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The Choices Justices Make
The Choices Justices Make is a groundbreaking work that offers a strategic account of Supreme Court decision making. Justices realize that their ability to achieve their policy and other goals depends on the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they act. All these factors hold sway over justices as they make their decisions, from which cases to accept, to how to interact with their colleagues, and what policies to adopt in their opinions.
Choices is a thought-provoking, yet nontechnical work that is an ideal supplement for judicial process and public law courses. In addition to offering a unique and sustained theoretical account, the authors tell a fascinating story of how the Court works. Data culled from the Court's public records and from the private papers of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Powell provide empirical evidence to support the central argument, while numerous examples from the justices' papers animate the work.
Choices is a thought-provoking, yet nontechnical work that is an ideal supplement for judicial process and public law courses. In addition to offering a unique and sustained theoretical account, the authors tell a fascinating story of how the Court works. Data culled from the Court's public records and from the private papers of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Powell provide empirical evidence to support the central argument, while numerous examples from the justices' papers animate the work.
224 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1997
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
August 8, 2022
"As escolhas que os juízes fazem" foi publicado originalmente em 1988. O livro apresenta a abordagem estratégica para análise das decisões judiciais. A obra representou um importante marco nos estudos judiciais estadunidenses. Os autores defendem que os juízes agem como atores estratégicos na tomada de decisão.
No capítulo um, os autores dizem que as escolhas dos juízes assumem estratégias que visam objetivos políticos pessoais. Para sustentar o ponto, os autores apresentam dados dos principais componentes da abordagem estratégica: metas, interação estratégica, instituições. Nos capítulos seguintes, os autores buscam mostrar como cada um desses componentes importa para que juízes tomem decisões visando objetivos políticos.
No capítulo dois, os autores mostram como juízes têm metas políticas e como no processo de decisão usam estratégias para convencer, induzir ou negociar com colegas em prol de suas posições. No capítulo três, os autores tratam dos tipos de estratégia usados para fins políticos. Em seguida, discutem como instituições afetam a tomada de decisão. O capítulo cinco é sobre como instituições estabelecem relações com atores externos e limitam as estratégias dos juízes.
Nesse ponto, cabe ressaltar que a abordagem estratégica não é reducionista porque ela não defende que apenas objetivos políticos importam, mas sim que objetivos políticos são o principal fator explicativo para decisões estratégicas. No último capítulo, os autores tratam de como sua abordagem pode contribuir para análises futuras. Uma obra que pode contribuir bastante para análise do comportamento dos juízes brasileiros em tribunais colegiados.
No capítulo um, os autores dizem que as escolhas dos juízes assumem estratégias que visam objetivos políticos pessoais. Para sustentar o ponto, os autores apresentam dados dos principais componentes da abordagem estratégica: metas, interação estratégica, instituições. Nos capítulos seguintes, os autores buscam mostrar como cada um desses componentes importa para que juízes tomem decisões visando objetivos políticos.
No capítulo dois, os autores mostram como juízes têm metas políticas e como no processo de decisão usam estratégias para convencer, induzir ou negociar com colegas em prol de suas posições. No capítulo três, os autores tratam dos tipos de estratégia usados para fins políticos. Em seguida, discutem como instituições afetam a tomada de decisão. O capítulo cinco é sobre como instituições estabelecem relações com atores externos e limitam as estratégias dos juízes.
Nesse ponto, cabe ressaltar que a abordagem estratégica não é reducionista porque ela não defende que apenas objetivos políticos importam, mas sim que objetivos políticos são o principal fator explicativo para decisões estratégicas. No último capítulo, os autores tratam de como sua abordagem pode contribuir para análises futuras. Uma obra que pode contribuir bastante para análise do comportamento dos juízes brasileiros em tribunais colegiados.
October 27, 2023
3.5. An interesting and seminal piece on judicial decision-making. I acknowledge that the authors’ goal was to develop a *broad* picture of judicial decision-making, and thus no models were used. Yet, I still questioned the methods/data the authors used to demonstrate their arguments. Not to the point that it was cherry-picked, but I wasn’t convinced by every argument/aspect advanced. All in all, though, judging this piece as it is - a broad stroke’s introduction of a concept - it is an interesting and important piece that significantly moved the study of judicial politics in an important direction.
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May 3, 2023Working my way though the judicial seminals. This certainly is one.
November 6, 2012
The Choices Justices Make argues, quite convincingly, that the decisions the Supreme Court justices make are often, if not always, strategic in nature. Through the examination of specific cases and the personal notes and records of former justices Brennan, Marshall and Powell, the authors provide numerous examples of such strategic considerations.
In looking at models of Supreme Court decision-making, the two most common models are the legal and attitudinal model. The legal model is the ideal in that the justices are assumed to be objective reasoning beings uninfluenced by those around them. They apply the plain meaning of the statute, law or Constitution; consider the Framers’ and/or legislative intent; and apply precedent. The attitudinal model, on the other hand, argues that the justices make decisions based mostly, if not solely, on their own personal policy preferences. The model offered here, the rational choice model, splits the difference. The authors argue that the decisions made are the ones closest to an individual justice’s policy preference, but they are constrained by considerations of what the other justices will do, along with internal and external institutional norms, etc.
The book opens with an extensive analysis of the justices’ actions in Craig v. Boren (1976). This case involved a 1972 law passed in Oklahoma making the legal age to purchase alcohol 18 for women and 21 for men. A suit was filed against the law claiming gender discrimination. The Court heard the case and ruled in favor of Craig, the petitioner, stating that the law was discriminatory. In writing the opinion, Brennan’s policy preference was for strict scrutiny in which a law is generally considered unconstitutional unless there are strongly compelling reasons, no less restrictive options are available, and the law infringes on the right as narrowly as possible. However, several members of the majority coalition favored the rational basis argument which says that the government only needs a rational (reasonable) basis for the law. Eventually, Brennan wrote a majority opinion that proposed an intermediate basis of scrutiny, heightened scrutiny. This represented the best Brennan could hope for to carry the case. However, it was not his ideal policy position.
The authors examine each stage of judicial decision-making from the consideration of which cases to accept, initial conference votes on the decision of a case based on its merits, to the assignment of the opinion, the commentary on opinion drafts and finally, the final vote on the opinion. I found the book to be a fascinating examination of how the justices reach the decisions they do. It was difficult to put the book down. Although the arguments presented here may not tell the whole story, they offer plenty of food for thought. I’d highly recommend the book to anyone with an interest in our legal system or the Supreme Court.
In looking at models of Supreme Court decision-making, the two most common models are the legal and attitudinal model. The legal model is the ideal in that the justices are assumed to be objective reasoning beings uninfluenced by those around them. They apply the plain meaning of the statute, law or Constitution; consider the Framers’ and/or legislative intent; and apply precedent. The attitudinal model, on the other hand, argues that the justices make decisions based mostly, if not solely, on their own personal policy preferences. The model offered here, the rational choice model, splits the difference. The authors argue that the decisions made are the ones closest to an individual justice’s policy preference, but they are constrained by considerations of what the other justices will do, along with internal and external institutional norms, etc.
The book opens with an extensive analysis of the justices’ actions in Craig v. Boren (1976). This case involved a 1972 law passed in Oklahoma making the legal age to purchase alcohol 18 for women and 21 for men. A suit was filed against the law claiming gender discrimination. The Court heard the case and ruled in favor of Craig, the petitioner, stating that the law was discriminatory. In writing the opinion, Brennan’s policy preference was for strict scrutiny in which a law is generally considered unconstitutional unless there are strongly compelling reasons, no less restrictive options are available, and the law infringes on the right as narrowly as possible. However, several members of the majority coalition favored the rational basis argument which says that the government only needs a rational (reasonable) basis for the law. Eventually, Brennan wrote a majority opinion that proposed an intermediate basis of scrutiny, heightened scrutiny. This represented the best Brennan could hope for to carry the case. However, it was not his ideal policy position.
The authors examine each stage of judicial decision-making from the consideration of which cases to accept, initial conference votes on the decision of a case based on its merits, to the assignment of the opinion, the commentary on opinion drafts and finally, the final vote on the opinion. I found the book to be a fascinating examination of how the justices reach the decisions they do. It was difficult to put the book down. Although the arguments presented here may not tell the whole story, they offer plenty of food for thought. I’d highly recommend the book to anyone with an interest in our legal system or the Supreme Court.
February 27, 2013
Reductive simplistic non-falsifiable account of how justices are strategic actors. This shouldn't be surprising once the reader understands that strategic doesn't mean advancing a policy agenda, but merely aiming to achieve certain goals (whether they be policy, personal, institutional, or whatever). The opposing idea that justices (or anyone for that matter) doesn't act strategically is conceptually incoherent. What would it mean to act without aiming towards something? It's not an idea which we can understand.
March 7, 2009
Based on empirical evidence from supreme court justices notes on conferences, the book argues that judges make decisions based on personal preferences, but that they also act strategically in trying to achieve their policy objectives.
March 3, 2011
It was okay. Nothing special
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August 9, 2014It was a textbook for my Judicial Politics class at GWU
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews