Robert O. Keohane

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Robert O. Keohane


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Chicago, The United States
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Robert O. Keohane (b. 1941) is an American scholar of international relations, best known for his work on neoliberal institutionalism. His numerous books include After Hegemony (1984) and Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (2002). Currently a professor at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Keohane has received numerous awards for his scholarship. Among these, he was honored with the Centennial Medal of the Harvard Graduate School in 2012. Keohane received his bachelor's degree in 1961 from Shimer College, a Great Books school where he now sits on the Board of Trustees. He received his graduate education at Harvard, where he completed his Ph.D. in 1966. (from Shimer College Wiki) ...more

Average rating: 3.61 · 1,335 ratings · 65 reviews · 28 distinct worksSimilar authors
After Hegemony: Cooperation...

3.71 avg rating — 446 ratings — published 1984 — 11 editions
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Power and Interdependence

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3.82 avg rating — 210 ratings — published 1977 — 7 editions
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Neorealism and Its Critics

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3.64 avg rating — 165 ratings — published 1985 — 3 editions
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International Institutions ...

3.24 avg rating — 21 ratings — published 1989 — 2 editions
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Internationalization and Do...

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3.82 avg rating — 17 ratings — published 1996 — 5 editions
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Power and Governance in a P...

3.29 avg rating — 17 ratings — published 2002 — 9 editions
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Transnational Relations and...

3.69 avg rating — 13 ratings — published 1971 — 3 editions
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After the Cold War: Interna...

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3.50 avg rating — 4 ratings — published 1993 — 2 editions
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Institutions for Environmen...

3.25 avg rating — 4 ratings — published 1996 — 3 editions
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Local Commons and Global In...

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really liked it 4.00 avg rating — 2 ratings — published 1994 — 6 editions
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More books by Robert O. Keohane…
Neorealism and Its Critics
(1 book)
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3.64 avg rating — 165 ratings

“International regimes perform the valuable functions of reducing the costs of legitimate transactions, while increasing the costs of illegitimate ones, and of reducing uncertainty. International regimes by no means substitute for bargaining; on the contrary, they authorize certain types of bargaining for certain purposes. Their most important function is to facilitate negotiations leading to mutually beneficial agreements among governments. Regimes also affect incentives for compliance by linking issues together and by being linked together themselves. Behavior on one set of questions necessarily affects others’ actions with regard to other matters.”
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy

“In the first place, Coase specified three crucial conditions for his conclusion to hold. These were: a legal framework establishing liability for actions, presumably supported by governmental authority; perfect information; and zero transaction costs (including organization costs and the costs of making side-payments). It is absolutely clear that none of these conditions is met in world politics. World government does not exist, making property rights and rules of legal liability fragile; information is extremely costly and often held unequally by different actors; transaction costs, including costs of organization and side-payments, are often very high. Thus an inversion of the Coase theorem would seem more appropriate to our subject. In the absence of the conditions that Coase specified, coordination will often be thwarted by dilemmas of collective action.”
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy



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