained men into combat. General John J. Pershing had greater independence than most wartime commanders, but he proved notably lacking in his mastery of the tactics needed on the stalemated Western Front. He and his General Headquarters were more hindrance than help in insisting on "open warfare" training which was little more that a warmed over version of _Infantry Drill Regulations, 1911_. It was up to the various divisions to adapt to the conditions of a "stabilized front." Some, notably the 1st and 2d Divisions, did so. Others, the 77th and 26th Divisions, did less well. On the other hand, Woodward gives Pershing high marks for his efforts to mold an independent American Army and not succumb to pressures to use Americans as replacements in British and French divisions. Often, Pershing's stand is represented as an example of American parochialism, but Woodward has examined British archives and argues that the Allies were no less parochial. The British government, he remarks at one point, had fought to the last Russian and almost the last Frenchman, and was now willing to fight to the last American to achieve victory.

Woodward gives a clear, concise summary of the field of American World War I studies as of the time of his writing. The only difficulty is that the field is markedly thin, both in terms of detailed studies of the mobilization and particularly of American participation in operations on the Western Front. For a social history of the war as experienced by the Doughboys, Edward M. Coffman's _The War To End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I_ (1968) still provides the best introduction. Hopefully, Woodward's excellent survey will stimulate further work in this under developed field. ...more

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Sep 02, 2014 Craig Pearson rated it really liked it

Shelves: reviewed

This is not what you were taught in school about how America won the First World War. I was taught that Wilson's 14 Points were the basis for the League of Nations and that Pershing's million man Army saved the day for the Allies.

This book goes much deeper into the socialist passivism of Wilson and the intransigence of Pershing to a degree not seen in other histories of the war. Wilson is shown to be extremely anti-military and Pershing to be militarily inflexible.

The details given enumerate th ...more

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