An Inoffensive Rearmament: The Making of the Postwar Japanese Army

by Frank Kowalski, Robert D. Eldridge (Editor)

Col. Frank Kowalski served as the Chief of Staff of the American military advisory group that helped establish the National Police Reserve, the predecessor to the Japan Self-Defense Forces during its first two years of existence. His work provides a detailed account of the manning, logistics, and personalities involved in standing up--on short notice--of a force of approximately 75,000, while sharing insights about the diplomatic, political, legal, and constitutional challenges his headquarters and his Japanese counterparts faced in rearming Japan in the wake of the sudden outbreak of the Korean War. Published in Japanese in 1969, this is the first English version of this edition, and includes a biographic section about Kowalski.

Genres: Nonfiction

224 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2014

Reviews

[Nick]

Kowalski shows that both those who argue for and against constitutional change regarding Japan's Article 9 are essentially correct in their arguments while mischaracterizing the key point that Japan already deliberately and effectively remilitarized between 1950 and 1954.

Those arguing against constitutional change are correct that Japan's Self Defense Forces can rightly be considered illegal and could point to the deliberate cover-up regarding the force's establishment as admitted and described by Kowalski. However, to argue that the constitution should not be changed leaves unanswered the fundamental question of what defensive forces are necessary for Japan and how to govern those forces, which is the fundamental question that those opposed to constitutional change must address to remain relevant in this important debate.

Those arguing for constitutional change that overtly permits military forces are correct that Japan already effectively has a military, but should be more willing to admit that the SDF were deliberately created in a way meant to deceive both Japan and the international community in 1950. In doing so supporters of constitutional change that legitimizes the SDF as a military force could emphasize that although Japan had deceived itself and the international community for many decades, it has nonetheless acted responsibly in wielding one of the largest, in terms of both budget and manpower, militaries in the world over several decades. Constitutional change could thus be seen as having great symbolic importance, but not the functional importance that other countries and many individuals believe. In fact, there is a strong argument to be made that changing Article 9 would merely recognize what is already a de facto military and thus represent only an incremental change, important only symbolically and not substantively, in Japan's military posture.

This book is essential reading for anybody interested in current debates over constitutional change in Japan. In considering that Japan remilitarized in 1950 we see the inadequacies and emotions of much of the current commentary regarding this question.