Lessons from the Trial: The People V. O.J. Simpson

by Gerald F. Uelmen

Law professor Gerald Uelmen was preparing for sabbatical on June 16, 1994, three days after the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman, when he got a call from Robert Shapiro, asking him to join in O.J. Simpson's defense. From that day until the reading of the verdict more than a year later, Professor Uelmen was at the epicenter of the trial of the century. His position on Simpson's legal "Dream Team" was He was not only an advocate for his client, but also a teacher and a scholar.
Lessons from the Trial is Professor Uelmen's account of what the Simpson case can teach all of us. He addresses hotly debated legal strategies - from jury selection to Johnnie Cochran's closing arguments - as well as the broader social issues, such as race relations and spousal abuse, that were thrust into the public's consciousness.
For the countless millions who became engrossed by the case. Lessons from the Trial is the perfect book to help gain a fuller understanding of what really happened in the courtroom, and what it all means - for Simpson, for the justice system, and for the country as a whole. Professor Uelmen's legal insight and his insider status allow him to speak with authority where pundits and journalists can only speculate. And his thoughtful, evenhanded approach gives Lessons from the Trial an objective tone that will be difficult to match in books from the other principal players in the case.

323 pages, Hardcover

First published April 1, 1996

Reviews

[Phil · Rating 3 out of 5]

Uelmen's book is pedantic and offers a bland perspective into the trial. At times his exposition even struck me as blatantly dishonest. You'd be better off reading Cochran or Shapiro.

[Steven H · Rating 2 out of 5]

A MEMBER OF THE ‘DREAM TEAM’ DEFENSE TALKS ABOUT THE TRIAL, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Gerald F. Uelmen (b. 1940) is best-known as a member the ‘Dream Team’ defense in the O.J. Simpson murder trial. He is a professor at the Santa Clara University School of Law, and is also executive director for the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice.

He wrote in the first chapter of this 1996 book, “I will offer no apologies for the vigor of the advocacy with which O.J. Simpson was defended. Even if the conduct of his lawyers fuels the ultimate destruction of some of the constitutional protections we cherish most, there is very little we would do differently if we had it to do over again. Our purpose was not to foster greater public confidence in the ‘system.’ Our purpose was not to endear the legal profession to the American people. Our purpose was not to advance the cause of race relations. Our purpose was to employ every advantage the law permits to enhance the prospects of our client’s acquittal. Our purpose was to utilize every device and strategem the law allows to weaken and discredit the prosecution’s case. The vindication of our client was the beginning, the end, and the substance of our every effort. Anything less would have been a violation of our ethical responsibility to faithfully perform the duties of an attorney-at-law.” (Pg. 2)

He continues, “It seems fair to say that the successful defense of O.J. Simpson has… been credited with setting back race relations, lowering public esteem for the legal profession, diminishing respect for the police, and destroying faith that justice is equally available to all our citizens. If good race relations can be founded upon hypocrisy… if respect for police can best be accomplished by a code of silence… then the credit is deserved. I believe that the parade of reformers who advocate radical changes in our system of criminal justice because they are unhappy with the verdict… are the real sowers of public confusion. This is not to say that there are no lessons to be learned from the Simpson trial. The thesis of this book is that lessons abound. But they are not lessons about the failure of our system. They are lessons about human frailty and arrogance… They are lessons about how things which appear black and white are frequently gray.” (Pg. 3-4)

He asserts, “In California, where judges are elected, public criticism of a judge by a prosecutor may cost a judge his job. That may explain why so many judges appear to favor the prosecution in their rulings.” (Pg. 21)

He suggests, “The prosecution belittled the defense suggestion that Fuhrman may have planted the glove, because he would have had no motive to ‘frame’ O.J. Simpson with a murder charge. I believe that the most probable motive for planting the glove would have been to supply the probable cause needed for a search warrant, rather than any effort to ‘frame’ Simpson. Fuhrman may well have believed Simpson guility but the case needed some ‘extra help’ to allow further searches.” (Pg. 40)

He explains, “One of the things that personally convinced me of O.J. Simpson’s innocence was the lack of any impairment in his judgment… After he had recovered from the emotional shock of his former wife’s death and the trauma of being suspected and then arrested for her murder, he was clearheaded and responsive. He was never evasive or reluctant to discuss any detail of his relationship with Nicole… O.J. took it all in stride, and put everyone around him at ease, even the deputy sheriffs who guarded him. He was truly the ‘dream’ client.” (Pg. 50-52)

He reports, “What was not immediately obvious was what role [Johnnie] Cochran would play. [Robert/Bob] Shapiro and Cochran huddled and made a public show of unity, but there was a real undercurrent of tension in terms of who was in charge of what. Bob had agreed to a ‘group portrait’ of the entire defense team… We all showed up … but the photo session was aborted when Cochran simply failed to show. It was as though he was delivering a message to Shapiro: ‘We’ve got a lot of work to do, and shouldn’t be wasting our time primping for media attention.’” (Pg. 56)

He notes, “Frankly, I was surprised at how little time Bob spent in the office. Everyone seemed to be fending for themselves, with minimal leadership or direction. The lack of supervision was a serious problem with the investigators, and we paid dearly for it. The most embarrassing moments for the defense … were directly attributable to the sloppiness of attorney supervision of the investigators… Shapiro set up a ‘hot line’ for the public to call in information…. It was very expensive to maintain, and 99% of the thousands of calls it produced were useless dead ends. The money would have been better spent on hiring more investigators to follow up on the discovery we were receiving from the prosecution.” (Pg. 56-57)

He argues, "I find the opponents of televised trials espousing a rigid, all-or-nothing approach that ignores some of the potential benefits of cameras in court. While I remain convinced that the harm outweighed the benefits in the Simpson trial, I do not see how that justifies a flat prohibition of televised coverage of all future trials. The excesses of the Simpson trial were baggage that comes with a ‘trial of the century’ and may not be a problem in a more routine case.” (Pg. 93)

He explains, “The prosecutors hoped to avoid a challenge to the accuracy of their test results by employing two different outside laboratories to conduct the tests… The greatest vulnerability of their test results, however, was … in the collection and handling of the samples by the [LAPD] before they were sent out for testing. The LAPD was that ‘black hole’ through which ALL evidence passed, and if it was contaminated, compromised, and corrupted, the responsibility fell right in the lap of the LAPD.” (Pg. 120-121)

He states, “The lesson from the so-called ‘mountain of evidence’ is that if the messengers who bring the evidence can’t be trusted, the evidence itself won’t be trusted. Technology is only as good as the people who operate it.” (Pg. 126)

He points out, “The prosecution sought every opportunity to bolster Fuhrman in presenting their case. They hoped to paint a scenario in which it would have been physically impossible for Fuhrman to have picked up a glove at the Bundy scene, because he would have been seen by other officers. Another officer was called to testify that Fuhrman was never alone, and he never went near the physical evidences surrounding the bodies. The jury was told that a photograph which clearly depicted Mark Fuhrman kneeling between the bodies, pointing to a glove and a cap at Ron Goldman’s feet had been taken… after Simpson returned from Simpson’s Rockingham residence… the photographer … indicated … the photo in question had been taken in the early morning hours, PRIOR to Fuhrman leaving the Bundy scene. The photographer also testified he found Fuhrman alone before the photo was taken.” (Pg. 136-137)

He asserts, “Rooting out racism in American police departments will be no easier than rooting it out of our other institutions. It has to start with the recognition that we still have a serious problem. If the Fuhrman tapes weren’t enough to deliver that message, the public reaction to the jury’s verdict should have been. It doesn’t seem to be a message many people want to hear. Not only is racism alive and wall in America; so is denial.” (Pg. 154)

He suggests, “The lesson to be learned from the invocation of privileges … is that inferences should not be drawn from silence, unless the silence is unambiguous. The principle is one that is frequently ignored by the press and the public. I still find that the question I am most frequently asked when speaking about the case it, ‘If O.J. Simpson is innocent, why didn’t he get up on the witness stand and say so, and be cross-examined?’ Now, at least I have a more compact response. I can say, ‘Read my book.’” (Pg. 164-165)

He reports, “The strongest reaction to Cochran’s allusion to Adolf Hitler seemed to come from the Jewish community… the point Johnnie Cochran was making... [was] that Adolf Hitler’s genocidal and racist rantings were not taken very seriously prior to his rise to power. Once Fuhrman had been exposed, and his genocidal ravings had been admitted into evidence (‘If I had my way, they would take all the n-----s, put them together in a big group, and burn them’) the prosecution shifted from a spirited defense of Fuhrman’s integrity to a dismissive posture… Cochran was simply suggesting that cancer spreads, and it is not irrational to believe that Fuhrman infected those around him, at least to the extent that they protected him and covered up his wrongdoing.” (Pg. 170-171)

He concludes, “For me, the case… was a defense lawyer’s dream, because the resources were available to do everything right. The advocates on both sides performed at a consistent level of excellence and with great vigor. Both sides believed in their vision of ‘the truth,’ but neither that belief nor the vigor of their advocacy could substitute for credible evidence.” (Pg. 200)

This is not one of the more ‘insightful’ memoirs of the case, but it occasionally provides some interesting viewpoints.

[Denise · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author was one of the few attorneys able to put the facts to the law during the OJ Simpson trial. This book aptly explains many of the issues, rulings, and strategies that arose during the trial, making sense of it all for the layperson.