In December 1950 General Matthew B. Ridgway replaced General Walton Walker as commander of the Eighth Army, and in April 1951 he succeeded Douglas MacArthur as supreme commander of the United Nations forces in Korea and supreme commander of the United States Far East Command. In this spirited book, General Ridgway describes how he took a dispirited army and rebuilt it in a few short months, leading it into battle against the Chinese and North Korean forces, forcing them back over the 38th parallel and ”victory.” It is a book that takes a close look at MacArthur, his failings and brilliance, and a hard look at the idea of limited war. Infused with a humane leader's appreciation for the ordinary fighting soldier, Ridgway's history also teaches important lessons about Vietnam and any future conflict. Above all, he emphasizes: We should not involve ourselves in escalating warfare without a specific and attainable goal.
Matthew Bunker Ridgway was a United States Army general. He held several major commands and is most famous as the commander of the famed 82nd Airborne Division during World War II and for resurrecting the United Nations (U.N.) war effort during the Korean War. Several historians have credited Ridgway for turning the war around in favor of the UN side.Ridgway was also the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)and his final assignment was as the Chief of Staff of the United States Army.
His long and prestigious military career was recognized by the award of the Presidential Medal of Freedom on May 12, 1986 by President Ronald Reagan, who stated that "Heroes come when they're needed; great men step forward when courage seems in short supply."
Ridgway died at his suburban Pittsburgh home at age 98 in July 1993 of cardiac arrest, holding permanent rank of General in the United States Army. He is buried at Arlington National Cemetery. In a graveside eulogy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell said: "No soldier ever performed his duty better than this man. No soldier ever upheld his honor better than this man. No soldier ever loved his country more than this man did. Every American soldier owes a debt to this great man."
An interesting blend of memoir, commentary and military history by General Matthew Ridgway. General Ridgway served in the U.S. Army from 1917-1955. He is remembered for commanding the famed 82nd Airborne Division during World War II and then assuming command of the (somewhat) demoralized 8th U.S. Army in December of 1950 after General Walker (8th Army commander) was killed in a jeep accident. He is credited by many with turning the 8th U.S. Army from a battered and worn-down force into an effective fighting force in just five months (12/50-04/51). General Ridgway assumed the position of Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command (UNCOM) after General MacArthur was relieved by President Truman in April of 1951.
"The Korean War" is not a lengthy work and isn't intended to be a microscopic review of the fighting or politics of the war. Nor does General Ridgway go into great details about his time in command during the war with a few notable exceptions.Like most generals he is modest about his contribution and well aware of the fact that there is only so much he can do from such a high level in the Army. Ridgway understands that the fighting ,and dying, is done by the troops and sergeants and officers at the battalion and company levels. The book has a large number of photographs (several of which I personally have never seen before) and several detailed maps that I found to be particularly useful in giving me an overview of the strategic layout of the war.
General Ridgway is good solid writer. Articulate, complimentary and critical (of himself and others) where needed. The book is an easy read and flows nicely. The one point that I found of great interest is that he (like so many of his professional peers) had a love-hate relationship with General Douglas MacArthur. At time throughout the book Ridgway is complimentary and then critical of MacArthur. Ridgway's book was originally published in 1967 and MacArthur died in 1964. It's possible that Ridgway felt more comfortable in being more forthright because of that fact. Well that and the fact that he had retired from the Army in 1955 and could be more outspoken. After all he was now a private citizen. Whatever the case might have been it demonstrated that generals are as Human as everyone else.
A little slow at times if you aren't into military strategy, but overall an interesting look at the Korean war. The two closing chapters are very pertinent to the present in terms of how we think of victory in war and the civilian/military balance of power.
Matthew Ridgway was made the Commander of 8th Army in 1950 and in 1951,succeeded MacArthur as Supreme Commander of UN Forces in Korea and Commander of U.S. Far East Forces.
He had two unenviable tasks: handling the course correction of troops that were struggling in Korea, for reasons of strategy and morale; and following in the shoes of one of the most controversial but popular generals in U.S. history.
This book is as plainly written - and as free of ego - as any book ever written by a celebrated military leader. He is especially candid in his assessment of why MacArthur's behavior and attitude earned him the ouster he received by President Truman. He clearly states that a civilian government must have oversight over the military, regardless of what high-ranking military leaders might believe.
Ridgway also makes it clear that war objectives must not only be clearly defined, but limited and have a specific end game. He wrote the book during the early days of the Vietnam War, when he (and other Americans) assumed that that philosophy was going to be followed. It is tragic that it was not.
I suspect that the book's age makes it less than sought-after by military minds of contemporary times, which is also tragic. His opinions about how war should be fought and why, and the necessary relationship between the government and the military are as timely today as they were during the Korean War.
Matthew Ridgway was one of our nation's best commanders ever, right up there with Washington, Grant, and Pershing in terms of his impact on the major conflict of his time and his selfless service to our country, and a rival of Patton, Lee, and Sherman when it came to personal example in the field. Without his personal effort and example in 1951, in my opinion, we would think of Korea in the same way that we think of Viet Nam now (and the way we will likely end up thinking about Iraq once this is over). In fact, if not for Ridgway, Truman might have ended up with a historical reputation like LBJ's and Bush II's (who will NOT be vindicated by history in the long run, in my opinion - 'nuff said on that for now). Plus, without Ridgway's adamant stand against intervention in the 50's while serving as Army Chief of Staff, we might have ended up in Viet Nam ten years earlier. Admittedly, Eisenhower and his cabinet were a lot more likely to listen to his Joint Chiefs than Bush II, Cheney, and Rumsfeld were in 2002-3. Still, the example set by Ridgway at that time should be the model for the general serving as the Chairman of the JCS and the Army Chief (although I give Gen Shinseki some credit for at least trying to let the Congress and the country know what a realistic troop figure should have been in order to properly provide security once we had invaded).
Anyway....Ridgway is the major 20th century American historical figure most deserving of a real scholarly biography like James's The Years of MacArthur, Pogue's series on Marshall, or the fine works on Eisenhower by Ambrose and others. Yet until our military and political historians get off their collective ass and make the effort to do the right research, this book and Ridgway's Soldier are all we have to work with.
This is an OK book, but we know we're only getting one side of a huge story that has many varied and credible perspectives.
All of our current generals, especially the ones in charge in Iraq and who are directly responsible for advising the national command authority, would do well to learn from the example set by Matthew B. Ridgway.
Published in 1967, 'The War in Korea' tells the story of that conflict through the eyes of a senior figure in the Allied hierarchy. Whilst this inevitably leads to a degree of personal bias, it does give a unique and, at times, brutally realistic perspective on the unfolding events. He does make a credible attempt to see early developments from the Korean perspective, highlighting for example that they were not new to being fought over by foreign nationals, nor did they have any reason to trust the resolve of the USA. He expresses admiration for the sacrifice of the Glosters at Imjin, but similar sacrifices by Turkey barely get a mention. Not surprisingly, given the time of its first publication, he draws parallels with events in Vietnam as a warning for the future of that conflict. I accept that most books on the Korean conflict show some kind of bias, and allowing for that I found this a truly amazing and thought-provoking read.
This book gives you a broad picture of what the US did in Korea due to American politics. I think the biggest limitation of this book is that it fails to consider a lot of the context in which the war was occurring. I kept on getting frustrated because I wanted to know more about what was going on with the South Korean people, how they reacted to the war, and how the US collaborated with them. I also wish that Ridgway spent more time considering what was going on politically in both the north and south of Korea, China, and the USSR, particularly in the events leading up to the war. It was a good thing Ben read this book to me so he could answer a lot of my questions.
You can skip the last two chapters; they just reiterate his ideas about how the nature of war has changed since WWII.
A truly captivating first-hand account of the Korean War from one of its finest Generals. Matthew Ridgeway provides an inside perspective on events from his initial view in Washington to his frozen experience in the hills of Korea. His commentary on the military and political environment are fascinating. He also provides a balanced, and yet condemning, view on the events that led to the MacArthur-Truman rift and eventual relief of MacArthur. While not a comprehensive history of the war, this book provides a primary source for any student of the Korean War.
One of the best accounts of the Korean Conflict written by one of the best commanding Generals America has produced. Great man who is often overlooked.
My dubious knowledge of American history means I knew little about Matthew B. Ridgeway before reading this. I enjoyed this book immensely because Ridgeway is a tremendous writer. It’s unfair, I know, but I often assume these military writers are going to lean heavily on ghostwriters to get their copy published. There doesn’t seem to be one at all with this text. So, assuming this is Ridgeway’s writing, he gets a salute from this book-reading civilian for his highly readable writing style and his ability to tell a story without bogging down in names, dates, and locations until you’ve lost the point of the story.
Essentially, this is Ridgeway’s account of the Korean war from his perspective as commander of the 8th Army and then as commander of the U.S. Far East region and commander of the United Nations forces, a job he took when Truman fired MacArthur.
You’ll read about the various battles and their locations, but they won’t confuse you, again, because of Ridgeway’s clear writing style. And while Ridgeway is sympathetic to MacArthur, he agreed with Truman in the end that MacArthur had to go. Ridgeway even saw that as a constitutional test of whether civilian leadership of the military is the right thing to do, as the constitution says it is, or whether we should run our wars via a cabal of warriors. He thought the Korean War would be America’s last war fought solely with conventional weapons. Of course, time proved him wrong on that, but that’s a good kind of wrong.
I love nothing more on a Sunday night after I’ve taught a zoom class than to sit back and immerse myself in a book, and last night, I felt like some military history from a source I knew little about. I buried this treasure on my hard drive more than nine years ago. But it shone just as brightly yesterday as it would have had I read it the minute I downloaded it back in May of 2014.
Written in 1967, in the middle of the Vietnam War, this book is somewhat an attempt by General Ridgway (the main general in charge of the Korean War after the relief of MacArthur's command in 1951) to contextualize the Korean War as a similar limited war engagement and the lessons learned from it, and how to avoid the same mistakes, mainly in clarifying objectives and reeling in the psychopaths calling for total nuclear war.
I have been reading through nearly every English source on the Korean War as I could find, and while this does have some interesting information, particularly about the American side of their military maneuvers, logistics and other objective facts about the war, it reads like total anti-communist propaganda which is endemic to the American government, blatant lies and claimed valor and indignant denials of accusation of Nazi-like war crimes from Chinese and North Korean negotiators, when MacArthur was on record as a psychopath suggesting nuking the entire Yalu River with cobalt, 3 million civilians (including 1m SOUTH KOREAN civilians) were killed by American bombing (more than the entire Pacific theater during WW2) as well as never mentioning South Korean atrocities that were also well documented.
It is for that reason I gave it 3 stars, since while valuable to my research, will be read as distasteful Nazi propaganda to an objective reader of history.
General Ridgeway should be known as one of the greatest American generals in history for his actions in Korea. This book is a brilliant memoir/history of both the Korean War, and the American policy during the early 50’s.
Ridgeway’s leadership changed the course of the war, and saved the UN forces from an embarrassing defeat. Ridgeway offers an in depth commentary on the Truman/MacArthur scandal, and the latter’s dismissal.
Lastly, the book ends on an in depth analysis of the civilian/Military leadership relationship in the US, explaining the importance of the civilian, an elected officials making decisions on foreign policy, not the military. This was one of the many mistakes of MacArthur in that he breached that relationship. The military must not control foreign policy, and we saw with MacArthur, the results can be disastrous.
The book also explains the importance of clear objectives and goals in limited war. Limited war being the type of warfare fought post ww2. He openly critiques Vietnam as lacking these objectives, and states that the American mind must give up the prospects of “total victory”. Something that has become antiquated.
Matthew Ridgway, as the commander of the 8th Army and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, was deeply involved in many aspects of decision making that profoundly impacted the Korean War. This book, instead of diving into those details, provides a big-picture view. In particular, it offers a close-up to the legendary General MacArthur immediately before his demotion.
Korean War was bloody with nearly 5 million deaths, 1/10 -1/7 among which were soldiers. The conditions were often brutal. Winter in Korean Peninsula is extremely cold and summer can be hot and humid due to its proximity to the ocean. No parties were really for a military conflict of this magnitude. However, both sides fought hard and Gen. Ridgway described in detail their bravery. But in the end, he made one point loud and clear. Wars can be fought. But they can only be fought with a specific and attainable goal, with a blanket goal such as victory not being one of those.
The book provides good insights into Ridgeway's leadership style. I found the chapters on the problems with North Korean and Chinese POWs very interesting as it is an aspect of the war of which I knew nothing, and I also learned more about the frustrations and on-going conflict during the two-years of truce negotiations. In the final chapter, Ridgeway warns of the challenges that the US will face in Vietnam (book was written in 1967). In many ways, the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam were not that much different. Both were prefaced on limited war, a new mode of warfare that the US painfully had to learn. Good book.
You’re tempted to try to draw profound lessons from this outstanding history of the Forgotten War, even 50-plus years later.
General Matthew Ridgway’s look back at the Korean War, written 15 years after the armistice and just as Vietnam was becoming a quagmire for the United States, still resonates even today.
That the cautions he espouses seem to have often been overlooked or ignored in the decades since make this book feel like a cautionary tale.
5/5 for two reasons - it's an excellent overview of the Korean War, and it shows the thinking of one of the US Army's best Generals. Highly recommended.
"How could it happen that a major conflict like this could explode without warning?" (page vi) "The existence of the powerful striking force in North Korea and the massing of troops near the border were no secret from our intelligence. It was our evaluation that was at fault ..." (page 12) "Only six days before the NKPA crossed the border in force a Central Intelligence field agency reported 'extensive troop movements' north of the 38th parallel, together with 'evacuation of all residents from the Northern side of the parallel to a depth of two kilometers; ... movement of armed units to border areas; and movement of large shipments or ordnance and ammunition to border areas.' How anyone could have read this report and not anticipated an attack is hard to fathom. Yet this report was not used a basis for any conclusio0ns by G-2 at General Headquarters in Tokyo ..." (pages 13-14)
Not particularly well written and can be a bit dense and technical at times. This is not a good comprehensive narrative of the Korean War as it is thoroughly couched in the perspective of General Ridgway. This should be obvious, but for that reason I do not recommend this book for anyone who is looking for a general history of the Korean War. Rather, this is more interesting as a supplement in order to have an account of the conflict through the eyes of the particular US General that wrote it!
Recommended only for someone who already has a solid understanding of the Korean War and wants to compare that with how Ridgway experienced and understood it.
General Ridgway was one of the generals I held in high regard. After reading this book, I reflected on my experiences in Afghanistan and found that we have not heeded many of the lessons learned from Ridgway's Korean War experience nor his comments on having a sound national strategy. If you examine the book from that perspective vs. the way it was written I think you will find it more enjoyable. I would recommend you follow up with a book called Funding the Taliban to understand my perspective.
Very readable history from a military perspective. General Ridgeway seems somewhat dazzled by the personality of Gen. MacArthur and eases his viewpoint somewhat. Good overall perspective of the Korean War, with some Vietnam insights included.