CIA Practices
One of the terms that shows up frequently in regard to the CIA and the JFK assassination is the word ‘asset’. In a way that’s good because it at least provides a bit of differentiation – in contrast to someone simply being described as ‘working for the CIA’. Or perhaps being a ‘source’, a ‘paid employee’, a ‘spy’ or some other series of words implying that an individual was knowingly cooperating with the Agency, providing information or actually being given tasks or assignments.
Using the right word is very important in characterizing a relationship between and individual since all the words above can mean very different things – and in some instances relationships were and can be either ‘witting’ or ‘unwitting’. Indeed the CIA did not only designate relationships as witting/unwitting, but had separate sets of files and paperwork for each.
Beyond that, given operational concerns, an individual might even be treated as unwitting or witting over the course of time or by different groups within the agency itself. As an example, a general 201 file (created on basically anyone coming to the CIA’s attention) might not have all the details found within separate files on that same individual held in different areas.
If all that sounds complex and confusing, its supposed to because the overriding concern was always security and the need to prevent Agency activities from being penetrated or exposed. Standard practice for the bureaucracy inherent in any intelligence agency.
My friend David Boylan has spent the past few years exploring the types of documents and paperwork associated with CIA sources and assets, examining actual examples of the paperwork for people in those roles. Its often dull work but if you pay close attention to document routing, to who is copied on what, to who signs off on what, and what types of background checks and even polygraph testing (referred to as ‘fluttering’) are involved you can reverse engineer the process and the paperwork that should exist for a given type of relationship.
More importantly you can trace it all the way though what is required to move someone into being a source and on to what gains them provisional operational approval and then actual operational approval for specific tasks or missions.
David and I joined Chuck Ochelli last week to discuss the complexities of such things and if you are interested in a more detailed discussion you can find it at the link below:
