What do you think?
Churchill & Sea Power
Winston Churchill had a longer and closer relationship with the Royal Navy than any British statesman in modern times, but his record as a naval strategist and custodian of the nation's sea power has been mired in controversy since the ill-fated Dardanelles campaign in 1915. Today, Churchill is still regarded by many as an inept strategist who interfered in naval operations and often overrode his professional advisers--with inevitably disastrous results.
Churchill and Seapower is the first major study of Winston Churchill's record as a naval strategist and his impact as the most prominent guardian of Britain's sea power in the modern era. Based on extensive archival research, the book debunks many popular and well-entrenched myths surrounding controversial episodes in both World Wars, including the Dardanelles disaster, the failed Norwegian Campaign, the Battle of the Atlantic, and the devastating loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse in 1941. It shows that many common criticisms of Churchill have been exaggerated, but also that some of his mistakes have been largely overlooked--such as his willingness to prolong the Battle of the Atlantic in order to concentrate resources on the bombing campaign against Nazi Germany.
The book also examines Churchill's evolution as a maritime strategist over the course of his career, and documents his critical part in managing Britain's naval decline during the first half of the twentieth century. Churchill's genuine affection for the Royal Navy has often distracted attention from the fact that his views on sea power were pragmatic and unsentimental. Indeed, as Christopher M. Bell shows, in a period dominated by declining resources, global threats, and rapid technological change, it was increasingly air rather than sea power that Churchill looked to as the foundation of Britain's security.
Churchill and Seapower is the first major study of Winston Churchill's record as a naval strategist and his impact as the most prominent guardian of Britain's sea power in the modern era. Based on extensive archival research, the book debunks many popular and well-entrenched myths surrounding controversial episodes in both World Wars, including the Dardanelles disaster, the failed Norwegian Campaign, the Battle of the Atlantic, and the devastating loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse in 1941. It shows that many common criticisms of Churchill have been exaggerated, but also that some of his mistakes have been largely overlooked--such as his willingness to prolong the Battle of the Atlantic in order to concentrate resources on the bombing campaign against Nazi Germany.
The book also examines Churchill's evolution as a maritime strategist over the course of his career, and documents his critical part in managing Britain's naval decline during the first half of the twentieth century. Churchill's genuine affection for the Royal Navy has often distracted attention from the fact that his views on sea power were pragmatic and unsentimental. Indeed, as Christopher M. Bell shows, in a period dominated by declining resources, global threats, and rapid technological change, it was increasingly air rather than sea power that Churchill looked to as the foundation of Britain's security.
464 pages, Hardcover
First published September 14, 2012
About the author
Christopher M. Bell
10 books7 followersChristopher M. Bell is Professor of History at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia. In addition to numerous articles on naval history, he is the author of Churchill and the Dardanelles (Oxford University Press, 2017), Churchill and Sea Power (Oxford University Press, 2012) and The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy between the Wars (Stanford University Press, 2000), and co-editor of Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International Perspective (2003) and At the Crossroads Between Peace and War: The London Naval Conference of 1930 (2014).
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
October 25, 2012
Author Christopher M.Bell in his book CHURCHILL AND SEAPOWER writes about many parts of Winston Churchill's political and civilian careers but does focus on his personal attitude to sea power. Churchill's relationship to the Royal Navy was tied closer and more personally than that of any other British statesman. Mr. Bell puts together rarely if at all seen and published material to make a very strong case for Churchill's reputation as not only a naval strategist but also a person personally,politically and emotionally connected despite the criticisms of many politicians, sailors, and historians. Mr. Bell shows Churchill's approach to naval power to be straitforward and practical. Churchill's faith in the navy as an offensive weapon was severly weakened by its limited achievements in WWI. Churchill came to see the navy's mission as mostly defensive with the start of WW II. Mr. Churchill is shown in WWII to conclude that the navy should be maintained at the lowest ship level only necessary to perform a defensive role while resources were best directed to air power. But Churchill also is hown in this wondefull book to protect its long-term interests.
July 13, 2017
Churchill and Roosevelt famously had a correspondence in which Churchill signed himself as "Former Naval Person." This book is a study of that aspect of Churchill's leadership and thinking. The author is a Canadian history professor, and the book does splendidly at reconciling rigor with readability.
The book goes chronologically from Churchill's first term as First Lord of the Admiralty before WW1 down to his retirement as Prime Minster, emphasizing controversial episodes such as Gallipoli and the dispatch of Force Z to Singapore.
The author brings out a unifying theme throughout Churchill's career: a desire to decisively engage the enemy, which could not be easily satisfied given the technical and strategic constraints of his situation. In 1914, Churchill wanted the navy to do more than blockade -- perhaps landing troops in Belgium, perhaps forcing an entrance to the Baltic, perhaps even seizing a North Sea island as a base but SOMETHING. The admirals of course pointed out that most of these schemes were pointless or unworkable, but Churchill kept looking for more. Gallipoli of course was the most emphatic example of this. As Bell points out, though, the whole Cabinet was for the operation and by the time things started to go seriously wrong, Churchill was no longer in position to do much about it.
Likewise in the WW2, Churchill was prepared to risk ships on a scale far beyond his admirals, if it would help win the war. Some of his proposed schemes would have resulted in pointless waste, but the basic desire to hit the enemy even at the cost of casualties seems a right-headed one.
Bell largely acquits Churchill from a number of charges that have been made against him. During the 1920s as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Churchill tried to keep down naval costs, for which he has sometimes been criticized. As Bell points out, Churchill was in favor of a fairly considerable level of defense spending and his main goals were maintaining funding for the RAF and avoiding a diplomatically harmful arms race with the United States. (As an aside, I now understand the "cruiser race" better: the British didn't want to appear visibly second to the US for fear of diplomatic costs in the empire; the US did want parity or superiority with the British for similar reasons of prestige. Churchill did understand that this was an arms race Britain would be better avoiding and was looking for ways to de-fuse the conflict.)
By the Second World War, Churchill still had the desire to hurt the enemy but had come to believe that the navy was just not going to be up for it and that blockade was not going to force Germany out of the war. Hence his enthusiasm for Norway, for fighting in the Aegean, and for his willingness to prioritize the bomber war ahead of the convoy war. This latter decision is one of the few points where Bell thinks Churchill made a clearly wrong call.
Bell gives a long and thorough account of the thinking behind the dispatch of Force Z. Churchill wanted it sent as a diplomatic signal, and also as a way to show Japan that Britain could spare enough force to make a war costly. He he didn't tell Philips to go risking his ships without air superiority and seems to have envisioned the ships serving in wartime as a threat to the Japanese in the way Tirpitz was to the British.
I found the book readable and illuminating and its basic thesis persuasive.
The book goes chronologically from Churchill's first term as First Lord of the Admiralty before WW1 down to his retirement as Prime Minster, emphasizing controversial episodes such as Gallipoli and the dispatch of Force Z to Singapore.
The author brings out a unifying theme throughout Churchill's career: a desire to decisively engage the enemy, which could not be easily satisfied given the technical and strategic constraints of his situation. In 1914, Churchill wanted the navy to do more than blockade -- perhaps landing troops in Belgium, perhaps forcing an entrance to the Baltic, perhaps even seizing a North Sea island as a base but SOMETHING. The admirals of course pointed out that most of these schemes were pointless or unworkable, but Churchill kept looking for more. Gallipoli of course was the most emphatic example of this. As Bell points out, though, the whole Cabinet was for the operation and by the time things started to go seriously wrong, Churchill was no longer in position to do much about it.
Likewise in the WW2, Churchill was prepared to risk ships on a scale far beyond his admirals, if it would help win the war. Some of his proposed schemes would have resulted in pointless waste, but the basic desire to hit the enemy even at the cost of casualties seems a right-headed one.
Bell largely acquits Churchill from a number of charges that have been made against him. During the 1920s as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Churchill tried to keep down naval costs, for which he has sometimes been criticized. As Bell points out, Churchill was in favor of a fairly considerable level of defense spending and his main goals were maintaining funding for the RAF and avoiding a diplomatically harmful arms race with the United States. (As an aside, I now understand the "cruiser race" better: the British didn't want to appear visibly second to the US for fear of diplomatic costs in the empire; the US did want parity or superiority with the British for similar reasons of prestige. Churchill did understand that this was an arms race Britain would be better avoiding and was looking for ways to de-fuse the conflict.)
By the Second World War, Churchill still had the desire to hurt the enemy but had come to believe that the navy was just not going to be up for it and that blockade was not going to force Germany out of the war. Hence his enthusiasm for Norway, for fighting in the Aegean, and for his willingness to prioritize the bomber war ahead of the convoy war. This latter decision is one of the few points where Bell thinks Churchill made a clearly wrong call.
Bell gives a long and thorough account of the thinking behind the dispatch of Force Z. Churchill wanted it sent as a diplomatic signal, and also as a way to show Japan that Britain could spare enough force to make a war costly. He he didn't tell Philips to go risking his ships without air superiority and seems to have envisioned the ships serving in wartime as a threat to the Japanese in the way Tirpitz was to the British.
I found the book readable and illuminating and its basic thesis persuasive.
May 27, 2019
The best book about Sir Winston Churchill I've ever read.
April 30, 2013
Very good on the Winston Churchill's philosophy and actions while the head of he British admiralty during World War I, Bell's account loses some steam in WWIi as the author covers territory covered extensively within the historiography. I would recommend it for upper class seminars on military history and graduate classes on naval history.
September 17, 2016
A fantastic account of Churchills involvement with the Royal Navy during his long career. Goes a very long way to dispelling a number of myths about his involvement in naval "disasters" and most importantly reaches the balance between academic rigour and readability for the average reader. Highly recommended
October 27, 2015
Churchills flaws and bad planning are glossed over and his failure to see Japan as a threat to the British Empire until they invaded China was willing to see Japan take over the far east and Australia and New Zealand, and hope to restore these countries after the war.
Read
April 6, 2017Very well written but highly technical. Not the easiest of reads.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews