Command of the Air

Aug 18, 2014 Rich rated it it was ok · review of another edition

Shelves: saass

I.B. Holley wrote in his essay “Reflections on the Search for Airpower Theory,” from The Paths of Heaven (p. 580) is quoted below:
One can classify ideas by the way they are authenticated. The following array of terms gives us a useful spectrum against which to set our airpower thinkers:
- Theories are ideas that are systematically prepared for authentication.
- Visions are ideas not systematically prepared for authentication.
- Illusions are ideas that could not survive systematic preparation for
I.B. Holley wrote in his essay “Reflections on the Search for Airpower Theory,” from The Paths of Heaven (p. 580) is quoted below:
One can classify ideas by the way they are authenticated. The following array of terms gives us a useful spectrum against which to set our airpower thinkers:
- Theories are ideas that are systematically prepared for authentication.
- Visions are ideas not systematically prepared for authentication.
- Illusions are ideas that could not survive systematic preparation for authentication.
- Myths are ideas that exempt themselves from any systematic authentication.
- Facts are ideas that have already passed the authentication process.
- Falsehoods are ideas certain to fail the authentication process.

Clearly, Gen Giulio Douhet was a visionary. With only the scantiest empirical evidence to go on, he visualized the concept of strategic air war… Douhet failed to anticipate the character of air-to-air combat, vastly overestimated the impact of conventional bombing, and misunderstood the importance of aircraft other than bombers. In these and many other respects. Douhet’s vision was decidedly flawed. But the evidence of experience would overcome these details. The significance of visionaries lies not in the details but in the stream of though they set in train.
Personally, I think Holley is a bit generous with Douhet. Outside of the explicit mention of the bombing of a funeral procession as proof of breaking the morale of the people, he’s outwardly disdainful of the need for empiricism in his theory in numerous (repetitive) mentions throughout. His insistence upon the use of pure logic alone (recall Clausewitz's 'Parallel Lines of Inquiry' the pure logic vs. practical reason) is sufficient for concern.

There are several aspects of the nature of airpower that Douhet gets right, but for the completely wrong reasons. And yet, there are many things that he gets wrong, and then proceeds to use circular logic to support. In these areas where he uses this tactic, his ideas are not prepared for authentication, but waiver between ideas that cannot survive systematic authentication by conscious choice, or exempt itself by pure logic from empirical authentication. Perhaps there are aspects of Douhet's ideas that are visionary, but there are also solid attempts to be illusive and build myths. Even in 1921, and certainly by 1928, 1929, and 1930 (the year in which he died) when he updated The Command of the Air, there was sufficient empirical evidence to raise doubts about the veracity of his ideas. He chose not to seek that data, despite it being available. ...more

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Feb 04, 2014 Mike Hankins rated it liked it · review of another edition

Shelves: military-history, aviation, ww1

Its difficult to "review" a work like this. This work is Giului Douhet's treatise, written shortly after WW1, on how the new technology of aircraft can be used to single-handedly win wars. Thus, its an important work for understanding the history of airpower. His work was meant to convince Italian military planners to rely heavily on the airplane as their main military force.

Douhet is often quoted for hist support of both strategic bombing and "morale bombing" (aka terror bombing) of civilians. Its difficult to "review" a work like this. This work is Giului Douhet's treatise, written shortly after WW1, on how the new technology of aircraft can be used to single-handedly win wars. Thus, its an important work for understanding the history of airpower. His work was meant to convince Italian military planners to rely heavily on the airplane as their main military force.

Douhet is often quoted for hist support of both strategic bombing and "morale bombing" (aka terror bombing) of civilians. His main concept here is that by bombing the "vital centers" of the enemy, such as its production centers, communication, and transportation networks, a quick decisive victory can be obtained. The most important target, according to Douhet, is the morale of the enemy civilian population itself. Douhet envisioned scenarios where bombers would directly attack civilians, destroying towns, killing innocents, women, and children. The goal of all this was to both halt enemy production but more importantly to spur an internal collapse or even rebellion of the nations people. His model for this seems to be what happened to the German population at the end of WW1, although most of his book does not rely on historical example at all, but instead is based solely on his predictions.

Although this sounds horrific and immoral, Douhet insists that this strategy will make war more humane. The idea is that by making war so terrible, so costly, and so horrific, war will be avoided in many cases, and when it is used, it will be short, thus saving many lives in the long run. This seems like crazy logic, but similar logic was later used in the Cold War to support the ideas of deterrence through mutually assured destruction.

Its also important to note that Douhet's bombing concepts are not the only part of this work. Those are the most often quoted bits, but he actually spends more time discussing what we now call "air superiority," the role of fighter planes. He insists that before bombers can do their work, the sky must be cleared of enemy fighers (or "pursuit" craft) which then leaves the bombers free to do their work. This concept survived mostly intact (although abandoned briefly in the early cold war) until the present day. In these ideas, Douhet borrows heavily from Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan, in the 1890s, insisted that sea power was the key to victory, and that only combined actions of large concentrated fleets could be effective. Douhet applies the same concept to airpower, insisting that one large mass concentration of aircraft is the only way to truly realize airpower's potential. He even uses the sea as a metaphor, referring to the skies as the new oceans, and the ground itself as the new coast.

Of course, all of Douhet's work is based on prediction, not founded in historical examples, and he fails to imagine the possibility of any type of conflict that is not the large-scale conventional war of WW1. Surprisingly, he rarely mentions experiences of aircraft in WW1 to support his points. The idea of limited wars does not even occur to him. Many of his predictions have proven false, especially his concept of strategic and terror bombing, both of which were tested and found ineffective in WW2. Some airpower defenders will say that his theories were never completely tested because airpower was never so fully concentrated as he advocates. Nonetheless, although most of his predictions, especially in the technical details, seem quaint when read today, he did accurately predict the various roles for aircraft. These roles are currently formalized in missions of strategic bombing, air superiority, and interdiction. Douhet did not use these terms, but he did promote the concepts -- although he envisioned the same type of aircraft serving all three roles rather than building separate planes specially designed for each mission.

Overall, this is a quick and interesting read. Examining what theorists such as Douhet thought reveals much about the effect WW1 had on the minds of many participants and leaders of the time. For those interested in airpower theory, this is practically required reading, as it set the stage for everything that came after. Airpower advocates and critics continue to reference Douhet to this day. Several recent articles in Foreign Policy magazine in 2013 and 2014 have made reference to Douhet both in support and in criticism of current airpower doctrine. While it is easy to criticize Douhet for his failure to accurately predict the future, he had a massive impact on the development and implementation of airpower, and continues to remain relevant to this day. ...more

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Aug 18, 2014 Rich rated it it was ok · review of another edition

Shelves: saass

I.B. Holley wrote in his essay “Reflections on the Search for Airpower Theory,” from The Paths of Heaven (p. 580) is quoted below:
One can classify ideas by the way they are authenticated. The following array of terms gives us a useful spectrum against which to set our airpower thinkers:
- Theories are ideas that are systematically prepared for authentication.
- Visions are ideas not systematically prepared for authentication.
- Illusions are ideas that could not survive systematic preparation for
I.B. Holley wrote in his essay “Reflections on the Search for Airpower Theory,” from The Paths of Heaven (p. 580) is quoted below:
One can classify ideas by the way they are authenticated. The following array of terms gives us a useful spectrum against which to set our airpower thinkers:
- Theories are ideas that are systematically prepared for authentication.
- Visions are ideas not systematically prepared for authentication.
- Illusions are ideas that could not survive systematic preparation for authentication.
- Myths are ideas that exempt themselves from any systematic authentication.
- Facts are ideas that have already passed the authentication process.
- Falsehoods are ideas certain to fail the authentication process.

Clearly, Gen Giulio Douhet was a visionary. With only the scantiest empirical evidence to go on, he visualized the concept of strategic air war… Douhet failed to anticipate the character of air-to-air combat, vastly overestimated the impact of conventional bombing, and misunderstood the importance of aircraft other than bombers. In these and many other respects. Douhet’s vision was decidedly flawed. But the evidence of experience would overcome these details. The significance of visionaries lies not in the details but in the stream of though they set in train.
Personally, I think Holley is a bit generous with Douhet. Outside of the explicit mention of the bombing of a funeral procession as proof of breaking the morale of the people, he’s outwardly disdainful of the need for empiricism in his theory in numerous (repetitive) mentions throughout. His insistence upon the use of pure logic alone (recall Clausewitz's 'Parallel Lines of Inquiry' the pure logic vs. practical reason) is sufficient for concern.

There are several aspects of the nature of airpower that Douhet gets right, but for the completely wrong reasons. And yet, there are many things that he gets wrong, and then proceeds to use circular logic to support. In these areas where he uses this tactic, his ideas are not prepared for authentication, but waiver between ideas that cannot survive systematic authentication by conscious choice, or exempt itself by pure logic from empirical authentication. Perhaps there are aspects of Douhet's ideas that are visionary, but there are also solid attempts to be illusive and build myths. Even in 1921, and certainly by 1928, 1929, and 1930 (the year in which he died) when he updated The Command of the Air, there was sufficient empirical evidence to raise doubts about the veracity of his ideas. He chose not to seek that data, despite it being available. ...more

flag Like · see review

Aug 18, 2014 Rich rated it it was ok

Shelves: saass

I.B. Holley wrote in his essay “Reflections on the Search for Airpower Theory,” from The Paths of Heaven (p. 580) is quoted below:
One can classify ideas by the way they are authenticated. The following array of terms gives us a useful spectrum against which to set our airpower thinkers:
- Theories are ideas that are systematically prepared for authentication.
- Visions are ideas not systematically prepared for authentication.
- Illusions are ideas that could not survive systematic preparation for
I.B. Holley wrote in his essay “Reflections on the Search for Airpower Theory,” from The Paths of Heaven (p. 580) is quoted below:
One can classify ideas by the way they are authenticated. The following array of terms gives us a useful spectrum against which to set our airpower thinkers:
- Theories are ideas that are systematically prepared for authentication.
- Visions are ideas not systematically prepared for authentication.
- Illusions are ideas that could not survive systematic preparation for authentication.
- Myths are ideas that exempt themselves from any systematic authentication.
- Facts are ideas that have already passed the authentication process.
- Falsehoods are ideas certain to fail the authentication process.

Clearly, Gen Giulio Douhet was a visionary. With only the scantiest empirical evidence to go on, he visualized the concept of strategic air war… Douhet failed to anticipate the character of air-to-air combat, vastly overestimated the impact of conventional bombing, and misunderstood the importance of aircraft other than bombers. In these and many other respects. Douhet’s vision was decidedly flawed. But the evidence of experience would overcome these details. The significance of visionaries lies not in the details but in the stream of though they set in train.
Personally, I think Holley is a bit generous with Douhet. Outside of the explicit mention of the bombing of a funeral procession as proof of breaking the morale of the people, he’s outwardly disdainful of the need for empiricism in his theory in numerous (repetitive) mentions throughout. His insistence upon the use of pure logic alone (recall Clausewitz's 'Parallel Lines of Inquiry' the pure logic vs. practical reason) is sufficient for concern.

There are several aspects of the nature of airpower that Douhet gets right, but for the completely wrong reasons. And yet, there are many things that he gets wrong, and then proceeds to use circular logic to support. In these areas where he uses this tactic, his ideas are not prepared for authentication, but waiver between ideas that cannot survive systematic authentication by conscious choice, or exempt itself by pure logic from empirical authentication. Perhaps there are aspects of Douhet's ideas that are visionary, but there are also solid attempts to be illusive and build myths. Even in 1921, and certainly by 1928, 1929, and 1930 (the year in which he died) when he updated The Command of the Air, there was sufficient empirical evidence to raise doubts about the veracity of his ideas. He chose not to seek that data, despite it being available. ...more

flag Like · see review

Sep 11, 2012 Nate Huston rated it it was ok · review of another edition

Giulio had some crazy ideas, but hey, it was right after WWI! Bottom
line is that he said that there was no real way to stop airpower (both
pursuit aircraft and ground-based anti-aircraft guns were largely
ineffective) and therefore, the only way to win a war was to control
the air. In order to control the air, you needed to have an
independent air force. The independent air force ought to consist of
just enough "combat aircraft" (counter-air) to overwhelm whatever
aircraft the enemy put up in defense ...more

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May 27, 2012 Luis Sánchez rated it really liked it · review of another edition

Un interesante estudio sobre la importancia y el futuro (se escribió en 1921) de la aviación como elemento vital para ganar una guerra. El autor da muestras de una clarividencia sorprendente, al acertar en su escrito sobre los avances que se verían en el arma de la aviación.

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