Natylie Baldwin's Blog, page 105

Stephen Bryen: Biden’s emerging new Ukraine policy

By Stephen Bryen, Asia Times, 2/5/24

The Biden administration wants the Ukraine war to continue at least until after US presidential elections in November but there is a lurking danger that won’t be possible, especially if Russia mounts a really big offensive. For that reason, there is a new emerging plan, one that is not in writing but seen in politics.

An example: When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky decided to fire armed forces commander Valerii Zaluzhny, US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland, who is directly responsible for US and NATO Ukraine policy, rushed to Kiev.

There are no photo ops with Nuland and Zelensky. She briefed the press standing outside in front of a hastily assembled table with some microphones on it.

Why did Nuland run to Kiev? Almost certainly the White House told her to get herself over there immediately in case things went south in Kiev. There was apparently real worry that Zaluzhny might turn the army around and use it to go after Zelensky.

So far, Zaluzhny has not made a move. He still can, of course, so one supposes that Nuland was in Kiev to talk more to Zaluzhny than to Zelensky. There is no public record of any meeting but it would seem that her job was to calm Zaluzhny down and offer him incentives to behave.

Washington is saying nothing officially about the changing of the military guard in Kiev. The White House says it is an “internal Ukrainian” issue, not one Washington would have anything to say about.

Certainly, this is pure nonsense. Washington has been manipulating Ukraine’s internal politics since before 2014, and Nuland was the sparkplug to get what Washington wanted.

Nor was there any surprise about cashiering Zaluzhny. Someone has to take the blame for the failure of Kiev’s so-called counteroffensive and the waste of billions of dollars in US equipment and supplies.

It also isn’t a surprise that things are getting worse now, as Ukraine will soon face the loss of Avdiivka and the Russian army, newly refurbished, will push toward the Dnieper River, aiming at Kiev.

As has been noted now ad nauseum, Kiev’s manpower situation is dire and its lack of weapons means it is limited in what it can hope to do. But the real kicker is that Kiev’s mounting casualties, more than 1,000 per week, are hitting hard on the public perception that the war has gone wrong.

To pull men and women into the army Kiev resorts to rough, unpopular measures, including threats and intimidation. Going to the front untrained is seen more and more as a certain death sentence (which it is).

Zelensky won’t negotiate with Russia because Washington is opposed to any negotiation, seeing it as a potential defeat for NATO. The result would be unnerving NATO and truncating Washington’s leadership of the alliance.

Politically, Zelensky is more and more aligned with Kraken and other military formations who are extremely anti-Russian (and anti a lot of other things). The Russians regard them as fascists and Nazis.

But how can Kiev hold on if Russia actually mounts a major new military action in Ukraine?

An offensive is likely mostly because Putin needs one to cement his next term as president. Elections are scheduled for March 17, and Putin’s reelection is likely because he has suppressed any real opposition. But even so, Putin needs a boost from the Russian public and a celebratory election would count for a lot.

This puts Kiev in a terrible bind. Once there is a real Russian breakthrough across the current line of contact, sending Ukrainian forces reeling backward, it will be nearly impossible for the Zelensky government to survive in Kiev.

Under such circumstances, there are already indications of planning to move the Ukrainian government westward, probably to Lviv (Lvov), which is near the Polish border. The Poles are already saying they might use their nearby air defenses to protect Lviv.

Why would they say this? The reason is that they are preparing a plan to hold off the Russians by use of Polish Patriot and other air defenses, and even to send Polish brigades reinforced by other NATO assets. The British are already preparing public opinion and openly talking about sending their Special Forces to Ukraine’s rescue.

Anyone who looks at a map must realize that the only way NATO can “invade” or “support” a Zelensky government is if it is done close to the border with Poland.

That’s far enough away from Russian missiles that it will be difficult for Russia to deal with that area, unless of course there is either a de facto or de jure breakup of Ukraine in which the western part stays somewhat independent while the rest is subject to whatever arrangements the Russians decide to impose.

Nothing will happen if the Russians stay with the plodding, slow grind-up of Ukraine’s army. But, as noted above, the Ukraine war is reaching an inflection point for both military and political reasons.

Shifting the Ukraine government to Lviv and gaining support from Poland and the UK (no others are likely to contribute anything) would buy time for Biden, although the end result either will be a war in part of Europe (Poland, the Baltic states) or a stalemate that Russia and NATO accept.

Biden gets off the hook for the time being if this scenario plays out but even in the medium term it is a strategic disaster. Biden, of course, is mindful he does not need and cannot survive another Afghanistan-like disaster.

British enthusiasm for war owes to pressure from Washington. It is well to remember that the British military is an unholy, underfunded and undermanned mess. The British forces lack materials, lift and cover to do much of anything, and it is foolish to think the Russians won’t retaliate.

That leaves the impression that British enthusiasm for war is simply fake news, intended to scare the Russians somehow. Most of Washington’s Ukraine policy has been based on the exaggeration of the value of American weapons and coordination capabilities, and on wishful thinking that Russia would back out of the conflict.

Any look at Russian history, dating back to Napoleon, should have suggested that Russia wasn’t going to back down. Moreover, taking into account British bombast, one is reminded of the outcome of the charge of the Light Brigade. Will we see another Balaclava in Ukraine?

Nuland has created a disaster with the full backing of the Biden-Obama team. As, so far, there is no counterweight in the United States or among the NATO states, the disaster will roll on. Washington will continue to risk a war in Europe, even a nuclear war, to try and salvage the disaster of its own making.

Washington and Nuland are effectively trying to rearrange the deck chairs on the Titanic.

Larry Johnson: WESTERN ACADEMICS DO NOT UNDERSTAND RUSSIA AND ITS MILITARY — THE FABIAN HOFFMANN EXAMPLE

By Larry Johnson, Substack, 1/15/24

Larry Johnson is Managing Partner of BERG Associates, former CIA Officer and State Department Counter Terrorism official.

A friend flagged this X-Twitter thread by Fabian Hoffman to me the other day because it attracted a lot of neo-con attention and cheerleading. Prior to this I had never heard of Hoffmann. I can’t tell if Hoffmann is Dutch, English or Norwegian. Here’s his bio, you tell me:

“Fabian Hoffmann is a PhD Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project. His PhD research focuses on the proliferation, deployment, and use of non-nuclear strategic weapons, in particular conventional precision-strike capabilities, and their implications on nuclear strategy and broader nuclear weapons policy (e.g., nuclear proliferation & disarmament). . . . Prior to joining the University of Oslo, Fabian Hoffmann worked as a research assistant at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). He holds an MA in War Studies from King’s College London, UK, and a BA in International Relations from the University of Groningen, The Netherlands.”

I am taking the time to focus on Hoffmann’s “analysis” of Russia as a military threat because it illustrates the ignorance predominant among Western scholars. This man’s critical thinking skills are quite weak and his lack of any military experience adds to his failure to grasp the real issues. I am reprinting the entire thread for your ease of reading. Here goes:

Fabian Hoffmann

@FRHoffmann1

“In this thread, I will explain why we are much closer to war with Russia than most people realize and why our time window for rearmament is shorter than many believe. In my opinion, we have at best 2-3 years to re-establish deterrence vis-à-vis . Here’s why 1/20

One common mistake in analyzing the threat posed by Russia is falling into the trap of ‘mirror-imaging’. This means assuming that Russia views a potential conflict with us in the same way we view a potential conflict with them. Nothing could be further from the truth. 2/20

In addition, it is important to be cautious about extrapolating too many lessons from Ukraine & assuming that a war with Russia would unfold in a similar manner, albeit on a larger scale. In reality, a war between NATO & Russia would likely take on a different form altogether. 3/20

Russia does not plan for the type of large-scale conventional war with NATO that we are currently seeing in Ukraine & for which we are primarily preparing. Already before taking substantial losses on the Ukrainian battlefield, Russia knew that it would be inferior in such a scenario. 4/20

Russian thinking on a war with NATO revolves around the concept of escalation control and escalation management. Russia’s primary objective in a war with NATO is to effectively manage escalation and bring the war to an early end on terms that are favorable to Russia. 5/20

Terminating hostilities early is necessary, given that Russia must secure a victorous outcome before NATO’s conventional superiority comes to bear, most notably that of the United States. Two key concepts play a crucial role: de-escalation strikes and aggressive sanctuarization. 6/20

Rather than comprehensively defeating NATO in a prolonged ground war, similar to what we see in Ukraine, Russian doctrine suggests that Russia would attempt to coerce NATO into submission by signaling the ability to inflict progressively greater amounts of damage. 7/20

This would entail, in particular, long-range strikes against critical civilian infrastructure across European NATO countries early on. The message to NATO governments: Don’t come to the support of your Eastern European allies, unless you want to see your population suffer. 8/20

Simultaneously, Russia would extend its nuclear umbrella over any NATO territory it managed to capture in an initial assault. This sends a second message: Any endeavor to retake that territory, particularly by external NATO forces (USA), will result in nuclear escalation. 9/20

The psychological fear of escalation, which may ultimately result in unacceptable damage, is supposed to open the door for negotiations about the future of NATO and the security architecture in Europe – of course, on Russia’s terms. 10/20

This type of warfighting scenario is not a contest of forces, but primarily a risk-taking competition. The question becomes: Who will be the first to back down when confronted with the prospect of largescale war, including potential exchanges of strategic nuclear warheads? 11/20

As Cold War historians know, the balance of military power is not deterministic of outcomes in risk-taking competitions. Instead, they are often determined by the balance of resolve; i.e., the relative willingness to remain steadfast even as risks are increasing. 12/20

This is why Russia pursues this type of strategy. Russia does not need to match NATO’s conventional power. As long as NATO gives in first amid mounting psychological pressure due to a lack of resolve, Russia can walk away with a victory. 13/20

Here’s the thing: The ongoing war in Ukraine is teaching Russia a crucial lesson – that the West lacks resolve. Domestic disunity and endless discussions about escalation only reinforce Russia’s belief that NATO will back down when push comes to shove. 14/20

This means Russia does not have to wait until its conventional power is reconstituted. Scenarios where we have 5-10 years to rearm following the end of the war are way too optimistic, in my opinion. 15/20

I am with the Eastern European states that we have at best 2-3 years from today to re-establish a credible deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia. Otherwise, we run the grave risk that Russia is going to challenge us, sooner rather than later. 16/20

NATO must credibly deny Russia the ability to seize any substantial part of NATO territory or to threaten strikes against NATO critical infrastructure. This is needed to escape the coercive conundrum that aggressive sancturization and de-escalation strikes pose. 17/20

We must also have a serious discussion not only about how to deter a war with Russia but also about how to fight one. Are we prepared to retaliate against Russian critical civilian infrastructure in case Russia strikes ours first? How do we react to Russian nuclear first use? 18/20

Our lack of preparedness, both in the physcial space but also in terms of our cognitive ability to think through these scenarios, is encouraging Russia. Since 2014, Russian intellectuals have debated extensively and publicly how to win a war against NATO. Where is our debate? 19/20

What we need, especially in Europe, is whole-of-society effort to get our affairs in order. There’s no denying that this will come with a significant cost, but I fail to see any other viable option. Considering worst-case scenarios, as we should, time has already run out. 20/20″

Let me highlight some of the biggest flaws in Hoffmann’s analysis. Let’s start with Hoffmann’s claim that, “Russia does not plan for the type of large-scale conventional war with NATO . . . [because] Russia knew that it would be inferior in such a scenario.” This is ridiculous. Russia’s military already has demonstrated that it is three steps ahead of NATO planners. You know, the Western clowns who conjured up Ukraine’s sure-fire counter-offensive victory that ended up decimating the Ukrainian army?

Russia absolutely has planned for having to deal with a large-scale conventional war with NATO. It is NATO that has failed to properly plan for dealing with Russia. NATO leaders foolishly convinced themselves that Russia’s army is led by incompetent drunks and staffed by criminals snatched from prison. Big mistake.

Hoffmann’s next mistake is that he still believes NATO has a conventional force advantage over Russia. He insists that, “Terminating hostilities early is necessary, given that Russia must secure a victorious outcome before NATO’s conventional superiority comes to bear.”

Hoffmann has not been paying attention to what has unfolded on the ground in Ukraine since February 2022. Not a single NATO weapon system has proved to be superior to what Russia has fielded. Himars, Patriot batteries, Leopard and Challenger tanks, and Bradley fighting vehicles have been effectively neutered. NATO has no air defense system comparable to Russia’s 49 year old S-300. To add insult to injury Russia employs superior electronic warfare and has hyper-sonic missiles.

Apart from superior battlefield weapons, Russia has a manpower advantage. Russia is smaller in terms of population than the combined NATO countries, but it is providing standardized training to soldiers that share a common cause — i.e., defending the motherland. NATO? It is a hodgepodge of different nationalities who have no unifying cause other than a hatred of Russia, which is rooted in racism. On top of that, most of the major NATO countries are struggling to meet recruitment goals.

Almost forgot. The war in Ukraine has revealed that NATO countries no longer have the military industrial capability to produce the volumes of artillery shells and combat vehicles and air defense missiles needed to fight Russia. Russia’s industry is running on all cylinders and cranking out prodigious quantities of ammunition, tanks, aircraft, combat vehicles, missiles, rockets and drones.

Hoffman is not alone in believing that NATO represents a superior military force compared to Russia. He is a prime example of the delusion that pervades Western military leadership. The West is preoccupied with LGBTQ and pronouns. Russia is busy training and equipping warriors. Ask yourself, would you rather have a division of Chechen fighters or a unit cobbled together with Germans, Swedes, Finns, French and Spaniards? I rest my case.

Riley Waggaman: NEWS FROM RUSSIA

By Riley Waggaman, Substack, 2/4/24

Welcome to Edward Slavsquat’s weekly Russian media news roundup and open thread-thing.

The quote of the week:

The real physical assets are with us, these are mines, pipelines, factories—it’s all here [in Russia]. And abroad there is a mirror image of this property in the form of financial documents. That is, the guys in the West are running the Russian economy from offshore companies. Locally they are controlled by very obedient oligarchs who prefer to look into the mouths of the owners of the money. And Russia for them is just a territory where they can earn money on a rotational basis.

— Economist Valentin Katasonov, as quoted by Free Press in a February 3 op-ed about Russian capital flowing west.

And now for some news.

SocietyMoscow will celebrate Chinese New Year for the first time in 2024. In honor of the holiday, the streets of Moscow will be decorated in a “traditional Chinese style”, and several festival sites will be set up in the city center. [fontanka.ru]Russian President Vladimir Putin earned around 67.5 million rubles (approximately 740,000 USD) from 2017 to 2022, according to information about his income and property published on the website of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation. [Interfax]Russia is planning to launch a group visa-free tourist exchange with India in 2024. [regnum.ru]Moscow airports will begin to collect personal biometric data of foreigners arriving in the country, as part of a pilot program outlined in Rusisa’s migration policy for 2024-2025. [pnp.ru]Speaking about Boris Yeltsin on his birthday, Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the first president of the Russian Federation was “an integral part of the history of our country, and, of course, we preserve the memory of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin”. [RIA Novosti]43% of Russians believe that their vote in elections has no affect on anything, according to a new survey released by sociological group Russian Field. [nakanune.ru]American journalist Tucker Carlson was spotted in Moscow. A photo of Carlson at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow went viral on social media. The purpose of the American journalist’s unannounced visit to Russia remains unknown. [regnum.ru]The Ministry of Education of Belgorod Oblast wants to create “social maps” of all children and adolescents in the region in order to “comprehensively analyze and evaluate their personalities” based on an analysis of the introduced social risk map. This map will take into account the entire life activity of the child and his family, including personality, education, employment, peers, ideology, health, and criminal record. [katyusha.org]Approximately 18 million Russians have connected their biometric data to the government’s State Services (Gosuslugi) portal, according to the head of the Ministry of Digital Development of the Russian Federation, Maksut Shadayev. In addition, 19 million citizens have digital copies of personal documents instead of paper ones, “which in the future can replace traditional identification, not only in digital, but also in offline interactions”. In total, 110 million Russians have a profile on Gosuslugi. [ixbt.com]The exhibition-forum “Russia”, which opened at Moscow’s VDNKh on November 4 and will last until April 12, has been visited by 6 million people in three months. [bmf.ru]MTS became the first mobile operator in Russia with state accreditation for working with biometric data. [RIA Novosti]“Public Health”Russia hopes to create a “universal vaccine” against flu and Covid-19, the composition of which does not need to be changed annually, Gamaleya Center Director Alexander Gintsburg said while speaking at the Russia International Exhibition and Forum on February 2. [Interfax]More than 130 domestic drugs for the treatment of cancer were registered in 2023, and today more than 100 more drugs are undergoing clinical trials, according to Health Minister Mikhail Murashko. [bmf.ru]Russia “has significantly relaxed its requirements for compulsory vaccination against Covid-19”, according to RT. “Under the new rules, [if an epidemiological threat is declared], only those that have never been vaccinated against Covid-19 or contracted the disease itself—as well as those suffering from chronic lung or heart diseases, HIV, or tuberculosis—and the elderly will have to take a mandatory shot.” [RT.com]Russia’s Health Ministry will expand the country’s vaccination calendar in an effort to fulfill directives in President Vladimir Putin’s decree on supporting large families, Health Minister Mikhail Murashko told RIA Novosti on Saturday. [RIA Novosti]Professional communication between Russian doctors and colleagues from other countries continue despite efforts by “politicized associations” to exclude Russian health authorities from global cooperation, Health Minister Mikhail Murashko said. Murashko added that Russia is actively cooperating with China on health issues, and that Chinese counterparts are actively monitoring what is happening in Russian healthcare. [spbdnevnik.ru]UkraineThe Ukrainian Armed Forces are attacking civilians and shooting at ambulances, effectively making them a “terrorist organization”, Russian President Vladimir Putin said during the “Everything for Victory!” forum on February 2. [Izvestia]72-year-old Evgenia Mayboroda was sentenced to five years and six months in prison for posting fakes about the Russian military, after sharing “information about the number of dead Russian military personnel” and an “emotional video.” Mayboroda admitted guilt but said she posted the material in an emotional state after her brother, who lived in Ukraine, was buried under the rubble of a building that collapsed as a result of shelling. However, a Rostov region court concluded she acted out of political hatred. [Kommersant]Gazprom continues to supply gas to Europe via Ukraine in the amount of 42.4 million cubic meters per day, a Gazprom representative announced on February 3. [TASS]Hungary will not veto an increase in the so-called European Peace Fund, which finances arms supplies to Ukraine, but will not itself take part in its work, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjártó said on February 4. [regnum.ru]A bill on raising the conscription age for those who have received Russian citizenship will be reintroduced after “comprehensive discussions” on the legislation’s language is finalized, according to one of the bill’s sponsors, State Duma deputy Mikhail Sheremet (United Russia). Last week, a bill was introduced to the State Duma proposing an increase in the conscription age to 50 years for men who have received Russian citizenship. However, the bill was quickly withdrawn. [Kommersant]The Ukrainian army lost more than 23,000 people killed and wounded in January of this year, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed during a conference call with Russia’s military leadership. [Interfax]The shelling of DPR territory will stop if the Ukrainian army is pushed back 150 km, the head of the republic, Denis Pushilin, said during a recent media appearance. [regnum.ru]Igor Strelkov’s lawyer said that if his appeal fails, the former defense minister of the DPR may request to be sent to fight in Ukraine, instead of serving his 4-year prison sentence. [ura.ru]Russian Health Minister Mikhail Murashko said that 70 billion rubles will be allocated for the rehabilitation of those wounded during the special military operation. [vademec.ru]Customs officers in Transbaikal discovered eight containers on a freight train containing uniforms for Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers. The cargo, which came from China, was in transit to Poland. [life.ru]EconomyOver the next 12 months, Russia plans to install 1,437 fast (50 or more kilowatts) electric charging stations for electric vehicles. [Vedomosti]The share of borrowers in Russia with five or more existing loans reached 8.6% at the end of 2013. The figure has almost doubled over the past two years (at the end of 2021 it was 4.7%). [nakanune.ru]In November, Russia became the main exporter of uranium to the United States for the first time since May, RIA Novosti calculated based on open data. [RIA Novosti]Russia took 15th place in the ranking of European countries in terms of gasoline availability at the beginning of 2024. Residents of Luxembourg can purchase the largest amount of fuel with their average monthly salaries, while residents of Moldova can purchase the least, according to a RIA Novosti study. [RIA Novosti]Dmitry Mezentsev, State Secretary of the Union State of the Russian Federation and Belarus, said the possibility of a single currency space within the framework of a supranational entity is not currently being discussed. [finobzor.ru]Since the beginning of 2024, the wealth of Russia’s richest businessmen has grown by $7.953 billion, according to data from the Bloomberg Billionaires Index. This is approximately 717 billion rubles at the current exchange rate. [nakanune.ru]Unlike other economies, the Russian economy is growing and has become the largest in Europe and fifth in the world, Russian President Vladimir Putin said at the “Everything for Victory” forum on February 2. [RIA Novosti]

The Nation: This Russian Opposition Leader Met With Putin to Discuss a Cease-Fire to Stop the Killing

The Nation, 1/17/24

Grigory Yavlinsky is the founder of Russia’s leading and oldest democratic opposition party, Yabloko, which is the only party in Russia calling for a cease-fire. The interview was conducted by The Nation’s longtime contributor Nadia Azhgikhina at Yabloko’s Moscow offices.

Q: At the end of 2023, the Russian media talked a lot about Yavlinsky’s “peace program” and about your midnight December 19 meeting in the Kremlin with Putin to discuss it. What is the essence of this program?

Right now, we need to reach a cease-fire agreement. That means talking about the disengagement of heavy weapons and troops, setting demarcation lines, ensuring international observation and control, and so on. Until the killing of people is stopped, it is impossible to talk about any positive prospects. I believe that the most important thing today is to stop the killing of people. Isn’t that clear? Over the past year, there have been no significant changes on the battlefield. The Ukrainian counteroffensive ended in nothing. But recently I read in the Western press that the number of people killed every day has increased significantly. That is, people on both sides are dying every day. For what?

I am amazed that there is not one major, influential politician in the world today who would put people’s lives first, before geopolitical projects. They talk about anything at all but people’s lives; that doesn’t matter. Yes, politicians seem to be sorry, but at the same time they speak directly about the necessity to continue the war until some “victorious end.” The preservation of human life is not the main criterion for them.

That is why people are dying every day. And on top of that, Ukraine is losing its prospects. I am a Russian politician, and Russia started this conflict, so it is not for me to talk about Ukraine’s problems. But personally, Russia and Ukraine are very dear to me, they are like my right and left hands. What is happening is incredibly painful for me. And I will do everything to stop the deaths of both Russians and Ukrainians. Cease-fire first and foremost.

A cease-fire is not a border treaty. There has been no peace treaty between North and South Korea for 70 years. There is no treaty between Russia and Japan, and no one has been bothered by it for years. The peculiarity of Russia’s conflict with Ukraine is that the situation is such that nothing else is possible. Everything else—other negotiations, discussions, truce—will be possible much later and only on the basis of a cease-fire agreement.

Q: With US involvement?

In one form or another, US participation is important. It can’t be done without the US. It would be good if China were not left out. Putin is explicitly saying that we are not interested in territories. He is interested in dialogue with the White House about Russia’s role, NATO, arms, etc.

Q: Your opponents say: You can’t have a cease-fire because Russia will then go farther. Let Russia first withdraw from Ukrainian territories. Putin cannot be trusted.

In such a situation and with such participants, it is not a matter of faith. It is necessary to make concrete decisions and in such a way as to minimize the possibility of their violation. This is politics. For example, we should realize that Russia has nuclear weapons, and the solution of territorial problems should be achieved through long and complex negotiations, not by force. In the meantime, people are just being killed.

I would say to my opponents: If you are in favor of continuing the war, go to the line of contact yourself and send your children there. It is easy to criticize from a cozy office or a European restaurant. You have to realize that Putin doesn’t really need any respite. He is actively exporting oil despite the sanctions. He can build any kind of factory. He doesn’t even need mobilization—he will promise contract workers the kind of pay they never dreamed of, and people will go on their own. What breathing space does he need? Ukraine objectively does not have as much strategic depth as Russia. It is organized differently, and the West’s help is not unlimited, especially since the Middle East has now become a serious problem for the West, a conflict that could escalate into a very dangerous one. In this context, what is happening in Ukraine has come to be perceived as a distant “local” conflict. Few American citizens actually care where exactly the border between Russia and Ukraine will be. People simply don’t want war, even though not a single American is officially fighting in Ukraine.

Q: Why do so many people today not want to talk about peace? Are they more afraid of talking about peace than they are of war?

Talking about peace is talking about official and mutual recognition of borders. So far there is no basis to talk about it. There are no prerequisites for a full-fledged peace now. That is why I am only talking about a cease-fire, i.e., that we should stop killing people. After that, they can take even 20 years to negotiate the terms of peace. Let me remind you about Finland. When, in 1939, the Red Army captured an important piece of Finnish territory, Marshal Mannerheim sat down at the table with the prime minister and the president and convinced them to stop in order to save the country and preserve the future. As a result, the country, its army, and its leadership were preserved. It is a difficult choice. But it is there for now. A peace treaty is a distant prospect. Two things are extremely important now. The first is to stop killing people immediately. The second is to preserve prospects, the opportunity to move into the future. Can’t 80 percent of Ukraine be oriented toward joining the EU?

Things will be very difficult in the returned territories. There is a lot of destruction and land mines. What will be done with the unfortunate population? Find out who sympathized with the Russians and punish them? This has already happened in liberated settlements and cities. What to do with people? Put them in jail? Is it not clear that there will be guerrilla warfare? An endless story… And Crimea? It’s no secret that today the majority of people there really support Russia.

Q: There was at least one moment when a cease-fire seemed to be possible.

Right. In November–December 2022, after the successful Ukrainian operation near Kharkiv and Kherson. Then there was a moment when both sides could have said something provisionally satisfactory to their peoples: Moscow something about the annexed territories, and Zelensky to declare that he had preserved the country, the sovereignty of the nation-state and was joining the EU. But this important moment was missed.

Q: What did Putin say in response to your proposal?

He was silent.

Q: But he listened to it?

Yes, he did. I told him I’m personally ready to negotiate an immediate cease-fire.

Q: You’re probably the only one everyone would talk to today, including in Ukraine and in the United States.

I am ready to do everything possible to stop the killing of people.

Q: Yabloko is the only party that openly calls for peace. You refused to participate in the presidential election, for the first time.

Actually, I refused for the first time in 2004—it was obvious then what was going on. There have been seven presidential elections in Russia since 1991. I participated three times. In 2000, I came third out of 11 candidates. Now it’s kind of a referendum, a plebiscite on Putin’s support, not a competitive election, and presidential spokesman Dmitri Peskov has already announced the results. Nevertheless, I still offered to informally collect signatures for my program, the peace program. We decided that if 10 million signatures were collected, that is, about 10 percent of voters who support my nomination, I would run despite all the difficulties. In two months, we collected about one and a half million signatures.

Q: Probably there were many voters afraid to leave their passport data on the signature sheets, I know such people.

That’s right, people are afraid to declare their opposition to the current government. Fear. It has enveloped the entire country in recent years. We live in a condition of fear.

Q: Why is it back? Why are the worst features of the Soviet past returning? During perestroika, there was confidence that we were free of the heavy legacy, that there was no return to it. How did this happen?

Because in the 1990s we carried out mistaken reforms, even criminal ones, and deceived people, deceived their hopes. It is well known what gross mistakes and crimes were committed. Mikhail Poltoranin, a Russian official close to Yeltsin, wrote in his memoirs how he tried to persuade Yeltsin in the fall of 1991 to appoint me as his deputy in charge of reforms. Yeltsin said: Yavlinsky will do what he thinks is necessary, but I need IMF loans, and they have a completely different reform plan. So, he appointed Gaidar [who pursued “shock therapy reform”]. And those were the wrong reforms. Of course, by and large it was not about the IMF. The problem was the lack of understanding of the essence of what had to be done, and the lack of political will of the Russian leadership in the first place.

On January 2, 1992, Russia announced “price liberalization”! This in a country without a single private enterprise at the time; there were only state monopolies. By the end of the year, hyperinflation reached 2,600 percent! That is, prices rose 26 times. Enterprises stopped, there was a gigantic decline in production, unemployment, crime. My 500 Days program provided for the use of people’s financial savings during the Soviet period for the privatization of small and medium-sized enterprises, the emergence of real private business, the creation of an inter-republic banking union, the implementation of an economic treaty between the former union republics, with which in the autumn of 1991, 13 republics out of 15 agreed in one way or another. All that was crossed out. In 1993, people protested the situation. The protest was crushed with the shooting and destruction of the Russian Federation parliament.

Q: People become disillusioned with democracy because of failed economic reforms.

Yes, you’re right. In addition, the government fraudulently transferred large state property to people close to them via the “loans for shares” program. This is how the oligarchs appeared, and corruption became the foundation of Russia’s economic system. A tiny group of oligarchs enriched themselves, merging power and property. The separation of powers, an independent court, a real parliament, an independent press, trade unions, real democracy were contraindicated and categorically unacceptable for the state corporate-criminal system.

The third circumstance is that during the 10 years of reforms after 1991, there was never an official state and legal assessment of Stalinism and the Soviet period in general. It is not surprising that the practices of that time have returned.

Under these conditions, in the 2000s the authorities imposed a formula on people, which many obeyed: “Mind your own business and do not interfere in politics. Nothing depends on you anyway. Democracy is just empty words.” High oil prices made it easier as people began to live better.

In my opinion, Russia has a lot of wonderful people, but as a result of all this there is no civil society. Today the country is experiencing the collapse of the failed post-Soviet modernization.

Q: Can there be a way out today?

We can talk about a way out when they stop killing people. Now the situation is worse than in December of last year. At that time, there were publications about the possibility of starting negotiations on a cease-fire. But Ukraine attacked a Russian warship. Russia responded with a missile attack. Then there was a strike on the Russian city of Belgorod. And so on since January first, almost every day. The situation is moving backward.

Q: What don’t Americans understand about Russia? What would be important to do to improve relations, to ease the dangerous confrontation?

We need to talk. Dialogue with Russia cannot be avoided. Sanctions have not worked because Russia is part of the world economy. The world economy cannot live without Russia. For example, all this time, gas from Russia continues to flow through Ukraine to Europe. There are many other examples. Russia is not going anywhere. This must be understood.

Second. We need to think about the future. I would not be surprised if an even more aggressive dictator emerges in the Russian political field, with a real claim to power.

And third. By the middle of the 21st century, the European Union will not be able to separate itself not only from Ukraine, but also from Russia and Belarus. It will have to look for some effective form of integration. This is an imperative, which must be met, otherwise Europe will not be able to become a serious center of economic power, competing with North America and Southeast Asia.

Q: Lately, the fear of the nuclear threat seems to have disappeared from the agenda, and war itself looks like a computer game to many. Is it the result of the war generation being gone? The generation of Khrushchev and Kennedy?

The digitalization of consciousness is hugely important. Thirty years ago, experts thought that digitalization would mean the free exchange of opinions and ideas, but that is not what has happened. Everything negative that was in people came out and became extremely loud, flooding social media. This digitally disordered and dangerous world is becoming a reality. That’s how populists and ignoramuses enter politics.

Q: But a living human voice, it seems to me, can stand up to hype and strong arm populism. I see how the voice of Yabloko is a sign of hope and a reference point for many people in Russia. Looking at you, some people are no longer afraid. What gives you hope? What do you see as the party’s main task today, and your own?

We are trying, doing everything possible and even seemingly impossible to create a civil society in Russia. We believe it is important that a real public opinion appears and that it becomes a factor influencing what is happening. We persistently talk to people and continue to insist that the most important thing today is to stop killing people. We believe that politics has only one main and indisputable goal—it must serve people, individuals, their interests.

I love my country, my people. What is happening today in Russia and Ukraine is a terrible tragedy for me. I want the killing to stop, and I want Ukraine and Russia to be preserved as modern states, to have a future.

Q: What gives you strength?

The memory of my comrades who gave their lives so that the country would be free.

Also, I am sure that at some point a window of opportunity will open. I vividly remember the feelings of a dead end in the early 1980s. What was there to hope for? But suddenly Gorbachev came and the modernization of the country began. The window of opportunity will definitely open. But you have to be ready for it.

RUSSIAGATE: The Fraud, Its Consequences, the Ongoing Damage, & Those Who Caused It—Glenn Greenwald Interview With Aaron Maté

Link to full show on Rumble here.

Link to excerpt from same program on YouTube here.

Ted Snider & Nicolai Petro: To End the War in Ukraine, Expose Its Core Lie

By Ted Snider & Nicolai Petro, Libertarian Institute, 1/18/24

The essential argument used to avoid negotiation and continue support for the war in Ukraine is based on a falsehood. That falsehood, repeated by President Joe Biden, is that when Vladimir Putin decided to invade, he intended to conquer all of Ukraine and “annihilate” it.

Its falsity has been exposed multiple times by military experts, who have pointed out, both before and after the invasion, that Russia could not have intended to conquer all of Ukraine because it did not invade with sufficient forces to do so. Indeed, this was a key reason why senior Ukrainian officials, and even President Volodymyr Zelensky himself, argued just days before the invasion that it would not occur.

The mistake that most analysts at the time made (these authors included), was to assume that since the troops mobilized by Russia did not suffice for a full scale occupation of Ukraine, no military operation, not even a limited one, was in the offing. It was only later that Western political leaders turned this mistake to their propaganda advantage by insisting that Russia had always intended to first take Kiev, then all of Ukraine, and ultimately even attack NATO.

But if basic military logic is taken into account, the fact that Putin committed only 120,000–190,000 men to his campaign and did not mobilize more resources until months later, after Kiev rejected the Istanbul peace deal, indicates that his objectives in Ukraine were limited and revolved around guaranteeing the security of the populations of Donbass and Crimea from Ukrainian assaults and Russia from NATO expansion. Given that Ukraine had cut off Crimea’s water and electricity years before, this required a land bridge to the region; hence, the illegal annexations of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions.

We also have indirect confirmation that territory was not his objective from an unimpeachable source: NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg, who stated that Putin invaded Ukraine to prevent NATO’s expansion. This would explain why, as soon as these goals were within reach when Ukrainian officials initialed the draft of the Istanbul Agreement in March 2022, Putin halted his assault and withdrew Russian forces from Kiev, rather than move further into Ukraine.   

This background is important, because the argument for increasing Western military support for Ukraine relies so heavily on the claim that Russia always intended to expand further, attack NATO, and reestablish the Russian empire.

But, as noted scholar John Mearsheimer has pointed out, “there is no evidence in the public record that Putin was contemplating, much less intending to put an end to Ukraine as an independent state and make it part of greater Russia when he sent his troops into Ukraine on February 24th.” It was never one of Putin’s stated goals, nor was it ever taken seriously by the Ukrainian leadership. David Arakhamia, the head of Ukraine’s negotiating team in Belarus and Istanbul, recently revealed that the “key point” for Russia was Ukraine not joining NATO, and “everything else was simply rhetoric and political ‘seasoning.’”

Putin himself has consistently said that “this conflict is not about territory…[it] is about the principles underlying the new international order.” We should not take him at his word, but it is still worth asking: had Putin’s ambitions been territorial, would he have waited until 2014 to annex Crimea? Would the upper house of Russia’s parliament have rescinded Putin’s temporary authority to use troops in Ukraine in June 2015? Would he have opposed the 2014 independence referendums in Donetsk and Lugansk?

Looking back even further, if Putin had truly wanted to incorporate parts of the former Soviet Union, he had an ideal opportunity to do so in August 2008, when Russian troops were but an hour’s drive from the Georgian capitol of Tbilisi. He could have simply recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and then annexed them to Russia, but he did not. Reviewing Putin’s current behavior, therefore, former U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Stephen Bryen concludes that “Russia has no intention of expanding outside of the Ukraine conflict area.”

The false narrative about Russian intentions has served its essential purpose of rallying Western countries behind Ukraine. Continuing to insist on it now, however, risks involving NATO directly in the conflict, and threatens Ukraine’s very survival.

If the challenge the West faces in this conflict is defined as “existential,” then what choice does NATO have but to send its own military forces in to prevent Ukraine’s defeat? President Biden implied as much when he said, “If Putin takes Ukraine, he won’t stop there. It’s important to see the long run here. He’s going to keep going…Then we’ll have something that we don’t seek and that we don’t have today: American troops fighting Russian troops.”

At some point, a decision will have to be made to either greatly expand the West’s commitment, or abandon Ukraine to its fate. Alas, President Biden’s request for $61 billion in additional funding for 2024 does neither, since Ukraine needs at least five time that amount to win, according to its top military commander. With the Ukrainian counteroffensive already running out of steam due to a lack funding, lack of weaponry, and unsustainable losses, Ukraine will likely soon be facing a Russian counteroffensive.

Before such an assault, however, Russia might offer Ukraine new peace terms, albeit far less advantageous than the ones it offered in March 2022. If Ukraine balks, Russia will press its overwhelming advantage and take more territory, which it does not really want (for a good discussion of why, see former Ukrainian diplomat Rostislav Ishchenko), in order to force Ukraine to the negotiating table.

At that point, the West will be faced with a fateful choice: either accept Ukraine’s surrender or send in NATO troops. Either scenario is likely to lead to sharp divisions in the NATO alliance, since Hungary, Slovakia, and Turkey have all indicated that they want a peaceful resolution to the conflict, not escalation.

The one thing that escalation cannot guarantee, however, is Russia’s defeat. That is because, by confirming Putin’s narrative that NATO is intent on destroying Russia, his support both within Russia and around the world would likely skyrocket. A more divided West would thus be facing a more united Russia, this time supported openly by the BRICS countries, as well as many other major international actors currently on the sidelines. This would effectively turn the tables on America’s strategy of using Ukraine to contain China’s global ambitions. Instead, it would now be Russia and its allies using Ukraine to contain the global ambitions of the United States.

It was, in no small part, the West’s original false narrative about Russia’s goals in Ukraine that has led us to this dismal outcome; European security weakened, the specter of nuclear war, Ukraine destroyed, and America’s global standing undermined. It has already been used once before to scuttle the Istanbul Agreement, which could have ended the war before hundreds of thousands died. For peace negotiations to become an acceptable alternative to mutual annihilation, this falsehood must be exposed and discarded.

About Ted Snider and Nicolai N. Petro

Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and the Libertarian Institute, and is a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft, The American Conservative, and other outlets. He can be contacted at tedsnider@bell.net Nicolai N. Petro is Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island, and the author of The Tragedy of Ukraine: What Classical Greek Tragedy Can Teach Us About Conflict Resolution (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2023).

Zelensky’s Desire to Oust General Zaluzhny and Seymour Hersh’s Reporting on the Issue

Russia Matters, 2/2/24

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy summoned Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU) Valerii Zaluzhnyi on Jan. 29 to tell the general he was being fired. At the meeting, Zaluzhnyi was offered the post of secretary of the national security council, but he turned it down, according to The Economist.[1] Two days after the meeting, the general, still in command of ZSU, published an essay with CNN, in which he said that bureaucracy is holding back Ukraine’s defense industry and “a new philosophy of training and warfare” is needed in 2024. By doing so, he “doubled down on a confrontation with Zelenskyy over military leadership,” according to Bloomberg. Zelenskyy and Zaluzhnyi have recently sparred on whether to mobilize an additional 500,000, with the president arguing that his government lacks the money to sustain such a mobilization. Zelenskyy has also been reportedly discontent with both the insufficient progress of ZSU’s counteroffensive last year and Zaluzhnyi’s acknowledgement of stalemate on the battlefield. In addition, some members of Zelenskyy’s staff have reportedly become weary of Zaluzhnyi’s growing popularity as he has become the most trusted figure in Ukraine. The removal of Zaluzhnyi, which was yet to be formalized as of Feb. 2, but which Kyiv has already informed Washington about, would cause an uproar within both Ukraine’s civil society and ZSU’s rank-and-file, according to FT. Nevertheless, two generals are being mentioned as contenders to replace Zaluzhnyi, commander of the ground forces Oleksandr Syrsky and military intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov, according to the Economist and WP.

***

According to an article by Seymour Hersh dated 2/1/24, one of the main reasons Zelensky wants to fire Zaluzhny is because the general has been conducting secret talks with western military and intelligence officials about a path toward a negotiated end to the war, which Zelensky opposes:

Zelensky’s desire to fire his commanding general is the result, some Americans believe, of his knowledge that Zaluzhny had continued to participate—whether directly or through aides is not known—in secret talks since last fall with American and other Western officials on how best to achieve a ceasefire and negotiate an end to the war with Russia. It was those talks that led Zaluzhny to declare to the Economist that the war was stalemated. Zelensky has talked of mobilizing 500,000 more soldiers, via another draft, and to try again this spring to launch another counteroffensive against the Russians. Ukraine, of course, would need renewed funding from the Biden administration to do so. It is not clear that Republicans in Congress are prepared to finance another counteroffensive, but there is little doubt that the Biden administration would lobby hard for the funds. (On Thursday, the EU approved funding for Ukraine in excess of 50 billion euros.)

All of this comes at a time when there has been renewed interest among some in the American military and intelligence community in finding a way to both support significant reform in the Ukrainian government and support Zaluzhny’s efforts for far-reaching talks with Russia about a settlement in the war. A few hints of the details were provided last week to the Washington Post in a story headlined “In Ukraine, U.S. dials back plans to take turf.” The article left open the possibility of Ukraine undertaking future military action against Russia. The Post reported that the key elements are support for Ukraine’s battered industrial and export base and funding for the political reforms required for full integration into Western Europe.

According to Hersh’s sources, various western officials, including current CIA director William Burns, have communicated to Zelensky in recent months that continued western support is dependent upon four things: implementing serious reforms to address corruption, a meaningful audit of all government funding, serious investment in building up Ukrainian infrastructure and economy, and defense of the country.

The current plan evolved among experts in the intelligence and military bureaucracy without input from the White House, the State Department, or the National Security Council. “It stems from the American and Ukraine general staffs and it is putting investments” from private industry, the official said, “and not solely government funding and grants as the ticket out.

In a December 1, 2023 article, Hersh claimed that, according to his sources, Zaluzhny had also been conducting secret talks with Russian Chief of General Staff of the armed forces Valery Gerasimov:

The ingredient that triggered the private talks is a shared understanding that Putin would not object to a settlement that fixed borders according to where the troops were in place when the peace talks ended. Russia would be left with unchallenged control of Crimea and, pending an election to be held under martial law in March, with essential control of the four provinces, or oblasts, that Russia annexed last year: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and the still embattled Kherson. In return—in a concession not foreseen—Russia, that is, Putin himself, would not object to Ukraine joining NATO.

Though Hersh has an excellent reputation as an investigative reporter, his understanding of Russian politics and society seems to be rather shallow and he seems to have an overreliance on mainstream media sources and his own insider government sources in forming his view of Russia and its leadership. I think this may make him vulnerable at times to unwittingly publishing what amounts to information warfare from western insiders. While it’s possible there have been talks between Zaluzhny and Gerasimov to get a feel for how a negotiated settlement could be worked out, I don’t find it credible that Putin would allow Ukraine to join NATO even if Crimea and the four oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia were agreed to be part of Russia. NATO membership – de facto or de jure – was a repeatedly stated red line over the course of many years and It’s the main reason Putin felt the need to conduct the “special military operation.” Even if Putin were foolish enough to think a smaller Ukraine would be less of a long-term threat on behalf of NATO shenanigans, I don’t think it would fly politically among Russians, especially among Russian families who have lost loved ones in the fighting. My sense is that most Russians don’t care about taking any more territory but It would be tough to spin Ukraine ultimately joining NATO as a Russian victory worthy of the sacrifice, especially when Russia has gained the upper hand.

Ted Galen Carpenter: The Foreign Policy Blob’s Desperate Attempt To Preserve NATO

By Ted Galen Carpenter, Antiwar.com, 1/10/24

There are multiple indications that members of the foreign policy establishment are increasingly worried that the American people are growing weary of Washington’s strategic overextension and the excessive costs in treasure and blood that role imposes.  Elites show their nervousness through desperate attempts to preserve the policy status quo.  One recent example was the effort in Congress to limit the president’s powers and options regarding NATO.

In December 2023, hawks finally achieved their goal when both the Senate and House approved a provision attached to the National Defense Authorization Act that would bar a president from withdrawing the U.S. from NATO without the approval of two-thirds of the Senate or separate legislation passed by both houses of Congress. Washington Post analyst Meagan Vasquez notes that “the bipartisan attempt to add checks and balances highlights the lengths Congress is willing to go to protect the U.S.-NATO relationship amid ongoing Russian aggression and after years of criticism of the military alliance during Trump’s presidential tenure.”

Yet even the Brookings Institution’s Michael E. O’Hanlon, a prominent establishment foreign policy figure, concedes that Congress is entering uncharted and controversial territory.  He points out “that there is precedent for presidents withdrawing unilaterally from treaties without consulting Congress. A chief executive conceivably could push back on efforts to restrict that [authority] particularly if the treaty addresses the United States’ defense posture abroad.  A “future president might challenge such an effort and invoke the president’s authorities as commander in chief under Article 2 of the Constitution.”

O’Hanlon is probably correct.  Indeed, a congressional-presidential collision is likely to take place even if critics of promiscuous military interventions do not attempt to end U.S. membership in NATO.  Members of the “NATO forever” crowd will react badly even if a president committed to a more restrained foreign policy merely attempts to reduce the U.S. military footprint in Europe.  Such a move would indicate a long overdue willingness on the part of an administration to move beyond burden sharing toward burden shifting with respect to transatlantic security policy.

Even a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe would signal to the European members of NATO that going forward they would need to accept primary responsibility for their own defense and the continent’s security.  NATO partisans would regard such a policy change as undermining continued U.S. dominance of the trans-Atlantic security relationship.  That faction in Congress would almost certainly move to thwart a reformist administration.

U.S. hardliners already have demonstrated a determination to prevent any president from implementing a less interventionist policy elsewhere in the world.  In October 2019, congressional hawks led by neo-conservative Rep. Liz Cheney (R-WY) secured a resolution condemning President Donald Trump for even considering a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria.  Fears that Trump might remove U.S. forces from Europe during a second term have become widespread in Washington.  Indeed, those worries on the part of America’s stodgy foreign policy elite were a major reason why Congress passed the new bi-partisan measure to prohibit the president from unilaterally exiting NATO.

It is notable that Congress has afforded presidents a great deal of latitude both with respect to the general handling of foreign policy and specifically in the use of U.S. forces on the world scene.  Yet that restraint seems to apply only when a president is willing to continue Washington’s interventionist foreign policy.  When merely a theoretical possibility of a less belligerent policy emerges, congressional hawks are prepared to severely restrict the president’s role as commander-and-chief of the military.

The controversy over whether the president has the authority to withdraw U.S. membership in NATO reflects a broader problem with U.S. foreign policy.  The core feature of Washington’s long-standing insistence on U.S. global primacy is a NATO under permanent U.S. dominance. That determination has been evident for decades.  Even when the Soviet Union disintegrated, there was vehement opposition from members of the foreign policy blob to dissolving an alliance whose overriding purpose was to counter Soviet power in Europe.  Clearly, that mission was no longer needed since the Soviet Union no longer existed.

Instead of accepting and adjusting to that existential change, the blob’s reaction was to find alternative missions for their sacred, but now obsolete, alliance.  Suggested new missions even included promoting student exchanges and coordinating environmental policies, measures for which a military alliance is not needed.  Worse, NATO enthusiasts sought to expand the alliance into Eastern Europe, thereby threatening non-Communist Russia’s security zone.  Such provocative actions eventually poisoned the West’s relations with Moscow.  The war in Ukraine and the resulting NATO-Russia confrontation is the alarming result.

The American people need to firmly rebuff the ongoing effort to make the current U.S. posture toward NATO permanent.  A smart foreign policy must be agile and willing to adjust to important changes in the international system.  The place to begin such badly needed policy reform is by rejecting the out-of-touch foreign policy establishment’s escalating campaign to freeze NATO in place.

Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute, is the author of 13 books and more than 1,200 articles on international affairs. Dr. Carpenter held various senior policy positions during a 37-year career at the Cato institute. His latest book is Unreliable Watchdog: The News Media and U.S. Foreign Policy (2022).

Andrew Korybko: Biden Won’t Be Removed For Corruption In Ukraine But New Allegations Can Still Have An Impact

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 1/15/24

Former Ukrainian MP Andrey Derkach dropped a bunch of bombshells about Biden’s corrupt dealings in Ukraine in a recent interview with Italian-American journalist Simona Mangiante. The takeaways can be read here, but they basically boil down to bribes and money laundering, among other crimes. While they might boost the Republicans’ impeachment efforts in the House where the opposition has a slim majority, their lack of a two-thirds majority in the Senate means that he won’t be removed from office.

Even so, these new allegations can still have an important impact on events, one that might be much more significant than his superficial impeachment by the House. Proceedings at that level have become politicized as proven by the Democrats’ witch hunt against Trump, which isn’t to say that the Republicans are carrying out their own against Biden, but just to emphasize that impeachment by the House has no tangible significance. At most, it’ll strengthen both parties’ efforts to get out the vote in November.

Where the actual importance of these latest allegations lies is in the larger context of the Ukrainian Conflict, which began to wind down late last year following the failure of Kiev’s counteroffensive and the consequent dwindling of Western aid. The Republicans already made their agreement on any more such deals contingent on robust border security reforms, but they might now also include the additional condition of a comprehensive joint investigation with Ukraine into Derkach’s bombshells about Biden.

If the opposition makes such a proposal, then there’s no way that the Democrats would agree, thus capsizing the possibility of any compromise on this issue until next year after November’s elections, which could shake up the congressional dynamics and potentially lead to Biden’s ouster as well. Furthermore, Zelensky’s regime can’t be counted on to assist any theoretical joint investigation in good faith since leading figures are also implicated in this corruption per Derkach’s revelations.

That particular point adds a curious twist to this scandal since it suggests that they might also be able to blackmail the Biden Administration, which provides a new layer of understanding to why the incumbent and his team have been so gung-ho about perpetuating NATO’s proxy war on Russia through Ukraine. Zelensky knows that any outcome short of the maximalist victory that he fantasizes about would kill his political career so he has self-interested reasons in wanting to turn this into a so-called “forever war”.

The US’ objective national interests aren’t served by depleting even more of its stockpiles and therefore reducing its ability to flexibly respond to foreign crises as they arise, or rather might even be provoked by America or its partners, hence why it’s become popular to talk about freezing the conflict. Former NATO Supreme Commander Admiral James Stavridis’ Korean-like “land-for-peace” armistice proposal last year could be a starting point but only if the West agrees to Russia’s security guarantee requests in Ukraine.

They’ve been reluctant to do so, however, hence why no progress has been made on this. One reason behind the US’ recalcitrance might not just be that it’s concerned about “losing face” upon reaching a pragmatic series of mutual compromises with Russia, but that Zelensky is blackmailing the Biden Administration that he’ll spill the beans if they dare to pursue this policy. Given his prior “godlike” status in the Western media, any corroboration of Derkach’s claims might be widely believed by Westerners.

They know that Zelensky isn’t a so-called “Russian agent” and have convinced themselves that he’s a “democratic freedom fighter” so it would be very damning to the incumbent Democrats’ reputation if he engaged in a “limited hangout” by sharing some relevant information. He of course wouldn’t implicate himself or his most loyal allies, but he could take down a couple less politically reliable officials in that event (perhaps as part of a purge) while possibly dooming Biden’s re-election and flipping the Senate.

Republican control of the White House and Congress coupled with what many regard as the right-leaning Supreme Court could lead to the Democrats’ worst nightmare of their opponents reversing most of Biden’s policies. Meanwhile, Zelensky’s worst nightmare is that Biden bows to the popular sentiment among Americans to scale back their country’s participation in this proxy war and coerce him to resume peace talks with Russia, so each can therefore keep the other in check through this mutual blackmail.

The legitimacy of both the Biden Administration and Zelensky’s regime is therefore dependent on each of them staying silent about their corruption scheme, but one or the other could at least in theory reveal some details about this if they begin to distrust the other or want to get rid of them. For instance, the Biden Administration could leak some information about Zelensky’s corruption to pro-Democrat media to pressure him into resuming peace talks or to pave the way for a “government of national unity”.

That proposal was pushed by a member of the influential Atlantic Council think tank last month in an article for Politico and could credibly be interpreted as a signal that the Biden Administration is beginning to get fed up with Zelensky. As for the Ukrainian leader, it was already explained that he might be the first to leak certain details about this scheme if he feels that the Democrats’ support for this proxy war is faltering, which could be one of his “nuclear options” in that case alongside a major false flag.

Circling back to Derkach’s latest corruption allegations, their impact in terms of the Ukrainian Conflict is much more important than the possibility of them aiding the Republicans’ efforts to impeach Biden in the House since they can’t remove him due to a dearth of support in the Senate. The Republicans could make support for more Ukrainian aid conditional on a joint investigation into these claims and/or the Biden Administration or the Zelensky regime could leak evidence if the other doesn’t do their bidding.

ICJ Ruling On Ukraine’s Case Against Russia for Violation of UN Terrorism Treaty

Link here.

January 31, 2024 – The United Nations’ top court on Wednesday mostly rejected Ukraine’s claims that Russia was financing “terrorism” in eastern Ukraine, saying only that Moscow had failed to investigate alleged breaches. Fernande Van Tets, FRANCE 24’s correspondent in the Netherlands, reports from The Hague on why this ruling is such a victory for Russia.