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The Crucible of War #1
The Crucible of War, Vol.1: Wavell's Command
When Sir Archibald Wavell assumed command of the British forces in North Africa, he had no choice but to keep Egypt from falling to the Axis. A defeat would give Hitler access to the Red Sea, and with it access to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and even to India. Because of Wavell's limited resources, he decided attack was the best form of defense. Wavell's brilliant campaign was carried out by his field commander, General Richard O'Connor, who routed Marshal Rodolfo Graziani's Italian forces, took thousands of prisoners, and pushed the Italians back hundreds of miles. The exhilarating and essential victory was short-lived, lasting only a few months until Erwin Rommel and his Afrika Korps entered the conflict in early 1941.
Paperback
First published May 22, 1986
About the author
Barrie Pitt
160 books7 followersBarrie William Edward Pitt was educated at Portsmouth Southern Grammar School before becoming a bank clerk. After service in the Second World War Pitt worked as a surveyor, joined 21 SAS (TA), with whom he rose to the rank of sergeant, and started to write for the magazine Adventure. Pitt also worked for a time as an information officer at the Atomic Energy Authority establishment at Aldermaston, where he demonstrated a talent for turning scientific information into readable prose
In 1958, Pitt wrote a novel, The Edge of Battle, and Zeebrugge, an admired account of the First World War raid on the Belgian U-boat base. This led to a long and prolific career as an author and editor of popular histories. Under the overall editorship of Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, he was responsible for the first major part-work, Purnell's History of the Second World War, a 96-instalment mass circulation series which was launched in 1966 at the Imperial War Museum. He also worked as a researcher for the 1960s BBC television series The Great War.
In 1958, Pitt wrote a novel, The Edge of Battle, and Zeebrugge, an admired account of the First World War raid on the Belgian U-boat base. This led to a long and prolific career as an author and editor of popular histories. Under the overall editorship of Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, he was responsible for the first major part-work, Purnell's History of the Second World War, a 96-instalment mass circulation series which was launched in 1966 at the Imperial War Museum. He also worked as a researcher for the 1960s BBC television series The Great War.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
January 17, 2014
Barrie Pitt's first volume of three as published by Cassell in 2001 (but originally two volumes by Jonathan Cape in 1980 & 82 respectively) is a lively and engaging account of the Desert war from August 1939 until Wavell's departure in June 1941.
The writer has an easy way of describing the command aspects and situation strategically whilst flowing down to units or individual officers and men. This makes for a story that flows from challenges over logistics, plans, numbers of troops available including an over zealous prime minister or men driving through sand, engaging enemy troops and asking prisoners to come back the next morning to surrender.
I liked it that Mr Pitt included the ignored campaign in East Africa and those in Iraq and Syria as well as the ill-fated but terribly costly and disruptive distractions of Greece and Crete.
Where the author is very strong is his recounting of O'Connor's fast paced and highly successful operations in the Western Desert against a far larger Italian and Libyan force in late 1940, and the actions and movements in British and Italian Somalialand, Eritrea and Ethiopia - I learned much here, particularly the difficult terrain and how hard the fighting was between Italian and British and Indian troops that caused heavy casualties as units took, lost and retook hills, defiles and other key points.
Mr Pitt also shows clearly the challenges Wavell had just from sheer size of command to the sparsity of troops and the availability of quality weapons in any useful number, and the need top seek sanction and agreement from a vast array of commonwealth and local military commanders or political appointees in various territories. The ever present difficulties of changing circumstances that drove counter order after counter order and multiple communiqués from an under-pressure Churchill and to the conduct and relationship is well described too.
Wavell is treated fairly and gives the impression the author thinks well of the man (like this reader) and the challenges he had and managed; although he does not shy from criticism and notes the terribly mistake Wavell makes by sending the Indian divisions to East Africa just when O'Connor had destroyed the Italian tenth army taking 130,000 prisoners. The What-if here is had they not stopped to let those troops leave (accepting that Greece now loomed) could North Africa have been secured before the Germans had set foot on its sand and rock.
I felt the book, with Mr Pitt's standing as a high quality historian, should have provided far more footnotes and sources merely through the depth and detail of accounts provided.
I am not convinced it is a definitive study as the publisher subtitles the three-volume set (not described as such by the original publisher Cape), but it is certainly a readable and informative book and I'll look to read the other two volumes.
Recommended to newcomers of the Desert War or those who have read much on the North African battles but have not explored the East African campaigns in any detail.
The writer has an easy way of describing the command aspects and situation strategically whilst flowing down to units or individual officers and men. This makes for a story that flows from challenges over logistics, plans, numbers of troops available including an over zealous prime minister or men driving through sand, engaging enemy troops and asking prisoners to come back the next morning to surrender.
I liked it that Mr Pitt included the ignored campaign in East Africa and those in Iraq and Syria as well as the ill-fated but terribly costly and disruptive distractions of Greece and Crete.
Where the author is very strong is his recounting of O'Connor's fast paced and highly successful operations in the Western Desert against a far larger Italian and Libyan force in late 1940, and the actions and movements in British and Italian Somalialand, Eritrea and Ethiopia - I learned much here, particularly the difficult terrain and how hard the fighting was between Italian and British and Indian troops that caused heavy casualties as units took, lost and retook hills, defiles and other key points.
Mr Pitt also shows clearly the challenges Wavell had just from sheer size of command to the sparsity of troops and the availability of quality weapons in any useful number, and the need top seek sanction and agreement from a vast array of commonwealth and local military commanders or political appointees in various territories. The ever present difficulties of changing circumstances that drove counter order after counter order and multiple communiqués from an under-pressure Churchill and to the conduct and relationship is well described too.
Wavell is treated fairly and gives the impression the author thinks well of the man (like this reader) and the challenges he had and managed; although he does not shy from criticism and notes the terribly mistake Wavell makes by sending the Indian divisions to East Africa just when O'Connor had destroyed the Italian tenth army taking 130,000 prisoners. The What-if here is had they not stopped to let those troops leave (accepting that Greece now loomed) could North Africa have been secured before the Germans had set foot on its sand and rock.
I felt the book, with Mr Pitt's standing as a high quality historian, should have provided far more footnotes and sources merely through the depth and detail of accounts provided.
I am not convinced it is a definitive study as the publisher subtitles the three-volume set (not described as such by the original publisher Cape), but it is certainly a readable and informative book and I'll look to read the other two volumes.
Recommended to newcomers of the Desert War or those who have read much on the North African battles but have not explored the East African campaigns in any detail.
March 9, 2021
This was an outstanding start to Barrie Pitt's three book trilogy on the war in North Africa in WWII. I found the book insightful and entertaining from cover to cover. It was so good I didn't want it to end but I was able to console myself because there are two more parts! Good God! That's over twelve hundred pages dedicated to the war in the desert. No stone is left unturned. World War II aficionados listen up because this one is for you!
Part One includes O'Connor's highly successful offensive, Operation Compass, against the hapless Italians at the war's outbreak, bonus coverage of the war in East Africa, Germany's foray into the desert war and Rommel's counter offensive and drive to the Egyptian border, and Beresford-Peirse dismal failure of a counteroffensive, Operation Battleaxe which led to Wavell's transfer to the India/Burma theatre.
I loved how all events in the desert are tied into what is happening in corresponding geographies. See how Operation Sea Lion, Barbarossa, Pearl Harbor, Palestine, Iraq and Syria, and most notably, the war in the Balkans impacts the desert war. I also loved the bonus coverage of the war in East Africa - something I would have never otherwise read about.
I really enjoyed this book. It gave me such a broad appreciation for why the Italians fought so poorly. Chief among them was poor leadership from most of their officer corps, an affinity for the British, and most of all, ineffectual weaponry. The book contains several communiques from Italy's top brass to Mussolini advising him that they do not have the equipment to fight. The Italian Navy described the British Navy as having "a crushing superiority" and said that Italian Air Force is "in a state of crises whose older material, which is the bulk of it, would be out of action in a few days." According to CIC of Italian North Africa, Italo Balbo, The Italian artillery was limited and very old. They lacked anti-aircraft and an anti-tank weapons, medium tanks for two divisions, thousands of motorized vehicles and water tanks. Balbo said to Mussolini "It's not the number of men which causes me anxiety but their weapons." and he said "It is useless to send more thousands of men if then we cannot supply them with the indispensable requirements to move and fight." Mussolini originally told Hitler that the Italians wouldn't be ready to fight until 1943 but he was adamant to join Hitler after the Fuhrer's early successes. Germany had blazed through France and was about to launch operation Sea Lion. Mussolini was embarrassed and he told his top Generals "We will do what we can." Mussolin's son-in-law, count Ciano says "God help Italy" and with that, the Italians declared war.
The first large coordinated offensive is launched by the British, December 1940 and is called Operation Compass. O'Connol is the British commander at the front and he appears to be the original Desert Fox. O'Connol was on his way to Tripoli and captured over 100,000 Italian prisoners when his momentum was stopped by Wavell because Anthony Eden and Churchill made a commitment to Balkans to protect Greece. The author argues that this was considered a lost cause by Wavell and the General staff because it was too late. It was a decision that resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of prisoners and a total loss of equipment. The author argued that the Balkans was Anthony Eden's baby and that Wavell could have argued more ardently and insisted upon O'Connor continuing the advance to Tripoli. If this would of happened, the Italian Colonial occupation of Africa would have been over. There would have been no Italians or Germans in Africa, no Rommel, and no Afrika Corps.
Enter Rommel the Desert Fox:
Germany's Chief of Staff, Franz Halder sends Rommel to Africa with one armored division. He tells Rommel to take a defensive posture and wait for fifteenth Panzer to arrive. Rommel is a breath of fresh air. He is an insubordinate, independent thinker. He was reported to have asked Germany's Chief of Staff what he had ever done in war except sit on his backside in an office chair. After a meeting with Halder, Rommel arrived back in Africa on March 23rd, and according to the author, proceeded to disobey his orders with a diligence which compels the admiration of all who have ever cocked a snook at Authority. Rommel does an air reconnaissance and sees nothing but burning and abandoned Italian equipment and broken down British equipment. He decides to strike before the Brits can perform maintenance, resupply, and fortify. His instincts served him well as the Desert Fox was able to retake nearly every Libyan objective conquered and occupied by Commonwealth and Imperial forces.
The last part of the book is Operation Battleaxe. This is the British counterattack against Rommel led by Beresford-Peirse. The goal was to force Rommel to commit his tanks against the British Matildas. Rommel didn't believe in this. To Rommel, and most German Panzer leaders, tanks should be used to find a weak point in the enemy line and exploit them. According to Rommel:
...the task for armour was to find weak places in the enemy defence, which would generally be infantry positions, break through them and then attack the soft-skinned and unprotected rear echelons of the enemy supply organisation. It was the task of artillery to fight tanks, and infantry to capture artillery posts - a case almost of scissors cut paper, paper wraps stone, stone sharpens scissors.
He would fight the British armor with antitank weapons deployed by infantry and the famous 88. The result was a disaster. The British Matildas were invincible to anything the Italians had but the slow moving behemoths were fodder for the 88s. Meanwhile, the British 2 pounder was only effective against the Panzer inside of 500 yards. The problem was that the German panzers could scatter British artillery with HE at 3,000 yards. When the British artillery limbered up and left the Germans would switch to an armor piercing round for the British tanks. Wavell discovered that he was opposed by an enemy as fanatical, efficient and hardy as his first desert enemy had been unenthusiastic and ill trained.
In Part II, Claude Auchinleck takes over for Wavell and I already know what happens but still, I can't wait.
A word of caution: I read this book on my Kindle. There were no maps and a few times I ran into several typos and punctuation errors. This happened in bunches and I tried to fix them (something you can do on a Kindle). Therefore, I ordered used hardcovered books of this set. I have to say that it is much more effective to have a map of the battle in the chapter during that particular battle. I like the photos too. I will read the rest of this series in print.
Part One includes O'Connor's highly successful offensive, Operation Compass, against the hapless Italians at the war's outbreak, bonus coverage of the war in East Africa, Germany's foray into the desert war and Rommel's counter offensive and drive to the Egyptian border, and Beresford-Peirse dismal failure of a counteroffensive, Operation Battleaxe which led to Wavell's transfer to the India/Burma theatre.
I loved how all events in the desert are tied into what is happening in corresponding geographies. See how Operation Sea Lion, Barbarossa, Pearl Harbor, Palestine, Iraq and Syria, and most notably, the war in the Balkans impacts the desert war. I also loved the bonus coverage of the war in East Africa - something I would have never otherwise read about.
I really enjoyed this book. It gave me such a broad appreciation for why the Italians fought so poorly. Chief among them was poor leadership from most of their officer corps, an affinity for the British, and most of all, ineffectual weaponry. The book contains several communiques from Italy's top brass to Mussolini advising him that they do not have the equipment to fight. The Italian Navy described the British Navy as having "a crushing superiority" and said that Italian Air Force is "in a state of crises whose older material, which is the bulk of it, would be out of action in a few days." According to CIC of Italian North Africa, Italo Balbo, The Italian artillery was limited and very old. They lacked anti-aircraft and an anti-tank weapons, medium tanks for two divisions, thousands of motorized vehicles and water tanks. Balbo said to Mussolini "It's not the number of men which causes me anxiety but their weapons." and he said "It is useless to send more thousands of men if then we cannot supply them with the indispensable requirements to move and fight." Mussolini originally told Hitler that the Italians wouldn't be ready to fight until 1943 but he was adamant to join Hitler after the Fuhrer's early successes. Germany had blazed through France and was about to launch operation Sea Lion. Mussolini was embarrassed and he told his top Generals "We will do what we can." Mussolin's son-in-law, count Ciano says "God help Italy" and with that, the Italians declared war.
The first large coordinated offensive is launched by the British, December 1940 and is called Operation Compass. O'Connol is the British commander at the front and he appears to be the original Desert Fox. O'Connol was on his way to Tripoli and captured over 100,000 Italian prisoners when his momentum was stopped by Wavell because Anthony Eden and Churchill made a commitment to Balkans to protect Greece. The author argues that this was considered a lost cause by Wavell and the General staff because it was too late. It was a decision that resulted in the loss of tens of thousands of prisoners and a total loss of equipment. The author argued that the Balkans was Anthony Eden's baby and that Wavell could have argued more ardently and insisted upon O'Connor continuing the advance to Tripoli. If this would of happened, the Italian Colonial occupation of Africa would have been over. There would have been no Italians or Germans in Africa, no Rommel, and no Afrika Corps.
Enter Rommel the Desert Fox:
Germany's Chief of Staff, Franz Halder sends Rommel to Africa with one armored division. He tells Rommel to take a defensive posture and wait for fifteenth Panzer to arrive. Rommel is a breath of fresh air. He is an insubordinate, independent thinker. He was reported to have asked Germany's Chief of Staff what he had ever done in war except sit on his backside in an office chair. After a meeting with Halder, Rommel arrived back in Africa on March 23rd, and according to the author, proceeded to disobey his orders with a diligence which compels the admiration of all who have ever cocked a snook at Authority. Rommel does an air reconnaissance and sees nothing but burning and abandoned Italian equipment and broken down British equipment. He decides to strike before the Brits can perform maintenance, resupply, and fortify. His instincts served him well as the Desert Fox was able to retake nearly every Libyan objective conquered and occupied by Commonwealth and Imperial forces.
The last part of the book is Operation Battleaxe. This is the British counterattack against Rommel led by Beresford-Peirse. The goal was to force Rommel to commit his tanks against the British Matildas. Rommel didn't believe in this. To Rommel, and most German Panzer leaders, tanks should be used to find a weak point in the enemy line and exploit them. According to Rommel:
...the task for armour was to find weak places in the enemy defence, which would generally be infantry positions, break through them and then attack the soft-skinned and unprotected rear echelons of the enemy supply organisation. It was the task of artillery to fight tanks, and infantry to capture artillery posts - a case almost of scissors cut paper, paper wraps stone, stone sharpens scissors.
He would fight the British armor with antitank weapons deployed by infantry and the famous 88. The result was a disaster. The British Matildas were invincible to anything the Italians had but the slow moving behemoths were fodder for the 88s. Meanwhile, the British 2 pounder was only effective against the Panzer inside of 500 yards. The problem was that the German panzers could scatter British artillery with HE at 3,000 yards. When the British artillery limbered up and left the Germans would switch to an armor piercing round for the British tanks. Wavell discovered that he was opposed by an enemy as fanatical, efficient and hardy as his first desert enemy had been unenthusiastic and ill trained.
In Part II, Claude Auchinleck takes over for Wavell and I already know what happens but still, I can't wait.
A word of caution: I read this book on my Kindle. There were no maps and a few times I ran into several typos and punctuation errors. This happened in bunches and I tried to fix them (something you can do on a Kindle). Therefore, I ordered used hardcovered books of this set. I have to say that it is much more effective to have a map of the battle in the chapter during that particular battle. I like the photos too. I will read the rest of this series in print.
March 14, 2016
Pitt's first volume provides a very readable account of the campaigns during Wavell's command from mid 1939 to June 1941. Wavell was responsible for the security of Egypt and the Suez Canal, Palestine, the Western Desert, East Africa, Greece and Crete, Iraq and Syria. And he carried this responsibility during a period when the UK had limited resources and a leader, Churchill, whose interference and micromanagement proved costly.
Pitt blends a stategic overview of the theatre with personal stories of the men involved and creates an engaging account.
While generally thorough and factual, Pitt's 'folksy' description of the Anzac soldiers perpetuates a myth that does not stand up to close scrutiny. In contrast, Stocking's account of the Battle at Bardia provides a much more insightful and informative account of the reasons for the Allied's overwhelming success against the Italians: leadership, training, logistics, equipment.
Like his other volumes in this three part series, Pitt's first volume is an engaging read for someone interested in military history and the leadership lessons that can be drawn.
Pitt blends a stategic overview of the theatre with personal stories of the men involved and creates an engaging account.
While generally thorough and factual, Pitt's 'folksy' description of the Anzac soldiers perpetuates a myth that does not stand up to close scrutiny. In contrast, Stocking's account of the Battle at Bardia provides a much more insightful and informative account of the reasons for the Allied's overwhelming success against the Italians: leadership, training, logistics, equipment.
Like his other volumes in this three part series, Pitt's first volume is an engaging read for someone interested in military history and the leadership lessons that can be drawn.
February 20, 2023
Believe it or not, there are actually very few end of end narrative history on the North Africa campaign from start to finish. Luck for us this is the one.
It is not scholarly history, but very good for the general public. It goes from the highest level of grand strategy (i.e. how Churchill was a micromanaging boss), to snippets of exciting action on the battle field.
This volume covers the start of the campaign till Wavell's departure (i.e. end of Battleaxe).
I plan to finish the whole trilogy. If anyone is interested in the general history of the campaign, a good place to start.
Note: I read the kindle edition, there there are many errors that is probably the result of automated OCR problem. (i.e. the head of OKH is Halder, not Haider, etc.)
It is not scholarly history, but very good for the general public. It goes from the highest level of grand strategy (i.e. how Churchill was a micromanaging boss), to snippets of exciting action on the battle field.
This volume covers the start of the campaign till Wavell's departure (i.e. end of Battleaxe).
I plan to finish the whole trilogy. If anyone is interested in the general history of the campaign, a good place to start.
Note: I read the kindle edition, there there are many errors that is probably the result of automated OCR problem. (i.e. the head of OKH is Halder, not Haider, etc.)
June 18, 2021
A single review for the Crucible of War trilogy seems fitting as they read as three parts of a single book. Overall, very in-depth and informative trilogy but seemed to expect a reader to have a solid background in both Axis and Allied equipment, structure, and organization. It also suffered from a lack of supplemental media such as maps, orders of battle, and even pictures. It became difficult to keep track of where in Libya and Egypt events are unfolding and then where specific actions on the battlefields are taking place. A detailed order of battle would have also been helpful to understand both sides’ forces that were involved. Certainly readable, just needed constant pauses to reference my own maps or look up specific units.
November 30, 2020
I enjoyed this history, somewhat. I say this because while reading it I found many portions of it jingoistic. I also noticed that most of the sources that he relied upon were from the 1940s, 50s and 60s and that for me in a book that was written in 1980 seems to be sloppy or at best lazy history. No wonder I couldn’t get the jingoistic phrases out of my head because at times it soundly too much like patriotic self-serving newspaper reporting rather than a serious look at Wavell’s campaigns using modern research.
May 15, 2026
DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF THE CAMPAIGN. START HERE.
The series as a whole should be the starting point for anyone interested. For those only interested in the 101, the trilogy should be the ONLY books they read if they must "pick one".
Part 1 is notable for its lead up to the war and the hodgepodge "squeeze water out of rock" nature of the desert forces in Wavell's days. It ends with the arrival of Rommel and the victories that convince Churchill to swap Wavell and the Auk.
The series as a whole should be the starting point for anyone interested. For those only interested in the 101, the trilogy should be the ONLY books they read if they must "pick one".
Part 1 is notable for its lead up to the war and the hodgepodge "squeeze water out of rock" nature of the desert forces in Wavell's days. It ends with the arrival of Rommel and the victories that convince Churchill to swap Wavell and the Auk.
July 6, 2021
An appalling version of a good book
No maps, abundant typos, soldiers quoted without italics or quotation marks and a whole section missing at 1470. Terrible. I gave up half way through. Don't waste money buying this version. A shame because it's one of the definitive books of the early days of the desert war.
No maps, abundant typos, soldiers quoted without italics or quotation marks and a whole section missing at 1470. Terrible. I gave up half way through. Don't waste money buying this version. A shame because it's one of the definitive books of the early days of the desert war.
November 4, 2024
Well Worth the Read
A great insight, into the early war campaigns in the desert, from Wavell's command. Intense battles with great victories and shattering defeats. Could not out this book down, a fantastic read.
A great insight, into the early war campaigns in the desert, from Wavell's command. Intense battles with great victories and shattering defeats. Could not out this book down, a fantastic read.
April 2, 2024
Very interesting account of actions early in WWII.
July 30, 2024
Kan geschiedschrijving humor bevatten? Wel zodra iemand als Mr Pitt de pen ter hand neemt. Kan nauwelijks wachten om aan deel 2 en 3 te beginnen, maar eerst even bijkomen.
February 9, 2020
Almost comprehensive
Too detailed for easy use without maps to indicate places and depositions of forces. A few photos would also be helpful especially of equipment and armaments.
Too detailed for easy use without maps to indicate places and depositions of forces. A few photos would also be helpful especially of equipment and armaments.
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews