World Order

by Henry Kissinger

Henry Kissinger offers in World Order a deep meditation on the roots of international harmony and global disorder. Drawing on his experience as one of the foremost statesmen of the modern era—advising presidents, traveling the world, observing and shaping the central foreign policy events of recent decades—Kissinger now reveals his analysis of the ultimate challenge for the twenty-first century: how to build a shared international order in a world of divergent historical perspectives, violent conflict, proliferating technology, and ideological extremism.

There has never been a true “world order,” Kissinger observes. For most of history, civilizations defined their own concepts of order. Each considered itself the center of the world and envisioned its distinct principles as universally relevant. China conceived of a global cultural hierarchy with the Emperor at its pinnacle. In Europe, Rome imagined itself surrounded by barbarians; when Rome fragmented, European peoples refined a concept of an equilibrium of sovereign states and sought to export it across the world. Islam, in its early centuries, considered itself the world’s sole legitimate political unit, destined to expand indefinitely until the world was brought into harmony by religious principles. The United States was born of a conviction about the universal applicability of democracy—a conviction that has guided its policies ever since.

Now international affairs take place on a global basis, and these historical concepts of world order are meeting. Every region participates in questions of high policy in every other, often instantaneously. Yet there is no consensus among the major actors about the rules and limits guiding this process, or its ultimate destination. The result is mounting tension.

Grounded in Kissinger’s deep study of history and his experience as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, World Order guides readers through crucial episodes in recent world history. Kissinger offers a unique glimpse into the inner deliberations of the Nixon administration’s negotiations with Hanoi over the end of the Vietnam War, as well as Ronald Reagan’s tense debates with Soviet Premier Gorbachev in Reykjavík. He offers compelling insights into the future of U.S.–China relations and the evolution of the European Union, and examines lessons of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Taking readers from his analysis of nuclear negotiations with Iran through the West’s response to the Arab Spring and tensions with Russia over Ukraine, World Order anchors Kissinger’s historical analysis in the decisive events of our time.

Provocative and articulate, blending historical insight with geopolitical prognostication, World Order is a unique work that could come only from a lifelong policymaker and diplomat.

Genres: Politics, History, Nonfiction, International Relations, Political Science, Economics, World History

420 pages, Hardcover

First published September 9, 2014

About the author

Henry Alfred Kissinger (born Heinz Alfred Kissinger) is a German-born American bureaucrat, diplomat, and 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the Richard Nixon administration. Kissinger emerged unscathed from the Watergate scandal, and maintained his powerful position when Gerald Ford became President.

A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente.

During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.

Reviews

[Chris Ziesler · Rating 5 out of 5]

I approached this book with a little trepidation.

My two previous experiences with Kissinger's earlier books were: Diplomacy, which I found pithy, insightful and very enlightening; and his three volume memoirs which I found to be overwhelming in their level of detail and which eventually defeated my best efforts to read them.

Which Kissinger would be the author of World Order?

I worried unnecessarily. World Order is a master class on Foreign Affairs given by a virtuoso on the subject.

Kissinger's grasp of the historical and cultural background of the present world situation is comprehensive and deeply learned. His central theme is the perennial interplay between legitimacy and power which he illustrates by examining the evolution of order in successive sphere's of influence: Europe, the Middle East, Asia, the United States. He also dissects how certain key international relationships have arisen and are developing: US-Iran, China-India, Islam with the Christian West. He concludes by assessing what role technology plays now and likely to play in the future.

His leitmotif and touchstone is the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648, at the end of the Thirty Years War, which led to a new concept of the nation state which he calls the Westphalian system. The reason this system is significant is that, "The Westphalian system spread around the world as the framework for a state-based international order spanning multiple civilizations and regions because, as the European nations expanded, they carried the blueprint of their international order with them."

He examines how and why this system worked in Europe in the succeeding centuries, how it came to define modern international relations, and to what extent it applied to other parts of the world during different epochs.

He is at his most engaging and entertaining when he his introducing the vast array of characters who populate this narrative. He peoples his story with a thousand and one fascinating characters: Augustine of Hippo, Richelieu, Bismarck, Kautilya, Palmerston, Sayyid Qutb, Sadat, Mao Zedong, all described in such detail as to seem to be personal friends of Kissinger, or, if not friends, at least the best of enemies.

Kissinger's keen insights and analysis are dispassionate and profound. They are often based on his unequaled direct experience of many of the situations his discusses from the eternal conflict in the Middle East through the reappearance of Islam as a world force to the renaissance of the ancient civilizations of China and India as global powers.

His greatest contribution as a commentator is his ability to place current world affairs deftly into their proper historical context. He combines the insight of a learned historian with the statesman's meticulous grasp of naked realpolitick.

This book is a worthy successor of Diplomacy, and should be highly valued for its clear-sighted, unsentimental, and highly-informed view of current world politics

[Gary · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book has a deep knowledge and eloquence about the history of foreign policy and diplomacy. But its analysis of recent events is rendered treacly by his almost embarrassing unwillingness to say a bad word about any modern president -- and particularly those who have asked him for advice and counsel. Of course, this is the man who was famous for his withering comments about almost everybody and everything, so this gently gently approach not only rings false but robs his comments of any real punch. On the Middle East he essentially throws up his hands in despair and takes refuge in the Huntingtonian thesis of a clash of civilizations and perhaps the inevitability of war. The Islamists' radical denunciation of the Western Westphalian state system -- a phenomenon that could accurately be applied to Germany, France and China at various times in the past -- now makes it impossible to engage. Thus, he essentially dismisses the nuclear talks with Iran on the ideological grounds that the Leader's revolutionary statements mean they can't be trusted. This coming from a man who negotiated with the Soviets and Mao himself. He never addresses Obama's proposal to rebalance US policy toward Asia while reducing US involvement in regional conflicts in the Middle East -- actually a very Kissingerian notion that reflects the purposes of the Nixon Doctrine of which he was a major architect -- but any positive word in that direction would put him at odds with both the Republican leadership and Israel (both of whom generally escape notice in this book). He raises truly important questions at the end: How you can build a modern Westphalian world order in this age when communications and economic globalization are destroying the very borders on which the European state system was founded? His solution -- that these enormous forces must be subjected to international rules and brought under the control of responsible statesmen -- is appealing but lacking in even a rudimentary roadmap. He does stress repeatedly that the Peace of Westphalia was possible only after the ravages of the Thirty Years War had nearly reduced the system to rubble and the statesmen involved were prepared to make decisions out of sheer existential necessity. Perhaps the catastrophes of the modern Middle East will eventually result in such a sober conclave when all the fight has been drained from all parties. But there is no sign that we are there yet.

[Saadia B. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Concept of World Order was defined and its implementation determined in Europe. Before that, with no means of interacting with each other on a substantial basis and no framework for measuring the power of one region against another, each order vowed its own as unique and defined others as barbarians.

The structure established in the Peace of Westphalia which represented the first attempt to institutionalise order on the basis of agreed rules and limits and to base it on a multiplicity of powers rather than the dominance of a single country. Westphalian system spread around the world as the framework for a state based international order spanning multiple civilisations and regions.

After the collapse of Soviet Union, America emerged as the new super power. China followed suit with its emerging economy, today China and America are both indispensable pillars of the world order - historically both have exhibited an ambivalent attitude towards the international order they now anchor.

The essence of building a constructive world order is that no single country whether US or China is in a position to fill by itself the world order leadership role that US occupied after Cold War period when it was materially and psychologically preeminent. American policy is to prevent hegemony in Asia while China's policy is to keep potentially adversial forces from its borders.

American foreign policy reflects the conviction that its domestically self-evidently universal and its application at all times is salutary. The openness of American culture and its democratic principles made US a model and refugee for millions. However its compulsion to attack Afghanistan and later on Iraq is one challenge which has no answer to it. The wreck has left the world in havoc. Facts are rarely self explanatory: their significance, analysis and interpretation at least in the foreign policy world depend on content and relevance. Hence the concept of truth is relativized and individualized, losing its universal character.

The Westphalian system followed by US today did not supply a sense of direction, it dealt with methods of allocating and preserving power but gave no answer to the problem of how to generate legitimacy. The structure of the 21st century world order lacks in 4 important dimensions:
1. The nature of the state itself
2. Political and economical organizations of the world are at variance with one another
3. Absence of an effective mechanism for the great powers to consult and possibly cooperate on the most consequential issues
4. American leadership has been indispensable, tries to sought a balance between stability and advocacy of universal principles not always reconcilable with the principles of sovereign noninterference

For US, the quest of world order functions on two levels:
a) The celebration of universal principles needs to be paired with a recognition of the reality of other regions histories and cultures
b) A purposeful American role will be philosophically and geopolitically imperative for the challenges

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[Domhnall · Rating 5 out of 5]

I do not share many opinions with Kissinger - and he will not be very troubled to hear this - but given that he has played such an important part in world politics, and has been directly engaged in decisions as serious as war and peace, it is well worth while to see the myths by which he lives.

The first two chapters set out his understanding of power politics. "No truly global "world order" has ever existed. What passes for order in our time was devised in Western Europe nearly four centuries ago at a peace conference in the German region of Westphalia, conducted without the involvement or even the awareness of most other continents or civilisations... The Westphalian peace reflected a practical accommodation, not a unique moral insight. It relied on a system of independent states refraining from interference in each other's domestic affairs and checking each other's ambitions through a general equilibrium of power... Division and multiplicity, an accident of Europe's history, became the hallmarks of a new system of international order with its own distinct outlook." He contrasts this system with the Russian project of that time, to impose a single, autocratic ruler and a unified religious orthodoxy over a continually expanding empire; with the Chinese Emperor holding sway over "All Under Heaven," the pinnacle of a cultural hierarchy radiating from the centre of the world in the Chinese capital outward to all of humanity; with Islam's vision of a single, divinely sanctioned governance uniting and pacifying the world. Kissinger argues that in time, the USA also departed from the Westphalian model, instead advocating liberal democracy and free market economics as a universal aspiration to be actively promoted and even imposed. He never actually seems to criticise the USA's actions, but it is hard not to use his theoretical framework to identify major problems.

Kissinger's sweeping survey of the use made in Europe of the Balance of Power, not to prevent war but to restrain its violence and scope, is to my mind very clever, culminating in a snappy explanation for the outbreak and consequences of the First World War. With his model in mind, it becomes terribly easy to see the strategic disaster of the way that war was ended, failing to draw either Germany or Russia into the new order, installing a string of small and hard to defend states along their borders, virtually inviting the great powers to snack on them at leisure. He contrasts this with the 1815 peace after the defeat of Napoleon, when France was immediately restored to its proper place in the order of things.

He moves on to give a dry and not very useful account of the Middle East and modern Islam, in which Israel is hardly noticed, before a much more lively chapter about Iran. This is both informative and, to my surprise, respectful of the Iranian approach to diplomacy. Quite simply the Iranian strategy is to seek the complete removal of American and Western influence from the region and to replace the colonial legacy with a restoration of Islamic culture. It is not difficult to consider this account as one that would be compatible with the sentiments in Edward Said's Orientalism, as others too have observed. Of course, Kissinger does not dwell on the negative aspects of America's role in the region. Although this comes later in the book, his account of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are brief but not without insights. His discussion of Afghanistan especially give a strong impression that he has no patience with American fantasies about the introduction of a western style democracy into a land of diverse local tribes, lacking traditions of even centralized government, and he implies that stronger neighbours will almost certainly intervene in time, reiterating the violent cycle.

His discussions of Japan and of India are succinct. He has far more to say about China, not least to emphasize the continuity of modern and historic Chinese diplomatic strategies, but he talks about Mao in such bland terms that we have to assume he is being diplomatic himself. This does not matter - we have other sources for that.

Two chapters directly concerned with the history of the USA give a very clear exposition of the major events of the past two centuries and offer some good insights, notably in his brief discussion of the Vietnam War and the domestic US opposition to that. He is not at all embarrassed to describe the various expressions of American "exceptionalism" which to my mind are in fact unpleasant. He quotes Thomas Jefferson: "We feel that we are acting under obligations not confined to the limits of our own society. It is impossible not to be sensible that we are acting for all mankind; that circumstances denied to others, but indulged to us, have imposed on us the duty of proving what is the degree of freedom and self-government in which a society may venture to leave its individual members." This is a thread running through the story of the USA, heard for instance in President Reagan's speech about the USA as a "City on the Hill." I have no problem with the idea that the world should watch and learn from America's experience, albeit many of those lessons are starkly negative, but I do object to the delusion that the world offers no reciprocal lessons for the Americans.

The book closes with a review of some implications of new technologies, most importantly nuclear weapons and proliferation, but also cyber warfare and the political impact of the internet and search engines. "For most of history, technological change unfolded over decades and centuries of incremental advances that refined and combined existing technologies. Even radical innovations could over time be fitted within previous tactical and strategic doctrines: tanks were considered in terms of precedents drawn from centuries of cavalry warfare, airplanes could be conceptualised as another form of artillery, battleships as mobile forts, and aircraft carriers as airstrips. For all their magnification of destructive power, even nuclear weapons are in some respects an extrapolation from previous experience." He goes on from this to worry that computers and the internet might present insoluble problems but that is hardly the lesson to draw from the lines just quoted.

He seems specifically worried that the role of serious minded foreign policy experts might be undermined and a lower calibre of politician attracted to high office. "What once had been substantive debates about the content of governance will reduce candidates to being spokesmen for a marketing effort... The candidates' main role may become fund-raising rather than the elaboration of issues. Is the marketing effort designed to convey the candidates' convictions or are the convictions expressed by the candidate the reflections of a "big-data" research effort...? If the gap between the qualities required for election and those essential for the conduct of office becomes too wide, the conceptual grasp and sense of history that should be part of foreign policy may be lost..."

This book will certainly help to give us a better "conceptual grasp and sense of history." It does paint a pretty picture of American activities on the world stage, and omits mention altogether of some difficult topics - notably Israel, or Central America - but to be fair it leaves enough material to permit a more challenging interpretation. If he were forced to be honest, I am confident he would agree that America's role as a "City on the Hill" is simply not in keeping with the Westphalian values which Kissinger presents as such an excellent model for a new world order. He does not advocate a perfect world, but one that we can all live in, with our diverse values and priorities. I like that model and much to my surprise, I very much liked Kissinger's book.

[Vipassana · Rating 4 out of 5]

As an Indian, I was taught to despise Henry Kissinger much before I knew anything about him. This is strongly rooted in his insults of Indira Gandhi, Indians and support of Pakistan during the Bangladesh Liberation War. The reason I picked up this book is because Hillary Clinton called Kissinger a friend at some point during the US presidential election campaigns. This lead to a bunch of paralysing analyses and opinion pieces on the statement. Surely, he couldn't have been entirely the monster he has been painted as in India.

Very early on in the book, I understood the controversy. For all of his disastrous interventions around the world, he has also thought quite deeply about world order from the paradigm of power relations between nations. Foreign policy is a high stakes endeavour and Kissinger argues convincingly that a do-nothing policy by the US has huge implications because of its power in the international arena. I get the sense that Kissinger has had some change of beliefs throughout his career or at least I hope so.

‘Long ago, in youth, I was brash enough to think myself able to pronounce on ‘The Meaning of History.’ I now know that history’s meaning is a matter to be discovered, not declared’

However, this book isn't about Kissinger and but his notion of how world order can be achieved. Kissinger advocates the Westphalian model of balance of power, and believes that the world's acceptance of that model is tied to historical forms of governance, religion and culture. He then compares the models of governance in other parts of the world, primarily the Middle East, Iran, India, China and Japan. These regions have all become part of the international community with differing motives and have varying views on the purpose of the international community. Some interesting things I learnt were Saudi Arabia's need to find legitimacy among radicals and yet interact with the international community, Japan's forceful opening up to the western world, the ancient political strategy of India's Kautilya and mostly what a glaringly different ball game domestic policy and foreign policy are. He offers some fair criticisms of the Obama administration, primarily that Obama withdrew for the world stage in a manner that proved to be a misstep.

There are some glaring inconsistencies. He believes in maintaining the balance of power in the Middle East, but supports the Iraq war which ends up emboldened Iran. I will admit that it's more complicated than what I have just phrased. In a different context Kissinger cautions against heuristics to make policy. Yet, his moral appeal to the plight of persecuted Iraqis under Saddam Hussein, rang a little hollow. He staunchly refuses to apologize for Iraq, and the entire section on the war felt so moralizing and unlike Kissinger in the rest of the book that I feel like Kissinger has detangled some of the complexity, but is unwilling to reveal it to his readers.

One thing that struck me was the Kissinger still believes that the US will have the power and should remain an active player in the world stage. However, he concludes accepting that the Westphalian model of governance gives rise to questions of legitimacy that haven't been addressed. It seems evident to me that Foreign Policy solely on the basis of power is insufficient. This is not a notion that Kissinger conveys, but my own loosely-held opinion.

His analysis of how technology has shaped policy making and politics was impressive. Kissinger fears that technology and 'Big Data' will make policy more rule based, than analytical. He cites research to say that as we are able to store more and more in devices, we become less capable of recalling certain things. The shift towards appealing to the electorate's emotions has had a profound effect on current events. As he says, We live in a wondrous time, in which the strong is weak because of his scruples and the weak grows strong because of his audacity. I wonder now, where Kissinger would place himself on the spectrum of scruples and audacity. I feel cautious about appreciating the man, but blown away by how much I learnt from this book.

Foreign policy is incredibly complex.

--
February 8th, 2017

[Maciej Nowicki · Rating 4 out of 5]

World Order is an impressive study that focuses on the geopolitical distribution of power. The book methodically provides a multitude of studies enhanced by anecdotal personal experience of the author.

Worth to say that Henry Kissinger served as the 56th Secretary of State under presidents Nixon and Ford and as the National Security Advisor for six years. During that time he pioneered the policy vs the Soviet Union. He orchestrated the opening of relations with China and negotiated the Paris peace accord which accomplished the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973.

Anyway, the book covers roughly 400 years of diplomatic geopolitical and military history and five continents. The author focuses predominantly on Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the US. The chapters detail the regional history and a perspective on cultural differences that create fracturing in understanding and negotiation. In the beginning, we receive a tract describing the distribution of power in Europe and how the Peace of Westphalia gave the model for stability. From this point on, the author refers to the Westphalian model regularly.

World order is also a comprehensive analysis of the challenges of building international order in a world of differing perspectives, violent conflicts, burgeoning technology and ideological extremism. In addition, the book states many great questions which might be really suprising, but the most important one is... (if you like to read my full review please visit my blog: https://leadersarereaders.blog/world-...)

[Trish · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a book that begs to be studied, not just read. Kissinger has spent his career thinking about world order and in this book he looks both forward and back, eliminating much of the static in the view we have of historical events. The result is a clear outline of national interests, power, and its balance through recent history, centered especially on the U.S. perspective, its intents and its perceived responsibilities. The discussion is helpful, and useful. However, in eliminating the “noise” from the systems and structures he presents, Kissinger may lead us to think within the framework he has created. In looking forward, a new world order must be something outside any previous framework: “wisdom counsels that a different path must be chosen. To undertake a journey on a road never before traveled requires character and courage…” The cyber world developing around us changes everything.

A reconstruction of the international system is the ultimate challenge to statesmanship of our time.

Beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia after the Thirty Years’ War of 1618-48 in which nearly a quarter of Central Europe’s population was decimated, we see the structure of world order based on national sovereignty:

The Westphalian peace reflected a practical accommodation to reality, not a unique moral insight. It relied on a system of independent states refraining from interference in each other’s domestic affairs and checking each other’s ambitions through a general equilibrium of power. No single claim to truth or universal rule had prevailed in Europe’s contests. Instead, each state was assigned the attribute of sovereign power over its territory. Each would acknowledge the domestic structures and religions vocations of its fellow states as realities and refrain from challenging their existence. With a balance of power now perceived as natural and desirable, the ambitions of rulers would be set in counterpose against each other, at least in theory curtailing the scope of conflicts. Division and multiplicity, an accident of Europe’s history, became the hallmarks of a new system of international order with this own distinct philosophical outlook. In this sense the European effort to end its conflagration shaped and prefigured the modern sensibility: it reserved judgment on the absolute in favor of the practical and ecumenical; it sought to distill order from multiplicity and restraint.

Although China had little involvement with the world and no interest in the Westphalian system of order for centuries, it adheres to and calls on its principles now, when that system of beliefs is being eroded and perhaps even abandoned by the West. Kissinger points out that the Westphalian system of world order based on precepts of national sovereignty and non-interference in other nations’ affairs, is not working in the way it had been for centuries. Kissinger suggests that while in Asia states still adhere to the Westphalian model, the system is breaking down in Europe where economic and military interests are grouped while political power is based on the nation. In the Middle East, a radical Islamic group seeks to operate regionally, ignoring state boundaries. Since 2001 the United Nations has adopted new responsibilities that directly challenge Westphalian principles: asserting the “the responsibility to protect and intervention as a duty of care” even within the boundaries sovereign states. The cyber world features asymmetric power imbalances in which one laptop outside the boundaries of a nation can disable powerful national and international systems.

Regarding technological changes that have changed our notion of speed, and information, Kissinger says

Cyberspace has become strategically indispensable…The history of warfare shows that every technological offensive capability will eventually be matched and offset by defensive measures, although not every country will be equally able to afford them, Does this mean that technologically less advanced countries must shelter under the protection of high-tech societies?...Nor is it possible to base deterrence in cyberspace on symmetrical retaliation, as in the case with nuclear weapons…In the end, a framework for organizing the global cyber environment will be imperative…
The dilemma of such technologies is that it is impossible to establish rules of conduct unless a common understanding of at least some of the key capabilities exists. But these are precisely the capabilities the major actors will be reluctant to disclose…In this manner, asymmetry and a kind of congenital world disorder are built into relations between cyber powers both in diplomacy and strategy. The emphasis of many strategic rivalries is shifting from the physical to the information realm, in the collection and processing of data, the penetration of networks, and the manipulation of psychology. Absent articulation of some rules of international conduct, a crisis will arise from the inner dynamics of the system.

I guess we have Snowden to thank for revealing that “all is known.” Warfare can now move to the psychological: What is it you think you know? There is perhaps no better time to think about the imperative for establishment of a new world order. Kissinger suggests that America must retain her moral compass but not abandon her sense of realism.

Society needs to adapt its education policy ultimate imperatives in the long-term direction of the country and in the cultivation of its values. The inventors of the devices that have so revolutionized the collection and sharing of information can make an equal if not greater contribution by devising means to deepen its conceptual foundation. On the way to the first truly global world order, the great human achievements of technology must be fused with enhanced powers of humane, transcendent, and moral judgment.

The suggestion that the technologists that bring us our systems for connection be involved in “deepening its conceptual foundations” is an interesting one. But perhaps more importantly, we need to move as the people of one nation to make that understanding of the internet's uses and abuses a part of our moral and ethical decision-making. These things can be taught.

The task ahead seems insurmountable, and the tasks addressed without knowing the outcomes of our choices. Kissinger reminds us that

the Westphalian system was drafted by some two hundred delegates, none of whom has entered the annals of history as a major figure, who met in two provincial German towns forty miles apart (a significant distance in the seventeenth century) in two separate groups. They overcame their obstacles because they shared the devastating experience of the Thirty Years’ War, and they were determined to prevent its recurrence. Our time, facing even graver prospects, needs to act on its necessities before it is engulfed by them.

Kissinger leaves us with a series of questions we need to ask ourselves in order to frame an outline to begin discussing this issue in earnest. It is a gift. Elder statesmen are rare beings, and whatever else he may have been called, Kissinger can claim that title. He is now an old man, an old man with long vision. He helps us by reminding us to get a grip, look within, take stock of our urgent responsibilities to our children, to be brave and take the steps needed to preserve and protect our country and our liberty.

To this point, I have addressed and quoted only the first and final pages of this book. In the rest of it, Kissinger gives us distilled observations, opinions, and insights from a lifetime of looking at historical underpinnings and the foreign affairs of nations, and of our own. There is no flab in these pages. It is enlightening. Kissinger was at his influence apogee in the Nixon administration and he speaks longingly of Nixon’s willingness and ability to think in strategic terms:

Nixon treated foreign policy as an endeavor with no end, as a set of rhythms to be managed. He dealt with its intricacies and contradictions like school assignments by an especially demanding teacher.

We have that teacher in this book, challenging us to lead.

I listened to the Penguin Random House Audio of this title, read with appropriate pacing and gravitas by Nicholas Hormann. Listening helped to bring some elements of the discussion into clarity. I supplemented listening with the text, published by Penguin.

[Elham Yaghoobi · Rating 1 out of 5]

افتصاحی که در ورق طلا جلد شده😁!!
کتاب بسیار کند جلو میرفت و از یه جایی به بعد نتونستم ادامه‌اش بدم!!! یک ستاره هم بخاطر اطلاعات جدیدی هس که بدست آوردم از دیدگاه یه سیاستمدار کهنه‌کار آمریکایی درباره جهانه!
اینکه آمریکا نقش پدر رو برای جهان داره و اونه که به جهان نظم میده و کشورها رو هدایت میکنه. نظم آسیا هم توسط آمریکا و اروپا داده شده و آسیا خودش به تنهایی تو باقالیا بوده و جنگجو و جنگخو!
جالبه هرجا که بریده‌هایی از کتاب بود که کلیی ازش تعریف کرده بودن نهایت از فصل یک و دو بود اگه وارد فصل سه و چهار و پنج میشدید مدام کلیشه‌ی آقایی و سروری آمریکا و بدبخت بودن بقیه مردم جهان میخورد تو صورتتون! بدون کوچکترین اشاره به جنایت آمریکا تو ژاپن یا جنایت انگلیس در هند و چین و..!
جالبه که این کلیشه الان که تو دوران کرونا هستیم واقعا دیدنیه!! همه دنیا یکجوریم نه آقایی هست نه گدایی:))

[Syed Fathi · Rating 3 out of 5]

As oppose to many mainstream media - many regards Kissinger as a war criminal. The architect of many US-backed coup and war around the world especially during his tenure as national security advisor during Nixon's presidency. The most memorable and shameful of all was the US war in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which minimum estimate put the death toll at at least 4 million people.

Having this fact in mind, it is a hypocrite at a maximum level when in the book, Kissinger mark US role in the global order as "acting for all mankind", he talked about how US would go into war to spread democracy, freedom and its value, while in reality it supported various coup and suppressive regimes for their national interest. But one thing I admire him most, is his effort to justify all wars no matter how shameful it was, even if it was popularly oppose domestically.

The book also show case Kissinger's strong belief in the American Exceptionalism, phrases like "US was not simply a country but an engine of God's plan and epitome of world order", "international society was like a frontier settlement without an effective police force", "America would emerge as the decisive guardian of the global balance and international peace", "American idealism and exceptionalism were the driving forces behind the building of a new international order" was everywhere in the book.

Having said all these, it does not mean that the book lack some good quality in term of knowledge and thought. His explanation on how Europe overcome their war torn countries and resolving to eventually develop Wesphalian system was helpful and easy to understand. His analysis on Japan, China and India will help reader to understand why nations treat their foreign policy differently. Lastly, his conclusion on the rising power of social media also will guide readers on the question why we tend to diverge on the definition of truth.

[Orestis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ένα εξαιρετικό βιβλίο για όσους ενδιαφέρονται να καταλάβουν το υπόβαθρο πίσω από ορισμένες αποφάσεις των σημερινών κρατών. Ο Κίσινγκερ μας ξεναγεί στον κόσμο της παγκόσμιας διπλωματίας και γεωπολιτικής.
Στις σελίδες του θα δούμε την ίδρυση της τάξης στην Ευρώπη στην βάση της ισορροπίας δυνάμεων μέσω της συμφωνίας ης Βεστφαλίας και της Βιέννης, για να τερματιστούν οι εχθροπραξίες που είχαν ρημάξει την ήπειρο κατά των τριακονταετή πόλεμο. Την ελαστική ισορροπία στην ανατολική Ασία. Την αιώνια ανισορροπία στην μέση ανατολή. Την αιώνια αμφιταλάντευση των ΗΠΑ ανάμεσα στις αρχές του Τζέφερσον και του Γουίλσον και την ανάγκη της για παγκόσμια ισχύ.
Βλέπουμε τον κόσμο από τα μάτια του Κίσσινγκερ και η προσωπικότητα του δεν θα μπορούσε να αφήσει την αφήγηση ανεπηρέαστη. Δεν αναφέρει ουτε μια φράση για τα οικόνομικα συμφέροντα των ΗΠΑ. Τα συγχωνεύει όλα στην λέξη "ισχύς". Είμαι της αποψής ότι τα οικονομικά συμφέροντα διαφέρουν από τα γεωπολιτικά.
Κατά τα άλλα, μεταφέρει όλη την γνώση που χρειάζεται ο σύγχρονος άνθρωπος για να καταλάβει τι γίνεται στον κόσμο σήμερα. Διαβάστε το με κριτική σκέψη και ανοιχτό μυαλό.

Soundtrack βιβλίου: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T9Grm...

[Andrew · Rating 2 out of 5]

A certain fellow reader was recently so right in a recommendation that I rushed to this.

Prematurely.

Now, it's not Dr. Kissinger's fault that I've studied Europe and India and China, and learned about Westphalia and the Arthashastra and George Macartney's embassy to China, and didn't need to hear about it again. But, frankly, anyone reading Kissinger shouldn't be new to these ideas and so there's not a lot of original material or even analysis here. Balance of power, American exceptionalism, contemporary multipolarity. Seen it. Heard it. And read it better elsewhere.

So, not his best work. Check out Diplomacy instead.

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[Ahmed Taher · Rating 3 out of 5]

إحنا طيبين أوي يا خال :( ..
This book should've been named "The American order"!

[أنس برادة · Rating 4 out of 5]

كتاب يخرج زبدة نظر هنري كينسنجر للنظام العالمي عبر فصول عدة ابتدأ بأوروبا و مسارها المحدد لهذا النظام منذ سلام وستفاليا إلى أوروبا العالمية الأولى مرورا
بتحولات القرن الثامن عشر و التاسع عشر ، انتقل إلى الحرب العالمية الثانية و هواجس السلام في الإتحاد الأوروبي و تماسكه .
في الفصل الثالت يحاور الشرق الأوسط منذ بزوغ فجر الإسلام ثم يقفز إلى الحركة الإسلاموية المعاصرة و مواقع عدة دول فيه ، السعودية و إيران خصوصا ثم يمر على تعددية آسيا و كيف يفهمها و خصوصا الصين و الهند .
يعطف على نظرة أمريكا للنظام العالمي بين الواقعية و المثالية و هما النظريتان اللتان تتجاذبان السياسة الخارجبة الأمريكية ، ثم في فصل أمريكا قوة عالمية مترددة ينتقد حروب أمريكا منذ انتصارها في الحرب العالمية الثانية و يبين مشاكلها الإستراتيجية و عواقبها على دور أمريكا في العالم .
له فصول بعد ذلك في التكنولوجيا النووية و تكنولوجيا المعلومات و تأثيرها في النظام العالمي .
كتاب له حظه من النظر في تعريف النظرة الأمريكية إلى النظام العالمي .

[Viet Nguyen · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Trật tự thế giới” (World Order) của Henry Kissinger là một quyến sách rất hay! Hay đến nỗi tôi thấy mình phải viết một bài review dài thật dài về quyển sách này, vì nó đã cho tôi rất nhiều bài học về chính trị, lịch sử, quan hệ ngoại giao giữa các nước. Cộng thêm đây là một trong những cuốn sách đầu tiên tôi đọc về quan hệ quốc tế, nên kiến thức vẫn còn có vẻ hơi nông, rating cao một phần là do tôi được “khai sáng” :) Nếu đọc thêm những review khác trên Goodreads này thì thấy Kissinger là môt nhân vật đầy tranh cãi. Nhưng nếu chỉ xét về nội dung và bỏ qua các kiến thức nền thì tôi thấy vẫn nên cho sách rating cao vì sự logic cao và cái nhìn tổng quan của tác giả.

Sách bắt đầu từ châu Âu, với một sự kiện quan trọng là hoà ước Westphalia năm 1648 kí giữa các nước sau 30 năm chiên tranh tôn giáo. Nó quan trọng vì nó thiết lập nên hệ thống trật tự thế giới mới ở Châu Âu, dựa trên khái niệm các quốc gia có chủ quyền tồn tại bên cạnh nhau. Trong hoà ước Westphalia, một số các nguyên tắc gồm có: sự xâm lược giữa các nước bị kiềm chế bởi tính toán về cân bằng quyền lực, và một chuẩn mực mới được thiết lập chống lại việc một quốc gia can thiệp vào tình hình bên trong một quốc gia khác. Về sau này, khi ảnh hưởng của châu Âu lan rộng khắp thế giới, những nguyên tắc Westphalian này, đặc biệt là khái niệm quốc gia có chủ quyền, bắt đầu trở thành trọng tâm của luật pháp quốc tế. Trật tự Westphalia được nói lại xuyên suốt sách vì nó rất phổ biến trên thế giới hiện nay, nhưng nó không phải là duy nhất, và phần sau của cuốn sách miêu tả những trật tự thế giới khác có mâu thuẩn với nó.

Trớ trêu là mặc dù châu Âu là nơi sản sinh ra trật tự Westphalia, cộng đồng này giờ lại đang rời xa nó. Sau nhiều thế kỉ bị chiến tranh tàn phá, các nước châu Âu giờ đang hướng tới một lục địa hoà bình và thống nhất: mỗi nước thành viên chủ động kiềm chế sức mạnh của mình và cam kết không tranh chấp lãnh thổ. Thế nhưng vì mục tiêu này, Châu Âu đang bị đặt ở thế khó trong hoàn cảnh thế giới hiện nay: Các nước hoặc các khu vực khác không có được cam kết quyết tâm như vậy mà vẫn đang ra sức gia tăng sức mạnh và tầm ảnh hưởng, như Trung Quốc, Iran. Nếu châu Âu không tham gia vào tiến trình xây dựng trật tự thế giới, nó có khả năng sẽ bị nhấn chìm.

Sau châu Âu là đến thế giới Hồi giáo. Thế giới Hồi giáo có một cái nhìn khác hẳn về trật tự thế giới: Hồi giáo chia thế giới thành hai, một bên là thế giới Hồi giáo, bên kia là phi Hồi giáo, và nhiệm vụ của thế giới Hồi giáo là biến phần còn lại thành thế giới Hồi giáo trong một sứ mệnh jihad ( thánh chiến). Quan niệm này tất nhiên mâu thuẫn với trật tự Westphalia, vì những khái niệm như “nhà nước” là không được công nhân trong Hồi giáo, chúng chỉ là những khải niệm thế tục, không chính thống. Thế giới hồi giáo được miêu tả chỉ trong một chương sách, có phần hơi ít so với sự phức tạp của nó. Tôi biết được thêm một số kiến thức như là cuộc xung đột giữa hai nhánh hồi giáo Sunni và Shia. Nguồn gốc sâu xa của sự chia rẽ này là tranh cãi xoay quanh ai là người nối nghiệp nhà tiên tri Mohamed để lãnh đạo Hồi giáo sau cái chết của ông. Hiện tại ở Trung Đông, dòng Shia được lãnh đạo hay chịu ảnh hưởng từ Iran và bao gồm: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, và vùng Địa Trung Hải, còn dòng Sunni được lãnh đạo bởi Ả-rập Saudi, và bao gồm Ai Cập, Jordan, các nước vùng Vịnh, và vùng bán đảo Ả-rập. Chương này có nói qua về Israel, nhưng theo tôi là đã không đi sâu vào vai trò của Israel trong khu vực (một nước Do Thái nhỏ bé giữa một quần thể các nước Hồi giáo!)

Sách dành hẳn một chương để nói về Iran và mối quan hệ với Mỹ. Năm 1979, Giáo chủ Khomeini sau một thời gian sống lưu vong ở nước ngoài đã trở về đảm nhận vai trò “Lãnh đạo tối cao” của cuộc cách mạng chống lại Shah Reza Pahlavi. Ông ta làm vậy dưới danh nghĩa tấn công lại trật tự khu vực thời đó: Học thuyết Khomeini coi các quốc gia có chủ quyền là không chính danh vì chúng “khong dựa trên luật lệ của thánh thần”. Mục tiêu của Khomeini là hướng tới l���t đổ tất cả các chính phủ trong thế giới Hồi giáo và thay thế chúng bằng một chính phủ Hồi giáo duy nhất. Kể từ đây, mối quan hệ giữa Iran với Mỹ và phương Tây trở nên đối địch. Hiện tại, Iran đang đều đặn gia tăng khả năng hạt nhân của mình và phương Tây găp nhiều khó khăn trong việc đàm phán với nước này.

Phần tiếp theo của cuốn sách nói về châu Á. Châu Á là một khu vực phức tạp với nhiều thành phần khác nhau. Thế nhưng trật tự thế giới trong thế kỷ 19 và nửa đầu thế kỷ 20 chủ yếu là do châu Âu thiết lập. Có thể nói, ngoại trừ Nhật Bản, châu Á là một nạn nhân chứ không phải một người chơi trong trật tự quốc tế do chủ nghĩa thực dân sắp đặt. Sau khi trật tự châu Âu sụp đổ sau hai cuộc thế chiến, các nước châu Á đã vượt lên khỏi trật tự cũ qua nhiều cuộc chiến tranh đẫm máu để dành quyền tự chủ. Sau những thay đổi này, các nước châu Á lấy các nguyên tắc của Hoà ước Westphalia làm tiền đề cho chính sách đối ngoại của mình: các quốc gia được coi là đơn vị cơ bản của chính trị quốc tế và trong nước.

Hai quốc gia được nhắc đến trong chương về châu Á là Nhật Bản và Ấn Độ. Với Nhật Bản, vị trí địa lý ở trên quần đảo ngoài khơi đã giúp nước này xây dựng truyền thống và văn hoá đặc biệt trong biệt lập. Trong quá khứ, Nhật Bản vay mượn nhiều từ tôn giáo và văn hoá Trung Quốc nhưng biến nó thành riêng của mình. Nhật Bản cũng không chịu nằm dưới sự ảnh hưởng của Trung Quốc mà phát triển thành một thế lực đối trọng: đã có lần Nhật Bản xâm lược Triều Tiên đến tận gần biên giới TRung Quốc, TRung Quốc đã phải huy động quân để đẩy lùi Nhật. Sau thất bại này, Nhật chuyển sang trạng thái biệt lập. Nhưng khi Mỹ đề nghị được thông thuơng, Nhật Bản đã cân nhắc thông minh và bắt đầu gia nhập vào trật tự thế giới, trở thành một cường quốc hiện đại theo Westphalia. Sau khi bại trận trong Thế chiến 2, Nhật Bản một lần nữa lại chấp nhận sự sắp xếp của các nước thắng trận, đặc biệt là cấm các hành động quân sự, để đổi lấy sự phát triển trong dài hạn. Với Ấn Độ, tóm gọn chính sách đối ngoại hiện nay của nước này là chú trọng vào lợi ích quốc gia, không theo phe phái nào.

Trung Quốc được ưu tiên một chương sách riêng. Trung Quốc có khái niệm lâu đời nhất, rõ ràng nhất và khác biệt nhất so với những ý tưởng của hệ thống theo Hoà ước Westphalia. Từ khi thông nhất bởi Tần Thuỷ Hoàng đến nay, Trung Quốc luôn nghĩ mình ở trung tâm của trật tự thế giới. Các xã hội khác chỉ được nhìn dưới quan hệ triều cống với Trung Quốc mà không thể được xếp bình đẳng.

Sách có hai chương nói về quan điểm của Mỹ về trật tự thế giới. Như trong sách đã tóm tắt: “Thấm nhuần niềm tin rằng xu hướng của mình sẽ định hình vận mệnh toàn nhân loại, kể từ khi lập quốc Mỹ đã đóng một vai trò nghịch lý trong trật tự thế giới: quốc gia này mở mang lãnh thổ trên toàn lục địa với danh nghĩa Vận mệnh hiển nhiên trong khi tuyên bố từ bỏ bất kỳ mưu đồ đế quốc nào; gây nhiều ảnh hưởng quyết định tới các sự kiện trọng đại trong khi tuyên bố không thừa nhận bất kỳ động cơ lợi ích quốc gia nào; và trở thành siêu cường trong khi chối bỏ bất kỳ ý định tiền hành quyền lực chính trị nào”. Mỹ vì thế được gọi là “siêu cường nước đôi”. Chủ nghĩa lý tưởng và chủ nghĩa thực dụng luôn đi song song với nhau trong suy nghĩ của Mỹ. Các đời tổng thống Mỹ luân phiên chuyển đổi giữa hai chủ nghĩa này.

Kissinger có lẽ ủng hộ quan điểm về vai trò đặc biệt của Mỹ trên thế giới. Đọc sách này là lần đầu tiên tôi biết về giai thoại “Thành phố trên đồi” của Ronald Reagan trong bài phát biểu nhậm chức của Tổng thống này (xem ở đây: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pi...). Bài phát biểu này cũng là một khẳng định về những giá trị ưu việt của nước Mỹ. Giờ tôi có thể hiểu được phần nào suy nghĩ của người Mỹ, nhưng tôi không đồng ý rằng nước Mỹ không có gì phải học hỏi từ những nước khác.

Sách kết thúc bằng cái nhìn của Kissinger về ảnh hưởng của khoa học kỹ thuật với trật tự thế giới hiện nay. Chiến tranh hạt nhân khiến các nước không thể tùy tiện xâm phạm lãnh thổ của nhau vì nguy cơ hạt nhân có thể là tận diệt của nhân loại. Chiến tranh mạng là một hình thức mới hơn của việc can thiệp vào lãnh thổ của nước khác. Mạng xã hội tạo ra một hình thái liên quốc gia (transnational) mới mà nhân loại cần làm quen. Công nghệ hiện đại đem đến khả năng vô hạn về lưu trữ, truy xuất thông tin, điều này sẽ có ảnh hưởng đến khả năng ra quyết định của con người, ví dụ trong bầu cử… Nhưng Kissinger cho rằng, nhiều thông tin hơn chưa chắc đã phải là có khả năng thông tuệ cao hơn. Tôi thích luận điểm này của tác giả.

Cuối sách, tác giả vẫn tin vào trật tự Westphalia, nhưng có vẻ như thời nay chúng ta bắt đầu phải nghĩ tới cách tiếp cận những hình thức trật tự thế giới khác.

[Martin, I hate MTG · Rating 1 out of 5]

I wasn’t sure what I was getting into when I chose to read this book. I fell asleep 💤 a couple of times while reading it.

Henry Kissinger is very bright man and I am sure he knows what he is talking about in this book. However, life is just to short to trudge through a book that will put you asleep over time.

[Emiliya Bozhilova · Rating 2 out of 5]

Имах значително по-високо мнение за Кисинджър преди да прочета негова книга, случи се да е тази. Дори от неласкавите портрети, които му бяха обрисували противниците му, включително Ориана Фалачи и нейното прочуто интервю, пак очаквах повече дълбочина.

Вместо това се озовах с една от онези пропагандни листовки от времето на Студената война, възхваляваща другата страна на барикадата, вместо социалистическия рай. Или с една от онези сектантски листовки от времето на Прехода, които ловяха заблудени души, а самите секти - накрая - бяха забранени за щастие, но не и преди да нанесат много вреди.

Месианската, дадена от Бога и от силата на тоягата, мисия на Америка дори не е нужно да се коментира. Световният полицай е и световен мисионер - спасява нации и души, като ги предава на огъня, ако трябва. Нищо ново. Хей, доктор Кисинджър, та Вие сте ветеран в тази игра, и нищо ново? Куп кухи фрази.

Саудитска Арабия е разгледана почти с любов. Тя е вечният, необходим съюзник на САЩ, който не бива да бъде притесняван с неприятни намеци за свободи или права. За разлика от брата-близнак Иран (само дето е шиитски, а не сунитски), който пък е коварен и подмолен.

Точни наблюдения има за ислямския радикализъм, който е наднационален и негова цел е целият свят. Такава е обаче и целта на външната политика на САЩ. Идейно разликата трябва да е огромна, но след прочита такава просто липсва. А се надявах на обратното.

Концепцията за Вестфалския мир от 17-ти век за мен беше нова, и е ценна с тезата за равновесието на конкуриращи се сили като удачен механизъм за баланс и поддържане на ред на европейската сцена.

Имаше интересни исторически наблюдения за Европа, Индия и Китай. Но като цяло схематични, а Европа е привидяна изцяло в прегръдката на Големия Брат.

Войната във Виетнам е щрихирана изцяло от защитна позиция - тя (войната), видите ли, била разумен дебат, но не била доразбрана... Оценките на Кисинджър за бойните действия в Ирак и Афганистан са в пълен синхрон с предаванията на CNN за мироопазващата война и бодрото изстрелване на ракети в кадър.

Ролята на Кисинджър на официалната сцена е приключила през 1977 г. Какъв късмет за всички!

***
🇺🇸”Външната политика на Америка отразява убеждението, че вътрешните и принципи очевидно са универсални сами по себе си и че е добре да се прилагат винаги и навсякъде”

🇺🇸 За Виетнамската война и участието на САЩ:
”Правителствата, които вкарват Америка в Индокитай, са съставени от личности със значителна интелигентност и умение, които внезапно се оказват обвинявани в престъпна лудост и нарочни лъжи.”

🇺🇸 За политиката към Ирак, Иран и региона:
”В тези условия Америка трябва да реши как да постигне най-доброто съчетание между сигурност и моралност, осъзнавайки, че няма как да постигне и двете.”

🇺🇸 “Американският идеализъм и изключителност са движещите сили, стоящи зад изграждането на един нов международен ред.”

🇺🇸 “Изпълнен от убеждението, че разпространението му би обединило цялото човечество, ислямът е едновременно религия, мултиетническа държава и нов световен ред.”

🇺🇸 “САЩ имат достатъчно исторически и геополитически основания да насърчават ЕС и да го предпазват да не се измести към един геополитически вакуум.”

[Chet Herbert · Rating 3 out of 5]

Excellent beginning; astute historical analysis, especially regarding the evolutionary nature of the balancing of power, legitimacy, and order in Europe from the seventeenth century Peace of Westphalia, through the Congress of Vienna in the wake of Napoleon's wars, up to collapse of order with the First World War. Kissinger is at his weakest in presenting a shockingly whitewashed and rhetorically idealistic foundation of United States' concept of order as "Acting for All Mankind". . . a cherry-picked, feel-good, American Exceptionalism story ([America] expanded across a continent in the name of Manifest Destiny while abjuring imperial designs; exerted a decisive influence on momentous events while disclaiming any motivation of national interest. . ." so much for Realism, Henry) leaving out inconvenient things like, say, atrocities committed against American Indians, brutal suppression of Filipino resistance after American acquisition of the islands during the Spanish-American War, or the frequent intervention of the U.S. government on the behalf corporate interests world-wide (United Fruit in Guatemala? or messy regime change in Iraq [or Chile, eh Henry?]) Kissinger is better with his brief global summations, emphasizing that nations play better together when they have a vested interest to do so and that it's probably important to have an understanding of the historical, cultural, religious, and psycho-social make-up of nations one is dealing with because wishful thinking or willful ignorance isn't a very effective foreign policy strategy.

[Mahya danesh · Rating 3 out of 5]

هنری کسی��جرتو ان کتاب از نظم هایی که در ادوار مختلف بر جهان حاکم شده مثل (موازنه قوا و دوقطبی زمان جنگ سرد و هژمونی امریکا ) حرف میزنه و پذیرش متفاوت مناطق مختلف از این نظم به ویژه در خاورمیانه و حتی یه فصل مت��اوت برای ایران.
توی این کتاب احساس کردم تمایل و تاکید کسینجر بیشتر روی دو شکل از نظم بود یکی موازنه قوا که از پیمان وستفالی اغاز شده و یکی هژمونی امریکا بعد از فروپاشی شوروی.
کتاب روان نوشته شده و ترجمه خوبی هم داره ولی به نظرم زیادی درباره امریکا نویسنده غلو کرده ،انگار که رسالت امریکا پیامبری و اطلاح و نظم سازی در جهانه و بقیه موظف به اطاعت از اون .
هرچند من خودم موافق یک سری اصول و هنجارهای جهانی هستم ولی به شیوه معتدلانه چون به قول خود کسینجر پیاده کردن این نظم توی هر نقطه از جهان قرار نیست یک پاسخ مشابه بده گاهی خودش ایجاد بی نظمی‌و‌ به وجود اومدن گروهک هایی مثل القاعده میکنه .
.
خلاصه که خوندنش واسه بچه های روابط بین الملل و علوم سیاسی واجبه ولی بقیه اگه صرفا علاقه دارن بخونن ،با نخوندنش شاید چیز خاصی رو از دست نداده باشن
.
راستی این چه طراحی افتضاحی بود که برای جلد داشتن😄ادم بدش میومد سراغ کتاب بره😅😅

[Jack · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kissinger can write a book. His wisdom and depth of understanding are phenomenal. He discusses the concept of world order. Or what we perceive as world order based off of the Westphalian system of states from 1648. Now we progress through that of empires and their disintegration after World War I. What next...in reality not much except a hiatus of hostilities which broke out fully in World War II. The next great phase is that of the Cold War, NATO, the rise of the oil states, and the post-colonial era where the colonies threw off the yoke of the colonial masters. The monoliths were the Soviet Union and the US. They divided the world in a way. The free and those of the communist block. Mixed in this was the subtle rise or the whispers of radical Islam. The mixing of the lineup of Islamic nations versus the rest do us...the European nations and the US where it remains today. I could go on and on. A fantastic book written by one of the greatest of statesman...maybe the last...Henry Kissinger.

[Laura Noggle · Rating 4 out of 5]

Stirring conclusion, impressive in scope, valid analysis.

Kissinger is an astute statesman even if I don’t agree with him on every point.

Looking forward to reading his book On China, as I lived in Beijing for several years and earned my MA in international China studies while living in Taiwan.

[Dulguun]

Энэ оны 9-н сарын 9-нд Америкийн нэрт дипломатч Хенри Киссенжер-н “World Order” буюу Монголоор “Дэлхийн Дэглэм” гээд ном гаргасныг миний бие авч уншлаа. Хэвлэлтээс гараад удаагүй байгаа ч гэсэн намайг Вашингтонд сая хоёр долоо хоноход тэнд ажиллаж байгаа хүмүүсийн дунд ихэд яригдаж эхэлсэн, цаг хүрээ нь зөвхөн гадаад бодлого боловсруулдаг хүмүүс гэлтгүй, олон нийтэд их сайн хүрч байх шиг санагдсан юм.

Зохиогч Х.Киссенжер өөрөө Вашингтон ДиСи-д “Center for Strategic Studies” дээр ирж яриа хүртэл өгч байсан. Мэдээж Х.Киссенжер бол олон улсад танигдсан мэргэжлийн дипломатч хүн, өмнө нь “Diplomacy”, “On China” гээд хэд хэдэн ном гаргасан, эдгээрийн зарим нь дипломатч хүний ширээний ном болж дэлхий дахинаа хүлээн зөвшөөрөгдсөн бүтээл болсон. Үүнээс гадна Х.Киссенжер АНУ-н Төрийн Департаментийн сайд зэрэг өндөр албан тушаал эрхэлж, АНУ-н бодлогыг боловсруулалтаас эхлээд хэрэгжүүлж дуусах бүх шатны процесст ямар нэг байдлаар ажиллаж, зааварлаж, боловсруулж, удирдаж ирсэн төрийн хүн. 1970-д онд Ерөнхийлөгч Никсоны тусгай элчээр ажиллаж, АНУ-БНХАУ-н харилцааг дахин сайжруулж өнөөгийн түвшинд гаргахад гол үүрэг гүйцэтгэсэн хүмүүсийн нэг гээд яривал түүний хийсэн гавьяа, бүтээсэн ажил дуусахгүй биз. Тэгвэл Х.Киссенжер энэ номон дээрээ яг юуг зорьж бичив гэдгийг өөрийн мунхаг оюундаа тунгааснаа та бүхэнтэй хуваалцая гэж бодлоо.

Зохиогч энэ номондоо өнөөгийн дэлхий дахинаа бүрдээд буй дэглэм юунаас үүдэлтэйг түүхийн өнцгөөс харж, тухайн цаг үеийн нөхцөл байдалтай уялдуулан тайлбарлажээ. Энд дэглэм гэдгээр би юуг хэлэх гээд байна вэ гэхээр өнөөдрийн энх тайван мандан бадарсан (зарим хүмүүс тэгж бодохгүй байх, гэхдээ энд тэнд жижиг мөргөлдөөн гарч байгаа ч сүүлийн хэдэн зуун жилд байгаагүйгээр өнөөдөр энх тайван ноёлож байгаа) олон улсын энэ систем буюу дэлхийн нэгдүгээр дайнаас өмнө сууриа тавьж, хоёрдугаар дайны дараагаар дахин бэхжиж бүрэлдэн тогтсон одоогийн системийг хэлж байгаа юм. Аль нэг улс хүчирхэгжихэ��р хажуу бөөрөндөө байгаа улс руу “дуртай” өдрөө дайрч, хүссэнээ авчихдаг байсан үеээс өнөөг хүртэл замналыг Х.Киссенжер ах өөрийн бодол, гаргасан гаргалгаатайгаар тайлбарлаж, өнөөдрийн тогтоод буй дэглэмийн суурь шинж чанар болоод үүний давуу тал, сул талыг харуулахыг оролдсон байна. Мэдээж энэ бүхний голд АНУ-н үүрэг роль, алдаа дутагдал болон цаад шалтгааныг тэрээр өөрийн бодлоор, нуршилгүйгээр үгүйлсэн байна.

Гадаад бодлого судалж буй хэн боловч олон улсын харилцаанд хоёр ерөнхий чиг хандлага байдгийг мэдэх биз. Эхнийх бол бодит риалист геополитик буюу нь олон улсын харилцаа нь харилцаанд оржу буй улсуудын хүчний тэнцвэр дээр тогтдог гэж үздэг харин нөгөөх нь Вилсониан буюу олон улсын харилцаа нь нийтийн эрх ашгийг хамгаалсан, илүү хүний цаад мөн чанар сайн гэдэгт тулгуурласан, энх тайван нь зөвхөн хүчний тэнцвэр дээр биш, улс хоорондын ойлголцол, хүмүүсийн итгэлцэлд суурилж бүрдэж болно гэсэн ойголт байдаг. Эдгээр ойлголтын талаар илүү нарийн судлая гэвэл Х.Киссенжерийн бичсэн Diplomacy гэдэг ном нь хамаагүй сайн ойлголт өгнө. Харин “Дэлхийн Дэглэм” номны хувьд эдгээр ойлголтуудыг ашиглаж, орчин үед нийцүүлэн хүмүүст илүү ойр өнцгөөс харж, өнөөдрийн энэ дэлхийн дэглэмийн цаана ямар хүчний далд тоглолт оршиж байгааг харуулжээ.

Мөхөс миний хувьд номын хураангуйг энд бичих гэсэнгүй, харин энэ номыг хэн илүү сонирхвол бол, хэнд илүү хэрэг болж болох бол, бас энэ номыг уншихаас өмнө тавьж буй хүлээлт юу байх вэ гэдгийг өчүүхэн чадвартаа тулгуурлаж бичихийг зорисон болой. Нэг талаас өдөр тутмын амьдралаа болгох гээд өнөөдрийн хоол маргаашын талх гээд явж байгаа хүмүүст энэ ном ач холбогдлоор бага байх болов уу. Энэ номыг уншаад хувийн бизнестэй бол бизнесийн хүрээ тэлнэ гэж байхгүй, ажлынх нь бүтээмж өснө ч гэж бас байхгүй. Тэгэхээр энэ номыг илүү гадаад бодлого сонирхогчид, мөн дэлхий дахинаа энд тэнд мөргөлдөөн болоод байгаа хэрнээ яагаад мөргөлдөөн даамжирч дэлхийг хамарсан зөрчилдөөн үүсчихгүй байна, томоохон хэмжээний зөрчилдөөн үүсэхээр бол хаана ямар нөхцөлд үүсэх боломжтой бол, ирээдүйд манай хөрш улс дэлхийн тавцнаа гарахаар бол ямар шинж чанарыг нь бид ажиглах ёстойв, нөгөө талаас бид яаж бэлдэх боломжтой гэдэг асуултыг бага ч болов хариулахад дэм болохоор бичигджээ.

Уг номыг манай гадаад бодлого боловсруулагчид, улс төрийн удирдагчид, Монгол улсын бодлогыг чиглүүлж буй эрхэмүүд, даа ялангуяа дотоодын бодлогоо гадаад ерөнхий орчин нөхцөлтэй хэрхэн уях вэ, Монголчуудын хүсэл зоригийг төлөөлөхдөө ямар зарчимд тулгуурлавал манай үндэстэний оршин тогтнол бэхжих вэ, бид ямар үзэл баримтлалыг цуцашгүй дагавал бидний хойч үе маань илүү амар амгалан орчинд амьдрах бол гэдгийг шийдвэрлэж буй төрийн зүтгэлтэнгүүд үзвэл ач холбогдлоор өндөр байх болов уу гэж мунхагланам. Хүйтэн дайны үед ерөнхийлөгч Никсоны удирдлаган дор Хятадтай харилцаагаа сайжруулах бодлого нь АНУ-н хувьд хоёр коммунист улстай хоёулантай нь харилцаагаа сайжруулж, энэ хоёрын хоорондын харилцаанаас АНУ-н эдгээр хоёр улстай харилцах тус тусын харилцаа нь илүү байх юм бол АНУ-д ихээхэн хожилтой байна гэсэн дүгнэлт дээр хийсэн хүчний тэнцвэрийн тоглолтын нэг хэсэг байсныг энд өгүүлсэн. Үүнтэй агаар нэг бодож үзвэл Орос Хятад хоёрын хоорондын харилцааны түвшингээс илүү хэмжээнд Монгол улс маань энэхүү хоёр хөрштэйгээ харилцаагаа сайжруулж чадвал Монголд ч гэсэн маш том давуу талтай гэдэг нь ахмад дипломатчийн хувьд илэрхий юм байж болох ч гэсэн сонирхолтой гаргалгаа гарч байна. Энэ талаар цааш нь ургуулаад бодоод үзвэл бидний Монголчууд хөршийн харилцаагаар өндөрт хүргэж чадлаа гэхэд гурав дахь хөршийн(хөршүүдийн) бодлогоо энэ стратегитэй хэрхэн уялдуулж, манай улсын үндсэн зарчимд нэгээхэн тулгуур болсон гурав дахь хөршийн харилцааг яаж авч явбал зүгээр вэ гэсэн энгийн мэт боловч хэрэгжүүлэхэд яривагтай асуудлуудыг хүртэл хөндөхөд хүрнэ. Уг номыг унших зуур энэ мэт элдэвийн эргэцүүлэл орж ирэх нь уг номны танд өгөх өгөөжийг нэмэх болов уу.

За тэгээд Х.Киссенжер гуай номны сүүлийн хэсэгт АНУ-н гадаад бодлого, үйл ажиллагааны талаар өгүүлэхдээ АНУ-н үйлдлүүдийн цаад шалтгааныг өөрийн өнцгөөс тайлбарлаж, дэлхийн дэглэм оршин тогтнох нэгээхэн тулгуур бол АНУ-н оролцоо гэсэн гол ерөнхий санааг багтааж өгсөн. Мэдээж ийнхүү ойлгуулах нь тэр хүний хувийн амьдралын замналтай салшгүй холбоотой, нөгөөтэйгүүр АНУ-н эрх ашигтай яв цав нийцэж ч байгаа тул уншигч авхай энэ бүхнийг, АНУ-н үйл��эл тус бүр дээр сөргүүлэн тавьж буй шалтгаан бүртэй харьцуулан өөрийн дүгнэлтийг гаргах нь зүйд нийцнэ гэдгийг надаар хэлүүлэлтгүй мэдэх бизээ.

“Юу хэлэх нь хамгийн чухал биш, юуг хэлээгүй нь хамгийн чухал юм” гэж нэгэн ухаантан хэлсэн байдаг. Тэгвэл эцэст нь гэж хэлэхэд та энэ номыг уншаад номонд юуг дурьдалгүй өнгөрчихөв, энэ бүхнийг илэрхийлэхдээ хувь хүний цаад итгэл үнэмшил юунд тулгуурлаж байв, ил тод бичээгүй ч гэсэн үг бүрийн цаана нуугдах давхар утга, өгүүлбэр дунд далдлагдах нуанс бүрийг гарган ойлгож чадах юм бол үнэхээр бахархууштай. Оюуны бяд муухан миний бие 10-н жилийн өмнө энэ номыг уншсан бол номны гол санааг орхигдуулж, цаад зорилгыг ойлголгүй өнгөрөх байсан юм уу гэж бодлоо. Одоо ч гэсэн олон зүйлийг орхигдуулсан гэдэгт огт эргэлзэхгүй байгаа учир удалгүй дахин нэг уншиж, цаад үг өгүүлбэр бүрийг дахин нэг самнана гэж бодож байна.

Өчүүхэн миний бясалгал үүгээр дуусч буй учир, энэ хүртэл уншсан танд талархахын зэрэгцээ цаг зав, хүч хөдөлмөрөө гарган байж шивсэн сэтгэгдэл маань миний бичгийн чадвар муугаас болж тэр чигээрээ хог дээр үсэрчих вийдээ гэсэн айдас агуулан байж, өгүүлэл маань танд энэ номны талаар бага ч атугай ойлголт өгсөн байгаасай гэж гүнээ сүсэглэн найдюу. Номын цагаан буян дэлгэрэх болтугай.

[Dimitar Angelov · Rating 4 out of 5]

От теоретична гледна то��ка "Световен ред" е апология на концепцията за "баланса на силите" в международните отношения.

Макар и почти никога да не съм се съгласявал с тезите на Кисинджър, винаги ми е харесвало как пише. След изказванията му за нуждата Украйна да отстъпи територии на Русия, за да сложи край на войната (което ми се иска да отдам на преклонната му възраст), много се почудих дали изобщо да прочета книгата.

Все пак го сторих и не мога да кажа, че съжалявам. Във вече неблизкото минало, като студент, следвах именно в това направление и прочитът на "Световен ред" ми даде шанс да си припомня някои позабравени факти и гледни точки. Книгата върви бързо и не уморява с прекалена абстрактност. И "Световен ред", и magnum opus-ът "Дипломацията" (която е по-ориентирана към историята на международните отношения и значително по-обемна) обаче препоръчвам да се четат критично. Кисниджър далеч не е най-безпристрастният анализатор на световните дела...

[Mostafa · Rating 4 out of 5]

هنری کیسینجر وزیرخارجه سابق ایالات متحده و از افراد مشهورِ دورانِ حاضر در زمینه سیاست خارجی است؛ چه از وی بدمان بیاید چه خوشمان، او دیپلماتی کارکشته و فردی با دانش و هوش سرشار در علم سیاست است.
کیسینجر در آخرین اثر مکتوب خود به مفهوم "نظم جهانی" پرداخته است. کیسینجر معتقد است تاکنون هیچ نظمی شکل نگرفته است که مصداق تمام و کمال نظم جهانی باشد و چیزی که امروزه به عنوان "نظم جهانی" شناخته میشود حدود چهارقرن پیش در اروپای غربی بر اساس صلح وستفالی بنیان نهاده شده است. در آن زمان یک نبرد فرقه‌ای و شورش سیاسی منجر به یک جنگ سی ساله خانمان سوز گردید که در نتیجه آن یک چهارم جمعیت اروپای مرکزی از بین رفتند.
اما این آرمانِ هرگز استقرار نیافته‌یِ برپایی نظم جهانی وی را سرخورده از تلاش برای دستیابی به این امر نمیکند.
صلح وستفالی که شروعی شد بر همزیستی مسالمت آمیز دولت‌های اروپایی نه یک دیدگاه سراسر اخلاقی، بلکه ارائه دهنده راهکاری عملی برای کنار آمدن با واقعیت بود.
همان گونه که از عنوان فرعی کتاب پیداست کیسینجر به تاریخ اهمیت فراوانی میدهد و به همین خاطر به دنبال پیدایش و استقرار نظم و درس گیری از برپایی انواع نظم‌های جهانی به اعماق تاریخ سرک میکشد.
شروع او باسقوط امپراتوری رم است و با رسیدن به قرون وسطا و جنبش پروتستان، که او آن را پایانی بر مفوم نظم جهانیِ مبتنی بر پاپ و امپراتور میداند، به سراغ جنگ‌های سی ساله اروپایی میرود. او پس از بررسی تاریخ اروپا به سراغ دیگر مناطق دنیا میرود.
مقصد بعدی او خاورمیانه است. خاورمیانه‌ای که مهد اسلام است و در سده هفتم و هشتم میلادی درصدد برپایی نظمی جهانی بر پایه اسلام بود.
در فصل بعدی او به تبیین جایگاه ایران در مفهوم نظم جهانی میپردازد. او رویکرد ایران به نظم جهانی را به 3دوره تقسیم میکند؛ ایرانِ امپراتوری، ایرانِ قبل و بعد از انقلاب اسلامی.
در فصل بعدی او به سراغ شرق آسیا رفته با و بررسی تاریخ مللِ چین، هند، ژاپن به نقش این کشورها در مفهوم نظم بین المللی میپردازد.
در فصول بعد او به سراغ آمریکا که به عبارتی میتوان سرمنشا نظم جهانی کنونی دانست میرود. او نقشی راهبردی و تعیین کننده در برپایی نظم جهانی برای آمریکا قائل است. نظمی که از 1948 با بسط دموکراسی، آزادی و تجارت آزاد در دنیا شروع شد و درنهایت با پیروزی بر رقیب خود یعنی کمونیسم به قله رهبری رسید. اما او نقش راهبردی و نه رهبری برای آمریکا قائل است و معتقد است که برای برپایی نظم جهانی اقدامات یک کشور کافی نبوده و نیاز به ارتباط و همکاری با سایر ملل نیز هست.
در فصل پایانی او به سراغ تسلیحات هسته‌ای و عصر انقلاب اطلاعاتی رفته و برای تکنولوژی و فضای سایبری نقشی تعیین کننده در ارتقا یا نابودی نظم جهانی کنونی قائل است. او معتقد است برای رسیدن به نخستین نظم واقعا جهانی دستاوردهای بزرگ انسان در زمینه فناوری میبایست با افزایش توانایی قضاوت اخلاقی و انسانی همراه گردد.

هدف امروزه ی دولتمردان جهان باید حفظ تعادل و در عین حال زنجیر بستن بر پای دیوِ جنگ و رام کردن خوی جنگ طلبی باشد و میبایست برای رسیدن به این هدف سری هم به سیلاب خروشانِ تاریخ زنند.

پ.ن: امتیاز 4 نه به ترجمه ضعیف کتاب و همچنین نداشتنِ فهرست اعلام بلکه به خاطرِ میزان دانش کسب شده از پیرمردِ دیپلمات، هنری کیسینجر، است.

[Brian Eshleman · Rating 4 out of 5]

My expectations of Kissinger as a writer were shaped by an interaction in Woodward and Bernstein's Final Days where he commends the analysis of one of his underlings but supposedly says that it is too complicated for Pres. Nixon to understand, that the document in question needed to be at "Reader's Digest" level for Nixon to be able to process it.

Therefore, I expected Kissinger to be both difficult to read and condescending. Perhaps the quote was inaccurate, perhaps it represented a moment of snarky condescension in an otherwise wiser communicator, or perhaps Kissinger either matured or communicated differently to a general reading audience, but here, he is a clear and gracious communicator – even about Nixon. This is one of those works that makes the reader feel smarter about a daunting area because the writer does such a good job laying out general patterns that are going to show themselves to the reader again in foreign affairs and in life.

To assist in this, Kissinger sifts through centuries of quotes in a variety of fields to help the reader crystallize understanding and pack away an apt phrase. He actually manages to organize centuries of diplomacy over an entire planet into a coherent narrative, and, as such I would recommend this work to almost anyone.

[Bakunin · Rating 5 out of 5]

I found this book to be a gem.
Kissinger describes from a historical perspective why we have the global challenges that we have today. He generalizes a tad in my view but in doing so also allows the reader to get a much firmer grasp of what each nations foreign policy is really about.
In Kissingers view, the modern world was formed in the aftermath of the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 where the concept of the sovereign state was invented. Foreign embassies were established in different countries and foreign policy became largely a matter of trying to keep the power balance between these different countries. The hegemony of this type of order came to be challenged both by islamism and communism and it remains a question for the 21st century as to which system of dealing with conflicts will prevail.

[Vigan Rogova · Rating 2 out of 5]

In general, the book was below my expectations and what it's title suggests. The first chapters on Europe, its history is thoroughly explained and I learned a lot of interesting facts. The same goes for last chapters on American Presidents, their doctrines and visions which I liked a lot.

However, the middle of the book is of the poor value. The author goes briefly on Middle East and Asia... there is a lot of "take and leave" of subjects without really giving a sense of it. Given the actuality, I would expect more thorough view on this area of the world and thoughts on its future, as a former Secretary of State. The author gives a lot of accent to Westphalia Treaty comparing it to Middle East and Asia order which is odd to me!?!

As I finished the book I got un empty feeling of it.

[Peter · Rating 5 out of 5]

Henry Kissinger requires no introduction…but here it is anyway. Kissinger is among the most astute participants in the foreign policy debates of the 20th and early 21st centuries. He has been at the table throughout the post-WWII Russian acquisition of eastern Europe, the Cuban Missile crisis, the Cold War, the collapse (and potential re-emergence) of Russian strength, and the new Islamist disruptions in the Middle East. As Nixon’s Secretary of State he played a central role in the early1970s American-Chinese rapprochement. His view that western institutions—democracy, free markets, religious tolerance, separation of church and state— translate poorly to non-western countries has been demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Kissinger's emphasis on national interest as a guide to policy—to the near exclusion of moral and humanitarian interests—irks many, but it offers a stable lens for guiding policy in a world where morality isn't absolute. He believes that any “world order” is a web of international understandings providing a tenuous and fragile balance of current national interests, constantly threatened by changes in perceived interests and departures from agreed-upon rules, and not greatly affected by sporadic attempts to build good will—good will is fine but it doesn’t bring home the bacon. To Kissinger, a stable world order requires two things: legitimacy (the acceptance of each state by other states) and power (the ability to redress aggressions by individual states)

The World Order is Kissinger’s latest (2014) contribution to the geopolitics of Planet Earth; his last was the very enlightening On China (2012, see review). I am inclined to highlight things I want to remember, and in this book the pages are strikingly yellow. We get a deep and thoughtful trip through world history and the institutions and ideas that framed the notion of “world order” in each of the major regions: United States, Europe (including Russia), the Middle East (with emphasis on Iran and Islam) , South Asia (India and Pakistan) and the Far East (China and Japan); sorry Australia, Africa, South America. The differences in approaches to foreign policy are skillfully outlined, and at the end we better understand why it is so difficult to obtain mutually beneficial agreements that serve both religious and secular interests.

Consider Kissinger’s description of the notion of world order in Europe. The Pax Romana, a world order maintained by force in which a single powerful entity—Rome—held the power and mediated disputes between the regions and local city-states, was based on a simple rule: national interest—what was good for Rome was good for the empire. Rome suppressed dissent and extracted resources from its hinterlands, but it kept the peace for centuries. The division of the Empire between the Orthodox eastern (centered in Constantinople) and the Rome in the 4th century weakened the Empire. Invasions by “barbarians” resulted in collapse of the Roman empire and a slide of western Europe into feudal Only the rise of the Catholic Church provided a restoration of order as the Pope mediated them on a rule of national interest—what was good for the Vatican was good for all. Essentially, the Church and the Pope replaced Rome and the Emperor. Once again, a balance of power was re-established--force (the moral force of excommunication and the military force of fealty to the Pope) kept order.

Kissinger marks the beginning of a decentralized European order at the Peace of Westphalia that ended the 1618-48 Thirty Years War between western Europe, begun as a religious dispute over which state should have its prince elected as Holy Roman Emperor, the conflict spread to include all of Europe and to draw in the Ottoman empire. The Peace restored order by creating the notion of equal sovereign states operating maintaining a balance of power: If any state became aggressive outside its borders, other states would oppose it until balance was restored, at which time sovereignty for all nations—even former aggressors—would be honored.

In post-Westphalian Europe there were numerous conflicts, most notably the Napoleonic Wars and World War I. In each of those, England used its vast navy to counter the aggression and Russia played an important role with its land forces. However, WWI toppled the Westphalian system of checks and balances: that “accidental” war restored no balance as the British-American-Russian forces and the German-Austrian forces beat each other into a bloody stalemate that ended in the punitive Treaty of Versailles that severely infringed on Germany’s sovereignty with limitations on military forces, outrageous reparations, and forced abdication of the Kaiser. No longer would the vanquished return to its former status as an equal and sovereign state. Not until the Pax Americana after World War II did a world order reemerge.

After Europe, Kissinger turns our attention to the Middle East and the rise of Islam. The Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire maintained balance until 1453, when the Ottoman Turks took Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire became the key player in the Middle East and Islam became the official religion and the source of the Empire’s foreign policies. Once again, a central power equivalent to the old Roman Empire provided order. But the requirements of Islam were different from the requirements of Christianity at that time—though not much different than those of earlier Christianity with its inquisition and crusades. Islam forbade compromise with nonbelievers except as a temporary tactical practice; Islam forced conversions at the pain of death; Islam recognized no other religion—a nonbeliever was automatically an atheist. The pluralism and tolerance that Europe had developed was anathema to Islam. A notion of order had risen that was implacably bent on expansion and conquest.

The Islamic world order lasted until the end of World War I, when the victors attempted to re-establish the Westphalian system of equal sovereign nations and balance of power by drawing the borders of newly-created nations that lacked legitimacy, ersatz states like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and, later, Pakistan. The core of the Ottoman Empire—Turkey—became a secular state in 1923 under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; it has long struggled to remain secular. Of the new states only Iran (and Turkey) had a long political tradition and, ironically, Iran’s was not in Islam. The Iranian state was formed from what had been Persia, with a long cultural history and with Zoroastrianism as its primary religion. Unlike Islam, Zoroastrianism stressed good deeds, was of a secular hue, and was generally tolerant. This philosophy prevailed under the Shah until the 1979 Iranian revolution crushed it, with consequences of which we are well aware.

Before turning to the United States, Kissinger discusses China and Japan. Much of the discussion of China is a summary of his 2012 On China, particularly its belief that it was the master of All Under Heaven and its reliance on a tribute system in place of force: other states were vassals whose awe at China’s magnificence would bring them to the Emperor’s feet. His awe was expressed by ritual gifts in which the tribute-giving state received more tribute in return. The tribute system allowed China to buy the docility of its neighbors and it provided a barter system of international trade as an alternative to the western market system. China was supremely indifferent to the doings of distant states, focusing its attention on the neighboring states. China also eschewed expansion because it already owned the world—the Emperor was already Master of All Under Heaven. Its isolation began breaking down with the two opium wars in the mid-19th century, followed by the intrusion of western powers onto its soil. The ultimate collapse came with the communist revolution’s ascendancy in 1949.

One could go on and on…and I already have. This is a very serious book well worth reading by anyone interested in how the world got to here, and where it might go. A slam-dunk five stars.

[Natia Morbedadze · Rating 4 out of 5]

ეს წიგნი მხოლოდ დიპლომატიით ან პოლიტიკით დაინტერესებულთათვის არ არის. ჰენრი კისინჯერს იმდენად საინტერესოდ და მარტივი ენით აქვს განმარტებული მსოფლიო წესრიგის თემა ევროპის, აზიის, ახლო აღმოსავლეთისა და აშშ-ს მაგალითებზე, რომ ყველა სიამოვნებით წაიკითხავს ისტორიას, რომელიც უხსოვარი დროიდან იწყება და დღევანდელ დღემდე მოდის ვესტფალიის ზავის, ვენის კონგრესისა და კიდევ უამრავი მსოფლიო მნიშვნელობის მოვლენის "გავლით", მსოფლიო წესრიგის შემქმნელი თუ ამრევი ადამიანების ამბით...

[Yves Gounin · Rating 2 out of 5]

On repose le dernier livre de Henry Kissinger avec deux sentiments contradictoires : l’admiration respectueuse et la gêne persistante.

D’un côté, cette brillante fresque de trois siècles et demi d’histoire diplomatique et les analyses visionnaires de l’actualité internationale qui la prolongent ne peuvent que susciter l’admiration. A quatre-vingt dix ans passés, Henry Kissinger est un monstre sacré des relations internationales : il en fut l’un des acteurs les plus influents aux temps de l’administration Nixon et Ford et en reste l’un des commentateurs les plus autorisés. Son livre, typiquement anglo-saxon, est sans équivalent dans l’édition française : c’est ni plus ni moins l’histoire du monde qu’il nous raconte. En ouvrant « L’ordre du monde », on se sent bien modestes face à tant d’érudition ; puis on se sent un peu plus intelligents en le refermant.
A travers le temps et à travers l’espace, Kissinger raconte l’ordre mondial, produit toujours fragile de la combinaison de la force et de la légitimité, au prisme d’une théorie : la théorie réaliste des relations internationales dont il est l’un des pères fondateurs . Ses principes en sont simples : l’histoire des relations internationales est celle des États qui la composent et qui s’opposent au nom de la défense de leurs intérêts égoïstes. Ils ont été posés en 1648 par les traités de Westphalie qui mirent fin à la guerre de Trente ans. Ils furent réaffirmés à Vienne en 1815 au lendemain de la Révolution française et des guerres napoléoniennes. Le vingtième siècle les a trahis à deux reprises : en 1919 à Versailles en excluant l’Allemagne de la table de négociation, en 1945 à San Francisco en rêvant à une communauté internationale fondée sur des valeurs partagées.
D’inspiration européenne, ces principes westphaliens ont essaimé à travers la planète : dans le monde musulman où l’Islam aspire à étendre le califat à la terre entière, en Asie où la Chine s’est longtemps vécue comme le « centre du monde » appelé à gouverner « tout ce qui est sous le Ciel ». Par une paradoxale pirouette de l’Histoire, l’ordre westphalien a abandonné les terres qui l’a vu naître pour trouver une nouvelle vitalité dans des régions qui lui étaient étrangères : l’Europe, bercée par le rêve d’une construction fédérale qui a toujours inspiré et inspire encore à Henry Kissinger le plus grand scepticisme, est devenue post-westphalienne alors que l’Asie et, derrière l’image fallacieuse que donne la croyance en une même foi, le Moyen-Orient, sont devenus des espaces westphaliens où des États s’affrontent au nom de leurs intérêts nationaux.

De l’autre côté, le respect que suscite une si brillante analyse n’empêche pas une gêne persistante. Vingt ans après Diplomacy (1994), son œuvre maîtresse, il livre une analyse qui repose encore et toujours sur les mêmes paradigmes. Témoignage d’une admirable cohérence dans son œuvre ? ou incapacité à tenir compte de l’évolution du monde ? Henry Kissinger reste fidèle aux principes qui structurent sa pensée depuis la thèse qu’il avait consacrée à Harvard en 1954 à la paix de Vienne. Pour lui, seuls les États et leurs intérêts égoïstes importent. Kissinger reste aveugle au rôle grandissant des acteurs non-étatiques – et aux réflexions de ceux qui, de James Rosenau à Stephen Krasner en passant par Richard Rosecrance ou Susan Strange, n’ont cessé de prophétiser l’avènement d’un monde postnational. Sans doute sensible à cette critique, Kissinger consacre-t-il l’ultime chapitre de son dernier livre aux questions technologiques. Mais, il y est surtout question de l’arme nucléaire – analysée en des termes identiques depuis cinquante ans. Si Internet y est évoqué, c’est plus pour son impact sur notre vie quotidienne que son influence sur la conduite des relations internationales.

[حيدر العبدلي]

كتاب هائل المعلومات يتناول مفهوم النظام العالمي عبر العصور وعناصره من توازن القوة والمشروعية وغيرها . من تأليف داهية العصر الثعلب هنري كيسنجر احد ابرز مهندسي سياسة الولايات المتحدة الامريكية الاستراتيجية وأشهر وزير خارجية لأمريكا على الإطلاق. من الكتب شديدة الدسامة والمهمة لأي مكتبة بل هو مرجع لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه. شعرت بمراوغته الشديدة في الفصل المتعلق بالقضية الفلسطينية عندما شرح الصراع على انه اسلامي يهودي، هو تغاضى عن مشكلة شعب وسكان اصليين وتناسى فترة المقاومة اليسارية والقومية وحشر الصراع في زوايته الدينية كي يعطي المبرر لدعم اسرائيل المطلق في محيط اسلامي لا يقبل التعايش مع الأفكار الاخرى. ان فشل العرب الذريع في الصراع مع الصهيونية وتسلم راية المقاومة من قبل ايران مع توظيفها للقضية ومتاجرتها بها لمصلحة نظامها الايديولوجي اعطى لهكذا اراء حجتها في الوقت الحالي. لكن ومع بقاء قضية فلسطين دون حل عادل فلا اعتقد انه سيكون هنالك استقرار حقيقي في المنطقة. بل ان الحركات المتطرفة تجد مشروعيتها من تبني هذه القضية وكذلك اسرائيل تروج تهديدات هذه الجماعات للمجتمع الدولي لاظهار الصراع على انه بين اكثرية اسلامية واقلية يهودية في المنطقة.
تنبأ الكتاب او حذر وهو المكتوب عام 2015 من استغلال تكنلوجيا المعلومات ومواقع التواصل في خلق انظمة ديماغوجية تخاطب العواطف والغرائز وترسم السياسة الخارجية لها على اساس الاحتياجات الداخلية قصيرة المدى مهددة بانهيار النظام العالمي على المدى الطويل، ولعل اول اثبات لهذا التنبوء هو صعود دونالد ترامب وفوزه بالانتخابات مع ما صاحب ذلك من عملية استغلال للبيانات الخاصة بمواقع التواصل واعطاء الناس ما يريدون سماعه من خطاب كراهية ولعب على الغرائز.