Alexandre Koyré


Born
in Taganrog, Russian Federation
August 29, 1892

Died
April 28, 1964

Genre


Aleksandr Vladimirović Kojre, published as Alexandre Koyré was a philosopher and historian of science. He contributed to the development of the history of science in France and to its diffusion in the United States after the Second World War.

In the 1930's, Koyré began the research that made him one of the most eminent historians of twentieth century scientific thought, the first phase of which ended before the Second World War with the publication of the three volumes of Galilean Studies. Koiré became one of the protagonists of French historical epistemology, a new discipline that claimed to study the history of scientific thought as such and as a whole.

Average rating: 3.7 · 381 ratings · 52 reviews · 36 distinct worksSimilar authors
From the Closed World to th...

3.95 avg rating — 154 ratings — published 1957 — 35 editions
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مدخل لقراءة أفلاطون

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3.25 avg rating — 93 ratings — published 1945 — 5 editions
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Bilim Tarihi Yazıları

4.10 avg rating — 31 ratings — published 1973 — 6 editions
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ثلاثة دروس في ديكارت

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2.76 avg rating — 25 ratings
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سیاست از نظر افلاطون

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3.60 avg rating — 10 ratings — published 2007
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Réflexions sur le mensonge

4.11 avg rating — 9 ratings — published 1945 — 3 editions
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Newtonian Studies

4.33 avg rating — 6 ratings — published 1965 — 5 editions
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Galileo Studies

4.60 avg rating — 5 ratings — published 1939 — 5 editions
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Metaphysics and Measurement...

3.83 avg rating — 6 ratings — published 1968 — 3 editions
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Rozhovory nad Descartem

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3.75 avg rating — 4 ratings — published 1944 — 3 editions
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More books by Alexandre Koyré…
“Il dialogo socratico, sia esso composto da Platone, Senofonte o Eschine di Sfetto, non mira a insegnarci una determinata dottrina - che Socrate, come tutti sanno e come infinite volte egli stesso ci ha detto non ha mai posseduto - ma intende evocare un'immagine luminosa del filosofo assassinato, intende difendere e perpetuare la sua memoria e quindi tramandarne il messaggio.
Tale messaggio, essi ci dicono, è senza dubbio filosofico. Ma, se è vero che i dialoghi comportano un insegnamento, non si tratta dell'esposizione di una dottrina, bensì di una lezione di metodo. Socrate infatti ci insegna l'uso e il valore della definizione dei concetti che vengono impiegati nella discussione e nello stesso tempo ci dimostra come sia impossibile arrivare a possedere il concetto senza procedere preliminarmente ad una revisione critica delle nozioni tradizionali, delle opinioni <> presenti e operanti nel linguaggio. Il risultato apparentemente negativo della discussione è di grande valore. E' molto importante infatti sapere di non sapere, scoprire che le opinioni e il linguaggio comuni, pur formando il punto di partenza della riflessione filosofica, non costituiscono altro che questo e che la discussione dialettica tende proprio al suo superamento.”
Alexandre Koyré, Discovering Plato

“That man has always lied, to himself and to others, is indisputable. He has lied for the sheer fun of it—the fun of exercising this astounding gift of being able to "say what is not so," creating by his word a world for which he alone is responsible. Also, he has lied in self-defense: the lie is a weapon. It is the preferred weapon of the underdog and the weakling.”
Alexandre Koyré, Réflexions sur le mensonge

“In totalitarian anthropology man is not defined by thought, reason or judgment, because, according to it, the overwhelming majority of men lack just these very faculties. Besides, can one speak In terms of man altogether? Decidedly not. For totalitarian anthropology denies the existence of any human essence, single and common to all men. Between one man and "another man" the difference is not one of degree but of kind, says that anthropology. The old Greek definition of man, distinguishing him as the zoon logicon rests on an equivocation: there is no more necessary connection between reason and the word than there is between man, the reasoning animal, and man, the talking animal. For the talking animal is above all the credulous animal, and the credulous animal is by definition one who does not think.

Thought, that is, reason, the ability to distinguish the true from the false, to make decisions and judgments—all this, according to totalitarian anthropology, is very rare. It is the concern of the elite, not of the mob. The mass of men are guided or, more accurately, acted upon, by instinct, passion, sentiments and resentment. The mass do not know how to think nor do they care to. They know only one thing: to obey and believe.”
Alexandre Koyré, Réflexions sur le mensonge