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How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster
How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States analyzes the themes, techniques, and styles that have characterized Pakistani negotiations with American civilian and military officials since Pakistan’s independence.
- GenresNonfiction
210 pages, Hardcover
First published April 1, 2011
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
September 16, 2018
Considering this is political non-fiction, it's a good read. And terribly informative.
July 5, 2014
The book is written and meant purely for an all American reader base. This becomes more evident due to the fact that the authors lack some very basic knowledge of Pakistan as a country.
The authors, in their perspective, believe Pakistan to be a country somewhere between Sudan and Turkey, and this I say not in geographical sense, but in the sense of its administrative infrastructure, and which is obviously quite wrong of a perception. The same perception leads them to believe that the institutions in the country are extremely weak, and that administratively there is no force in Pakistan to counter its military.
The authors also believe that the opinion or standings in global affairs are formulated purely or at least largely in an already defined structure, dominated by Pakistan's military at first, then its history and after that its civilian government. This is factually wrong if one observes Pakistan with a modern eye. It is wrong perhaps because the authors seem to lack a first hand twenty first century experience on the negotiating table. Pakistan now has a vibrant media, that at most levels indigenously formulates a separate voice, which is in most cases largely heard and agreed by the general public.
Besides that, Pakistan now also enjoys a larger public base and hand in its political scenario and its formulation. The freedom of expression at these political platforms is an idea practiced far more than ever. For the past seven to eight years, military, at least on opinion making table is at the back foot and other factors are increasingly influencing this aspect more. Military is no more a sacred cow in the country, ISI is progressively and justifiably bashed on its policies unliked in the civilian circles. The authors, however, seem to be freezed in the Zia era somehow.
They still believe Pakistan is nothing but a one man show, and this I say knowing the fact that they made effort in adding civilian, political and religious dimensions to their story. But with every dimension, the concluding point was, 'be aware of the guys in boots.'
The authors also wrote the whole book standing, or at least perceiving themselves to be at a point of superiority. That was the basic consideration I believe. It made everything Pakistan-made look stupid. The authors with that writing ground made a mockery of everything Pakistan has done, is doing or hopes to do in future. They perhaps forgot that at negotiating table, you deal with your problems on equal footings, and the global status of the opposite party matters the least, specially when talking points include terrorism, nukes and blood. There is a reason you are on the table, if you are superior, you don't need to come down to table at first place.
As I earlier said, the book is written with the stereotypical pseudo American pride in mind, resulting in a fairly wrong image of Pakistan and its policies.
Not recommended, even for the serious of serious American readers.
The authors, in their perspective, believe Pakistan to be a country somewhere between Sudan and Turkey, and this I say not in geographical sense, but in the sense of its administrative infrastructure, and which is obviously quite wrong of a perception. The same perception leads them to believe that the institutions in the country are extremely weak, and that administratively there is no force in Pakistan to counter its military.
The authors also believe that the opinion or standings in global affairs are formulated purely or at least largely in an already defined structure, dominated by Pakistan's military at first, then its history and after that its civilian government. This is factually wrong if one observes Pakistan with a modern eye. It is wrong perhaps because the authors seem to lack a first hand twenty first century experience on the negotiating table. Pakistan now has a vibrant media, that at most levels indigenously formulates a separate voice, which is in most cases largely heard and agreed by the general public.
Besides that, Pakistan now also enjoys a larger public base and hand in its political scenario and its formulation. The freedom of expression at these political platforms is an idea practiced far more than ever. For the past seven to eight years, military, at least on opinion making table is at the back foot and other factors are increasingly influencing this aspect more. Military is no more a sacred cow in the country, ISI is progressively and justifiably bashed on its policies unliked in the civilian circles. The authors, however, seem to be freezed in the Zia era somehow.
They still believe Pakistan is nothing but a one man show, and this I say knowing the fact that they made effort in adding civilian, political and religious dimensions to their story. But with every dimension, the concluding point was, 'be aware of the guys in boots.'
The authors also wrote the whole book standing, or at least perceiving themselves to be at a point of superiority. That was the basic consideration I believe. It made everything Pakistan-made look stupid. The authors with that writing ground made a mockery of everything Pakistan has done, is doing or hopes to do in future. They perhaps forgot that at negotiating table, you deal with your problems on equal footings, and the global status of the opposite party matters the least, specially when talking points include terrorism, nukes and blood. There is a reason you are on the table, if you are superior, you don't need to come down to table at first place.
As I earlier said, the book is written with the stereotypical pseudo American pride in mind, resulting in a fairly wrong image of Pakistan and its policies.
Not recommended, even for the serious of serious American readers.
June 24, 2012
Book written by two former Foreign Service Diplomats with extensive expertise in South Asia. The book goes into great deal about the intricacies of negotiating with Pakistanis. They go through all the historical negotiations and provide context to each negotiation. They talk about the role of the military plays with civilian led governments such as with Zardari (now) and Bhutto, Shariff in the past. They talk about some of the cultural manners that would help American negotiators. They also feel strongly that the Foreign Service posts in Islamabad, at least critical positions, should go back to three year positions in order to better establish personal relationships with their Pakistani counterparts. They also explain how the US uses carrot and sticks with economic/military assistance but how they need to identify other forms of leverage to be more successful. Good book with excellent insight. (DB - 24 June 2012)
March 16, 2012
read for school. interesting but really did not provide much new information.
June 2, 2012
Probably the best academic work out there explaining the history and nature of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews