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Why the Germans Lose at War
The German armed forces suffered crushing defeat in the last century. Kenneth Macksey examines the reasons behind these catastrophic military the random fortunes of war, or the inevitable result of a particular structure, leadership and history? A nation with few natural defensive boundaries, Germany traditionally had to struggle to survive, and developed an aggressive and militant outlook. Its great strengths were the brilliance of individual generals and military thinkers, the innovative development of the military forces, and the skill and tenacity of the fighting men. Set against all this was a short-term war policy, a tendency to underestimate the enemy and believe its own propaganda, and the politicisation of the military staffs. These and many other factors were to lead Germany from nineteenth-century success, and dreams of world domination, to twentieth-century defeat. Kenneth Macksey s other books include Panzer General, Campaigns and Battles, and the alternate history The German Invasion of England, July 1940.
240 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1996
About the author
Kenneth John Macksey
55 books16 followersBritish author and historian who specialized in military history and military biography, particularly of the Second World War. Macksey was commissioned in the Royal Armoured Corps and served during the Second World War (earning the Military Cross under the command of Percy Hobart). Macksey later wrote the (authoritative) biography of Hobart.Macksey gained a permanent commission in 1946, was transferred to the Royal Tank Regiment in 1947, reached the rank of major in 1957 and retired from the Army in 1968.
Amongst many other books, Macksey wrote two volumes of alternate history, one, entitled Invasion, dealt with a successful invasion of England by Germany in 1940 and the other describing a NATO–Warsaw Pact clash in the late 1980s. The latter book was done under contract to the Canadian Forces and focuses on the Canadian role in such a conflict. He was an editor and contributor to Greenhill's Alternate Decisions series since 1995.
In Macksey's Guderian – Panzer General, he refuted the view of historian Sir Basil Liddell-Hart regarding Hart's influence on the development of German Tank Theory in the years leading up to 1939.
Amongst many other books, Macksey wrote two volumes of alternate history, one, entitled Invasion, dealt with a successful invasion of England by Germany in 1940 and the other describing a NATO–Warsaw Pact clash in the late 1980s. The latter book was done under contract to the Canadian Forces and focuses on the Canadian role in such a conflict. He was an editor and contributor to Greenhill's Alternate Decisions series since 1995.
In Macksey's Guderian – Panzer General, he refuted the view of historian Sir Basil Liddell-Hart regarding Hart's influence on the development of German Tank Theory in the years leading up to 1939.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
May 12, 2013
Mackey is a cut above most of the military historians I've read in terms of writing style. Although dense--this being primarily a condensed survey of the European theatre of WWII with focus on the German officers who led it--and slow going for one not already familiar with the principals, it became increasingly enjoyable as I became accustomed to his rhythms.
The author is opionated with an appreciation of the elegance of strategy and tactics. Hitler, his staff and the regular military officers who conducted German operations are all rated. Surprisingly, Rommel fares poorly, quite contrary to his portrayal by others I've read, but then Rommel was a favorite of the allies.
The author is opionated with an appreciation of the elegance of strategy and tactics. Hitler, his staff and the regular military officers who conducted German operations are all rated. Surprisingly, Rommel fares poorly, quite contrary to his portrayal by others I've read, but then Rommel was a favorite of the allies.
February 7, 2016
There are at least two regimes in modern Western history who, despite their ultimate defeat and destruction, still attract the admiration of contemporary students of military history because of their supposed tactical brilliance, namely the Confederate States of America and the Germany of World Wars I and II. In this acerbic and deeply biting revisionist history, the author explores why it is that the Germans lose at war with a specific look at World War II that nevertheless puts this nightmare in a larger historical context going back to the Middle Ages [1]. To briefly summarize the author’s point, the vulnerability of the Germans based on their geography has led to the adoption of preemptive offense as a form of defense, and their initial tactical success in many conflicts and their inattention to issues of logistics, demography, and diplomacy has led to eventual ruin and disastrous defeat. The author then argues his thesis with considerable flair and brilliance in about 230 pages of main text that mostly focuses on the Second World War and the culpability of German general officers in enabling and serving Hitler.
In terms of its contents, the book is straightforward and chronological in its approach. After introductory material including maps, charts, and the organizational structure of the German staff under the Prussian monarchs and Hitler, the book begins with a short look at the nightmarish scene at Nuremberg where many of Hitler’s generals were put on trial for their horrifying crimes against humanity, pointing to the fact that this defeat, while the latest of German overreach, was far from the first such scene. The book then goes back to the early 19th century and the rise of Prussia after its defeat during the Napoleonic wars to the period when it unified Germany under its own militaristic state. The book then spends a couple of chapters looking at the folly of the two-front war that led to defeat in World War I. After another couple of chapters, one dealing with the German army under the Weimer Republic and another about the first half of the Third Reich, the book spends most of its space looking at World War II as the quintessential example of German military disaster, an early success based on tactical brilliance and the defeatism of enemies, combined by a blinding arrogance that leads to looking down on allies and disregarding and underestimating enemies and the building up of opponents on every front, followed by inevitable defeat when prolonged warfare reduces the tactical brilliance of an army and logistics and demographics lead to grinding down and defeat, with the hope that this fate can be avoided through a miracle like that which saved Prussia in 1762 when Russia pulled back from delivering the final blow to Frederick the Great allowing Prussia to survive with the status quo antebellum. In World War II there was no such miracle and the book details the grim and unpleasant decline of Germany despite the brilliance of many of its highest officers.
This book has a lot to offer the reader who is intrigued by the title and willing to read its contents. For one, the book offers a thoughtful and chilling look at the political corruption of a military leadership, and the way that divide and rule of a capable military leadership leads to national defeat when people only want to be surrounded by sycophants and not talented but sometimes abrasive subordinates. For another, the book offers a critical reassessment of Rommel and considerable praise for leaders like Guderain, Kesselring, and Model. The book demonstrates the internal feuding of German military leadership under Hitler’s misrule and the culpability of leaders in adopting a form of von Clausewitz’s military philosophy that neglected the importance of the defense and the fact that military plans never survive contact with the enemy. For all of the author’s apparent hostility to von Clausewitz, he offers a critique that is remarkably similar in many respects. More importantly, the author notes, as some historians have also noted, that the international prestige of the German army which led many nations (like Chile) to engage in the Prussianization of their forces [2] often neglected to note the corruption and rigidity that often followed the adoption of a facsimile of Germany’s military. The author is strident and quick to criticize, but the criticism has merit all too often, as Germany’s persistent pattern of arrogance and underestimation of their opposition, and their failure to cultivate demographic or logistic excellence and the building of strong alliances of mutual respect has led persistently to disastrous defeat.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
[2] See, for example:
http://www.amazon.com/Time-Well-Waste...
In terms of its contents, the book is straightforward and chronological in its approach. After introductory material including maps, charts, and the organizational structure of the German staff under the Prussian monarchs and Hitler, the book begins with a short look at the nightmarish scene at Nuremberg where many of Hitler’s generals were put on trial for their horrifying crimes against humanity, pointing to the fact that this defeat, while the latest of German overreach, was far from the first such scene. The book then goes back to the early 19th century and the rise of Prussia after its defeat during the Napoleonic wars to the period when it unified Germany under its own militaristic state. The book then spends a couple of chapters looking at the folly of the two-front war that led to defeat in World War I. After another couple of chapters, one dealing with the German army under the Weimer Republic and another about the first half of the Third Reich, the book spends most of its space looking at World War II as the quintessential example of German military disaster, an early success based on tactical brilliance and the defeatism of enemies, combined by a blinding arrogance that leads to looking down on allies and disregarding and underestimating enemies and the building up of opponents on every front, followed by inevitable defeat when prolonged warfare reduces the tactical brilliance of an army and logistics and demographics lead to grinding down and defeat, with the hope that this fate can be avoided through a miracle like that which saved Prussia in 1762 when Russia pulled back from delivering the final blow to Frederick the Great allowing Prussia to survive with the status quo antebellum. In World War II there was no such miracle and the book details the grim and unpleasant decline of Germany despite the brilliance of many of its highest officers.
This book has a lot to offer the reader who is intrigued by the title and willing to read its contents. For one, the book offers a thoughtful and chilling look at the political corruption of a military leadership, and the way that divide and rule of a capable military leadership leads to national defeat when people only want to be surrounded by sycophants and not talented but sometimes abrasive subordinates. For another, the book offers a critical reassessment of Rommel and considerable praise for leaders like Guderain, Kesselring, and Model. The book demonstrates the internal feuding of German military leadership under Hitler’s misrule and the culpability of leaders in adopting a form of von Clausewitz’s military philosophy that neglected the importance of the defense and the fact that military plans never survive contact with the enemy. For all of the author’s apparent hostility to von Clausewitz, he offers a critique that is remarkably similar in many respects. More importantly, the author notes, as some historians have also noted, that the international prestige of the German army which led many nations (like Chile) to engage in the Prussianization of their forces [2] often neglected to note the corruption and rigidity that often followed the adoption of a facsimile of Germany’s military. The author is strident and quick to criticize, but the criticism has merit all too often, as Germany’s persistent pattern of arrogance and underestimation of their opposition, and their failure to cultivate demographic or logistic excellence and the building of strong alliances of mutual respect has led persistently to disastrous defeat.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
[2] See, for example:
http://www.amazon.com/Time-Well-Waste...
September 12, 2024
If you go by the title, I guarantee you will be scratching your head and try to figure out are you reading a book that by accident got the cover with the title in question.
Book is not analysis on why Germans lose at war - this is story of highest level of command of German army (from around unification, through 1800's, WW1 and finally WW2) and the way high command saw itself as a true political body that should actually run the country (or at least act as king-maker).
High level of country's militarization and pretty elite status of the army was driven by the very location of Germany in Europe, ever so good neighborly relations in Europe (which is same for every country that shares its border with also-very-trigger-happy neighbors, different one every couple of hundred miles) and need to finish the war as fast as possible to avoid catastrophic attrition. This is what Germany was known for until WW1 - relatively localized wars with one or (at maximum) two opponents (in the same direction), with aim to finish it fast.
So, to sum the book up (because, again, to underline - proper title would be History of German High Command) is that Germans paid the price other great nations paid when they chewed more than they can swallow - Alexander the Great and the Napoleon to name the few. They started very carefully and after successes started to believe their own might and invincibility (very similar to current West that spent 20 years chasing insurgents on open ground and they believe they can confront peer-opponent in direct combat like that - right....). Driven by this superiority complex, Germans just over extended themselves, committed disgusting crimes (yes, German Army too, oh yes) and then found themselves crushed and ruthlessly hunted and decimated while retreating to their home country.
Only thing that is different here is that Germans used start of Cold War to create the myth of their professionalism and quality in battle, myth that was supported unfortunately by (further west) Western Allies because they needed something to act as a barrier against the USSR (even in form of barren fields decimated by nuclear weapons if need be - but even for this that same nation needs to be ready to die to the last man so give them a myth).
Did they have more capable, and adaptive senior and junior officers - definitely at the beginning. This was truly advantage over more strict and inflexible French and Russian command chains and even rather rigid British socially-controlled officer corps. But against US and (to a degree) Canadians, I dont think so - these were initiative driven armies from the start (which together with ANZAC they proved in WW1). And lets be honest - adaptability and capability is something that gets (unfortunately very bloody) learned in the field of the battle. After few bloody battles each surviving army unit grows and does not forget the lessons learned (which is something West is [shockingly!] becoming aware in the East Europe these days).
I gotta say I expected something more but then again it is obvious my expectations were unrealistic. Why? Because story of German Army is story of Napoleon, Alexander the Great, Gustav Adolphus - people who created great armies but then just went over the cliff because they could not control themselves.
German's myth survived only due to the better propaganda machine.
Interesting book. If you disregard the title very good history of German High Command.
Recommended.
Book is not analysis on why Germans lose at war - this is story of highest level of command of German army (from around unification, through 1800's, WW1 and finally WW2) and the way high command saw itself as a true political body that should actually run the country (or at least act as king-maker).
High level of country's militarization and pretty elite status of the army was driven by the very location of Germany in Europe, ever so good neighborly relations in Europe (which is same for every country that shares its border with also-very-trigger-happy neighbors, different one every couple of hundred miles) and need to finish the war as fast as possible to avoid catastrophic attrition. This is what Germany was known for until WW1 - relatively localized wars with one or (at maximum) two opponents (in the same direction), with aim to finish it fast.
So, to sum the book up (because, again, to underline - proper title would be History of German High Command) is that Germans paid the price other great nations paid when they chewed more than they can swallow - Alexander the Great and the Napoleon to name the few. They started very carefully and after successes started to believe their own might and invincibility (very similar to current West that spent 20 years chasing insurgents on open ground and they believe they can confront peer-opponent in direct combat like that - right....). Driven by this superiority complex, Germans just over extended themselves, committed disgusting crimes (yes, German Army too, oh yes) and then found themselves crushed and ruthlessly hunted and decimated while retreating to their home country.
Only thing that is different here is that Germans used start of Cold War to create the myth of their professionalism and quality in battle, myth that was supported unfortunately by (further west) Western Allies because they needed something to act as a barrier against the USSR (even in form of barren fields decimated by nuclear weapons if need be - but even for this that same nation needs to be ready to die to the last man so give them a myth).
Did they have more capable, and adaptive senior and junior officers - definitely at the beginning. This was truly advantage over more strict and inflexible French and Russian command chains and even rather rigid British socially-controlled officer corps. But against US and (to a degree) Canadians, I dont think so - these were initiative driven armies from the start (which together with ANZAC they proved in WW1). And lets be honest - adaptability and capability is something that gets (unfortunately very bloody) learned in the field of the battle. After few bloody battles each surviving army unit grows and does not forget the lessons learned (which is something West is [shockingly!] becoming aware in the East Europe these days).
I gotta say I expected something more but then again it is obvious my expectations were unrealistic. Why? Because story of German Army is story of Napoleon, Alexander the Great, Gustav Adolphus - people who created great armies but then just went over the cliff because they could not control themselves.
German's myth survived only due to the better propaganda machine.
Interesting book. If you disregard the title very good history of German High Command.
Recommended.
September 21, 2015
Jag har sett hundratals timmar med dokumentärer om Hitler och andra världskriget. De första åren jag hade kabel-TV såg jag så mycket på Discovery att jag började känna igen de enskilda filmklippen: ”Hitler kommer att rätta till mössan snart”, ”Ardenneroffensiven. Stridsvagnen till höger träffas… nu.”
Sedan var det lugnt ett tag med andra världskriget tills jag fyllde fyrtio och andra världskrigsgenen aktiverades, så efter det har blivit en del.
Jag antar att det är förlaget som har valt titeln eftersom innehållet är akademiskt snustorrt. Faktum är att det är ganska svårt att urskilja några tydliga orsaker över huvud taget, inte en punktlista så långt ögat kan nå, istället så är det i stort sett en historisk framställning av Preussens och Tysklands militärmakt.
Mackseys övergripande förklaring till Tyskland och Preussens många nederlag verkar hur som helst vara vissa systemfel i den tyska krigsmakten som kan spåras långt tillbaka i tiden.
Sedan var det lugnt ett tag med andra världskriget tills jag fyllde fyrtio och andra världskrigsgenen aktiverades, så efter det har blivit en del.
Jag antar att det är förlaget som har valt titeln eftersom innehållet är akademiskt snustorrt. Faktum är att det är ganska svårt att urskilja några tydliga orsaker över huvud taget, inte en punktlista så långt ögat kan nå, istället så är det i stort sett en historisk framställning av Preussens och Tysklands militärmakt.
Mackseys övergripande förklaring till Tyskland och Preussens många nederlag verkar hur som helst vara vissa systemfel i den tyska krigsmakten som kan spåras långt tillbaka i tiden.
May 5, 2016
Awesome book. This is a really a quick guide to the history of the Prussian/German Army general staff. It points the reader to the sheer cheek and slapdashery of the real German side of World Wars I and II. For every bit of "brilliance", the German war effort has a serious blunder or clear oversight to match. The weakness of Intelligence services, the poor planning for logistics, the constant faith in their own superiority, the constant underestimation of their rivals, all are quickly introduced and explained, just enough to lead one to want to re-read other texts for corroboration. This is a book that helps you understand other books. Never a bad thing, and this is a great read. Just too brief.
July 17, 2015
Fails to deliver on the promise of the title. Mostly a recap of what an idiot Hitler was as a war leader and how the generals who tried to stand up to him were punished.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews