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I Am a Strange Loop

Douglas R. Hofstadter

3.93 · Rating details · 5,128 Ratings · 420 Reviews

What do we mean when we say "I"? Can thought arise out of matter? Can a self, a soul, a consciousness, an "I" arise out of mere matter? If it cannot, then how can you or I be here? I Am a Strange Loop argues that the key to understanding selves and consciousness is the "strange loop"--a special kind of abstract feedback loop inhabiting our brains. Deep down, a human brain ...more

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Hardcover, 412 pages

Published March 27th 2007 by Basic Books (AZ) (first published 2007)

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Jun 05, 2018 BlackOxford rated it liked it

Shelves: american-non-fiction, philosophy-theology, science

Strangely Wrong

I must suggest something blasphemously arrogant: Douglas Hofstadter has it wrong. My only justification for saying such an outrageous thing is that it doesn’t matter. Nevertheless I have a valid objection which needs to be recorded. Enough, then, of self-referentiality.

Hofstadter’s teenage intuition got him started on the idea that there are degrees of souledness in the material world. Atoms (and presumably their constituent parts) have no souls; bacteria have very primitive, that Strangely Wrong

I must suggest something blasphemously arrogant: Douglas Hofstadter has it wrong. My only justification for saying such an outrageous thing is that it doesn’t matter. Nevertheless I have a valid objection which needs to be recorded. Enough, then, of self-referentiality.

Hofstadter’s teenage intuition got him started on the idea that there are degrees of souledness in the material world. Atoms (and presumably their constituent parts) have no souls; bacteria have very primitive, that is to say, very small souls; dogs have somewhat bigger souls; and human beings have much larger souls but even among those there is enormous variation and no logical upper limit to size. This of course is not an entirely novel intuition. It was shared by Ancient Greek philosophers, pre-industrial tribal groups, perhaps some Shinto sects, and St. Thomas Aquinas among others.

This idea of souledness is of course essentially a moral one. Hofstadter’s explicit intention is to provide a criterion by which he and his fellow human beings can decide how to act - in general the more soul, the more respect should be afforded to its bearer. Incidentally he is also developing a theory of consciousness, which is a correlate of soul.

But this is simply wrong. Hofstadter, from the very beginning of his exceptionally discursive argument, presumes that what he is doing is constructing a metric of souledness through which he can estimate the size of soul or degree of consciousness possessed by an entity.

This is, of course what scientists, and engineers, and husbands who are putting up curtains usually think they are doing when they measure something, namely determining what length, breadth, volume, color, texture, or other magnitude constitutes some entity of interest. The metric employed depends on the interest one has of course.

It is this interest one has, however, and not the molecule, or bridge, or curtain material, which ‘contains’ the result of any measurement. The choice of which metric to employ determines not how much of something is contained in an object but where that object sits in relation to other objects on the metric. The object is a property of the metric; the metric is definitely not a property of the object.

This distinction is crucial in light of Hofstadter’s fundamental motivation to provide a criteria for correct behaviour. The choice of metric is THE moral choice. The thing measured has no moral content at all - not people, not events, not inanimate objects. They are considered as moral (or tall, or wide, or disgusting) when we put them on the scale we have chosen.

The consequence is that Hofstader’s Strange Loop, the ‘I’ of consciousness, is not some objective entity, a logical ego which can be studied scientifically for its salient characteristics. This Strange Loop is literally a moral construction, a consequence of the very metric of souledness that Hofstader chooses. We, not just human beings but all that exists, have no soul whatsoever until someone like Hofstader, or Plato, or Thomas Aquinas comes along and sets up a criterion for assessing it. Then, hey voila, it’s there.

But it’s really not there as well. The mirage that Hofstadter writes about is that the things we measure have the characteristics that we measure. An innocuous self-delusion, except when it’s not. The metric he started with is the Strange Loop, hiding in plain sight, a ninja ego smirking behind his index finger with a Cheshire Cat grin. It was created when Hofstadter said it and someone else heard it. The Strange Loop is not ‘I’, it is ‘We’.

And so the Strange Loop exists in that very strange state we call language, being nowhere specific but lurking invisibly everywhere. This gives the Strange Loop the character of quantum uncertainty: it can be experienced and reflected upon, but never at the same time. Just like the metric of souledness, one of its many masks. ...more

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Sep 22, 2008 David Katzman rated it liked it

I have an interesting perspective on this title because the book I read just before it was The New Earth by Eckhart Tolle, a book grounded in Zen Buddhist philosophy. Tolle declares that the Ego (or thinking mind) is the cause of all the poisons of our civilization and the only hope for us as a species is to embrace awareness and presence and escape the thinking mind that feeds our needs for material possessions, success, achievement, domination, and so on. This book is in fact an entire logicia I have an interesting perspective on this title because the book I read just before it was The New Earth by Eckhart Tolle, a book grounded in Zen Buddhist philosophy. Tolle declares that the Ego (or thinking mind) is the cause of all the poisons of our civilization and the only hope for us as a species is to embrace awareness and presence and escape the thinking mind that feeds our needs for material possessions, success, achievement, domination, and so on. This book is in fact an entire logician’s analysis of what the “Ego” is, which Hofstadter believes is equivalent to the “I,” the Self, the soul, and consciousness itself. In fact Hofstadter believes the Ego is all there is in us. Tolle would probably say…you may be right that the Ego is a strange loop…but so what? It’s poison; cure it! While Tolle occasionally does fall into new-age batshit, overall his analysis was fairly compelling to me. I would also claim that Hofstadter’s equating consciousness, the “I,” and the “Ego” as all one equivalent thing is nothing more than an assertion.

Hofstadter’s essential claim is that the Ego is a strange loop in the mind, and by strange loop he means a feedback loop (or “pattern”) that reflects on itself. Everything in our brain is a symbol, including the symbol of itself. I believe he would say that the Self-symbol is a loop, and the loop is a symbol that is continually reevaluating itself and making slight adjustments to itself. A loop that can observe itself and provide feedback on itself (it’s “self”). We invent this Self-symbol in our minds over our lifetime as it constantly accretes bits of other symbols to it—it provides feedback on itself constantly. I actually agree that this is (possibly) an accurate way to describe much of the Ego. Hofstadter agrees with Buddhism that the Self is an illusion, but he off-handedly says striving to get past the illusion as Buddhism suggests is a pointless, dead-end pursuit.

I did not find that Hofstadter compellingly demonstrates that this strange loop is the entirety of consciousness. Awareness and energy or pure presence seem to be aspects of consciousness which are outside the symbol of the Ego. He tries—but doesn’t succeed in my mind—to dispel that there is something else present. In addition, he seems to confuse our mind's symbol of the “I” with what the “I” might really be. The mind is easily fooled after all so, this strange loop might certainly be an illusion. But also there might be something else we can’t sense because we are so easy to fool.

I think one of the key flaws in his argument is that he doesn’t delve deeply enough into the “self-reflexivity” he talks about. Since this “self-reflexivity” is the very point when a self-symbol examines itself then that very point may well be the point of the conscious mind. He essentially claims the self is a formula, and life is in fact mechanistic. There is no free-will because all your brain is doing is weighing pros and cons of various choices and whichever internal symbol gets the most checkmarks wins. The brain is an infinitely extensible, malleable computer processor and there is no “free” in will, only the choosing based on our brains weighing various symbols. He starts out sounding non-deterministic but in the end came out pro-deterministic. Thought=computation. In fact, he hasn’t really thought it all through. For example: can’t our brain re-evaluate a symbol’s value by thinking about it? By examining it internally, we can uncheck old boxes and check new ones. So in fact there is a consideration that occurs, a self-reflective change, an awareness that could be called “free.” It’s only action without analysis which is not free (at least within the framework he has set up.) This “will” to change is perhaps our moment of freedom.

There is something else to this self-reflective loop that Hofstadter doesn’t consider very thoroughly. Godel’s self-reflective mathematical statements are his model for what the Self is, such as “I am unprovable.” The self-reflective quality of Godel’s theories are certainly clever and very brilliant, but where they part ways with the analogy to human consciousness is our ability to change our formula and take a different direction through awareness. Someone actually wrote Godel’s formula, it didn’t burst into existence on its own. The claim that it represents the model for the self is nothing but a claim unbacked by scientific evidence.

One key outcome of Hofstadter’s analysis is that the “pattern” of the Self, or consciousness, can be distributed between people…so that a piece of his deceased wife’s consciousness exists in him because they were so intimate and her pattern lives on in him. But the flaw in this argument is so blatant, I can’t believe he doesn’t acknowledge it. If we grant him the premise that the Self is a symbol in the mind that the mind is constantly reinterpreting—then the symbol of “my dead wife” exists in his mind as a symbol of her but that symbol does not provide feedback to itself or reinterpret itself. So her consciousness is not distributed, merely a symbol of her is in his mind. The key difference being that (by his own definition) the Self is a self-reflexive symbol but my symbol of someone else—no matter how detailed it is, no matter how intimate we were—does not provide feedback to itself.

He gives us another hypothetical case to reinforce this theory. The story of a man who jumps into what is basically a Star Trek teleporter and is then reintegrated on another planet with every memory, thought, inclination, etc. Is it the same person or a new Self? What if the first person accidentally wasn’t disintegrated but survived? Which of the two would be the “real” man? He concludes that they really both are the real man and thus consciousness can be distributed. What this story lacks is an understanding of how a unique point-of-view makes the self what it is. To me the simple answer is: To other people, these two men will appear in every way the same. But to the individual who is teleported, the experience is not continuous. He simply dies in the first place and is not “reborn”. His consciousness will end and some other person identical to him in every way will be reborn, but his point-of-view of the world will be snuffed out. In the second case, the man who wasn’t disintegrated is the real consciousness while the new one is essentially an insta-clone. It’s not the complicated “grey area” puzzle Hofstadter claims. The clone may think it’s the same person as the previous one because it has the same thoughts and memories, but the man who stepped into the teleporter never had another thought. He died and was replaced by a doppelganger that was convinced it was him in every way. Hofstadter’s vision of distributed consciousness is not compelling.

Finally, in his conclusion, Hofstadter tries to bucket all people into two categories (an annoying habit he has): those who believe all things must follow physical laws (which would include those who agree with his theory), and those who believe in Dualism that would declare that there’s magic in that-there brain, a magic soul that gets squirted in at some point. The obvious flaw here is to assume that we have anywhere near a full grasp on what “physical laws” are. Does Quantum Physics “really” reflect what’s going on down there? Or is it just a metaphor for something we don’t understand at all? What about other universes or dimensions in space/time? So, perhaps there is another point to be made that maybe our “self” does follow a physical law that allows it to exist…but we just haven’t found that law yet. Or maybe physical laws are just abstractions and not so “determined” or concrete anyway. And what about the ambiguity and indeterminacy of quantum action itself? Or maybe something completely other is true that we have never even imagined.

Oh, and his weighing of “souls” by their level of consciousness is creepy. As well as his odd philosophy of how love of Bach makes you a bigger soul.

I Am a Strange Loop is overly-wordy and jammed with a few too many analogies and painful puns, but I enjoyed the intellectual challenge. He truly provides no concrete “reasons to believe” only assertions, which are worth pondering if not agreeing with.
...more

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Feb 23, 2009 Clay Kallam rated it it was ok

Shelves: philosophy

I read Douglas Hofstadter”s “Godel, Escher, Bach” long ago – sometime in the early ‘80s, and I remember thinking “I really need to read this again. I liked this book, but there was a lot I think I missed.”

When I saw a copy of “I Am a Strange Loop” in a used-book store, and Hofstadter said in the intro it was his update of “Godel, Escher, Bach,” I figured this was my chance to rediscover the concepts in “Godel, Escher, Bach.”

Well, I did, but I can’t say I was happy with the result. Hofstadter’s t ...more

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Nov 17, 2015 Annie rated it it was amazing

Shelves: favorites, wishlist, philosophy

I’d like to preface the review (which is very long, but if you are vacillating on whether or not to read this book, I hope my review will help you decide to your best interests, whichever those will be. Particularly if you, like me, are decidedly not math-inclined) by saying that I’m a philosophy student. I love philosophy so much it’s disgusting. We’re dating. We moved in together after our third date. We have a wedding registry at Macy’s. So it is with nothing but complete affection that I say ...more

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Nov 23, 2016 Leo Robertson rated it really liked it

The parts I liked were great, were what literature is for, really. Intellectual musings based on personal experience. Fascinating to hear about Hofstadter going through the loss of his wife. Easier to understand than Godel, Escher, Bach, especially if you read that one first.

It is so awesome that Hofstadter is celebrated for/is allowed to/has made a career out of following the conclusions of his passions, making previously unforeseen connections. Ultimately I think it's an empty meditation, but The parts I liked were great, were what literature is for, really. Intellectual musings based on personal experience. Fascinating to hear about Hofstadter going through the loss of his wife. Easier to understand than Godel, Escher, Bach, especially if you read that one first.

It is so awesome that Hofstadter is celebrated for/is allowed to/has made a career out of following the conclusions of his passions, making previously unforeseen connections. Ultimately I think it's an empty meditation, but a beautiful one all the same. Every now and then, we humans, despite knowing we won't come to any definite conclusion, need to sit back and wonder what it all means, in a new way each time. Hofstadter provides one of these ways. It was so cool to hear him unashamedly demonstrate his passions for the rigorous and logical study of mathematics and then discuss the definition of a soul and how we live in many people, live on in others to some extent, that this offers some consolation when people pass.

It reminded me of something I was thinking hard about last year. It's no secret that I love DFW's book Oblivion—many of my reviews attest to that. Anyways, there's a story in it called The Soul is Not a Smithy, referencing the quote in Joyce's Portrait of an Artist...:
"Welcome, O life! I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race.”
DFW is saying, no, you can't do this, that the tragedy of human existence is that we are trapped in our own heads.
Since his background was philosophy, he's been trained, I think, to argue for a particular side of a debate even although there isn't enough evidence available in the universe to ever prove it one way or another. So in one respect what DFW is saying is true, but in another, Hofstadter says 'True, but you can't deny the way we live in other people's thoughts, influence their decisions.'

I'm very proud to think of myself as a test for my loved ones. It seems despite all my own follies, most people I know respect me way more highly than I think I deserve (this is just a fact, not a boast. Whatever. Why am I defending myself to you? I don't know you, I'm basically writing this for my own understanding and I offer you all these words for free!) Anyways to get the full picture of my own family and friends I often have to ask around and hear things secondhand because whatever someone disapproves of that they're doing, they don't tell me! That's at least the clearest evidence I've ever found that when I'm not around, I have a certain influence in people's heads, that they ask what I would do or think. My boss said that whatever people say about you when you're not around is your reputation. I've done nothing overt to make myself so scary. But if I make people want to be better, I love it.

So in conclusion: I believe the soul is a smithy, albeit an imperfect one, because I've seen evidence of it. Sure, I can't prove it, but I'm glad for that, because maybe we were never meant to. Maybe, in the face of existence, we were mercifully left to choose the happier philosophical position. So why wouldn't you?! And should I get hit by a bus today, with these words I am with you now. The only immortality we get is pseudo, but we do get it. And that's pretty damn cool :)

...more

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May 13, 2008 Craig rated it did not like it

The purpose of this book is to explain the mystery of consciousness. He admits off the top that the concept of the mind and conscious thought is quite difficult to nail down, and probably impossible to draw a distinct line upon. Is a mosquito conscious? After all, it, like us, seems to have a will to live, and responds to environmental stimuli in ways that benefit itself. If not a mosquito, is a bee conscious? A fish? A snake? A dog?

He does so by describing the mind's process of something like " The purpose of this book is to explain the mystery of consciousness. He admits off the top that the concept of the mind and conscious thought is quite difficult to nail down, and probably impossible to draw a distinct line upon. Is a mosquito conscious? After all, it, like us, seems to have a will to live, and responds to environmental stimuli in ways that benefit itself. If not a mosquito, is a bee conscious? A fish? A snake? A dog?

He does so by describing the mind's process of something like "infinite reflexivity". Whereas a mosquito probably only responds in very predictable and determined ways to stimulus, higher order life "reflects" on stimuli in increasing complicated and diverse ways. His epiphany came back in the 70's when he took a video camera and began shooting it directly at the TV monitor which itself was displaying the video feed, thus showing an infinite number of reflections which gradually fade to a single point. The point, I suppose, is that because of the depth and arbitrary complexity of human thought, it is difficult to define in discrete terms, although this fact does not make it any less grounded in purely scientific and reasonable terms. Perhaps the thing I learned most from this book is that consciousness can perhaps only be understood by analogy, not by a direct understanding of the physiology or via mechanical terms.

The fact that he spent nearly 200 page trying to develop this metaphor, and providing multiple anecdotes illustrating the concept of the infinite and circular suggests to me that he really has no idea what consciousness is. He tries to keep his discussion purely on mathematical and scientific terms. It's clear he falls into the camp of those who believe the mind and soul are no more than complicated atomic and molecular interactions, and is doing his part to further the quest for the Holy Grail of atheists: explaining humanity in purely godless terms.

The problem is that if consciousness and brain function (if that is really the essence of humanity) were truly understood, scientists should be able to program it into a computer. So far, the only noticeable advances in the field of AI have only been virtual magic tricks -- in part researchers can get computers to seem to "think" like humans (as in Deep Blue's chess victories over Garry Kasparov) for specific tasks, but such simulations only work for the specific applications for which they were programmed. This isn't really AI -- they're just essentially complicated math solutions. There has been no AI which has successfully modeled the brain and human intelligence, which can respond to abstract and arbitrary input and truly "learn".

Aside from the author's utter failure to explain the essence of consciousness (I mean, really, how could you in < 400 pages?), he shows himself to be quite the arrogant scholarly type, with contempt towards those living outside his bubble. Himself a strict vegetarian for many years, he suggests meat eaters are less human than he is, because they seem not to be bothered by eating that which once represented a conscious and semi-sentient being. He even uses such eating habits to establish his own numerical scale of human consciousness -- essentially the less meat you eat, the more human you are. Um, okkk... ...more

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May 25, 2007 shawn rated it did not like it

Recommends it for: no one

Shelves: reviews

i am sorry to give this book one measly star. i am a huge admirer of hofstadter's work. i would fanatically recommend any of his books, which are all fantastic and required reading by this point for all intellectually-minded people interested in "putting it all together". i was therefore ecstatic that he should finally publish another book, but crushed upon reading it.

the principle point is that though he purports to have some new big answer, this book merely retraces terrain he covered decades ...more

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Oct 12, 2007 Jane rated it it was amazing

This book, on consciousness and what makes a human an "I," is methodical and exuberant, technical and personal. Reading it was a long, thoughtful journey. It's not an easy book. The workings of the human brain are described metaphorically (and not physiologically), and often those metaphors are mathematical. Sometimes, too, Hofstadter employs playful analogies to show how consciousness works, and how it doesn't work. (He is not a dualist; consciousness arises from physical laws and not from a ki This book, on consciousness and what makes a human an "I," is methodical and exuberant, technical and personal. Reading it was a long, thoughtful journey. It's not an easy book. The workings of the human brain are described metaphorically (and not physiologically), and often those metaphors are mathematical. Sometimes, too, Hofstadter employs playful analogies to show how consciousness works, and how it doesn't work. (He is not a dualist; consciousness arises from physical laws and not from a kind of essence.)

You can read summaries of this book elsewhere; I won't write one. What I loved about it was how challenging and yet accessible it is (if you put in the time), and how willing Hofstadter is to make it personal in ways that are really relevant. (That our ability to be friends, to have empathy and affection for others, are aspects of our higher-level consciousness, according to H., is very affirming to me.) He's a scientist, and a brilliant one, but a human, too, and he's frank about his fascination and struggles with the same knowledge.

From the epilogue:

"The key problem is, it seems to me, that when we try to understand what we are, we humans are doomed, as spiritual creatures in a universe of mere stuff, to eternal puzzlement about our nature. I vividly remember how, as a teen-ager reading about brains, I was forced for the first time in my life to face up to the idea that a human brain, especially my own, must be a physical structure obeying physical law... In a nutshell, our quandary is this. Either we believe that our consciousness is something other than an outcome of physical law, or we believe it is an outcome of physical law--but making either choice leads us to disturbing, perhaps even unacceptable, consequences" (357).

This book unfolds in layers of concepts and insight. H. builds his argument gracefully. His attention to a reader like me, studying consciousness for first time, is thoughtful and steady. Not easy stuff, he makes learning (one model of) it possible.

p.s. Buddhists, beware. He admires the "noble goal" (295), yet dismisses the possibility that the self can be dismantled. ...more

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Jul 11, 2011 Jeffrey rated it really liked it

Shelves: science

I agree. He is a strange loop. The first third of this book is the Hofstadter that I expected to read - dragging me through a layperson's guide to prime numbers, squares, the Fibonacci series, Principia Mathematica and Bertrand Russell's attempt to banish paradox from mathematics, and finally, Godel's discovery of the ultimate self reflective mathematical string which shattered Russell's dreams. This was tough going, but ultimately worth it for this non-mathematician. Along the way we learned th I agree. He is a strange loop. The first third of this book is the Hofstadter that I expected to read - dragging me through a layperson's guide to prime numbers, squares, the Fibonacci series, Principia Mathematica and Bertrand Russell's attempt to banish paradox from mathematics, and finally, Godel's discovery of the ultimate self reflective mathematical string which shattered Russell's dreams. This was tough going, but ultimately worth it for this non-mathematician. Along the way we learned that a young Hofstadter played around with video cameras - daring to point the camera back at the TV screen to create swirling loops, endless corridors and infinite regressions.

The Fibonacci series begins somewhat arbitrarily with the numbers 1 and 2. Such a series could start with any 2 numbers, but once it has started, it can go on to infinity. The swirling loops made by the self reflective video camera will only start after a movement is inserted, any movement, and once started maintains the loopy image forever - or until another movement changes it.

The connection to consciousness comes through a theory of development and evolution. As brains get bigger and more complex, able to hold more and more images and symbols, a critical mass is reached and consciousness appears. Like the swirling feedback or the Fibonacci series, we don't know how it starts, but once started it is self sustaining and permanent - as long as the physical brain continues to work normally. I can see it, and believe it.

Then, like the self reflective numbers and riddles that Hofsatder likes to observe and understand, he tells us about his own life, his wife and family, and the loop widens. I didn't expect this, and as Hofstadter himself worries, it is hard not to think that the sections about his family and the idea that two consciousnesses can share the same brain or many consciousnesses can share many brains, came from his own need to share his suffering, not from a need to teach us anything about consciousness. Yet, he points out that his musings on the subject predated his own personal tragedies.

Hofstadter shows his imagination in Godel, Escher, Bach, and he continues to teach with creativity and imagination in this book. He is a wonderful teacher - he got me to understand - oh, how briefly - Godel's ideas and how they translate into the real world, I think! As we learn about his life, his teenage fascination with self reflective images and the meaning of life, his family, his friends, we get a more complete picture of this wonderful teacher.

I don't agree with all of his conclusions about the looseness of the connection between brain and consciousness and some of his ideas about symbols and the physical structure of the brain - I don't think that the loop can escape the system in which it is created, but I applaud Hofsatder for his imagination in creating his theories and explaining them, and especially for his courage in bringing himself fully into the loop. I do have a few questions: why doesn't our consciousness reboot when we sleep or wake from a coma? How can we always wake up as the same person? How do we come back to the same loop, not a different one? And what is sleep about anyway? Why do we need to sleep? And why dream?

I am a strange loop and so is Douglas Hofstadter, and so, most likely, are you. ...more

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Feb 14, 2011 Zach rated it it was ok

I didn’t like this book, although I agree with almost all of its assertions. Conceptually, I guess you could say, I enjoyed it, but the presentation - the language of the author, the over-long format, and the strange mixture of hard math and elementary philosophy - diminished and diluted the content to the point that it was barely worth reading. The first problem is Hofstadter’s “aww shucks” Uncle Fluffy writing style. His language is so steeped in a fireside chat mentality that the meat of his I didn’t like this book, although I agree with almost all of its assertions. Conceptually, I guess you could say, I enjoyed it, but the presentation - the language of the author, the over-long format, and the strange mixture of hard math and elementary philosophy - diminished and diluted the content to the point that it was barely worth reading. The first problem is Hofstadter’s “aww shucks” Uncle Fluffy writing style. His language is so steeped in a fireside chat mentality that the meat of his ideas is completely devoured by his good-natured cleverness. He is kind of a dork (I mean that as uninsultingly as possible) and it shows. Despite his obvious grasp of a difficult subject, I can’t imagine conversing with him about it. His anecdotal asides alone are enough to trigger the gag reflex. The book is written as if he is more worried about getting the reader to like him than he is about clarity in the presentation and defense of his thesis (which, I must assert again, is a marvelous thesis, indeed).

What was already to me a shaky book collapses completely in the final few chapters, when Hofstadter devotes a significant portion of his efforts to refuting only tangentially related philosophical claims. In particular, his analysis of the “inverted spectrum” is not only extraneous but outright wrong. His grasp of the philosophical arguments is lacking, and he spends most of a chapter refuting thought experiments with the laws of physics. It is frustrating for an author who has been delving into abstraction for 400 pages to suddenly attack others for their abstractions. While I’m not versed in the particular philosophers he is addressing (and I don’t think he addresses anything with thoroughness), I know enough of the concept to realize immediately the fallacy of his argument. His conclusions are irrelevant because they operate within a field of study separate from the one in question. Not only that, he is mistaken on a number of his assumptions, including the foundation of his argument – that physical external stimuli cause the same internal neural reaction. The quickest way to refute this claim is with dyslexia, where a concrete word, number or shape is viewed completely differently by a dyslexic brain as compared to a normal brain. He assumes a universal nature for thought, which proven wrong quite simply, and on the abstract level the actual nature of thought is irrelevant for philosophical musings. His mixing of physics and metaphysics, especially in an important part of his book, so near the end, shattered for me much of his credibility, mainly because it is presented in the context of a petty attack against ideas he doesn’t “like.”

My long refutation of this single point of Hofstadter’s should not imply that I liked the book up to this point. I was disappointed from the beginning it. It seemed like his arguments could have been made much more clearly in a shorter work and if he toned down his personality. The density of “revelations” in this book is too low for it to be worth reading. ...more

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Feb 22, 2008 Claus rated it it was ok

Shelves: non-fiction, 2-stars

I read Hofstadter's "Gödel, Escher, Bach" many years ago and was completely taken aback by the author's brilliant style and insight.

I read Hofstadter's "Metamagical Themas" many years ago and was fascinated by the author's vast area of expertise.

I read Hofstadter's "Le Ton Beau de Marot" a few years ago and was amazed by the author's enormous knowledge.

I just finished Hofstadter's "I Am a Strange Loop" and was thoroughly disappointed.

The author uses 300+ pages to say something that could just as ...more

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Jul 16, 2007 Janie rated it liked it

Shelves: non-fiction

I love Hofstadter but the good parts of this book were a rehashing of GEB and The Mind's I, and the parts I struggled through were off the mark as believable cognitive philosophical theory.

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Dec 21, 2008 Joe rated it it was ok

A bit redundant in prose, and just GEB lite when all is said and done. Not really recommended.

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Dec 22, 2007 Chuck McCabe rated it liked it

Recommends it for: Patient game lovers

Twenty-eight years ago, Douglas Hofstadter published a book titled "Goedel, Escher, Bach" that earned him instant academic renown and a cultlike following. A mathematician friend recommended the book to me, and I tried mightily to read it, keeping at it more because of my admiration for my friend that for the experience of reading the book. It was either too indirect, too intricately argued, or too Germanic for me to follow, and after months of off and on attempts I finally put it aside.

So why d Twenty-eight years ago, Douglas Hofstadter published a book titled "Goedel, Escher, Bach" that earned him instant academic renown and a cultlike following. A mathematician friend recommended the book to me, and I tried mightily to read it, keeping at it more because of my admiration for my friend that for the experience of reading the book. It was either too indirect, too intricately argued, or too Germanic for me to follow, and after months of off and on attempts I finally put it aside.

So why did I start out to read another Hofstadter book? I have long been interested in the nature and origin or human consciousness and sense of self, and as an irreligious materialist, the traditional explanations offered by our dominant social institutions were unsatisfactory. I bought and read "I am a strange loop" because the jacket liner began with the following: "Can a self, a soul, a consciousness, an 'I' arise out of mere matter? If it cannot, then how can you or I be here? If it can, then how can we understand this baffling emergence?" I was hooked.

My favorite materialist explanation of consciousness comes from Sartre, who says that consciousness arises out of material existence and serves as a presence to the world. The essence of human consciousness is the ability to negate, to say no, to conceive alternatives (l'etre et le neant). But Sartre does not explain in any detail how this consciousness can emerge from material existence. Rather, he develops a psychology that illustrates and supports his fundamental view of human reality.

The core of Hofstadter's consciousness (or self, soul, I) is the enormous capacity of the human brain for complex operations, among which are feedback loops that grow in number and sophistication until they enable the human consciousness of self, the emergence of an 'I', and our ability to conceive of or mirror others in our minds. This seems to me to be a satisfying, although not necessarily complete, analysis of the problem of human consciousness in a material universe. Hofstadter's intellectual touchstones lie in mathematics, and particularly number theory; mine are in language, grammar, linguistics.

The book's method and organization lead the reader to understand and perhaps accept this huge concept in a way that I again found very frustrating -- often indirect, full of special vocabulary and game-playing, highly personal, idiosyncratic, shifting and evasive, and (I would say) self-indulgent. More difficult, I thought, than it needed to be. The book demands great patience from the reader. I found myself cursing the author for the way he circled and circled around the subject, bringing in every thought he has ever had about consciousness, and relying to a disturbing extent on his personal experience.

But I'm going to forgive Hofstadter again because the book has in the end provided me with an enhanced perspective on something that interests me very much. I can also give him credit for having made a case that is certainly unpopular outside of academic circles in these days of established religion and political evangelicalism, and having made it in a way that rises above ad hominem criticism. (Indeed, given the way the book is written, it may be destined to forever fly under the Christian Right's polemical radar.) A critic could of course say that Hofstadter is mistaken in his conclusions, but there can be no doubt about the authenticity and good will of the effort he has made and the undeniability of the "factual" evidence he marshalls to support his claims.
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Jan 29, 2016 Mishehu rated it it was amazing

As reading experiences go, I'd rate this a 4-star book. It's highly repetitive and speculative; its digressions can annoy; it's cutesy (typical DH) in a way that can grate after a while; and it takes repeated pot shots at a towering intellect -- Bertrand Russell -- on whose shoulders the author un(sufficiently)self-acknowledgedly stands. (Goedel, DH's guiding muse, is rightly lionized in this and other DH books; Russell -- standing in for Whitehead as well -- is all but judged a moron for failin ...more

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Dec 20, 2010 Robert rated it liked it

Shelves: philosophy

This is merely a re-hash of Hofstadter's justly famous Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, with some ideas from Le Ton Beau de Marot thrown in but most of the fun stuff taken out; if you've read those, you don't need to read this. If you've only read GEB, then read this instead of Le Ton Beau de Marot unless you have a particular interest in the art/skill of translation.

This isn't a bad book, apart from the constant use of reference to the "dear reader", it's just redundant because of ...more

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Jul 10, 2008 Brady rated it it was amazing

Douglas Hofstader is a wonder, tackling the almost incomprehensible Big Question of "What is the I?" with relative clarity and wit. He is a master of metaphor and analogy, eschewing a microscopic understanding of how the brain works to giving a sensible, rational (though revolutionary) macroscopic explanation of what we commonly refer to as "the soul". Hofstader is certainly no Cartesian dualist, but his ideas are neither what you would expect from a material monist.

Hofstader wrote this book und ...more

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May 03, 2016 Greg rated it it was ok

I'm writing this review as I go along because the book is long. I read GEB in college and liked it, though I suspected that his idea that consciousness is a kind of self-referential loop might not bear close scrutiny. That's why I picked up this book when I saw it.

However, my hopes have been lowered within the first few pages when Hofstadter tells the reader that some living things have bigger souls/more valuable souls than others. In particular mosquitoes don't have much of a soul that you coul ...more

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Mar 13, 2008 Fred rated it it was ok

I've been reading "I Am A Strange Loop" by Douglas Hofstadter. The development of his theme is slow, so I read the epilogue to find out if he was coming to anything other than where he seemed to be going. The epilogue seems to be about the same as the first few chapters.

I skipped around the book a little and found this intriguing discussion on page 322 called 'Two Daves.' He presents a mental experiment of two universes, identical in every detail except that universe Q has the stuff of consci I've been reading "I Am A Strange Loop" by Douglas Hofstadter. The development of his theme is slow, so I read the epilogue to find out if he was coming to anything other than where he seemed to be going. The epilogue seems to be about the same as the first few chapters.

I skipped around the book a little and found this intriguing discussion on page 322 called 'Two Daves.' He presents a mental experiment of two universes, identical in every detail except that universe Q has the stuff of consciousness, and universe Z (zed, zombie) is missing the stuff of consciousness. In both universes Dave talks about his possession of consciousness but in universe Z he is lying without knowing it, (sound familiar?). His next section is titled 'The Nagging Worry that One May Be a Zombie." This is a promising title but he detours into fluff on this issue and dismisses it.

I would suggest that with careful work, he could learn to observe both universes in his own life and experience. I know I do. I have occasional moments of consciousness that make me aware of the long intervals of unconsciousness that I suffer.

I suspect that Mr. Hofstasdter has not done the experiment, followed the procedures, practiced the practices, that allows one to approach an awareness of the Self. Yet as a scientist he must have the habit of experimental verification of results. Results have no meaning without the formula, procedure, recipe, for generating them. In the index to his book the word 'meditation' is not listed, neither is 'yoga.' On page 297 his characterization of Zen 'They resent words,...' sounds more like someone who read the lab report but didn't bother to do the experiment. I would have been surprised to find Gurdjieff listed in his index.
See: www.gurdjieff-legacy.org.

I look forward to reading the remainder of the book and perhaps finding a few nuggets of value. But I'm afraid it is too soon to go beyond Ayn Rand's statements of the fundamental axioms of philosophy: Existence exits, and I am conscious.
See: www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pagen...

OK, I finished Hofstatder's book months ago and I have been pondering his ideas. My final conclusion is that his book is more autobiographical than a scholarly or scientific work. I did a cursory review of the field in terms of modern western scientific writing and found several writers who published significantly better works than his on this problem of the "I."

One key example is :
The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness by Antonio Damasio. I haven't finished this book yet, or really I haven't started it, but the result of skimming it is that this book, written 14 years before "I Am A Strange Loop" is at a much higher level than H's maudlin rendering of his senile? meanderings about Strange Loops. H should know better than to publish ideas that are half a century out of date. Or if you read Aristotle, perhaps a millennia out of date. But then again, he is a parochial computer scientist.

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Jan 11, 2009 Kristopher rated it did not like it

Shelves: philosophy-texts

After about 200 pages of reading I still was unsure what the point was supposed to be. Hoffstadter purportedly explores the nature of self-reference and consciousness, but instead, I think, spends more time pointing out through his writing how clever he is, how feeble he considers Bertrand Russell, and how much of a fan boy he (Hoffstadter) is of Godel. It's not at all clear to me that this book has any genuine insights to offer, but that may be that it is lost on me as I find his writing style ...more

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Nov 30, 2014 Randolph rated it really liked it

Shelves: non-fiction, philosophy, science-mathematics, owned

Not as dense or rich as Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid and more focused on the "scientific" side of things without all the wonderful digressions (you have to read GEB to understand). Still Hofstadter plays enough mind games to make the going entertaining and challenging.
Basically an argument for the nature of consciousness that all but proves Descartes' proposition. But Hofstadter presents a pretty convincing argument for his theories on why I think I am I.

The one place where he go ...more

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Oct 22, 2015 Miloš Kostić rated it liked it

Shelves: nonfiction

Po Daglasu Hofštateru su nijanse sive, nasuprot crno-belom svetu, i dalje jednodimenzionalan pogled na svet i u njegovim opisima sveta postoje i sve ostale boje, kao i njihove nijanse. Dakle, sve je mnogo šarenije nego što izgleda. Kaže da nešto može biti i tačno i netačno, kao i nešto između. Tako je, iako je njegov pogled na svet čisto materijalistički on došao do zaključka da postoji „duša“. Naravno ne „ona“ duša. Kod njega su svi pojmovi „ličnost“, „svest“, „duša“, „ja-stvo“ i slični – sinon Po Daglasu Hofštateru su nijanse sive, nasuprot crno-belom svetu, i dalje jednodimenzionalan pogled na svet i u njegovim opisima sveta postoje i sve ostale boje, kao i njihove nijanse. Dakle, sve je mnogo šarenije nego što izgleda. Kaže da nešto može biti i tačno i netačno, kao i nešto između. Tako je, iako je njegov pogled na svet čisto materijalistički on došao do zaključka da postoji „duša“. Naravno ne „ona“ duša. Kod njega su svi pojmovi „ličnost“, „svest“, „duša“, „ja-stvo“ i slični – sinonimi.
Svakako da se sve to odvija u mozgu; neuroni i sve oko njih su i dalje glavni. Ali za dolaženje do odgovora šta svest zapravo predstavlja treba posmatrati mozak kao celinu, kao misleću mašinu, a ne njegove delove. Pitanje je šta gura šta u mozgu, neuroni ideje ili ideje neurone? Hofštater smatra kako nema nikakvog smisla pokušavati svoditi neki pojam, neki osećaj ili sećanje na jedan jedini neuron. Postoje dva nivoa na kojima se može govoriti o svesti, prvi, niži nivo neurona i drugi viši nivo simbola, velikih apstrantnih uzoraka, koji se formiraju u mozgu kao odjek spoljašnjeg sveta. Na niskom nivou nismo svesni ideja i simbola, na visokom nivou nismo svesni biologije. Taj viši nivo je kod ovog pitanja sasvim dovoljan. Dakle, suština je u simbolima. Svest je glavni simbol (skup simbola) u svakom mozgu. Na početku života „svest“ ne postoji. Prva pojava refleksivne simboličke strukture sadrži prvu iskru „ja-stva". Taj skup simbola se gomila u mozgu u petlji oko koncepta „Ja“ i vremenom postaje sve složeniji. Ta petlja je samoreferentna, usmerena sama na sebe. Ona evoluira, što čini da danas moje „Ja“ nije isto kao ono od juče a još manje ono od pre godinu dana. Ono što čini ovu petlju čudnovatom je to što taj skup simbola postaje sve komplikovaniji ali i dalje ostaje na neki način konstantan što čini da iluzija identiteta ostaje trajna.
Knjiga ima veliki deo koji se bavi matematičkom logikom, konkretno opisuje postupak kojim je Kurt Gedel dokazao svoju prvu teoremu o nepotpunosti. Razlog za to je što Hofštater u Gedelovom pozivanju matematike na samu sebe vidi primer i dokaz da samoreferentne petlje postoje. Ono što razlikuje našu čudnovatu petlju od ostalih je percepcija. Percepcija znači kategorizacija. Što je kategorizacija jača to će i ličnost biti ostvarenija i bogatija. Što je slabija kategorizacija, ličnost je manja, što znači da je u početku života nema.
Zanimljivo je što Hofštater tvrdi kako petlja „Ja“ nije jedina u našem mozgu. Takođe, naš mozak poseduje i tuđe „Ja“ petlje. Tako, ona pesnička tvrdnja da ljudi žive dok žive sećanja na njih za Hofštatera važi bukvalno. Ne postoji apsolutna i temeljna razlika između onoga čega se sećam kao vlastitih doživljaja i onoga čega se sećam iz pričanja drugih ljudi. Jedini razlog zašto vaša ličnost najjače postoji u vašem mozgu jeste taj što je vaš mozak prošao kroz ista iskustva kao i vi. Tuđe "Ja" u mom mozgu je samo snimljena u nižoj rezoluciji, sa manje detalja. Empatija je dokaz da živimo tuđe živote u svojoj glavi. Čak i likovi iz romana koje sam pročitao takođe na neki način imaju svoje "Ja" u mom mozgu. Ali naša se svest razlikuje od lika u romanu po tome što uključuje svest o samoj sebi. To je suština duše.
Duša, odnosno svest, jeste nematerijalna u smislu da je ona samo mit, ne postoji. Svest je stvarna samo onoliko koliko i duga. Ličnost je informacija, skup simbola koji se gomilaju s godinama, mozak je samo medij. Možda će nekada postojati i drugi mediji.

Prednost ove knjige kao i njena mana su mnogobrojne metafore. To olakšava čitanje nama laicima ali često se daje preteran broj različitih metafora za istu pojavu, ili za nešto što je samo po sebi jasno. A tek nabrajanja... Ovo je dobra knjiga za one koji nimalo nisu upućeni u tematiku.
Iako su neke ideje i metafore koje ih opisuju nategnute, za iznesene ideje dajem četiri zvezdice, ali zbog prekomplikovanog (ili možda prejednostavnog) izlaganja, kao i zbog toga što su mu svi dokazi anegdotalni, konačno dajem tri zvezdice. Osim metafora iznosi malo dokaza za svoje pretpostavke, uz neke krajnje olake kvalifikacije. Kad malo bolje razmislim, šta sam ja uopšte očekivao, ovo je filozofska knjiga. Uprkos tome većina (sva?) razmišljanja deluje uverljivo. Ovu knjigu vredi pročitati.
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Mar 05, 2009 David rated it did not like it

On the face of it, this is an interesting book. The author draws analogies between Godel's incompleteness theorem of mathematical logic and the question of the meaning of identity and consciousness. And on the plus side, at least Hofstadter's discussion of Godel was refreshingly correct technically -- it helps having had some formal mathematical training.

But I found his numerous and lengthy discursions to be, for starters, only tangentially and vaguely associated with Godel incompleteness. In my ...more

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Jul 29, 2009 Malini Sridharan rated it did not like it

The meat of this book, which uses an analogy with Godel's critique of the Principia Mathematica to explain how the concept of an "I" might be an emergent phenomenon of self referential loops in the brain, is interesting. I had a lot of issues with the structure of the argument, which was too dependent on the analogy. I think there are much better ways to make this point than by talking about math. Like, I don't know, maybe talking about BIOLOGY.

The last hundred pages or so of the book annoyed m ...more

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May 30, 2010 David rated it really liked it

Shelves: mathematics, nonfiction, philosophy

The first half of this book goes into some depth concerning Bertrand Russell's and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica, and then the work of Kurt Godel. Hofstadter has an interesting description and point of view about this area. But the later portions of the book become steeped in philosophy, and quite frankly, became a bit boring. On the other hand, I had read his book Godel, Escher, Bach long ago, and found it to be excellent.

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Jul 13, 2009 Pj rated it did not like it

This book is the painful rantings of a man suffering a great loss. Not the brilliance I was looking forward to.

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Jul 21, 2007 Brodie rated it liked it

Shelves: theoryandphilosophy

I enjoyed much of Hostetter's account of the ways in which a strictly biological account of cognition fails to grasp the complexities of consciousness and identities. I did find, however, his account of how identity is dispersed and externalized the be somewhat unconvincing, thought not because I disagree with the concept but with his interpretation of the concept. He tries to argue through several chapters that the decentered--"strange loopiness"--of consciousness comes about because cognition I enjoyed much of Hostetter's account of the ways in which a strictly biological account of cognition fails to grasp the complexities of consciousness and identities. I did find, however, his account of how identity is dispersed and externalized the be somewhat unconvincing, thought not because I disagree with the concept but with his interpretation of the concept. He tries to argue through several chapters that the decentered--"strange loopiness"--of consciousness comes about because cognition is really a series of complex and shifting patterns in the brain, super-imposed on top of micro-level physical processes. Because consciousness forms the substance of identity and consciousness is basically a process of accumulating and recalling patterns, these patterns have no essential connection to the "wet-ware" of the brain. Thus the patterns that represent my love for 19th century novels can easily to replicated in another's brain--my wife's for instance--which results in a part of identity having a kind of weak, second order existence in my wife's brain. If I were to die and she were to recall my thoughts and feelings about 19th century novels she would, in a sense, be re-processing my consciousness, as if uploading it like a program (though Hostetter's metaphors are at times less mechanical or technological than this, he seems very comfortable moving between physical and metaphysical tropes for cognition). This rings false to me because who is to say that my wife has truly internalized my actually thought process or even emotive reaction to such an external stimulus. She may think that she has, but how would she really know. Hostetter counters such an objection by bringing up Cartesian dualism, that thinking that we are minds locked inside of bodies conjures up that, to use Zizek's words, spectre that haunts western metaphysics. So, I have no real logical response to this counter-claim, other than his original description of such weak, second-order existences seems intuitively wrong to me. Nonetheless, an interesting read, though sometimes a bit too "cutesy" for my taste. ...more

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Apr 12, 2008 David Gross rated it it was ok

Recommended to David by: Greg Junell

Shelves: non-fiction, geeky

I got about three-quarters of the way through and by then it seemed like Hofstadter had completely lost the plot.

He makes some bold claims about the nature of consciousness, but he doesn't use his terms and concepts rigorously enough to keep his arguments straight, and he doesn't do much work to back them up anyway.

It amounts to listening to some friend who got stoned and had an amazing idea. If that friend happens to be Douglas Hofstadter, it's probably worth your while to stick around for a wh ...more

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Aug 23, 2015 Fredrik rated it liked it

Shelves: fakta

Begyne å lese denne ca i februar, og fullførte nå (august). Kort sagt handler boken jeg-et, hva skal til for å utgjøre et "jeg", hva er bevissthet, og lignende temaer. Det er veldig interessant, og jeg håpte å få noe nyttig ut av boken.

Dessverre viser det seg at Hofstadter er utrolig glad i metaforer. Så glad i dem at 3/4 av boken er metaforer og lignelser for forskjellige poenger han prøver å vise. Dette funker til dels bra, til dels blir det utrolig langtekkelig å lese. Så jeg har kost meg mye ...more

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Sep 18, 2016 to'c rated it liked it

Recommends it for: anyone fascinated by human intelligence

Dr. Hofstadter always has an intriguing and playful way to present his thinking. Even the title reflects this. "I Am a Strange Loop" should not be taken to mean "Douglas Hofstadter is a strange loop". The "I" in the title refers to the concept of the "I" in all of us. And the book does an excellent job of presenting his views on just how the "I" forms in a brain, what kind of hardware may be necessary for an "I", what kinds of "I" am out there, and on how many brains a single "I" may live.

He's t ...more

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About Douglas R. Hofstadter

Douglas R. Hofstadter

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Douglas Richard Hofstadter is an American academic whose research focuses on consciousness, thinking and creativity. He is best known for his book Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid, first published in 1979, for which he was awarded the 1980 Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction.

Hofstadter is the son of Nobel Prize-winning physicist Robert Hofstadter. Douglas grew up on the campus of St Douglas Richard Hofstadter is an American academic whose research focuses on consciousness, thinking and creativity. He is best known for his book Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid, first published in 1979, for which he was awarded the 1980 Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction.

Hofstadter is the son of Nobel Prize-winning physicist Robert Hofstadter. Douglas grew up on the campus of Stanford University, where his father was a professor. Douglas attended the International School of Geneva for a year. He graduated with Distinction in Mathematics from Stanford in 1965. He spent a few years in Sweden in the mid 1960s. He continued his education and received his Ph.D. in Physics from the University of Oregon in 1975.

Hofstadter is College of Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science at Indiana University in Bloomington, where he directs the Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition which consists of himself and his graduate students, forming the "Fluid Analogies Research Group" (FARG). He was initially appointed to the Indiana University's Computer Science Department faculty in 1977, and at that time he launched his research program in computer modeling of mental processes (which at that time he called "artificial intelligence research", a label that he has since dropped in favor of "cognitive science research"). In 1984, he moved to the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, where he was hired as a professor of psychology and was also appointed to the Walgreen Chair for the Study of Human Understanding. In 1988 he returned to Bloomington as "College of Arts and Sciences Professor" in both Cognitive Science and Computer Science, and also was appointed Adjunct Professor of History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy, Comparative Literature, and Psychology, but he states that his involvement with most of these departments is nominal.

In April, 2009, Hofstadter was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Member of the American Philosophical Society.
Hofstadter's many interests include music, visual art, the mind, creativity, consciousness, self-reference, translation and mathematics. He has numerous recursive sequences and geometric constructions named after him.

At the University of Michigan and Indiana University, he co-authored, with Melanie Mitchell, a computational model of "high-level perception" — Copycat — and several other models of analogy-making and cognition. The Copycat project was subsequently extended under the name "Metacat" by Hofstadter's doctoral student James Marshall. The Letter Spirit project, implemented by Gary McGraw and John Rehling, aims to model the act of artistic creativity by designing stylistically uniform "gridfonts" (typefaces limited to a grid). Other more recent models are Phaeaco (implemented by Harry Foundalis) and SeqSee (Abhijit Mahabal), which model high-level perception and analogy-making in the microdomains of Bongard problems and number sequences, respectively.

Hofstadter collects and studies cognitive errors (largely, but not solely, speech errors), "bon mots" (spontaneous humorous quips), and analogies of all sorts, and his long-time observation of these diverse products of cognition, and his theories about the mechanisms that underlie them, have exerted a powerful influence on the architectures of the computational models developed by himself and FARG members.

All FARG computational models share certain key principles, among which are: that human thinking is carried out by thousands of independent small actions in parallel, biased by the concepts that are currently activated; that activation spreads from activated concepts to less activated "neighbor concepts"; that there is a "mental temperature" that regulates the degree of randomness in the parallel activity; that promising avenues tend to be explored more rapidly than unpromising ones. FARG models also have an overarching philosophy that ...more