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On War

Carl von Clausewitz,

Michael Eliot Howard (Editor),

Peter Paret (Editor)

3.96 · Rating details · 12,619 ratings · 334 reviews

Carl von Clausewitz's On War has been called, "not simply the greatest, but the only truly great book on war." It is an extraordinary attempt to construct an all-embracing theory of how war works. Its coherence and ambition are unmatched by other military literature. On War is full of sharp observation, biting irony, and memorable phrases, the most famous being, "War is a ...more

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Paperback, 752 pages

Published June 21st 1989 by Princeton University Press (first published 1832)

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Apr 23, 2012 Michael Burnam-Fink rated it it was amazing

Shelves: 2012, history, war

"War is simply the continuation of politics by other means."

Far too many people quote Clausewitz without reading him, but after reading this edition of On War, there is no excuse not to read Clausewitz, and perhaps understand him.

I will speak first to the translation: This is how it should be done. Howard, Paret, and Brodie produce an accurate and highly readable text, with invaluable supplementary essays on the historical impact of Clausewitz and his key points. Accept no other translations.

Se ...more

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Jul 07, 2009 Matt rated it it was ok · review of another edition

Reviewing classics can be humbling. Some books have passed through so many generations and have been analyzed so thoroughly that they've reached mythic proportions. Only the arrogant or ignorant would criticize them. On War is just such a book.

First the disclaimer. I have an amateur interest in military history but do not have the depth to fully appreciate mid-19th century military theory. Regardless, I know enough to appreciate Clausewitz's rejection of formulated tactics and movement.

Now for ...more

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Dec 05, 2012 Stephanie rated it liked it

No one can actually enjoy reading Clausewitz - it simply must be done.

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Feb 02, 2013 E. G. rated it really liked it · review of another edition

Shelves: translated, non-fiction, germany-prussia, 4-star, own

Preface to the Pelican Edition
Introduction, by Anatol Rapoport

Introduction, by Col. F. N. Maude
Introduction of the Author
Brief Memoir of General Clausewitz by the Translator

--On War

Concluding Remarks by Anatol Rapoport
Notes
References
Glossary
Index

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Nov 22, 2011 Mike Edwards rated it it was amazing

Shelves: war, philosophy

Almost 200 years later, this masterpiece is still misunderstood and ignored.

Clausewitz argues that the purpose of war is to disarm your opponent and thereby force him to give you want you want. Based on this premise, he concludes that wars are essentially unwinnable on the battlefield: it is virtually impossible to completely disarm your opponent through might alone. Instead, your opponent at some point has to decide to give you want you want--and getting your opponent to come to that decision m ...more

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Apr 12, 2008 Silvana rated it really liked it · review of another edition

Shelves: used-to-own, nonfiction, military-history, classics

One of the most difficult books I've ever read (so far). Took me a month just to read it, and sadly not 100% able to understand the whole thing. This one needs a re-read someday. Some parts are just so indigestible and make me want to pull my hair due to frustration.

Having said that, why I gave this book four stars? Well, first it is a challenging read and I like challenges. Secondly, the contents are unbelievable. Yes, some explanations may be outdated, but the gist is still relevant. If one co ...more

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Jun 25, 2011 Aaron Crofut rated it liked it

Shelves: classics, war

It's hard to write a review of such a disjointed work. The important points he hits on are indeed extremely important, but wading through 750 pages of repetitive and wordy abstract run on sentences gets old pretty quickly. Two most important points:

1) Why don't nations fight wars of annihilation (remember, this is the early 19th Century, he doesn't know about the World Wars)? Well, why don't school children carry on their fights to the death? Answer: doing so isn't anywhere near worth the cost. It's hard to write a review of such a disjointed work. The important points he hits on are indeed extremely important, but wading through 750 pages of repetitive and wordy abstract run on sentences gets old pretty quickly. Two most important points:

1) Why don't nations fight wars of annihilation (remember, this is the early 19th Century, he doesn't know about the World Wars)? Well, why don't school children carry on their fights to the death? Answer: doing so isn't anywhere near worth the cost. Wars are fought by different nations over disagreements on policy; while that disagreement may be worth fighting over in their mind, it may not be worth risking national obliteration. The idea is to drive up the cost of war (deaths, wounded, money, political support) for the enemy higher than the worth of the thing being fought over is to them. What that thing is worth will be different for the different parties. While Clausewitz doesn't focus much on this, or at least not clearly, this asymmetric valuation is of extreme importance. The United States inflicted far more damage on our Vietnamese enemies than they did on us, but the value of victory for them approached infinity whereas most in the United States had only so much patience for supporting a corrupt regime in some country most couldn't find on a map. If both sides see victory as worth any cost, we get closer to the "pure theory of war", which is a bad thing.

2) The concept of friction. Pushing flags on a board: easy. Getting the 10,000 men that flag represents to the actual location indicated on the board in the face of enemy opposition, incomplete knowledge of roads and terrain, and feeding them all: not so easy. The more complex the plan, the more opportunities there are for something to go wrong.

I found these ideas, along with most of Clausewitz's theory, were better illustrated in Shelby Foote's The Civil War. Clausewitz himself is at his best when using historical examples to show his ideas in action, rather than pondering about "theory" and it's relation to practice and whether war is a science or art.

...more

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Jan 14, 2012 Ivana rated it it was amazing · review of another edition

Without doubt the best book about war ever written!
Even after all this time (how long has it been since it was written? centuries!) it is not dated. Really, it is not dated.

Carl Von Clausewitz is the first theorist of war (and he remains the best). Moreover, he is the first to write and understand war fully. There are other great books on this subject such as those written by Machiavelli and Sun Tzu but this is a theory, a great theory of war. Just like Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, the author creat ...more

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May 31, 2017 Clay Davis rated it it was amazing · review of another edition

A very wordy tome. Felt like I was reading War and Peace. Clausewitz seemed obsessed with Fredrick the Great. Odd that Clausewitz didn't mention Wellington. The edition I read needs to have the typos fixed. Not much mentioned about sea power or guerilla warfare. The book is a good snap shot of the thinking of the time. ...more

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Jan 15, 2012 Michael rated it really liked it · review of another edition

Recommends it for: European historians, military historians, strategists in training

Recommended to Michael by: Serendipity

Shelves: classics

This is the classic work of military strategy, written by a Prussian general in the nineteenth century, which has been often discussed but little understood. It is often held up as the ultimate example of “Prussianism,” of stifling military correctness, or as the champion of “absolute war” and the use of brutality and abandonment of rules in order to annihilate the enemy. It is blamed for the outbreak of both World Wars and for the horrors which those and subsequent conflicts loosed on the world This is the classic work of military strategy, written by a Prussian general in the nineteenth century, which has been often discussed but little understood. It is often held up as the ultimate example of “Prussianism,” of stifling military correctness, or as the champion of “absolute war” and the use of brutality and abandonment of rules in order to annihilate the enemy. It is blamed for the outbreak of both World Wars and for the horrors which those and subsequent conflicts loosed on the world.

None of this is true.

What we really have here is an unfinished text, since Clausewitz died before he could complete it, and I suspect that the complete version would have actually been shorter, as he cut out repetition and some of the less relevant digressions. Still, there is plenty here to chew on, and more than enough to disprove most of the above assertions.

Clausewitz is, of course, both Prussian and a military man, and his subject is war, but he is not uncompassionate. In fact, he takes into consideration the difficulties suffered by men in the field, not least because he has been one himself. He is aware that, at the time he was writing, disease was responsible for the loss of more soldiers than combat, and he does not advocate prolonged forced marches or other cruel methods. He is very much aware that the spirit of the men has an impact on the outcome of battle, and the terrible responsibility a commander has in making choices that will minimize the destruction and suffering of those under his command. He is also aware that vacillating and over-cautiousness can lead to worse catastrophes than boldness, in some circumstances.

So far as “absolute war” goes, yes, he does use the term. But he doesn’t necessarily advocate it as a “better” way to fight. There are two reasons for his use of it. The first is theoretical, in line with the idealist philosophy predominant in his time, he tries to use an idealized picture of war as a theoretical basis, from which particulars can be derived and adapted to real world conditions. This may or may not be the best approach, but it is not a matter of preferring war in its absolute state. The other reason he speaks of it is that as a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, he had witnessed the escalation of war much closer to its “absolute” state than had previously been considered possible. And he learned from Napoleon’s successes that where one side is willing to go to such an extreme while the other holds back, the more ruthless side will be at a distinct advantage. The other side is forced to adapt itself in order to survive.

So far as his influence is concerned, there is no doubt that Alfred von Schlieffen, who planned the German attack that started World War One, had read Clausewitz. But, Schlieffen didn’t start the war by himself, and had he used some other source in his planning, it wouldn’t have made the war any pleasanter. Hitler never read anything as long as this book (he boasted that he could learn all he needed to know by reading just the beginning and end of any book), and wouldn’t have cared for a lot of what Clausewitz had to say anyway.

The phrase that is best known from this book is translated here as “War is the continuation of policy by other means.” I have seen arguments that this translation misses the true meaning of this statement, and I can’t comment on that. It is true that Clausewitz also defines war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” I have seen it argued that the earlier statement is meant as a dialectical antithesis to this one. If that is true either a) Clausewitz was a very poor dialectician or b) there is something wrong in the translation of both statements. They do not negate one another. One could easily synthesize them by stating that “war is a continuation of policy by means of force, in order to compel a foreign nation to do the will expressed by our nation’s policy.” No new concept arises from this.

In all, the book is worthwhile, certainly from a historical standpoint, and maybe from a military science standpoint as well, but it is too long and too flawed to hold the interest of most readers. The best chapters are at the beginning and end of the book, while Books six and seven are the worst – book six because of too much repetition and book seven because of lack of analysis. The final chapters are where Clausewitz finally puts his theory to work by giving detailed historical analysis, and to me they would have been better if they had been placed earlier.

This edition includes a large amount of contextual prefatory matter, and a bloated summarizing essay at the end. Most of this could be dispensed with, though it is interesting to see the commenter apply Clausewitz’s concepts to the wars of the Twentieth Century. I would recommend this book primarily to specialists. ...more

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Sep 16, 2012 Al rated it it was amazing

Shelves: political-economic-theory, strategy, clausewitz, classics, favorites

Five stars for the translation which is simply the best on the market, and includes a superb commentary by Bernard Brodie. This is my fourth time reading this in the context of a class (Naval War College) and it is not any easier to navigate or understand, however, it is never a waste of time.

Clausewitz himself gives the best summary of this work on p. 89: "First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous, but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise ...more

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Jan 09, 2008 James rated it really liked it · review of another edition

This book stands as an important and modern classic about the nature of war. Clausewitz applies rigorous analysis to almost all the factors that influence war, not least of which are social and political aspects. Indeed, for him, war is part of man's social existence, and politics the womb in which war develops. This is encapsulated in his famous comment: "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."

There are a number of intriguing and developed insights within this book: how defens ...more

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Mar 03, 2017 Walter rated it it was amazing

Shelves: military-theory

"On War" is one of those books that was at the same time amazingly influential and almost never actually read. While Clausewitz is quoted and discussed by military men repeatedly, it fascinates me how many military officers serve long and distinguished careers without ever having read this book. In many ways this is understandable. Clausewitz is very philosophical and abstract, to the point that many of his ideas are simply not applicable to everyday military planning. One must also remember tha "On War" is one of those books that was at the same time amazingly influential and almost never actually read. While Clausewitz is quoted and discussed by military men repeatedly, it fascinates me how many military officers serve long and distinguished careers without ever having read this book. In many ways this is understandable. Clausewitz is very philosophical and abstract, to the point that many of his ideas are simply not applicable to everyday military planning. One must also remember that, despite the frequency with which he is cited, Clausewitz was a radical and very much opposed to the thinking of military men in his own day, and certainly in ours. While Clausewitz wrote in the first half of the 19th Century, his thought never really came to be accepted in the armies of France, Britain or the United States until well into the 20th century. Why was that? For one thing, Clausewitz bucked tradition by refusing to write about historical examples from antiquity. While most military authors waxed eloquently about the battles of Cannae, Thermopylae and Agincourt, Clausewitz felt, correctly I believe, that it is useless to take military lessons from battles so long ago because the tactics and technology of those days were very different from our own. For another thing, Clausewitz wrote far more at length about the defense, praising the defense as an excellent way to buy time and attrit the enemy before wearing him down enough to take the initiative in the attack. In most militaries of the 19th Century such thinking was heresy. The attack was the decisive form of battle, and it took on the aspect of almost a religion among military planners. These thinkers would scoff at the tendency of Clausewitz to praise the defense and discuss it at such great length. Finally, Clausewitz discussed the goal of a military campaign, not to take the enemy's capital, some key fortification or some key terrain feature, but rather to attack the enemy's "Center of Gravity". This concept applied to whatever it was that drove the enemy's military strength. In most cases this would be his forces, but perhaps it could be his ideology or perhaps even his leaders. Again, such thinking was scoffed by military thinkers who were sure that their objective must be some fixed location on the map. It was only in the wars of the 20th Century that we have learned how even an insignificant place like Stalingrad or Omaha Beach could be so decisive in war.

This particular edition of "On War" is undoubtedly the best one out there. The introduction gives the reader a great background on Clausewitz and the world in which he lived. Since most of us are relatively unfamiliar with the wars of Fredrick the Great, or the wars of the French Revolution and Napolean, this insight is invaluable. Reading this really made me want to understand better the Napoleanic era about which Clausewitz writes. Another thing that fascinated me about this book is how similar Clausewitz's view of war was to the view of Adam Smith concerning the economy. Whereas Smith spelled out the key components of the economy as land, labor, capital, transportation and entrepreneurial ability, Clausewitz discusses the five great elements of military success as the terrain, the troops, the weapons, maneuver and generalship. It would be fascinating to compare and contrast these similarities, especially since military theory has in recent years become so much in vogue among Corporate executives.

Overall I would highly recommend this book to everyone who is interested in military theory. It is an indispensable read for military leaders. And this edition is particularly valuable for both. ...more

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Jun 22, 2021 Gary rated it liked it · review of another edition

This was a rather heavy read that I had to put it away and revisit throughout a period of months. It was war specific in a lot of places as the name implies (I am a coddled North American and don’t have much use for war tactics except in chess or video games lol) but I really enjoyed the chapters on Criticism and and the subject of objectivity.

There are parts that’s I will revisit but I would not read the whole thing beginning to end again.

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Jun 03, 2008 Graham rated it it was amazing · review of another edition

Shelves: owned, non-fiction, military, strategy, history, politics, philosophy

Who am I to critique Clausewitz? Honestly, everything he says could be written in about 40% of the space he takes, but his kernels of truth remain so and ever shall. Worth everyone's time (especially in this abridged version, which cuts out much of the period-specific tactica on terrain and investing fortresses and the like). ...more

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Jun 20, 2011 Fredrick Danysh rated it it was amazing

Shelves: classics, military-manuals

Long considered one of the experts on waging war and studies at military academies around the world, Clausewitz sets forth his military theories on strategy.

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Oct 05, 2009 Jon rated it really liked it

Shelves: book-club, part-read

Ranked one of the great contributions in the literature of war, Clausewitz's book, "On War", presents a wide-ranging and very intellectual discussion of the subject of war. There is room for debate about precisely what the book is about. But Clausewitz is emphatic about what it is not: it is not a book on doctrine; it does not presume to give definitive tactical lessons; it does not pretend to give a formula on strategy-making. These are not Clausewitz's purpose. Rather it is theory that he say Ranked one of the great contributions in the literature of war, Clausewitz's book, "On War", presents a wide-ranging and very intellectual discussion of the subject of war. There is room for debate about precisely what the book is about. But Clausewitz is emphatic about what it is not: it is not a book on doctrine; it does not presume to give definitive tactical lessons; it does not pretend to give a formula on strategy-making. These are not Clausewitz's purpose. Rather it is theory that he says he is after. To use a formulation of Clausewitz: war is his subject, but theory is his object. This in a breath is the spirit of his book.

There is a lot to say about "On War". Some in praise, some in criticism, but all interesting. Because the space of this entry need not wander on needlessly in length or purpose, the discussion here must be abridged. Therefore I will confine myself to mention of three main themes. First is Clausewitz's discussion of politics and warfare. Second is his use of historical figures, particularly Napoleon and Frederick II. And third, the self conscious aspect of Clausewitz's theory.

The role of politics looms large in Clausewitz's theory of war. It is no coincidence Clausewitz and his book are known by the slogan "that war is nothing but the continuation of policy by other means." Though Clausewitz does not limit his theory of war to politics, his theory has become synonymous with the phrase. But Clausewitz is deliberate about identifying other influences on war. He proposes military genius, friction, and other intangible, psychic factors. Still for Clausewitz it is clear that politics has an influence on war that is predominant. Clausewitz goes out of his way in the preface to give the influence of politics specific highlight. That mention is followed right after by his dramatic first chapter, which exclusively discusses the importance of politics in war, and supplies its proof with an elaborate dialectical argument contrasting real and absolute war. This order of presentation should not be dismissed. The positioning of politics at a location foremost in the arrangement in his book has a special significance. By his own theory of war, Clausewitz advocates identifying the point of decision, and directing the main energy of the force against it. The same is apparent in his attention to argument. For Clausewitz, the influence of politics is the decisive point in his theory. Therefore he supplies it with his own main effort. The influence of moral qualities, military genius, danger, are important, but for Clausewitz they are really secondary actions. It is for this reason book 1 chapter 1 reads entirely different from every other chapter of the book. It has been combed and carefully organized in a way unmatched by any other chapter—this Clausewitz admits himself. It is also for this reason that he devotes all of book 8 to exploring the consequences of politics in his theory of war. Such disproportionate labor on the influence of politics, it is clear that Clausewitz’s intent is to impress the significance of this theme.

If politics represents the major insight of the book, his use of historical personages, particularly Napoleon and Frederick, is an important second. Clausewitz does not make it an explicit point of his theory. Nevertheless the same opinions appear too often and too consistently to be dismissed as trivia meant for illustration. For Clausewitz, Napoleon and Frederick represent something more than relevant examples. Far more. The two famous generals typify exactly the qualities of failure and success in warfare that his theory means to explain. Put more dramatically: they are the very inspiration for the theory itself. Napoleon is given as example of the archetypal general who is seemingly the great military genius, but in fact is not. Though he may possess characteristics that bring great success in battle, despite his brilliance, his politics and his war strategy are not in harmony. Therefore, for all Napoleon's apparent success, as a true strategist and statesmen he must be judged a failure. On the other hand, conventional opinion has it that Frederick should not enjoy equal rank with Napoleon, Alexander, Caesar, or other military royalty, though he be regarded as great general nonetheless. But by Clausewitz's reckoning, Frederick is truly the superior of Napoleon; for though he did not conquer near all of Europe in the manner of Napoleon, he achieved a harmony between his politics and his war strategy that Napoleon never did. Judged in this way, though he fought for bare existence in the Seven Years War, Frederick can claim a legacy greater than that of Napoleon. This anyway is one of the important sub narratives in Clausewitz's book. On most occasions Clausewitz prefers to question Napoleon's command, asking whether he truly deserved credit for his victories. While in the case of Frederick there is absolutely no instance where Clausewitz does not cover him with flatteries. The difference in treatment is extreme. So different in fact, one could speculate darkly whether Napoleon and Frederick are meant to serve theory, or whether the theory is meant to serve the men. Though it would be unfair to dismiss Clausewitz with such cynical speculation; there is an important strain of historical revisionism in "On War", which if true, degrades the theory as a disguise for rationalizing Prussian superiority.

There is one other feature of "On War" that stands out among others. Nevertheless, in many ways it is so pervasive in Clausewitz's writing, it is hard to perceive. This is the unusual manner Clausewitz uses to develop his study of war. His method and style are quite unorthodox. As a goal for his book, Clausewitz intends to make theory. But this is an end quite different then most other treatises on the subject. The tradition in military writing is to offer prescriptions, provide formulas, outline doctrine, and in general prepare lessons that have application for war. But for Clausewitz the project is far more intellectual. He says that he wants to give a theory of war. One that is holistic, that identifies key concepts, refines them with precision, illuminates war's principles, and give an order and coherence to the theory of war in the abstract. This is a project completely different in kind. And one gets the sense Clausewitz fancies himself a sort of heretic, and has his ambition set to provide a rethink of the way war is conceived. If so, it would explain his extended treatment of the weaknesses of earlier theories of war. He ridicules those that relied on numeric equations or depended solely on the geometry of the battlefield to provide a guide to war. These theories may have fulfilled a heuristic purpose he says, but so far as theory is judged they were inadequate. This interpretation of Clausewitz would also explain his censure of other academic styles for the study of war. Those writers that descend into petty technicalities, put their knowledge on parade, prefer to catalogue examples rather than give a single thorough description, or otherwise recall ancient history to beguile the reader with romantic accounts—all these Clausewitz says corrupt the analysis rather than advance it. In its place, Clausewitz proposes a style of deliberation all his own. Because war is not quite science, nor is it quite art, special accommodation is required. War may be a phenomenon unlike any other, nevertheless it is not beyond the power of theory. By this point Clausewitz has wandered far into the philosophical. Digressions of this kind, enormous repetition of substance, heavy reliance on abstract argument, intense use of the deliberative style of narrative, and a tendency to give conclusions in sweeping terms—all these distinguish Clausewitz's style for composing “On War”. It gives the entire book an intellectual, sage-like quality; though it also tends to obscure his meaning. It is in this context that Clausewitz proceeds to develop his theory of war. ...more

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Jan 26, 2017 Am rated it it was amazing

With the understanding of certain tactical level chapters being outdated, it is still a phenomenal read for strategic and operational theorizing, but must be consumed slowly, deliberately, and with much contemplation. Superficial hypocracy and seeming contradictions are eliminated with careful evaluation, intellectually Clausewitz reduces issues to their theoretical, most simplistic forms, and then walks them back with elaboration of the real world complications that prevent and contrive a perfe ...more

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Mar 31, 2020 Rüveyda is currently reading it · review of another edition

Clausewitz begins with the essential and simple definition of war as 'an act of violence intented to compel our opponent to fulfil our will'. Immediately, however, he finds the definiton inadequate to describe the different kinds of war it is possible to fight. The problem is solved by suggestion that there are in fact two types of war:

•influenced by the teaching Kant and his concept of the Ding-an-sich (literally, 'thing in itself'), Kantian ideal type, -that is, an abstract notion of what war ...more

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Sep 12, 2007 Henry Manampiring rated it it was ok · review of another edition

Recommends it for: anyone young and foolish enough to become an army officer

Dubbed "Sun Tzu from the West", I rushed to buy this book after it was mentioned in my fave movie Crimson Tide. Turned out to be as indigestible as unthawed frozen food. So much with my youth's dream of becoming a general and invade Malaysia....

One point from the book still rings in my head though: "you only achieve complete victory if you have broken the enemy's WILL to fight". As long as there is will to resist and fight, the enemy will be a pain in the ass, no matter how poorly equipped they ...more

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Jun 18, 2020 Dan R. rated it it was amazing

Best book on war I have ever read. There are no moral judgments in this book against war, on the contrary. Following the political purposes and the goal of defeating the enemy, an exposition of “total war” is given here by Clausewitz. By defining war mainly as an art and a practice (as opposed to a systematic theory), the content of the book is quite interesting in opposing theoretical miss-conceptions or even attempts to systematize or theorize particular aspects of war. Gives an insight into w ...more

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Jul 11, 2019 Jeff Whistler rated it really liked it

I see why this treatise is so famous. Clausewitz's erudition verges on genius often. Beside famous aphorisms like "fog of war" or "policy by other means", "war is not science, nor art, but a social interaction" struck me as profound. Editing is the only real issue as he died on campaign before finishing the book and his wife published it as is. ...more

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Aug 06, 2020 Tzu rated it liked it · review of another edition

Shelves: own, warfare, classics, history, politics-and-statecraft

Considering its historical setting, this is quite the read, and very interesting to say the least.
Though in today's light, I'm not too sure whether there's still much to be learned from Clausewitz lessons as war is fought in such different manner. ...more

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Jan 09, 2019 Woflmao rated it liked it · review of another edition

Shelves: reviewed

This review is on the abridged Reclam edition of the text.
It is hard to classify what type of book this is. What it is certainly not, is a textbook on military tactics. In its different parts, it contains a meta-analysis of war, aimed at dispelling many of the theoretical beliefs on war at the time, a psychological and sociological analysis of the countries in war, the military and its leaders, and it also contains a good deal of advice on large-scale military strategy.
In all this, the text most ...more

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Apr 15, 2020 Jake Sylvestre rated it really liked it

When it comes to military strategists in the Prussian tradition I prefer Moltke to Clausewitz (and believe Schlieffen gets more credit than he deserves).

Enough of the brilliant insights in this book have been spoiled in a hundred useless business strategy books and taken out of context and have had the affect of watering down my enjoyment of this formidable work.

Ultimately a must have for anyone interested in the history of strategy or prussian militarism.

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Jul 02, 2019 Sonny Dyon rated it it was amazing · review of another edition

Now I go to sleep and dream of War, but of course War dreams of itself

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May 15, 2020 Paul Conroy rated it liked it

I was very interested in this book, as it’s regarded as a classic. However I was a little disappointed, as the author struggled to describe psychological states and motivations of commanders.
The best part were the examples of various specific battles and tactics employed, but I would have liked this part to be much larger.

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Apr 11, 2021 Ask Franck rated it it was amazing

Great book—one of a kind.

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Oct 20, 2018 Ryan rated it it was amazing

The most difficult book I have ever read, 5/5, would invest the fortresses again

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Jul 17, 2017 Timons Esaias rated it really liked it · review of another edition

This is one of those classics that I've read sections of, read discussions of, read debates about, but hadn't actually read from cover to cover. Until this year.

First, a couple of notes about this edition. Goodreads has (at this writing) the wrong total page count for the book. My copy, at least, has 936 pages. Also, a fascinating element of having the Graham translation (with his footnotes) as edited by Maude (with his footnotes) is that you get glimpses of how this was taken in the late 1800s ...more

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About Carl von Clausewitz

Carl von Clausewitz

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Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz was a Prussian soldier, military historian and military theorist. He is most famous for his military treatise Vom Kriege, translated into English as On War.

Clausewitz has served in the Rhine campaign (1793–1794), when the Prussian army invaded France during the French revolution and in the Napoleonic Wars from 1806 to 1815.

Clausewitz helped negotiate the Conven ...more