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McClellan, Sherman, and Grant
Here are the characters and personalities of the three great Union generals, explored with intelligence and wit by one of our most distinguished historians of the Civil War. Mr. Williams is interested not only in military skills but in the temperament for command and, most of all, in moral courage. Each of these men, he writes, "represents a particular and significant aspect of leadership, and together they show a progression toward the final type of leadership that had to be developed before the war could be won. Most important, each one illustrates dramatically the relation between character and generalship." From McClellan's eighteenth-century view of war as something like a game conducted by experts on a strategic chessboard; to Sherman's understanding of the violent implications of making war against civilians; to the completeness of character displayed by Grant, Mr. Williams's absorbing investigation offers a fresh perspective on a subject of enduring interest.
122 pages, Paperback
First published February 1, 1977
About the author
T. Harry Williams
69 books34 followersT. Harry Williams (Thomas Harry Williams) was an historian at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge whose writing career began in 1941 and extended for thirty-eight years until his death in 1979. Williams is perhaps best known for his American Civil War study, Lincoln and His Generals, a "Book of the Month" selection from 1952, and Huey Long, winner of both the National Book Award and the Pulitzer Prize in 1970.
Williams passed away approximately two months after retirement due to complications from pneumonia.
In 1998, Williams was posthumously inducted into the Louisiana Political Museum and Hall of Fame in Winnfield.
Williams passed away approximately two months after retirement due to complications from pneumonia.
In 1998, Williams was posthumously inducted into the Louisiana Political Museum and Hall of Fame in Winnfield.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
December 24, 2018
In combination, this work from T. Harry Williams discuss both the overall military outlook of Northern strategists during the Civil War and some of the most and least successful practitioners of those strategies. The book by Williams devotes a chapter to one of the most controversial but ultimately unsuccessful of the Union generals, George Brinton McClellan. Williams describes McClellan’s military career from within the framework of the concept of leadership. He contends that while successful generals require some measure of various personal qualities – education, experience, and technical skill – no commander can achieve greatness without the intangible quality of great leadership.
McClellan’s great strength was, at the same time, his critical weakness. He inspired the love of his men, and for this reason, could not bear to lose them in battle. McClellan’s career in the Civil War demonstrates why rating him as a general is controversial. He won no outstanding victories, but suffered no crushing defeats. He disliked shedding his men’s blood, yet commanded at Antietam, the single bloodiest day of the war. His basic outlook was cautious, but his two main operations were offensive and inflicted significant casualties on the enemy. Three times his strategy created an opportunity for decisive victory, but McClellan never grasped those opportunities.
For Williams, the reason lies in McClellan’s personal scheme of envisioning the world around him. In his personal letters, McClellan often demonstrated a belief that only he could save the Union, yet he consistently believed the enemy too numerous or his own men insufficiently prepared to undertake offensive operations. Then there was McClellan’s irrational yet gnawing fear that his civilian superiors were scheming to betray him and sabotage his efforts. The final verdict is that McClellan did not have the temperament or leadership qualities for command. He envisioned the world, including the relationship between war and politics, in his own idealistic way, but to him that ideal was reality.
In contrast to McClellan, Williams sees greatness in three, but only three, Civil War leaders; only Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, and William T. Sherman meet his standard of great leadership. Each man exhibited greatness in his own way, despite that all three had been trained at West Point in the same military philosophy, that of the Swiss officer Antoine Jomini. The basics of Jomini’s strategy consisted of bringing an army to the decisive point in a theatre, then using your greatest force to engage the enemy force at its critical point. Using speed and simultaneous attacks, aided by interior lines of communication, a general could defeat the enemy and capture the critical objectives needed to achieve victory.
This approach was inherently backward-looking, yet both Lee and Sherman were true believers, while Grant was less so. Lee’s great strength lay in his abilities as a strategist and tactician who excelled at the Jominian concept of using speed and concentration to advantage. Yet for all his considerable achievements, he remained a theatre general who never truly comprehended the connections between war, economics, and politics. Much like the early Union generals such as McClellan, Lee failed to grasp that the Civil War was a new kind of war in which military operations had to accommodate the realities of politics.
Lincoln understood this, as did Grant, as demonstrated by his operations at Vicksburg. For Williams, Grant’s greatest strength was the ability to grow and transcend the rules of warfare as preached by the Jominians. This enabled him to conceive of a strategy featuring a general advance by all armies, not a concentrated advance by one, the strategy that eventually resulted in victory after its initiation in 1864. As for Sherman, he understood better than any other general the psychological importance of the will to fight in a democratic society. By destroying the economic and social structures that supported the enemy armies, he helped to weaken the structure that eventually fell when beset by Grant’s plan of a general offensive. It was Lincoln’s good fortune to have two generals whose strengths complemented each other so well.
This book, especially when describing the overall strategic framework of both sides, is a valuable addition to our general narrative despite its age, especially for those of us without extensive background in the history of military thinking. The description of Jomini’s tactics is valuable in seeking to understand the reasoning behind some actions that in hindsight appear to be unwise or short-sighted. The concept of leadership as a criterion for greatness is a bit more problematic. Clearly, it makes a difference, but that difference is difficult to measure and quantify, which necessitates a more diverse approach to considerations of military leadership.
McClellan’s great strength was, at the same time, his critical weakness. He inspired the love of his men, and for this reason, could not bear to lose them in battle. McClellan’s career in the Civil War demonstrates why rating him as a general is controversial. He won no outstanding victories, but suffered no crushing defeats. He disliked shedding his men’s blood, yet commanded at Antietam, the single bloodiest day of the war. His basic outlook was cautious, but his two main operations were offensive and inflicted significant casualties on the enemy. Three times his strategy created an opportunity for decisive victory, but McClellan never grasped those opportunities.
For Williams, the reason lies in McClellan’s personal scheme of envisioning the world around him. In his personal letters, McClellan often demonstrated a belief that only he could save the Union, yet he consistently believed the enemy too numerous or his own men insufficiently prepared to undertake offensive operations. Then there was McClellan’s irrational yet gnawing fear that his civilian superiors were scheming to betray him and sabotage his efforts. The final verdict is that McClellan did not have the temperament or leadership qualities for command. He envisioned the world, including the relationship between war and politics, in his own idealistic way, but to him that ideal was reality.
In contrast to McClellan, Williams sees greatness in three, but only three, Civil War leaders; only Robert E. Lee, Ulysses S. Grant, and William T. Sherman meet his standard of great leadership. Each man exhibited greatness in his own way, despite that all three had been trained at West Point in the same military philosophy, that of the Swiss officer Antoine Jomini. The basics of Jomini’s strategy consisted of bringing an army to the decisive point in a theatre, then using your greatest force to engage the enemy force at its critical point. Using speed and simultaneous attacks, aided by interior lines of communication, a general could defeat the enemy and capture the critical objectives needed to achieve victory.
This approach was inherently backward-looking, yet both Lee and Sherman were true believers, while Grant was less so. Lee’s great strength lay in his abilities as a strategist and tactician who excelled at the Jominian concept of using speed and concentration to advantage. Yet for all his considerable achievements, he remained a theatre general who never truly comprehended the connections between war, economics, and politics. Much like the early Union generals such as McClellan, Lee failed to grasp that the Civil War was a new kind of war in which military operations had to accommodate the realities of politics.
Lincoln understood this, as did Grant, as demonstrated by his operations at Vicksburg. For Williams, Grant’s greatest strength was the ability to grow and transcend the rules of warfare as preached by the Jominians. This enabled him to conceive of a strategy featuring a general advance by all armies, not a concentrated advance by one, the strategy that eventually resulted in victory after its initiation in 1864. As for Sherman, he understood better than any other general the psychological importance of the will to fight in a democratic society. By destroying the economic and social structures that supported the enemy armies, he helped to weaken the structure that eventually fell when beset by Grant’s plan of a general offensive. It was Lincoln’s good fortune to have two generals whose strengths complemented each other so well.
This book, especially when describing the overall strategic framework of both sides, is a valuable addition to our general narrative despite its age, especially for those of us without extensive background in the history of military thinking. The description of Jomini’s tactics is valuable in seeking to understand the reasoning behind some actions that in hindsight appear to be unwise or short-sighted. The concept of leadership as a criterion for greatness is a bit more problematic. Clearly, it makes a difference, but that difference is difficult to measure and quantify, which necessitates a more diverse approach to considerations of military leadership.
April 28, 2014
This book provides excellent insight into three of the most famous (and infamous) Union generals in the Civil War. Williams presents his information with clear flow of ideas. However, at times his work seems to float because it lacks specific dates that anchor the events described in place. In addition, Williams jumps around within each general's life so it can be easy to lose track of when he is referring to. These are very nit-picky observations, though. Whether you are searching for references or reading for entertainment, T. Harry Williams' book provides compelling arguments that will fulfill your needs and expectations.
September 18, 2023
Dr. Williams is one of my heroes!!
July 29, 2016
Interesting little work on that spark that makes a great general using George B. McClellan, William T. Sherman and U.S. Grant as test subjects
March 24, 2011
Definitely going to use this one with my students next year!
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews