Afghanistan & The Troubled Future Of Unconventional Warfare

by Hy S. Rothstein

A Naval Postgraduate School professor and former career Special Forces officer looks at why the U.S. military cannot conduct unconventional warfare despite a significant effort to create and maintain such a capability. In his examination of Operation Enduring Freedom, Hy Rothstein maintains that although the operation in Afghanistan appeared to have been a masterpiece of military creativity, the United States executed its impressive display of power in a totally conventional manner--despite repeated public statements by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that terrorists must be fought with unconventional capabilities. Arguing that the initial phase of the war was appropriately conventional given the conventional disposition of the enemy, the author suggests that once the Taliban fell the war became increasingly unconventional, yet the U.S. response became more conventional.

This book presents an authoritative overview of the current American way of war and addresses the specific causes of the "conventionalization" of U.S. Special Forces, using the war in Afghanistan as a case study. Drawing a distinction between special operations and unconventional warfare (the use of Special Forces does not automatically make the fighting unconventional), Rothstein questions the ability of U.S. forces to effectively defeat irregular threats and suggests ways to regain lost unconventional warfare capacity.

Genres: History, Military Fiction

224 pages, Hardcover

First published April 1, 2006

Reviews

[Corto]

This deceptively slim volume by Hy Rothstein (former career Special Forces officer and current Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School ) is part diatribe and part lament about military policy in relation to the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan and the implementation of Army Special Forces.

Using Organizational Theory, Rothstein delineates the missteps taken by conventionally minded war planners with narrow parochial interests who shaped America's role and conduct in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2006. Keep in mind, that this book is written specifically about the Rumsfeld-era. The rest of the book is devoted to an explanation of what Special Forces were originally intended to be (a Foreign Internal Defense/ oriented organization) rather than a unit designed or dedicated to "hyper-conventional" direct action "Ranger style" missions. He carefully describes the "Delta-envy" felt by the Army Special Forces community and how it has resulted in a diminished unconventional warfare capacity.

Ultimately he argues for a more population-centric, politically-aware grand strategy in low intensity warfighting. Additionally he argues for a separate service for Special Forces so its leadership can have a seat at the policymaking table instead of relying on Army/JCS leadership to present alternatives to conventional warfare as possible solutions for all problems that potentially require military force.

[Luckydogguy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mr. Rothstein captures the essence of the clash of conventional and unconventional and not only in Afghanistan, but for my 16 years in Special Forces. This one section says it best:

"An Irish guy with a beard is still an Irish guy," proclaimed
the conventional base commander in Kandahar when questioned
about the order for special forces to shave and get into
standard military uniforms. "I don't know what they are
trying to achieve." He was absolutely correct on both counts.

He does the best job I've seen describing why the use of UW will have significant resistance within DoD even when it is the ideal choice of options. I must wonder if the only chance for Special Forces to operate to its potential is divorce proceedings. The rumor that mother Army cannot allow it to succeed has moved from laughable to reasonable suspicion.

[Tin Wee · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting narrative using organisation theory to critique of the US war in Afghanistan. The basic premise is that the US Army is organisationally structured to fight a conventional war, and hence tries to fight wars in a conventional way, and as an organisation geared towards direct action, attrition type wars, fails to adapt to an unconventional war which requires winning hearts and minds. Somehow, it seems the US never learnt their lesson in Vietnam. I found this book a little academic, but interesting. Lay readers can skip to the last chapter which summarises the book nicely and presents recommendations on how the US should develop an unconventional warfare capability beyond what the army is capable of.

[Liam · Rating 3 out of 5]

A well-written and extremely thoughtful & thought-provoking analysis of the current state of the U.S. special operations community, and of the effects of the current commitment in Afghanistan on the unconventional warfare capabilities of the U.S. Government. The writing style is quite dry, and of course my inevitable complaint about proofreading/copyediting applies a little bit to this book (i.e. "illusive" instead of "elusive", etc.), but absolutely worth reading for anyone interested in the ongoing saga of conventional vs. unconventional thinking in the U.S. armed forces.

[Sathyanarayanan D]

For People who are interested to know why America is ineffective in front of an enemy who is invisible & a misfit for an unconventional warfare. Explains why it cannot claim a comprehensive victory in Afghanistan.