Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats

by Daryl G. Press

Calculating Credibility examines―and ultimately rejects―a fundamental belief held by laypeople and the makers of American foreign the notion that backing down during a crisis reduces a country's future credibility. Fear of diminished credibility motivated America's costly participation in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and, since the end of the Cold War, this concern has continued to guide American policy decisions. Daryl G. Press uses historical evidence, including declassified documents, to answer two crucial When a country backs down in a crisis, does its credibility suffer? How do leaders assess their adversaries' credibility? Press illuminates the decision-making processes behind events such as the crises in Europe that preceded World War II, the superpower showdowns over Berlin in the 1950s and 60s, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. When leaders face the prospect of high-stakes military conflicts, Press shows, they do not assess their adversaries' credibility by peering into their opponents' past and evaluating their history of keeping or breaking commitments. Power and interests in the current crisis―not past actions―determine the credibility of a threat. Press demonstrates that threats are credible only if backed by sufficient power and only if pursuing important interests. Press believes that Washington's obsession with the dangers of backing down has made U.S. foreign policy unnecessarily rigid. In every competitive environment―sports, gambling, warfare―competitors use feints and bluffs to tremendous advantage. Understanding the real sources of credibility, Press asserts, would permit a more flexible, and more effective, foreign policy.

Genres: Nonfiction

240 pages, Hardcover

First published September 1, 2005

Reviews

[Nate Huston]

Central Proposition: Leaders do not base their calculations of credibility on past actions - they base them on a combination of power & interests. Therefore: Don't go to war just to follow through on your threat. If you back down now, the other leader won't include it in their calculation the next time anyway.

Press pits four theories against each other: Past Actions, Current Calculus (the eventual winner), Ingrained Lessons (learned from the last meeting), and Never Again (since they backed down before, they certainly won't do it again). The argument is very interesting. There is certainly no denying the evidence that the "appeasement" of Germany, Berlin, and the Cuban Missile Crisis shows that leaders disregarded past actions in calculating credibility. However, the interests piece of Current Calculus (which I believe is necessary) complicates more than the author lets on.

What if the leaders simply consider past actions important, but less important than the risk of being wrong (Press addresses this briefly, but I'd like to see further discussion of this point). Perhaps there's some point after which the cost simply becomes too large. Take the Cuban Missile Crisis, for instance - we're dealing with nukes. How much is a leader really willing to gamble in that situation? Would he weigh past actions more if current calculus didn't include the risk of nuclear war?

Additionally, he contends that current calculus is based significantly on interests...but what if interests include reputation? What if the "weighty issue" IS following through on one's word? This gets tautological very quickly.

One other thought: Where do red lines fit exactly? Is there a difference between fulfilling a threat (get out of Berlin or else) and reacting to force? Does the "credibility" of the threat change if it's in reaction to something (like Taiwan?). It seems fundamentally different to tell the US to get out and then NOT take action than it does to say that IF China takes action, we will respond. There something here about the difference between deterrence and compellence, something that would be good to discuss in the context of this book's puzzle.

[Roger]

This book offers an interesting premise: that credibility during military crises is not a function of the past actions but of present capabilities. Leaders make judgments based on someone's power and interests now, and not what they did before. The reasoning is that every crisis is so unique that one can't just plot a trendline to arrive at an answer.

However, while leaders do not calculate others' credibility by their past, they nevertheless keep up their own reputations BECAUSE other people aren't so enlightened. When it comes to motivation, it doesn't matter what you think, but what they think.

There were 4 case studies done in order to highlight this "Current Calculus" theory vs. the conventional Past Actions one, which is an extension of our personal heuristics extended to a bigger theatre. Daryl says you can't just extend something that works on a small scale to one on a larger scale.

I skipped some of the case studies, but read the conclusion.

[George]

This book's arguments are very important and reading at least the intro and conclusion are completely worthwhile for anyone interested in international politics. That said, as other reviewers note, this would be a great 30 page article. As a book, it is repetitive and circumscribed. There are big questions, which Press acknowledges, that aren't deeply discussed (why leaders obsess over their own credibility; in lesser crises is credibility more dependent on past actions? and others I'm forgetting...). However, this is totally worth a read. The only problem is you'll want to pull your hair out the next time you hear someone connect Syria and Ukraine.

[Eleanore]

An interesting, albeit narrow argument. The real disappointment was given all the archival research he did for the case-studies, Press provided only top-level summaries of events in the book. In view of the subject matter, I would have thought more direct quotation from primary sources and analysis of primary actors and their discussions would have been required, not to mention vastly more interesting. This work proved long and repetitive at 150 pages.

[Dusan Fischer]

Press tried really hard to make this into a book. It could be easily written as a 20 to 30 pages long high quality paper. However, his arguments are too important to ignore and it is definitely worth looking at it.

[Hunter Hustus]

Terrific book & research. All national security policy actors should read this book.