Harold Titus's Blog - Posts Tagged "benedict-arnold"
Thomas Nelson -- Benedict Arnold Invades
Of great aid to the Americans would be the French fleet. It would be most valuable at the Battle of Yorktown. But the fleet had to be kept in provisions and armament, and it was America’s responsibility to see that it was. Early in June of 1780 the Continental Congress called for $2,000,000 to be placed in the Continental Congress Treasury to help provide for the French fleet. Thomas Nelson set out personally to raise as much money as he could in Virginia. His excursions took him through most of the southern counties of the state, but he had great difficulty finding people willing to advance their money. The resources of the state were drained and people were poor. Those who possessed money were afraid to trust it to no better security than that of the government, already too deeply involved financially to extricate itself from its difficulties. Nelson was turned down everywhere. But seeing that the need of the money was great, he decided he would add his own personal security to that of the government. The people of the state trusted Nelson, and many accepted Nelson’s offer of security and loaned to the government what money they could spare. Ultimately, Nelson succeeded in raising a good sum of money, through his own personal efforts, and through the efforts of his agents, whom he sent out with authority to use his name and pledge his fortune.
Nelson would take a great financial beating in this enterprise. It seems that he kept a record of the amount of money he pledged to back these loans. But during the year of war that came to Virginia the records were lost. When it came time for the loans to be redeemed, the government was practically without funds. And Nelson was forced to pay back the debts personally. Nelson could not furnish the Continental Congress with an accurate record of these expenditures. Consequently, he was never reimbursed for his losses.
In 1780 the British, under the generalship of Charles Cornwallis, opened in earnest their campaign to recover the southern colonies. Having already captured Savannah in December of 1778, the British seized Charlestown in May 1780. The Carolinas had little to oppose Cornwallis but hastily drawn militia. Congress then sent Horatio Gates with an army of regulars south to aid the southern militia. Gates was soundly beaten August 16 at Camden, South Carolina, and was replaced soon afterward by the competent Nathanial Greene. Moving though Virginia on his way southward, Greene left General von Steuben as the temporary commander-in-chief of the Continental forces in Virginia and Greene’s personal representative. Greene would need reinforcements from Virginia, and he thought this could be accomplished more easily with von Steuben in Virginia. Thomas Nelson placed himself and his state militia under von Steuben’s authority.
On December 31, 1780, Thomas Nelson received a letter from a citizen informing him that 27 sails had been sighted entering the capes. The arrival of the French fleet in Virginia had been eagerly awaited. But no one knew yet whether this fleet was friend or enemy. Nelson immediately informed Governor Jefferson of the fleet, and Jefferson sent the general down into the southern area of the state with full power to “take such steps as the exigencies of the moment might require” (Bowers 262).
Learning that the fleet was British, but believing it to be another raiding party, the governor called out half of the militia of the counties closest to the enemy, as well as one fourth of the militia from the more distant counties. Jefferson intended to put 4,600 militiamen in the field. On January 3, 1781, a force of 1,500 men sailed up the James River under the command of the recent American patriot turned traitor, Benedict Arnold. At this time Nelson was about 13 miles above Williamsburg on the Chickahominy River watching the advance of the enemy and waiting for bands of militia to gather. He wrote Jefferson in Richmond January 4 that the enemy had passed by the former state capitol and seemed headed for either Richmond or Petersburg. He theorized that the enemy would “proceed as high up the river as they can for fear of desertion among their troops, to which they are much disposed” (Kimball 132). Then, Nelson wrote the same day that the enemy had landed their full force at Westover and were marching for Richmond. With militiamen from the counties of King William, King and Queens, Gloucester, and New Kent arriving daily, he expected his strength to be about 350 in a day. He would then follow the movements of the enemy from the rear.
The enemy was able to reach Richmond and capture the town, but not before Jefferson had been able to flee to safety. The militia had not gathered in time to join von Steuben’s regulars to attempt to turn back Arnold. But soon the American forces were large enough to exert pressure. However, considerable lack of supplies and ammunition handicapped them. “Muskets and cannon that had been hidden from the British could not be found, other weapons had been handled so roughly in the excitement that they were unserviceable, and it was difficult to get wagons to transport usable arms to the troops who needed them” (Evans 92-93). Von Steuben, on the south side of the James River, wrote to Greene about this time complaining bitterly of the shortage of arms, and of the lack of “tents and camp kettles. It is impossible to describe the situation I am in – in want of everything” (Malone 141).
In writing to Jefferson January 8 Nelson exhibits great disappointment at not being able to help prevent Arnold’s capture of Richmond.
“I am pained to the very soul that we have not been able to prevent the return of the enemy, but even the elements have conspired to favor them. On Saturday night a flood of rain poured down as to render my plan abortive by almost drowning the troops, who were in bush tents that they (the enemy) may not go off without some injury. I have ordered two pieces of cannon to be planted … where I am told we may do them mischief. These cannon I propose to defend by infantry as long as I can … It is better to lose the guns than not to attack somewhere” (Kimball 142-143).
On January 13 Nelson reported the enemy’s withdrawal from Richmond and felt certain it intended “nothing further on the North side of James River at present” (Boyd 351). He was right. Arnold returned to Portsmouth, where he could feel safe from American resistance. Von Steuben, “a fine organizer and trainer of troops, was not noted for brilliant tactical leadership in the field; he was, in fact, overly cautious and his brigade commanders soon appeared to be of similar inclination” (Evans 94). He met with Nelson in Williamsburg January 20. They decided that an attack on Arnold would be inadvisable. Von Steuben decided instead “to concentrate on trying to contain Arnold at Portsmouth, keeping him from again raiding the heart of the state” (Evans 94).
Although Virginia’s forces outnumbered Arnold’s troops, the numbers were illusory. “Absence from home and expiring enlistments were not the only things that made militia hard to keep. Food, though plentiful, reached the troops only with difficulty and consisted largely of corn meal. The men were housed badly in brush huts or tents, which in a typically cold, wet, Virginia winter was a circumstance not conductive to the highest moral. … Through late January and early February of 1781 Nelson wrestled with these problems, but despite his efforts his force dropped to eight hundred men” (Evans 95).
Arnold seemingly content to remain in Portsmouth, Virginia’s leaders hoped for the arrival of the greater portion of the French fleet. With the fleet blockading all possible retreat by the sea after destroying Arnold’s ships, and American land forces engulfing Portsmouth on all other sides, Arnold’s army would be forced to surrender. When three French ships (one 64 gun ship and two frigates of 36 guns each) arrived at the posts below Williamsburg on the James River, Nelson felt the time for Arnold’s destruction had arrived. To von Steuben, February 14, he wrote, “What you expected has taken place. I give you joy with all my soul. Now is our time. Not a moment ought to be lost” (Boyd 678n). However, Nelson’s enthusiasm was dashed the next day after consulting the commander of the small fleet, Captain Arnaud Le Gardneur de Tilly. The Captain’s three ships blocked Arnold’s passage out of the Elizabeth River into the James River and Chesapeake Bay; but one of Arnold’s ships had managed to slip past “which was reportedly dispatched to New York, and de Tilly, fearing that if he lingered he would be caught by a superior fleet, decided to leave” (Evans 97). The Frenchman told Nelson that he would cruise off the capes to intercept British supplies, distress the enemy, and watch for the possible arrival of a superior British force. In fact, he sailed directly to Newport, Rhode Island to join the main French fleet.
Nelson was ill in Williamsburg February 19 with a severe cold. He remained sick for a month. Not surprisingly, he was bitter about de Tilly’s departure. He wrote to Jefferson that Arnold would now “make use of all the Advantages which their Command of the Water gives them over us” (Boyd 650-651). Because of some losses at the hands of the French fleet they would probably “wreck their Vengence on the Parts of the State most exposed,” especially Hampton, that had furnished pilots for the French. “It gives me the utmost pain that I find myself unable to give them the Protection they merit” (Kimball 153). He had now only a force of about 400 men.
“As February drew to a close, Nelson began to regain his strength, but a relapse forced him to remain in bed throughout the month of March. Steuben was especially upset, for he had come both to like Nelson and to depend on his advice.” In March he wrote Nelson that the Virginian’s indisposition “deprives me of your council and assistance at a time I am in the greatest want of it. You are better acquainted with the Strength and weakness of this state and you have the confidence of the People – judge then how much I regret your absence” (Evans 98).
Washington had also hoped that Arnold’s troops could be bottled up and taken. Accordingly, the commander-in-chief sent to Virginia in March the French patriot, Marquis de Lafayette, and an estimate 1,200 troops, the “elite corps” of Washington’s army, the Light Brigade. Rear Admiral Charles René Dominique Sochet, Chevalier Destouches’ fleet, sent to augment Lafayette, was driven away March 16 near the mouth of Chesapeake Bay in the Battle of Cape Henry by a British fleet commanded by Vice Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot. Destouches returned immediately to Newport, while Arbuthnot protected the bay for the arrival of land forces dispatched from New York to reinforce General Arnold. Lafayette had landed in York March 14. Because he had been deprived of the fleet, the plan for trapping Arnold was abandoned.
Works cited:
Bowers, Claude G. The Young Jefferson 1743-1789. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1945. Print.
Boyd, Julian F., ed. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951, IV. Print.
Evans, Emory G. Thomas Nelson of Yorktown: Revolutionary Virginian. Charlottesville, The University Press of Virginia, 1975. Print.
Kimball, Marie. Jefferson War and Peace 1776 to 1784. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1947. Print.
Malone, Dumas. Jefferson the Virginian. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948. Print.
Nelson would take a great financial beating in this enterprise. It seems that he kept a record of the amount of money he pledged to back these loans. But during the year of war that came to Virginia the records were lost. When it came time for the loans to be redeemed, the government was practically without funds. And Nelson was forced to pay back the debts personally. Nelson could not furnish the Continental Congress with an accurate record of these expenditures. Consequently, he was never reimbursed for his losses.
In 1780 the British, under the generalship of Charles Cornwallis, opened in earnest their campaign to recover the southern colonies. Having already captured Savannah in December of 1778, the British seized Charlestown in May 1780. The Carolinas had little to oppose Cornwallis but hastily drawn militia. Congress then sent Horatio Gates with an army of regulars south to aid the southern militia. Gates was soundly beaten August 16 at Camden, South Carolina, and was replaced soon afterward by the competent Nathanial Greene. Moving though Virginia on his way southward, Greene left General von Steuben as the temporary commander-in-chief of the Continental forces in Virginia and Greene’s personal representative. Greene would need reinforcements from Virginia, and he thought this could be accomplished more easily with von Steuben in Virginia. Thomas Nelson placed himself and his state militia under von Steuben’s authority.
On December 31, 1780, Thomas Nelson received a letter from a citizen informing him that 27 sails had been sighted entering the capes. The arrival of the French fleet in Virginia had been eagerly awaited. But no one knew yet whether this fleet was friend or enemy. Nelson immediately informed Governor Jefferson of the fleet, and Jefferson sent the general down into the southern area of the state with full power to “take such steps as the exigencies of the moment might require” (Bowers 262).
Learning that the fleet was British, but believing it to be another raiding party, the governor called out half of the militia of the counties closest to the enemy, as well as one fourth of the militia from the more distant counties. Jefferson intended to put 4,600 militiamen in the field. On January 3, 1781, a force of 1,500 men sailed up the James River under the command of the recent American patriot turned traitor, Benedict Arnold. At this time Nelson was about 13 miles above Williamsburg on the Chickahominy River watching the advance of the enemy and waiting for bands of militia to gather. He wrote Jefferson in Richmond January 4 that the enemy had passed by the former state capitol and seemed headed for either Richmond or Petersburg. He theorized that the enemy would “proceed as high up the river as they can for fear of desertion among their troops, to which they are much disposed” (Kimball 132). Then, Nelson wrote the same day that the enemy had landed their full force at Westover and were marching for Richmond. With militiamen from the counties of King William, King and Queens, Gloucester, and New Kent arriving daily, he expected his strength to be about 350 in a day. He would then follow the movements of the enemy from the rear.
The enemy was able to reach Richmond and capture the town, but not before Jefferson had been able to flee to safety. The militia had not gathered in time to join von Steuben’s regulars to attempt to turn back Arnold. But soon the American forces were large enough to exert pressure. However, considerable lack of supplies and ammunition handicapped them. “Muskets and cannon that had been hidden from the British could not be found, other weapons had been handled so roughly in the excitement that they were unserviceable, and it was difficult to get wagons to transport usable arms to the troops who needed them” (Evans 92-93). Von Steuben, on the south side of the James River, wrote to Greene about this time complaining bitterly of the shortage of arms, and of the lack of “tents and camp kettles. It is impossible to describe the situation I am in – in want of everything” (Malone 141).
In writing to Jefferson January 8 Nelson exhibits great disappointment at not being able to help prevent Arnold’s capture of Richmond.
“I am pained to the very soul that we have not been able to prevent the return of the enemy, but even the elements have conspired to favor them. On Saturday night a flood of rain poured down as to render my plan abortive by almost drowning the troops, who were in bush tents that they (the enemy) may not go off without some injury. I have ordered two pieces of cannon to be planted … where I am told we may do them mischief. These cannon I propose to defend by infantry as long as I can … It is better to lose the guns than not to attack somewhere” (Kimball 142-143).
On January 13 Nelson reported the enemy’s withdrawal from Richmond and felt certain it intended “nothing further on the North side of James River at present” (Boyd 351). He was right. Arnold returned to Portsmouth, where he could feel safe from American resistance. Von Steuben, “a fine organizer and trainer of troops, was not noted for brilliant tactical leadership in the field; he was, in fact, overly cautious and his brigade commanders soon appeared to be of similar inclination” (Evans 94). He met with Nelson in Williamsburg January 20. They decided that an attack on Arnold would be inadvisable. Von Steuben decided instead “to concentrate on trying to contain Arnold at Portsmouth, keeping him from again raiding the heart of the state” (Evans 94).
Although Virginia’s forces outnumbered Arnold’s troops, the numbers were illusory. “Absence from home and expiring enlistments were not the only things that made militia hard to keep. Food, though plentiful, reached the troops only with difficulty and consisted largely of corn meal. The men were housed badly in brush huts or tents, which in a typically cold, wet, Virginia winter was a circumstance not conductive to the highest moral. … Through late January and early February of 1781 Nelson wrestled with these problems, but despite his efforts his force dropped to eight hundred men” (Evans 95).
Arnold seemingly content to remain in Portsmouth, Virginia’s leaders hoped for the arrival of the greater portion of the French fleet. With the fleet blockading all possible retreat by the sea after destroying Arnold’s ships, and American land forces engulfing Portsmouth on all other sides, Arnold’s army would be forced to surrender. When three French ships (one 64 gun ship and two frigates of 36 guns each) arrived at the posts below Williamsburg on the James River, Nelson felt the time for Arnold’s destruction had arrived. To von Steuben, February 14, he wrote, “What you expected has taken place. I give you joy with all my soul. Now is our time. Not a moment ought to be lost” (Boyd 678n). However, Nelson’s enthusiasm was dashed the next day after consulting the commander of the small fleet, Captain Arnaud Le Gardneur de Tilly. The Captain’s three ships blocked Arnold’s passage out of the Elizabeth River into the James River and Chesapeake Bay; but one of Arnold’s ships had managed to slip past “which was reportedly dispatched to New York, and de Tilly, fearing that if he lingered he would be caught by a superior fleet, decided to leave” (Evans 97). The Frenchman told Nelson that he would cruise off the capes to intercept British supplies, distress the enemy, and watch for the possible arrival of a superior British force. In fact, he sailed directly to Newport, Rhode Island to join the main French fleet.
Nelson was ill in Williamsburg February 19 with a severe cold. He remained sick for a month. Not surprisingly, he was bitter about de Tilly’s departure. He wrote to Jefferson that Arnold would now “make use of all the Advantages which their Command of the Water gives them over us” (Boyd 650-651). Because of some losses at the hands of the French fleet they would probably “wreck their Vengence on the Parts of the State most exposed,” especially Hampton, that had furnished pilots for the French. “It gives me the utmost pain that I find myself unable to give them the Protection they merit” (Kimball 153). He had now only a force of about 400 men.
“As February drew to a close, Nelson began to regain his strength, but a relapse forced him to remain in bed throughout the month of March. Steuben was especially upset, for he had come both to like Nelson and to depend on his advice.” In March he wrote Nelson that the Virginian’s indisposition “deprives me of your council and assistance at a time I am in the greatest want of it. You are better acquainted with the Strength and weakness of this state and you have the confidence of the People – judge then how much I regret your absence” (Evans 98).
Washington had also hoped that Arnold’s troops could be bottled up and taken. Accordingly, the commander-in-chief sent to Virginia in March the French patriot, Marquis de Lafayette, and an estimate 1,200 troops, the “elite corps” of Washington’s army, the Light Brigade. Rear Admiral Charles René Dominique Sochet, Chevalier Destouches’ fleet, sent to augment Lafayette, was driven away March 16 near the mouth of Chesapeake Bay in the Battle of Cape Henry by a British fleet commanded by Vice Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot. Destouches returned immediately to Newport, while Arbuthnot protected the bay for the arrival of land forces dispatched from New York to reinforce General Arnold. Lafayette had landed in York March 14. Because he had been deprived of the fleet, the plan for trapping Arnold was abandoned.
Works cited:
Bowers, Claude G. The Young Jefferson 1743-1789. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1945. Print.
Boyd, Julian F., ed. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951, IV. Print.
Evans, Emory G. Thomas Nelson of Yorktown: Revolutionary Virginian. Charlottesville, The University Press of Virginia, 1975. Print.
Kimball, Marie. Jefferson War and Peace 1776 to 1784. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1947. Print.
Malone, Dumas. Jefferson the Virginian. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948. Print.
Thomas Nelson -- Thomas Jefferson Escapes
Here are links to two maps to help you locate the rivers and cities referenced below.
http://www.virginiaplaces.org/chesbay...
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...
Lafayette returned to Annapolis after American and French efforts to trap General Benedict Arnold in Portsmouth were abandoned. Not long afterward, General William Philllips and 2,600 redcoat soldiers reinforced Arnold. Virginia forces had dwindled to 1,200 men. Only 700 were positioned south of the James River. Lafayette was expected to return with about 1,200 soldiers. A new group of militia was being desperately called up. Neither source of reinforcements, however, would be useable before the end of April. Consequently, General von Steuben withdrew his troops from Portsmouth and stationed them at Richmond. Given free reign, on April 18, 1781, Arnold and 2,500 British troops left Portsmouth to move up the James River to plunder.
They launched an attack on the supply depot of Petersburg. Generals Steuben and Muhlenburg, with 1,000 militiamen, defended stubbornly. At the end of the day Steuben ordered a withdrawal. Arnold advanced into Petersburg where he destroyed four thousand hogsheads of tobacco. He destroyed at Osbornes, a small village on the James River 15 miles below Richmond, what passed for the Virginia navy. General Phillips burned barracks and stores at Chesterfield Court House. Both generals then moved toward Manchester, just across the James from Richmond.
Thomas Nelson, having recovered from his illness, gathered a handful of militiamen hoping somehow to defend the capitol city. “Fortunately the British did not get to Manchester until the morning of April 30, and on the previous afternoon General Lafayette had marched his nine hundred weary troops into Richmond, after a forced march that had taken them only ten days in miserable weather to cover the 150 miles from Annapolis. Thus, when the British arrived in Manchester, they were confronted across the river by Lafayette’s troops located in good position. Though superior in numbers, the British decided not to attack, and after burning some tobacco they dropped down the river, and by May 6, were below Jamestown” (Evans 99). To put Richmond beyond further attack, Lafayette moved Nelson and his militia to Williamsburg and his own forces between that city and the capitol.
In May, General William Cornwallis came driving up into Virginia from North Carolina. He had won a costly victory at Guilford Court House in March and had then moved to Wilmington, North Carolina, where he had made plans to march into Virginia to join Arnold and Phillips at Petersburg. He did so May 20, Lafayette, being outnumbered, forced to withdraw to Richmond. For a week and a half neither Lafayette nor the British made any further move.
On May 10, the state legislature had decided to convene two weeks later not in Richmond but in Charlottesville. In Richmond, Lafayette reorganized his army, now totaling 900 Continentals and the 1,200 to 1,500 militia divided into two brigades commanded by Nelson and Muhlenburg. After Cornwallis’s arrival May 20, British forces totaled about 7,200 men.
During this time Nelson had had to deal with numerous disloyal acts. “In early May, he was forced to take twelve disaffected persons into custody, including Williamsburg merchant John Greenhow, who had advised a ‘militia officer to lay aside his Sword because we were already conquered.’ Horses, which might strengthen an already superior British cavalry, had to be removed from Cornwallis’s path. Owners who did not cooperate were to have their animals seized. Nelson also had to oversee the impressment of horses for Lafayette’s cavalry. A condition approaching martial law prevailed” (Evans 100).
On May 24, Cornwallis marched out of Petersburg, crossed the James River, and headed toward Richmond to attack Lafayette. Wanting to keep his army intact and determined to prevent Cornwallis from getting between him and General Anthony Wayne, who was marching from Pennsylvania with reinforcements, Lafayette retreated northward toward Fredericksburg. On the last day of the month, Cornwallis ended his pursuit, deciding to direct his aggressive activities elsewhere.
Cornwallis wanted to destroy a main supply depot fifty miles above Richmond, capture the Virginia legislature in session in Charlottesville, and seize Governor Thomas Jefferson. Lieutenant Colonel John Simcoe and 500 troops destroyed the depot. Steuben and 400 militiamen ordered to defend it retreated. “Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton and 250 cavalry, assigned the second objective, fell upon Charlottesville early on the morning of June 4. Had it not been for the ride of Captain Jack Jouett from Cuckoo Tavern to warn the legislature and the governor, the plan would have been successful” (Evans 101). Here is how The Meriwether Society, Inc., on the internet, narrates this event.
***
On May 28th, the first day a quorum was present for the reconvened Assembly, Governor Jefferson wrote George Washington pleading he bring the Continental Army to Virginia to bolster the weary patriots, “That your appearance among them I say would restore full confidence of salvation…” Soon afterwards, General Washington wrote Jefferson almost apologetically, “The progress which the enemy are making in Virginia is very alarming…,” only daring to hint at his plans for the British, which would only be secured by a Naval Superiority not yet in place.
…
The Green Dragoons moved easily through the countryside between the North and South Anna Rivers on “a rainy dark day”. The heat of the weather obliged a rest around noon to refresh the men and horses. Then they pressed on into the night, and at a small crossroads in eastern Louisa County (the junction of today’s US 33 and US 522), tradition has it that their motions were then observed. About 10:00pm there at the Cuckoo Tavern, a young member of the Virginia militia, John Jouett (of Huguenot origins), watched the British cavalry sweep past along the main road. Whether they stopped is unknown; perhaps some officers entered the Tavern and Jouett overheard them talking, or maybe in watching from a window he just guessed what they were up to. A native of Charlottesville, Jouett’s father was the keeper of the Swan Tavern there, a stopping place and meeting room for many delegates to the Virginia Assembly. Figuring the British would take the main road, Jouett inconspicuously left the area, then mounted a horse said to be the finest in 7 counties, and (thoroughly familiar with the region) rode 40 miles over back roads in the middle of the night, which had nearly a full moon though it was probably overcast. He traveled through a maze of vines, brambles, and potholes, to Monticello where at 4:30am June 4 he awoke Jefferson and several prominent members of the legislature, effectively warning them. It is said he paused only briefly before continuing to Charlottesville. Jouett’s descendants say he wore the scars of brambles and branches from that ride the rest of his life.
Meanwhile, Tarleton’s troops arrived at the Louisa County Courthouse at 11:00pm. They remained on a “plentiful plantation” in Louisa until 2:00am June 4, 1781, then resumed their march. Before dawn, they burned a caravan of 12 supply wagons with stores of arms and clothing headed for South Carolina.
…
… Tarleton ordered Dr. Walker and his wife to prepare breakfast for the British Legion. It is said the Walkers knew or guessed of the plan to capture Jefferson, so while Mildred Walker “ordered the cooks to be slow in preparing breakfast, Dr. Walker was busy mixing mint juleps for… Tarleton and his troops.” … He [Tarleton] was still at that point counting on the surprise he might gain from the approximately 70 mile distance covered that night and the previous day.
…
Just ahead of the British on the morning of June 4, 1781, militia rider John Jouett reached Charlottesville, an 18-year-old town described by a visitor at the time as “a courthouse, one tavern, and about a dozen houses.” He warned the Virginia Assembly members staying there about the approaching raid. They hastily convened, and arranged to reconvene in Staunton, safely across the Blue Ridge Mountains in 3 days time. Their main business of electing a new Governor, because Jefferson’s term had expired June 1, would have to wait. A then little-known Colonel Daniel Boone and some others started loading up wagons with some of the public records.
Not far behind, British Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton and his troops were on the way, refreshed after a quick breakfast at Castle Hill. …
…
… About that time the former Governor had just left Monticello after seeing his family safely off via carriage toward Enniscorthy, the Coles plantation about 14 miles distant in southern Albemarle County. Jefferson had ordered his favorite riding horse to be shod and brought to the road (about where state highway 53 is today) in the valley between his mountaintop home and the nearby Carter’s Mountain … According to a popular folktale of the time, as the British approached, Jefferson walked a ways up Carter’s Mountain to a good viewing point, and gazed from a telescope. He looked down at the streets of Charlottesville and saw nothing out of order. Jefferson started to walk away, but it is said he noticed his light walking sword had slipped from its sheath, so he returned to retrieve it, and then took another look through his telescope, this time to see the streets swarming with Dragoons, identifiable by the color of their uniforms--green for the British Legion, and red for the Fusiliers. Jefferson then mounted his horse and briskly made his escape. [The Jeffersons’ eventual destination was their family’s Poplar Forest plantation further south.]
… with the help of Jouett’s early warning and the Walker family’s strategic delay, Jefferson, his family, and guests (including the Speakers of the State Senate and House, and some others) all had narrowly escaped, missing the British by just 10 minutes. …
Down in Charlottesville, the British were raiding the town, burning goods and seizing firearms. The numbers vary according to different sources. The British said they destroyed 1,000 muskets, 400 barrels of powder, 7 hogsheads of tobacco, and a quantity of Continental soldier’s clothing and “accoutrements”, while the American estimates were much lower. Also, invaluable county legal records were destroyed, that are still missing from 1748-1781, burned on the Courthouse green. About 20 prisoners, remnants from the neighborhood of The Barracks prisoner-of-war camp on the West side of town, were liberated.
… Elsewhere in Charlottesville, a British officer overtook Daniel Boone, dressed inconspicuously in frontier hunting shirts and leggings, with John Jouett walking away. The former was questioned and dismissed, then the latter. According to Boone family tradition, as their relative walked away, Jouett (probably exhausted and/or still full of adrenaline) absentmindedly called out Colonel Daniel Boone’s rank and name so that he could catch up with him. The British officer overheard and promptly arrested Boone.
…
After the drama and violence of the early June days and nights in 1781, life in Charlottesville gradually returned more to its routines. The most hunted General Assembly in Virginia’s history reconvened at the Old Trinity Church in Staunton with most of its members, somewhat riled by their recent harrowing experiences. Some placed blame on Jefferson for their lack of security.
… The Assembly later voted to exonerate Jefferson of any blame. A year later, Jouett traveled Daniel Boone’s Wilderness Road to Kentucky, serving well as a progressive delegate in State Assemblies. …
… unsuccessful in the main goal of his mission, Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton and his Green Dragoons sometime between June 6-9 made it back to join General Cornwallis at Point of Fork, where the Rivanna River meets the James River (near present day Columbia). He reported “the attempt to secure Mr. Jefferson was ineffectual.” Their main prisoners from the raid were then paroled, including Daniel Boone.
***
Jefferson’s term of office had expired on June 2. “The gentle Virginian was not a military man, his second term had been a frustrating one, and he was determined to step aside for someone better fitted for the position. A little over a week later, the Assembly meeting in Staunton chose General Thomas Nelson as Jefferson’s successor” (Evans 101).
Washington’s decision to remain north proved to be fortunate. General Henry Clinton, commander-in-chief of all British forces in the Colonies, situated in New York City, feeling uneasy about Washington’s near presence, ordered Cornwallis to take a defensive position at Williamsburg and York and send to him every man he could spare. Then, seeming to regain his composure, Clinton ordered Cornwallis to send no reinforcements. But Clinton did not countermand his order instructing Cornwallis to take a defensive position. Consequently, on August 2 Cornwallis positioned at York his 4,500 men.
Works cited:
Long, Stephen Meriwether. “British Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton and the American Revolution: Drama on the Plantations of Charlottesville.” The Meriwether Society, Inc. http://homepages.rootsweb.ancestry.co.... Net.
Evans, Emory G. Thomas Nelson of Yorktown: Revolutionary Virginian. Charlottesville, Virginia, The University Press of Virginia, 1975. Print.
http://www.virginiaplaces.org/chesbay...
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...
Lafayette returned to Annapolis after American and French efforts to trap General Benedict Arnold in Portsmouth were abandoned. Not long afterward, General William Philllips and 2,600 redcoat soldiers reinforced Arnold. Virginia forces had dwindled to 1,200 men. Only 700 were positioned south of the James River. Lafayette was expected to return with about 1,200 soldiers. A new group of militia was being desperately called up. Neither source of reinforcements, however, would be useable before the end of April. Consequently, General von Steuben withdrew his troops from Portsmouth and stationed them at Richmond. Given free reign, on April 18, 1781, Arnold and 2,500 British troops left Portsmouth to move up the James River to plunder.
They launched an attack on the supply depot of Petersburg. Generals Steuben and Muhlenburg, with 1,000 militiamen, defended stubbornly. At the end of the day Steuben ordered a withdrawal. Arnold advanced into Petersburg where he destroyed four thousand hogsheads of tobacco. He destroyed at Osbornes, a small village on the James River 15 miles below Richmond, what passed for the Virginia navy. General Phillips burned barracks and stores at Chesterfield Court House. Both generals then moved toward Manchester, just across the James from Richmond.
Thomas Nelson, having recovered from his illness, gathered a handful of militiamen hoping somehow to defend the capitol city. “Fortunately the British did not get to Manchester until the morning of April 30, and on the previous afternoon General Lafayette had marched his nine hundred weary troops into Richmond, after a forced march that had taken them only ten days in miserable weather to cover the 150 miles from Annapolis. Thus, when the British arrived in Manchester, they were confronted across the river by Lafayette’s troops located in good position. Though superior in numbers, the British decided not to attack, and after burning some tobacco they dropped down the river, and by May 6, were below Jamestown” (Evans 99). To put Richmond beyond further attack, Lafayette moved Nelson and his militia to Williamsburg and his own forces between that city and the capitol.
In May, General William Cornwallis came driving up into Virginia from North Carolina. He had won a costly victory at Guilford Court House in March and had then moved to Wilmington, North Carolina, where he had made plans to march into Virginia to join Arnold and Phillips at Petersburg. He did so May 20, Lafayette, being outnumbered, forced to withdraw to Richmond. For a week and a half neither Lafayette nor the British made any further move.
On May 10, the state legislature had decided to convene two weeks later not in Richmond but in Charlottesville. In Richmond, Lafayette reorganized his army, now totaling 900 Continentals and the 1,200 to 1,500 militia divided into two brigades commanded by Nelson and Muhlenburg. After Cornwallis’s arrival May 20, British forces totaled about 7,200 men.
During this time Nelson had had to deal with numerous disloyal acts. “In early May, he was forced to take twelve disaffected persons into custody, including Williamsburg merchant John Greenhow, who had advised a ‘militia officer to lay aside his Sword because we were already conquered.’ Horses, which might strengthen an already superior British cavalry, had to be removed from Cornwallis’s path. Owners who did not cooperate were to have their animals seized. Nelson also had to oversee the impressment of horses for Lafayette’s cavalry. A condition approaching martial law prevailed” (Evans 100).
On May 24, Cornwallis marched out of Petersburg, crossed the James River, and headed toward Richmond to attack Lafayette. Wanting to keep his army intact and determined to prevent Cornwallis from getting between him and General Anthony Wayne, who was marching from Pennsylvania with reinforcements, Lafayette retreated northward toward Fredericksburg. On the last day of the month, Cornwallis ended his pursuit, deciding to direct his aggressive activities elsewhere.
Cornwallis wanted to destroy a main supply depot fifty miles above Richmond, capture the Virginia legislature in session in Charlottesville, and seize Governor Thomas Jefferson. Lieutenant Colonel John Simcoe and 500 troops destroyed the depot. Steuben and 400 militiamen ordered to defend it retreated. “Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton and 250 cavalry, assigned the second objective, fell upon Charlottesville early on the morning of June 4. Had it not been for the ride of Captain Jack Jouett from Cuckoo Tavern to warn the legislature and the governor, the plan would have been successful” (Evans 101). Here is how The Meriwether Society, Inc., on the internet, narrates this event.
***
On May 28th, the first day a quorum was present for the reconvened Assembly, Governor Jefferson wrote George Washington pleading he bring the Continental Army to Virginia to bolster the weary patriots, “That your appearance among them I say would restore full confidence of salvation…” Soon afterwards, General Washington wrote Jefferson almost apologetically, “The progress which the enemy are making in Virginia is very alarming…,” only daring to hint at his plans for the British, which would only be secured by a Naval Superiority not yet in place.
…
The Green Dragoons moved easily through the countryside between the North and South Anna Rivers on “a rainy dark day”. The heat of the weather obliged a rest around noon to refresh the men and horses. Then they pressed on into the night, and at a small crossroads in eastern Louisa County (the junction of today’s US 33 and US 522), tradition has it that their motions were then observed. About 10:00pm there at the Cuckoo Tavern, a young member of the Virginia militia, John Jouett (of Huguenot origins), watched the British cavalry sweep past along the main road. Whether they stopped is unknown; perhaps some officers entered the Tavern and Jouett overheard them talking, or maybe in watching from a window he just guessed what they were up to. A native of Charlottesville, Jouett’s father was the keeper of the Swan Tavern there, a stopping place and meeting room for many delegates to the Virginia Assembly. Figuring the British would take the main road, Jouett inconspicuously left the area, then mounted a horse said to be the finest in 7 counties, and (thoroughly familiar with the region) rode 40 miles over back roads in the middle of the night, which had nearly a full moon though it was probably overcast. He traveled through a maze of vines, brambles, and potholes, to Monticello where at 4:30am June 4 he awoke Jefferson and several prominent members of the legislature, effectively warning them. It is said he paused only briefly before continuing to Charlottesville. Jouett’s descendants say he wore the scars of brambles and branches from that ride the rest of his life.
Meanwhile, Tarleton’s troops arrived at the Louisa County Courthouse at 11:00pm. They remained on a “plentiful plantation” in Louisa until 2:00am June 4, 1781, then resumed their march. Before dawn, they burned a caravan of 12 supply wagons with stores of arms and clothing headed for South Carolina.
…
… Tarleton ordered Dr. Walker and his wife to prepare breakfast for the British Legion. It is said the Walkers knew or guessed of the plan to capture Jefferson, so while Mildred Walker “ordered the cooks to be slow in preparing breakfast, Dr. Walker was busy mixing mint juleps for… Tarleton and his troops.” … He [Tarleton] was still at that point counting on the surprise he might gain from the approximately 70 mile distance covered that night and the previous day.
…
Just ahead of the British on the morning of June 4, 1781, militia rider John Jouett reached Charlottesville, an 18-year-old town described by a visitor at the time as “a courthouse, one tavern, and about a dozen houses.” He warned the Virginia Assembly members staying there about the approaching raid. They hastily convened, and arranged to reconvene in Staunton, safely across the Blue Ridge Mountains in 3 days time. Their main business of electing a new Governor, because Jefferson’s term had expired June 1, would have to wait. A then little-known Colonel Daniel Boone and some others started loading up wagons with some of the public records.
Not far behind, British Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton and his troops were on the way, refreshed after a quick breakfast at Castle Hill. …
…
… About that time the former Governor had just left Monticello after seeing his family safely off via carriage toward Enniscorthy, the Coles plantation about 14 miles distant in southern Albemarle County. Jefferson had ordered his favorite riding horse to be shod and brought to the road (about where state highway 53 is today) in the valley between his mountaintop home and the nearby Carter’s Mountain … According to a popular folktale of the time, as the British approached, Jefferson walked a ways up Carter’s Mountain to a good viewing point, and gazed from a telescope. He looked down at the streets of Charlottesville and saw nothing out of order. Jefferson started to walk away, but it is said he noticed his light walking sword had slipped from its sheath, so he returned to retrieve it, and then took another look through his telescope, this time to see the streets swarming with Dragoons, identifiable by the color of their uniforms--green for the British Legion, and red for the Fusiliers. Jefferson then mounted his horse and briskly made his escape. [The Jeffersons’ eventual destination was their family’s Poplar Forest plantation further south.]
… with the help of Jouett’s early warning and the Walker family’s strategic delay, Jefferson, his family, and guests (including the Speakers of the State Senate and House, and some others) all had narrowly escaped, missing the British by just 10 minutes. …
Down in Charlottesville, the British were raiding the town, burning goods and seizing firearms. The numbers vary according to different sources. The British said they destroyed 1,000 muskets, 400 barrels of powder, 7 hogsheads of tobacco, and a quantity of Continental soldier’s clothing and “accoutrements”, while the American estimates were much lower. Also, invaluable county legal records were destroyed, that are still missing from 1748-1781, burned on the Courthouse green. About 20 prisoners, remnants from the neighborhood of The Barracks prisoner-of-war camp on the West side of town, were liberated.
… Elsewhere in Charlottesville, a British officer overtook Daniel Boone, dressed inconspicuously in frontier hunting shirts and leggings, with John Jouett walking away. The former was questioned and dismissed, then the latter. According to Boone family tradition, as their relative walked away, Jouett (probably exhausted and/or still full of adrenaline) absentmindedly called out Colonel Daniel Boone’s rank and name so that he could catch up with him. The British officer overheard and promptly arrested Boone.
…
After the drama and violence of the early June days and nights in 1781, life in Charlottesville gradually returned more to its routines. The most hunted General Assembly in Virginia’s history reconvened at the Old Trinity Church in Staunton with most of its members, somewhat riled by their recent harrowing experiences. Some placed blame on Jefferson for their lack of security.
… The Assembly later voted to exonerate Jefferson of any blame. A year later, Jouett traveled Daniel Boone’s Wilderness Road to Kentucky, serving well as a progressive delegate in State Assemblies. …
… unsuccessful in the main goal of his mission, Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton and his Green Dragoons sometime between June 6-9 made it back to join General Cornwallis at Point of Fork, where the Rivanna River meets the James River (near present day Columbia). He reported “the attempt to secure Mr. Jefferson was ineffectual.” Their main prisoners from the raid were then paroled, including Daniel Boone.
***
Jefferson’s term of office had expired on June 2. “The gentle Virginian was not a military man, his second term had been a frustrating one, and he was determined to step aside for someone better fitted for the position. A little over a week later, the Assembly meeting in Staunton chose General Thomas Nelson as Jefferson’s successor” (Evans 101).
Washington’s decision to remain north proved to be fortunate. General Henry Clinton, commander-in-chief of all British forces in the Colonies, situated in New York City, feeling uneasy about Washington’s near presence, ordered Cornwallis to take a defensive position at Williamsburg and York and send to him every man he could spare. Then, seeming to regain his composure, Clinton ordered Cornwallis to send no reinforcements. But Clinton did not countermand his order instructing Cornwallis to take a defensive position. Consequently, on August 2 Cornwallis positioned at York his 4,500 men.
Works cited:
Long, Stephen Meriwether. “British Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton and the American Revolution: Drama on the Plantations of Charlottesville.” The Meriwether Society, Inc. http://homepages.rootsweb.ancestry.co.... Net.
Evans, Emory G. Thomas Nelson of Yorktown: Revolutionary Virginian. Charlottesville, Virginia, The University Press of Virginia, 1975. Print.
Thomas Nelson -- Trapping Cornwallis
In order to appreciate the great contribution that French soldiers and war ships made in forcing British General Charles Cornwallis’s surrender at Yorktown, we must go back several years.
“Ever since the rebel victory at Saratoga, in 1777, had convinced France to sign a treaty of alliance with the United States, George Washington had been waiting and praying for French intervention to come soon, but as the weeks and months passed with no sign that help was on the way, his hopes waned. … Fortunately for the patriots, the young French aristocrat Marquis de Lafayette, a volunteer who had been serving in Washington’s army, returned to Versailles in 1779 and came back to America a year later with the welcome news that seven French ships of the line, ten to twelve thousand veteran troops led by Comte de Rochambeau, and a war chest of 6 million livres were on the way and should arrive in Rhode Island in June [1780]” (Ketchum 9, 10).
Washington’s army had spent a desperate winter camped at Morristown, New Jersey, “twenty-five miles west of New York City, on high ground protected by the Watchung Mountains, overlooking the roads between New York and Philadelphia.” When Lafayette rejoined Washington at Morristown, he was appalled at what he witnessed: “‘An Army that is reduced to nothing, that wants provisions, that has not one of the necessary means to make war.’ However prepared for such squalor he may have been by his knowledge of past distress, ‘I confess I had no idea of such an extremity,’ he wrote” Ketchum 10). Demonstratively, Washington could accomplish nothing without French troops and a large fleet.
Ships carrying Rochambeau’s soldiers were sighted off Newport, Rhode Island, July 11, 1780, the fleet having sailed from Brest May 2. Washington’s immediate hope was that with considerable French assistance he could attack and defeat British commander-in-chief Henry Clinton’s army, situated in New York City. The timely arrival of British Admiral Thomas Graves with six ships of the line to augment British Admiral Arbuthnot’s fleet, giving “the British a thirteen-to-eight superiority over the French fleet” (Ketchum 27), thwarted Washington’s plan.
Subsequently, Washington learned that the French ships unloaded at Newport had “carried no arms, no gun-powder, no uniforms for his destitute, half-naked veterans. … Washington’s troops did not have enough horses and wagons to join the French in an operation anytime soon. … So lackadaisical were the states about providing food for the army that the commander-in-chief was obliged to authorize a program he detested. Here it was the harvest season, a time of abundance, yet appeals to the states had produced no results worth noting, forcing the General to resort once more to scavenging his own country” every few days moving “his camp, letting the men forage for anything within reach, and when the area was striped clean, move on to another and repeat the process” (Ketchum 28, 29).
Rochambeau wrote to his government that the real strength of Washington’s army was three thousand men and the country’s currency was worthless. He urged that he be sent troops, ships, and money. “Washington’s plan for an attack on New York was foolhardy, he observed – preposterous, in fact, and very likely the last gasp of a desperate commander” (Ketchum 31).
Months of inactivity ensued. A second French fleet at Brest was kept from departing by a British blockade. On September 24, 1780, Benedict Arnold fled his command at West Point after his communications with the British about turning West Point over to them had been intercepted. Rewarded by General Clinton with a brigadier general’s commission, Arnold was placed in command of 1,600 troops sent to Virginia in December.
Desperate appeals were made to the French government for immediate, essential assistance. Lafayette wrote: “With a naval inferiority it is impossible to make war in America. It is that which prevents us from attacking any point that might be carried with two or three thousand men. It is that which reduces us to defensive operations, as dangerous as they are humiliating.” Washington wrote: “If France delays a timely and powerful aid in the critical posture of our affairs it will avail us nothing should she attempt it hereafter. We are at this hour suspended in the Balance; not from choice but from hard and absolute necessity.” Rochambeau sent his son to France to plead for assistance. It was Benjamin Franklin, ambassador to France, however, who succeeded most in persuading the King to renew French assistance. “Shrewdly, the old man reminded Vergennes that if the English were to recover their former colonies, an opportunity like the present one might not recur, while possession of the vast territory and resources of America would afford the English a broad basis for future greatness, ever expanding commerce, and a supple of seamen and soldiers that would make them ‘the terror of Europe’” (Ketchum 137).
On May 8, 1781, a French frigate docked at Boston carrying the news that Admiral Francois Joseph Paul de Grasse had left Brest March 22 with 26 ships of the line, 8 frigates, and 150 transports, their immediate destination believed to be the West Indies. Aboard the ships were 6 million livres designated to satisfy the needs of Washington’s army. Washington and Rochambeau set about immediately determining how best to utilize this transfusion of military and naval assets. Rochambeau wanted to focus on the Chesapeake Bay. Washington looked upon that operation only as an alternative to attacking New York City. Rochambeau forthwith sent a dispatch to de Grasse urging that the admiral sail not to New York City but to the Chesapeake Bay where he should expect to be joined by Rochambeau’s and Washington’s combined forces. Believing that a combined French and American attack on New York was imminent, Clinton ordered General Cornwallis, now in Virginia, to send him all the troops he could spare and to establish a defensive position. Washington, eventually taking Rochambeau’s viewpoint, sent a trusted officer to the West Indies to find de Grasse and impress upon him the necessity that he sail immediately to the Chesapeake.
Washington and Rochambeau were taking a great risk. Acting on the assumption that de Grasse would reach the Chesapeake without being intercepted by a large British fleet and that he would be able to place his ships in a position that would prevent Cornwallis’s army’s escape by sea, the two generals would march their armies from Newport and the Hudson Valley all the way into Maryland, transport them by boats to Richmond, march them to the York peninsula, and have them encircle Cornwallis’s forces. “On June 10 the first brigade of French troops stepped off on what proved to be a 756-mile march to the South” (Ketchum 143). On August 14, Washington and Rochambeau learned from de Grasse that he was sailing for the Chesapeake. Once there, “he planned to stay until October 15—no longer—when he would have to return to the West Indies with his troops. It was clear at once to Rochambeau and Washington that they had a window of opportunity of four or five weeks at most in which to make use of the French fleet—if the British navy did not interfere” (Ketchum 150). The next day Washington wrote an order for Lafayette, in Virginia, “to position his force in such a way as to prevent Cornwallis from returning to North Carolina” (Ketchum 151). Rochambeau’s forces joined Washington’s troops at White Plains, New York, August 22, and the combined armies commenced their lengthy journey.
More than two months earlier, June 12, the Virginia legislature had elected as its new governor Thomas Nelson. There had been a good deal of informal talk among the legislators at Staunton about establishing a dictator. Possible candidates had been Patrick Henry, George Washington, Nathaniel Greene, and George Nichols, a young Hanover County representative with considerable military experience. The talk came to nothing, but the feeling remained that the new governor should be given broader powers to exercise.
The legislature vested Nelson with powers that his predecessor Thomas Jefferson had labored without. “His feelings on receiving the news are not known, but later he remarked that to ‘have declin’d the appointment might have indicated timidity. I, therefore accepted it with a determination to exert every power that I possess’d to give energy to Government and security to the inhabitants of the State” (Evans 103).
Nelson was given the power, with the consent of the Council, to impress provisions of any kind necessary for supplying the militia and Continental armies. It gave Nelson the freedom to act immediately at critical moments. He was empowered to “call out the state militia in such numbers as he saw fit and to send them where their services were required; … to seize loyalists and banish them without jury trial; to redistribute the property of persons who opposed laws for calling up militia … Additional legislation provided the death penalty for desertion and empowered the governor and Council to lay an embargo on exports from the state, to declare martial law within a twenty-mile radius of the enemy or American camps, and to strengthen militia regulations so that six months might be added to the service of those who failed to appear when originally summoned” (Evans 103, 104).
Nelson could not legally exercise this new power without the consent of the Council, consisting of 8 men elected periodically by the legislature. During the time Nelson was governor, only four members (the bare minimum required for carrying on business) were able to meet. They had difficulty meeting regularly. Frequently, Nelson chose to carry out his legislated powers without the Council’s consent.
“… state officials had little choice but to resort to impressment in order to get the necessary food and equipment. This frequently involved the threat of force, for Virginia farmers were loath to exchange their produce for vouchers which stated the appraised price and were redeemable at a future date. The situation was worsened by a long dry spell culminating in a poor harvest. Even when provisions were acquired a scarcity of wagons made if difficult to get them to the army. Owners often hid their wagons and refused to transport supplies unless they got protection from impressment and assurance that they would be paid for their services” (Evans 107).
“Assuring that all men eligible for militia duty reported for service when called was much more difficult in areas distant from Richmond, particularly in the western part of the state. In counties to the west of the mountains, where the Indians were a greater threat than the British and where there were large pockets of Loyalists, the evasion of militia duty in some instances reached the point of virtual insurrection” (Evans 109).
Virginia had reached its lowest point in the Revolution. Washington regretted that he had not been able to come to his state’s aid. Nelson’s election had pleased him. From Dobbs Ferry, New York, on July 25, Washington had written a letter to his step-son, John Parke Custis, praising him for “your choice of a Governor. He is an honest man, active, spirited, and decided, and will … suit the times as well as any person in the State” (Fitzpatrick XXII, 178).” Washington’s words would be proven prophetic.
Nelson had placed himself and his militia under General Lafayette’s command. As governor, he planned to take the field, but would yield to Lafayette’s decisions. It is interesting to compare the thoughts of these two men concerning their military situation during the summer months. In a letter to Brigadier-General Morgan, Nelson expressed his reluctance to call out the county militia at “the approach of harvest; but I have my hopes that some capital Blow may be struck time enough to enable the Commander of the Troops to dispense with their services at that time” (Nelson Letters 61). In a letter to Nelson, Lafayette expressed the opinion that the more reinforcements Virginia sent to General Nathaniel Greene in North Carolina, the better the situation would be for Virginia. “Whether he [Cornwallis] continues in his present situation, commences fresh ravages in the State, we shall find that to succor General Greene we shall want them [the militia] here [with Greene]. Indeed, it is one way of compelling the enemy to leave us, or at least force him to detach …” (Lafayette V, 380).
The answer to the question of what Lafayette and Nelson should do with Virginia troops – gather them to strike Cornwallis or send them to Greene into the Carolinas –- was answered by General Henry Clinton’s order to Cornwallis to establish a defensive position. On August 5 Nelson reported to the Virginia House of Delegates in Richmond Cornwallis’s movement from Portsmouth to the York River, where he could command both the York and Gloucester shores. Lafayette thereupon placed his forces not far below Richmond where he could march either northward or southward, “as their movements should make necessary …” (Nelson Letters 64).
Cornwallis was now camped on the neck of land upon which Washington had warned Nelson five years ago never to place a large detachment of soldiers. The roles of attacker and defender were now reversed. If the British had not the sense to see the danger in their position, Washington would not provide them much time to discover it. He gave Clinton every indication that the movement of his and Rochambeau’s armies was a prelude to an attack on Staten Island. Clinton was cognizant of the existence of de Grasse’s fleet, rumored to be somewhere in the West Indies. Would it arrive off New York to participate in a massive attack? On August 21, the Comte de Barras, commander of the French fleet at Newport, Rhode Island, set sail for Virginia to augment de Grasse’s fleet, “making it superior to anything the British could muster, but even so, questions remained. The allied generals now knew when and where they would march, but the fiction of an attack on New York had to be maintained lest Clinton assail them while they were on the move, and at a certain moment the British general would know with certainty that they were bound for the South” (Ketchum 158).
On August 27, Washington informed Nelson that he was coming south with American and French troops and to expect the arrival of a French fleet of war ships. He was concerned about being furnished with sufficient supplies to sustain him through his campaign. He would need most salted provisions, beef, forage, and the means of transportation. “Let me entreat your Excellency that every exertion may be made to feed and supply our army …” (Fitzpatrick XXIII 55-56). Nelson would need to concentrate his activities on procuring the essential food and supplies. With his own troops present, Washington would have little need of the militia.
On August 30, de Grasse’s fleet, consisting of 28 ships of the line and six frigates with 3,000 land forces, dropped anchor in the mouth of the York River. Nelson wrote confidently to Governor Lee of Maryland: “In all human Probability, Lord Cornwallis has nearly finished his career, and will shortly receive his reward.” Nelson then got down to the real purpose of his letter. He asked for flour, something “with which your State, I imagine, can easily and plentifully furnish me” (Nelson Letters 10, 11).
Nelson had begun a very tedious, frustrating, essential task. Virginia troops had always been short of supplies. Now Nelson had to raise supplies and food for Washington’s army. He sent out various requests to agents in the Virginia counties for specific commodities. From Smithfield he requested “large supplies of Vegetables and Vinegar;” from Caroline and the adjacent country “all the flour you can procure;” from Isle of Wight and the neighborhood flour, meal, spirits, and vinegar; and from Richmond entrenching tools. However, by September 12, there was not “a grain of meal in Camp” (Nelson Letters 12, 22-25). Nelson wrote that he did not know how Virginia could remedy such shortages in time.
On September 2, while Washington’s troops were marching through Philadelphia, Clinton “sent a message to Lord Cornwallis: ‘By intelligence which I have this day received, it would seem that Mr. Washington is moving with an army to the southward, with an appearance of haste, and gives out that he expects the cooperation of a considerable French armament. Your Lordship, however, may be assured that if this should be the case, I shall endeavour to reinforce your command by all means within the compass of my power …’” (Ketchum 163-164).
On September 5 Nelson placed an embargo on the shipping of all beer, pork, bacon, wheat, Indian corn, peas, and other grains and flours. Eight days later he would order the roads in the counties of Fairfax, Prince William, Stafford, Spotsylvania, Caroline, Hanover and New Kent to be put in order for the advance of Washington’s army. On the same day he asked Governor Burke of North Carolina for salt and beef, and Gloucester County for added salt. To one state official, Nelson wrote: “‘I think the trust my country has repos’d in me demands that I should stretch my powers to their utmost extent, regardless of the censures of the inconsiderate or any other evil that may result to myself from such a step [and] attain by the strongest methods of compulsion those necessaries which cannot otherwise be procur’d and from the want of which alone we can have any reason to fear that our enterprise will fail’” (Evans 115).
On September 5 a large British fleet appeared off the Virginia capes.
Here is a useful map.
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-PVmth_jOntY...
Works cited:
Evens, Emory G. Thomas Nelson of Yorktown: Revolutionary Virginian. (Charlottesville, Virginia: The University Press of Virginia, 1975). Print.
Fitzpatrick, John C., ed. The Writings of George Washington. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933). XXII. Print.
Ketchum, Richard M. Victory at Yorktown: The Campaign That Won the Revolution. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004). Print.
Lafayette to Nelson, July 29, 1781. The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography (April 1898), V. Print.
Publications of the Virginia Historical Society, New Series, No. 1. “Letters of Thomas Nelson, Jr.” (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1874). Print.
“Ever since the rebel victory at Saratoga, in 1777, had convinced France to sign a treaty of alliance with the United States, George Washington had been waiting and praying for French intervention to come soon, but as the weeks and months passed with no sign that help was on the way, his hopes waned. … Fortunately for the patriots, the young French aristocrat Marquis de Lafayette, a volunteer who had been serving in Washington’s army, returned to Versailles in 1779 and came back to America a year later with the welcome news that seven French ships of the line, ten to twelve thousand veteran troops led by Comte de Rochambeau, and a war chest of 6 million livres were on the way and should arrive in Rhode Island in June [1780]” (Ketchum 9, 10).
Washington’s army had spent a desperate winter camped at Morristown, New Jersey, “twenty-five miles west of New York City, on high ground protected by the Watchung Mountains, overlooking the roads between New York and Philadelphia.” When Lafayette rejoined Washington at Morristown, he was appalled at what he witnessed: “‘An Army that is reduced to nothing, that wants provisions, that has not one of the necessary means to make war.’ However prepared for such squalor he may have been by his knowledge of past distress, ‘I confess I had no idea of such an extremity,’ he wrote” Ketchum 10). Demonstratively, Washington could accomplish nothing without French troops and a large fleet.
Ships carrying Rochambeau’s soldiers were sighted off Newport, Rhode Island, July 11, 1780, the fleet having sailed from Brest May 2. Washington’s immediate hope was that with considerable French assistance he could attack and defeat British commander-in-chief Henry Clinton’s army, situated in New York City. The timely arrival of British Admiral Thomas Graves with six ships of the line to augment British Admiral Arbuthnot’s fleet, giving “the British a thirteen-to-eight superiority over the French fleet” (Ketchum 27), thwarted Washington’s plan.
Subsequently, Washington learned that the French ships unloaded at Newport had “carried no arms, no gun-powder, no uniforms for his destitute, half-naked veterans. … Washington’s troops did not have enough horses and wagons to join the French in an operation anytime soon. … So lackadaisical were the states about providing food for the army that the commander-in-chief was obliged to authorize a program he detested. Here it was the harvest season, a time of abundance, yet appeals to the states had produced no results worth noting, forcing the General to resort once more to scavenging his own country” every few days moving “his camp, letting the men forage for anything within reach, and when the area was striped clean, move on to another and repeat the process” (Ketchum 28, 29).
Rochambeau wrote to his government that the real strength of Washington’s army was three thousand men and the country’s currency was worthless. He urged that he be sent troops, ships, and money. “Washington’s plan for an attack on New York was foolhardy, he observed – preposterous, in fact, and very likely the last gasp of a desperate commander” (Ketchum 31).
Months of inactivity ensued. A second French fleet at Brest was kept from departing by a British blockade. On September 24, 1780, Benedict Arnold fled his command at West Point after his communications with the British about turning West Point over to them had been intercepted. Rewarded by General Clinton with a brigadier general’s commission, Arnold was placed in command of 1,600 troops sent to Virginia in December.
Desperate appeals were made to the French government for immediate, essential assistance. Lafayette wrote: “With a naval inferiority it is impossible to make war in America. It is that which prevents us from attacking any point that might be carried with two or three thousand men. It is that which reduces us to defensive operations, as dangerous as they are humiliating.” Washington wrote: “If France delays a timely and powerful aid in the critical posture of our affairs it will avail us nothing should she attempt it hereafter. We are at this hour suspended in the Balance; not from choice but from hard and absolute necessity.” Rochambeau sent his son to France to plead for assistance. It was Benjamin Franklin, ambassador to France, however, who succeeded most in persuading the King to renew French assistance. “Shrewdly, the old man reminded Vergennes that if the English were to recover their former colonies, an opportunity like the present one might not recur, while possession of the vast territory and resources of America would afford the English a broad basis for future greatness, ever expanding commerce, and a supple of seamen and soldiers that would make them ‘the terror of Europe’” (Ketchum 137).
On May 8, 1781, a French frigate docked at Boston carrying the news that Admiral Francois Joseph Paul de Grasse had left Brest March 22 with 26 ships of the line, 8 frigates, and 150 transports, their immediate destination believed to be the West Indies. Aboard the ships were 6 million livres designated to satisfy the needs of Washington’s army. Washington and Rochambeau set about immediately determining how best to utilize this transfusion of military and naval assets. Rochambeau wanted to focus on the Chesapeake Bay. Washington looked upon that operation only as an alternative to attacking New York City. Rochambeau forthwith sent a dispatch to de Grasse urging that the admiral sail not to New York City but to the Chesapeake Bay where he should expect to be joined by Rochambeau’s and Washington’s combined forces. Believing that a combined French and American attack on New York was imminent, Clinton ordered General Cornwallis, now in Virginia, to send him all the troops he could spare and to establish a defensive position. Washington, eventually taking Rochambeau’s viewpoint, sent a trusted officer to the West Indies to find de Grasse and impress upon him the necessity that he sail immediately to the Chesapeake.
Washington and Rochambeau were taking a great risk. Acting on the assumption that de Grasse would reach the Chesapeake without being intercepted by a large British fleet and that he would be able to place his ships in a position that would prevent Cornwallis’s army’s escape by sea, the two generals would march their armies from Newport and the Hudson Valley all the way into Maryland, transport them by boats to Richmond, march them to the York peninsula, and have them encircle Cornwallis’s forces. “On June 10 the first brigade of French troops stepped off on what proved to be a 756-mile march to the South” (Ketchum 143). On August 14, Washington and Rochambeau learned from de Grasse that he was sailing for the Chesapeake. Once there, “he planned to stay until October 15—no longer—when he would have to return to the West Indies with his troops. It was clear at once to Rochambeau and Washington that they had a window of opportunity of four or five weeks at most in which to make use of the French fleet—if the British navy did not interfere” (Ketchum 150). The next day Washington wrote an order for Lafayette, in Virginia, “to position his force in such a way as to prevent Cornwallis from returning to North Carolina” (Ketchum 151). Rochambeau’s forces joined Washington’s troops at White Plains, New York, August 22, and the combined armies commenced their lengthy journey.
More than two months earlier, June 12, the Virginia legislature had elected as its new governor Thomas Nelson. There had been a good deal of informal talk among the legislators at Staunton about establishing a dictator. Possible candidates had been Patrick Henry, George Washington, Nathaniel Greene, and George Nichols, a young Hanover County representative with considerable military experience. The talk came to nothing, but the feeling remained that the new governor should be given broader powers to exercise.
The legislature vested Nelson with powers that his predecessor Thomas Jefferson had labored without. “His feelings on receiving the news are not known, but later he remarked that to ‘have declin’d the appointment might have indicated timidity. I, therefore accepted it with a determination to exert every power that I possess’d to give energy to Government and security to the inhabitants of the State” (Evans 103).
Nelson was given the power, with the consent of the Council, to impress provisions of any kind necessary for supplying the militia and Continental armies. It gave Nelson the freedom to act immediately at critical moments. He was empowered to “call out the state militia in such numbers as he saw fit and to send them where their services were required; … to seize loyalists and banish them without jury trial; to redistribute the property of persons who opposed laws for calling up militia … Additional legislation provided the death penalty for desertion and empowered the governor and Council to lay an embargo on exports from the state, to declare martial law within a twenty-mile radius of the enemy or American camps, and to strengthen militia regulations so that six months might be added to the service of those who failed to appear when originally summoned” (Evans 103, 104).
Nelson could not legally exercise this new power without the consent of the Council, consisting of 8 men elected periodically by the legislature. During the time Nelson was governor, only four members (the bare minimum required for carrying on business) were able to meet. They had difficulty meeting regularly. Frequently, Nelson chose to carry out his legislated powers without the Council’s consent.
“… state officials had little choice but to resort to impressment in order to get the necessary food and equipment. This frequently involved the threat of force, for Virginia farmers were loath to exchange their produce for vouchers which stated the appraised price and were redeemable at a future date. The situation was worsened by a long dry spell culminating in a poor harvest. Even when provisions were acquired a scarcity of wagons made if difficult to get them to the army. Owners often hid their wagons and refused to transport supplies unless they got protection from impressment and assurance that they would be paid for their services” (Evans 107).
“Assuring that all men eligible for militia duty reported for service when called was much more difficult in areas distant from Richmond, particularly in the western part of the state. In counties to the west of the mountains, where the Indians were a greater threat than the British and where there were large pockets of Loyalists, the evasion of militia duty in some instances reached the point of virtual insurrection” (Evans 109).
Virginia had reached its lowest point in the Revolution. Washington regretted that he had not been able to come to his state’s aid. Nelson’s election had pleased him. From Dobbs Ferry, New York, on July 25, Washington had written a letter to his step-son, John Parke Custis, praising him for “your choice of a Governor. He is an honest man, active, spirited, and decided, and will … suit the times as well as any person in the State” (Fitzpatrick XXII, 178).” Washington’s words would be proven prophetic.
Nelson had placed himself and his militia under General Lafayette’s command. As governor, he planned to take the field, but would yield to Lafayette’s decisions. It is interesting to compare the thoughts of these two men concerning their military situation during the summer months. In a letter to Brigadier-General Morgan, Nelson expressed his reluctance to call out the county militia at “the approach of harvest; but I have my hopes that some capital Blow may be struck time enough to enable the Commander of the Troops to dispense with their services at that time” (Nelson Letters 61). In a letter to Nelson, Lafayette expressed the opinion that the more reinforcements Virginia sent to General Nathaniel Greene in North Carolina, the better the situation would be for Virginia. “Whether he [Cornwallis] continues in his present situation, commences fresh ravages in the State, we shall find that to succor General Greene we shall want them [the militia] here [with Greene]. Indeed, it is one way of compelling the enemy to leave us, or at least force him to detach …” (Lafayette V, 380).
The answer to the question of what Lafayette and Nelson should do with Virginia troops – gather them to strike Cornwallis or send them to Greene into the Carolinas –- was answered by General Henry Clinton’s order to Cornwallis to establish a defensive position. On August 5 Nelson reported to the Virginia House of Delegates in Richmond Cornwallis’s movement from Portsmouth to the York River, where he could command both the York and Gloucester shores. Lafayette thereupon placed his forces not far below Richmond where he could march either northward or southward, “as their movements should make necessary …” (Nelson Letters 64).
Cornwallis was now camped on the neck of land upon which Washington had warned Nelson five years ago never to place a large detachment of soldiers. The roles of attacker and defender were now reversed. If the British had not the sense to see the danger in their position, Washington would not provide them much time to discover it. He gave Clinton every indication that the movement of his and Rochambeau’s armies was a prelude to an attack on Staten Island. Clinton was cognizant of the existence of de Grasse’s fleet, rumored to be somewhere in the West Indies. Would it arrive off New York to participate in a massive attack? On August 21, the Comte de Barras, commander of the French fleet at Newport, Rhode Island, set sail for Virginia to augment de Grasse’s fleet, “making it superior to anything the British could muster, but even so, questions remained. The allied generals now knew when and where they would march, but the fiction of an attack on New York had to be maintained lest Clinton assail them while they were on the move, and at a certain moment the British general would know with certainty that they were bound for the South” (Ketchum 158).
On August 27, Washington informed Nelson that he was coming south with American and French troops and to expect the arrival of a French fleet of war ships. He was concerned about being furnished with sufficient supplies to sustain him through his campaign. He would need most salted provisions, beef, forage, and the means of transportation. “Let me entreat your Excellency that every exertion may be made to feed and supply our army …” (Fitzpatrick XXIII 55-56). Nelson would need to concentrate his activities on procuring the essential food and supplies. With his own troops present, Washington would have little need of the militia.
On August 30, de Grasse’s fleet, consisting of 28 ships of the line and six frigates with 3,000 land forces, dropped anchor in the mouth of the York River. Nelson wrote confidently to Governor Lee of Maryland: “In all human Probability, Lord Cornwallis has nearly finished his career, and will shortly receive his reward.” Nelson then got down to the real purpose of his letter. He asked for flour, something “with which your State, I imagine, can easily and plentifully furnish me” (Nelson Letters 10, 11).
Nelson had begun a very tedious, frustrating, essential task. Virginia troops had always been short of supplies. Now Nelson had to raise supplies and food for Washington’s army. He sent out various requests to agents in the Virginia counties for specific commodities. From Smithfield he requested “large supplies of Vegetables and Vinegar;” from Caroline and the adjacent country “all the flour you can procure;” from Isle of Wight and the neighborhood flour, meal, spirits, and vinegar; and from Richmond entrenching tools. However, by September 12, there was not “a grain of meal in Camp” (Nelson Letters 12, 22-25). Nelson wrote that he did not know how Virginia could remedy such shortages in time.
On September 2, while Washington’s troops were marching through Philadelphia, Clinton “sent a message to Lord Cornwallis: ‘By intelligence which I have this day received, it would seem that Mr. Washington is moving with an army to the southward, with an appearance of haste, and gives out that he expects the cooperation of a considerable French armament. Your Lordship, however, may be assured that if this should be the case, I shall endeavour to reinforce your command by all means within the compass of my power …’” (Ketchum 163-164).
On September 5 Nelson placed an embargo on the shipping of all beer, pork, bacon, wheat, Indian corn, peas, and other grains and flours. Eight days later he would order the roads in the counties of Fairfax, Prince William, Stafford, Spotsylvania, Caroline, Hanover and New Kent to be put in order for the advance of Washington’s army. On the same day he asked Governor Burke of North Carolina for salt and beef, and Gloucester County for added salt. To one state official, Nelson wrote: “‘I think the trust my country has repos’d in me demands that I should stretch my powers to their utmost extent, regardless of the censures of the inconsiderate or any other evil that may result to myself from such a step [and] attain by the strongest methods of compulsion those necessaries which cannot otherwise be procur’d and from the want of which alone we can have any reason to fear that our enterprise will fail’” (Evans 115).
On September 5 a large British fleet appeared off the Virginia capes.
Here is a useful map.
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-PVmth_jOntY...
Works cited:
Evens, Emory G. Thomas Nelson of Yorktown: Revolutionary Virginian. (Charlottesville, Virginia: The University Press of Virginia, 1975). Print.
Fitzpatrick, John C., ed. The Writings of George Washington. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933). XXII. Print.
Ketchum, Richard M. Victory at Yorktown: The Campaign That Won the Revolution. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004). Print.
Lafayette to Nelson, July 29, 1781. The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography (April 1898), V. Print.
Publications of the Virginia Historical Society, New Series, No. 1. “Letters of Thomas Nelson, Jr.” (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1874). Print.
