Alexandre Koyré


Born
in Taganrog, Russian Federation
August 29, 1892

Died
April 28, 1964

Genre


Aleksandr Vladimirović Kojre, published as Alexandre Koyré was a philosopher and historian of science. He contributed to the development of the history of science in France and to its diffusion in the United States after the Second World War.

In the 1930's, Koyré began the research that made him one of the most eminent historians of twentieth century scientific thought, the first phase of which ended before the Second World War with the publication of the three volumes of Galilean Studies. Koiré became one of the protagonists of French historical epistemology, a new discipline that claimed to study the history of scientific thought as such and as a whole.
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Average rating: 3.65 · 533 ratings · 67 reviews · 33 distinct worksSimilar authors
From the Closed World to th...

3.94 avg rating — 206 ratings — published 1957 — 38 editions
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مدخل لقراءة أفلاطون

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3.24 avg rating — 120 ratings — published 1945 — 8 editions
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ثلاثة دروس في ديكارت

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2.86 avg rating — 64 ratings5 editions
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Bilim Tarihi Yazıları

4.04 avg rating — 45 ratings — published 1969 — 9 editions
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Réflexions sur le mensonge

4.06 avg rating — 16 ratings — published 1945 — 5 editions
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سیاست از نظر افلاطون

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3.55 avg rating — 11 ratings — published 2007
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Newtonian Studies

4.29 avg rating — 7 ratings — published 1965 — 5 editions
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The Astronomical Revolution...

4.33 avg rating — 6 ratings — published 1961 — 11 editions
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Metaphysics and Measurement...

3.71 avg rating — 7 ratings — published 1968 — 3 editions
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Naučna revolucija

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4.50 avg rating — 4 ratings — published 1981
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More books by Alexandre Koyré…
“The mob believes everything it is told, provided only that it be repeated over and over. Provided too that its passions, hatreds, fears are catered to. Nor need one try to stay within the limits of plausibility: on the contrary, the grosser, the bigger, the cruder the lie, the more readily is it believed and followed. Nor is there any need to avoid contradictions: the mob never notices; needless to pretend to correlate what is said to some with what is said to others: each person or group believes only what he is told, not what anyone else is told; needless to strive for coherence: the mob has no memory; needless to pretend to any truth: the mob is radically incapable of perceiving it: the mob can never comprehend that its own interests are what is at stake.”
Alexandre Koyré, Réflexions sur le mensonge

“Il dialogo socratico, sia esso composto da Platone, Senofonte o Eschine di Sfetto, non mira a insegnarci una determinata dottrina - che Socrate, come tutti sanno e come infinite volte egli stesso ci ha detto non ha mai posseduto - ma intende evocare un'immagine luminosa del filosofo assassinato, intende difendere e perpetuare la sua memoria e quindi tramandarne il messaggio.
Tale messaggio, essi ci dicono, è senza dubbio filosofico. Ma, se è vero che i dialoghi comportano un insegnamento, non si tratta dell'esposizione di una dottrina, bensì di una lezione di metodo. Socrate infatti ci insegna l'uso e il valore della definizione dei concetti che vengono impiegati nella discussione e nello stesso tempo ci dimostra come sia impossibile arrivare a possedere il concetto senza procedere preliminarmente ad una revisione critica delle nozioni tradizionali, delle opinioni <> presenti e operanti nel linguaggio. Il risultato apparentemente negativo della discussione è di grande valore. E' molto importante infatti sapere di non sapere, scoprire che le opinioni e il linguaggio comuni, pur formando il punto di partenza della riflessione filosofica, non costituiscono altro che questo e che la discussione dialettica tende proprio al suo superamento.”
Alexandre Koyré, Discovering Plato

“That man has always lied, to himself and to others, is indisputable. He has lied for the sheer fun of it—the fun of exercising this astounding gift of being able to "say what is not so," creating by his word a world for which he alone is responsible. Also, he has lied in self-defense: the lie is a weapon. It is the preferred weapon of the underdog and the weakling.”
Alexandre Koyré, Réflexions sur le mensonge